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ABSTRACT 
 
The historiography of Scotland and the British army in the eighteenth century largely 
concerns the suppression of the Jacobite risings – especially that of 1745-6 – and the 
growing assimilation of Highland soldiers into its ranks during and after the Seven Years 
War.  However, this excludes the other roles and purposes of the British army, the 
contribution of Lowlanders to the British army and the military involvement of Scots of 
all origin in the British army prior to the dramatic increase in Scottish recruitment in the 
1750s.  This thesis redresses this imbalance towards Jacobite suppression by examining 
the place of Scotland and the role of Highland and Lowland Scots in the British army 
during the first half of the eighteenth century, at a time of change fuelled by the Union of 
1707 and the Jacobite rebellions of the period.  It does this by examining a number of 
connected themes and individuals.  The thesis begins with an analysis of the transition of 
Scottish soldiers from mercenaries in foreign service to soldiers of the British army.  It 
then appraises the career patterns of prominent Scottish soldiers and evaluates their 
impact upon – and significance for – the British army as a whole.  Issues of identity, 
motivation and nationality are also explored.  This is followed by an investigation of the 
wider policing duties of the British army in Scotland, of the legal constraints under which 
it operated, and the recruitment patterns that were arguably peculiar to the Scots.  
Scotland’s traditional military organisations and its distinct forms of military service are 
examined, as is how these related to the direction, functions and administration of the 
British army in this period.  Finally, an analysis is also made of Scotland’s fortifications, 
barracks and military roads, their development and their significance in terms of the 
defence of Scotland and of the wider United Kingdom of Great Britain.  The thesis 
concludes by arguing that, in addition to Colley’s suggestion of a common threat from 
France in the creation of ‘Britishness’, Jacobitism also provided unity for Scots within the 
British state, manifested in military service.  Therefore, Scotland and the Scots were 
already firmly embedded in the military organisation and infrastructure of the United 
Kingdom well before William Pitt the Elder made his famous boast in 1762 of having 
harnessed the volatile military resources of the Highlands. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Literature review 
Any study of the British army in Scotland during the first half of the eighteenth 
century will feature the Jacobite threat.  While the many wars of the century were all 
continentally and inter-continentally based, the only domestic threat faced by Britain 
originated from the Jacobites.  As a consequence of attempts to reinstate the Stuart 
dynasty, Britain experienced a series of plots, invasions and rebellions, often with foreign 
backing, many of which were focused on Scotland.  It was in countering these events that 
the British army experienced its principal military action on home soil.  However, most 
of the literature concerning the rebellions is focused on the Jacobite’s side of the 
conflicts.1  Many are notable for their thoroughness.  Beyond the broad-brush approach,2 
Reid, Petrie and McLynn provide valuable detail on the military aspects of the 
movement3 and Duffy’s The ’45 (2003) provides an operational viewpoint.4  Szechi 
stands out for his political and diplomatic contextualisation of the Jacobite movement and 
Zimmerman takes a refreshingly longer view point past the ’45.5  Pittock has provided a 
range of studies that bring compelling conclusions for the longevity of the Stuart myth 
                                                 
1 For example, B. Lenman, The Jacobite clans of the Great Glen 1650-1784 (Aberdeen, 1995) and S. Reid, 
Highland Clansman 1689-1746 (Oxford, 1997). 
2 M. Pittock, Jacobitism (Basingstoke, 1998); F. McLynn, The Jacobites (London and Boston, 1985) and B. 
Lenman, Jacobite risings in Britain, 1689-1788 (London, 1980). 
3 S. Reid, Highland Clansman; S. Reid, The Scottish Jacobite Army 1745-46 (Oxford, 2006); S. Reid, 
Culloden Moor 1746.  The death of the Jacobite Cause (Oxford, 2002); C Petrie, The Jacobite movement: 
the first phase 1688-1716 (London, 1948), C. Petrie, The Jacobite Movement: the last phase, 1716-1807, 
(London, 1950); F. McLynn, The Jacobite Army in England (Edinburgh, 1983), F. McLynn, France and 
the Jacobite rising of 1745 (Edinburgh, 1981); F. McLynn, Charles Edward Stuart: a tragedy in many acts 
(Oxford, 1991) and M. Barthorp, The Jacobite rebellions 1689-1745 (Oxford, 1982), 
4 C. Duffy, The ’45.  Bonnie Prince Charlie and the untold story of the Jacobite Rising (London, 2003). 
5 D. Szechi, 1715 The Great Jacobite Rebellion (New Haven and London, 2006); D. Szechi, The Jacobites.  
Britain and Europe, 1688-1788 (Manchester and New York, 1994); D. Szechi, Jacobitism and Tory 
Politics (Edinburgh, 1984) and D. Zimmermann, The Jacobite movement in Scotland and in exile, 1746-
1759 (Basingstoke, 2003). 
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and legacy6 and Alasdair and Henrietta Tayler specialised in editing little known or 
unknown letters and biographies of Jacobite individuals, families or communities.7   
 
What is noticeable is the perennial popularity of Jacobitism for researchers.  
Fiction and music both feed the continuing interest in the Jacobites, as each generation 
finds something to relate to in the movement.  These range from the early nineteenth-
century sympathy for the ‘noble savage’ to the twentieth-century affinity with minorities 
and the ‘under-dog’.8  Novels span the generations since Culloden and address the 
movement to each new generation.  The 1814 publication of Waverley by Walter Scott 
(as well as his subsequent sixteen novels that had backgrounds set in Scotland’s past) 
began an trend followed, notably, by Stevenson’s Kidnapped (1886) and The Master of 
Ballantrae (1889) and Broster’s Jacobite Trilogy published in 1925, 1927 and 1929.9  
                                                 
6 M. Pittock, Poetry and Jacobite politics in eighteenth-century Britain and Ireland (Cambridge, 1994); M. 
Pittock, The Myth of the Jacobite clans: the Jacobite army in 1745 (Edinburgh, 2009); M. Pittock, The 
social composition of the Jacobite army in Scotland in the Forty Five (London, 1997) and M. Pittock, P. 
Monod, D. Szechi, Loyalty and identity: Jacobites at home and abroad (Basingstoke, 2009). 
7 A. and H. Tayler (eds), Jacobites of Aberdeenshire and Banffshire in the Forty-Five (Aberdeen, 1928), 
Jacobite letter to Lord Pitsligo, 1745-1746 (Aberdeen, 1930); A. and H. Tayler (eds), The Old Chevalier, 
James Francis Stuart (London, 1934); A. and H. Tayler (eds), A Jacobite exile (London, 1937); A. and H. 
Tayler (eds), The Jacobite court at Rome in 1719: from original documents at Fettercairn House and at 
Windsor Castle (Edinburgh, 1938); A. and H. Tayler (eds), Lady Nithsdale and her Family (London, 1939); 
A. and H. Tayler (eds), John Graham of Claverhouse.  A Biography (London, 1939); A. and H. Tayler 
(eds), The Stuart papers at Windsor (London, 1939); A. and H. Tayler (eds), Jacobite epilogue: a further 
selection of letters from Jacobites among the Stuart papers at Windsor, (London, 1941); A. and H. Tayler 
(eds), Bonnie Prince Charlie.  A biography for children (London, 1945); A. and H. Tayler (eds), A Jacobite 
miscellany: eight original papers on the rising of 1745-1746 (Oxford, 1948) and A. and H. Tayler (eds), 
Prince Charlie’s daughter.  Being the life and letters of Charlotte of Albany (London, 1950). 
8 R. Clyde, From Rebel to Hero.  The Image of the Highlander, 1745-1830 (Scotland, 1995), p134. 
9 W. Scott, Waverley; or ‘Tis Sixty Years Since (Edinburgh, 1814), 3 vols; R.L. Stevenson, Kidnapped 
(London, 1986); R.L. Stevenson, The Master of Ballentrae (London, 1889); D. Broster, The Flight of the 
Heron (London, 1925); D. Broster, Gleam in the North (London, 1927) and D. Broster, The Dark Mile 
(London,1929). 
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Similarly, the interest in Jacobite music far exceeds any interest in the contemporary 
music of the British army.10   
 
However, in terms of historical accuracy, this general interest in the Jacobite 
movement is based on a false perception created in the early nineteenth century by Walter 
Scott.  Reacting to a time of uncertainty as industrialisation changed society and the 
‘purity’ of the Highland clans was viewed with envy, Scott stage-managed George IV’s 
visit to Edinburgh in 1822 drawing heavily on Highland culture.  This coincided with the 
replacement of the image of the Highlander as a potential Jacobite rebel with that of the 
‘defender of the empire’,11 where all things ‘Highland’ were glamorised.12  Jacobites 
have been, erroneously, remembered as synonymous with the Highlands because of their 
practice of wearing tartan regardless of origin, the frequency of rebellions in Scotland and 
the dramatic fate of the defeated Jacobite army and clans in the aftermath of Culloden.13  
The rise of the Scottish National Party (SNP) in the 1970s and its desire for independence 
has led to another reinvention of the Jacobites with their symbols being used to remind 
London of the last Scottish group to defy the Union.  More recent literature, therefore, 
                                                 
10 The only references to songs of the British army easily found are; R. Palmer (ed), The Rambling Soldier 
(Gloucester, 1985); J. Watlen, Rothsay and Caithness Fencibles.  A favourite Sots Song (Edinburgh, 1795) 
and J.J. McAleer, Ballads and songs loyal to the Hanoverian Succession (1703-1761) (Cambridge, 1955).  
This is compared to the range of Jacobite related material; A. Grosart, English Jacobite ballads, songs & 
satires etc (privately printed, 1877); W. Wallace, Jacobite songs (London, 1901); M. Pittock, New Jacobite 
songs of the Forty-five (Oxford, 1989); C.H. Firth, ‘Jacobite Songs’, Scottish Historical Review, 8, 1911, 
p.251-7; A. Lang, ‘Jacobite Songs: The True Loyalist or Chevalier’s Favourite, 1779’, Scottish Historical 
Review, 8, 1911, p.132-148; W. Montgomerie, ‘Two Songs by Lady Nairne’, Scottish Studies, 1, 1957, 
p.165-181 and T.F. Henderson, ‘Charlie is my Darling and other Burns Originals’, Scottish Historical 
Review, 3, 1906, p.171-8. 
11 Clyde, Rebel to Hero, p.150. 
12 Ibid, p.120-123, 127-129, 134 and D.B. Horn, ‘George IV and highland dress’, The Scottish Historical 
Review, 47:2, October 1968, p.209.  
13 Reid, The Scottish Jacobite Army, p.58. 
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has focused on the Jacobites as Scots oppressed by England and emphasised the 
distinctiveness of Scotland.14    
 
The influence of the rise of Scottish Nationalism and of the SNP in the Scottish 
Parliament has also influenced the historical studies currently being conducted in Scottish 
universities and thus the study of Scottish history as a whole.15  This has two main 
focuses.  Firstly, an interest in the socio-political changes brought by the Union in 
Scotland, and secondly, the question of identity and nationality, especially for the 
Highlander.  For the former, Phillipson and Mitchison’s collection of essays in Scotland 
in the Age of Improvement (1970)16 has influenced many later studies,17 this thesis 
included, examining the early life of ‘North Britain’ as part of Great Britain and the 
Scottish elites’ efforts to function within it.  Of these essays, Simpson’s ‘Who Steered the 
Gravy Train, 1707-1766?’18 and Cregeen’s ‘The Changing Role of the House of Argyll in 
the Scottish Highlands’19 in particular, provide valuable explanations of the complex 
nature of power sharing, the implementation of policy at a distance via government 
officials and the problems that arise when these servants are not entirely trusted.  The 
                                                 
14 D. Broun, R.J. Finlay and M. Lynch (eds), Image and Identity.  The Making and Re-making of Scotland 
Through the Ages (Edinburgh, 1998); M. Pittock, Scottish nationality (Houndsmill, 2001); M. Pittock, 
Inventing and resisting Britain: cultural identities in Britain and Ireland 1685-1789 (Basingstoke, 1997); 
M. Pittock, Celtic identity and the British image (Manchester, 1999) and M. Pittock, The invention of 
Scotland.  The Stuart Myth and the Scottish identity, 1638 to the Present (London, 1991), The road to 
independence?: Scotland since the sixties (London, 2008). 
15 All the authors mentioned in this paragraph were or are staff at universities in Scotland. 
16 N.T. Phillipson and R. Mitchison (eds), Scotland in the Age of Improvement.  Essays in Scottish History 
in the Eighteenth Century (Edinburgh, 1970). 
17 For example, B. Harris, Politics and the Nation.  Britain in the Mid-Eighteenth Century (Oxford, 2002). 
18 J.M. Simpson, ‘Who Steered the Gravy Train, 1707-1766?’, in N.T. Phillipson and R. Mitchison (eds), 
Scotland in the Age of Improvement.  Essays in Scottish History in the Eighteenth Century (Edinburgh, 
1970). 
19 E. Cregeen, ‘The Changing Role of the House of Argyll in the Scottish Highlands’, in N.T. Phillipson 
and R. Mitchison (eds), Scotland in the Age of Improvement.  Essays in Scottish History in the Eighteenth 
Century (Edinburgh, 1970). 
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complex nature of the political structure inside and between London and Edinburgh is 
further discussed in Murdoch’s ‘The People Above’.  Politics and Administration in Mid-
Eighteenth Century Scotland (1980)20 and is in no way less valuable for its focus on the 
post-’45 period.  Murdoch espouses the unusually British-orientated opinion that Scottish 
politicians wanted to be part of Great Britain.  He examines the lengths they went to in 
order to remain part of the governing process in Edinburgh, by ingratiating themselves 
into the new British political process in London.  Harris’ Politics and the Nation (2002)21 
makes the significant connection that service in the British army, especially during the 
’45, was an attempt by Scots to overcome the stigma of disloyalty, and that this meant the 
desire to retain the Union was apparent at all levels of society by the mid-eighteenth 
century.   
 
The influence of Scottish Nationalism has made historians focus on events that 
can be interpreted as nationalistic, such as the Malt Tax riots of 1725 and the Porteous 
Riots of 1736.  Some historians also examine Scotland in isolation, as if avoiding both 
Scotland’s desire to be part of the British state, and Scotland’s ‘British’ institutions, can 
erase that inconvenient history; “Some more daring historians have tried to overcome the 
difficulties posed by the union by ignoring it as far as possible.”22  This thesis will correct 
this tendency to avoid the Union by specifically addressing the changes caused by it, not 
                                                 
20 A. Murdoch, ‘The People Above’.  Politics and Administration in Mid-Eighteenth Century Scotland 
(Edinburgh, 1980). 
21 Harris, Politics and the Nation. 
22 Phillipson and Mitchison, Scotland in the Age of Improvement, p.1.  For example, J.W. Fortescue, The 
Royal Army Service Corps.  A History of Transport and Supply in the British Army (Cambridge, 1930), 2 
vols, I; J.W. Fortescue, A History of the British Army.  First Part – to the close of the Seven Years War 
(London, 1910), 13 vols, I; J.W. Fortescue, A History of the British Army.  First Part – to the close of the 
Seven Years War (London, 1899), 13 vols, II; M. Brander, The Scottish Highlanders and their Regiments 
(Edinburgh, 1996); P. Howard, The Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) (The 42nd Regiment of Foot) 
(London, 1968); T. Royle, The Black Watch.  A Concise History (Edinburgh and London, 2006).  
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just in economic and political terms, as examined elsewhere, but through the resulting 
administrative changes which are revealed by studying the British army as an institution. 
 
In addition to an interest in the socio-political changes caused by the Union, the 
second consequence of the rise of Scottish Nationalism is an interest in identity and 
nationality, especially amongst Highlanders.  This reflects the influence of Scott and his 
romanticisation of the Highlander, whose reinvented image and history provided the 
Scottish Nationalists with a unique identity.  Responsibility for this is shared by Stewart 
of Garth.  In 1825, he published Sketches of the Character, Institutions, and Customs of 
the Highlanders of Scotland.23  As this was the first history of the 43rd Highland 
Regiment (later becoming the 42nd but known by the epithet, The Black Watch) he 
therefore took the opportunity to relate a wider history of Highland culture.  As such, his 
view has influenced every history of the regiment written since.24  However, this is a 
view affected by his romanticised vision of the Highlander; for example, he modified the 
recruitment warrant for the 43rd from “in any County or Part of Our Kingdom of Great 
Britain”25 to “and the remainder of the non-commissioned officers and private men… to 
be raised in the Highlands…the men to be natives of that country, and none other to be 
                                                 
23 Stewart of Garth, Sketches of the Character. 
24 P. Simpson, The Independent Highland Companies 1603-1760 (Edinburgh, 1996); I.H. Mackay Scobie, 
‘The Highland Independent Companies of 1745-47’, Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, 
20, 1941, 5-37; J. Calder, The Story of the Scottish Soldier 1600-1914 (Edinburgh, 1987); Brander, Scottish 
Highlanders; J. Parker, Black Watch.  The inside story of the oldest Highland regiment in the British Army 
(London, 2005); J. Grant, Legends of the Black Watch: or forty-second Highlanders (London, 1859); 
Howard, The Black Watch; E. and A. Linklater, The Black Watch.  The History of the Royal Highland 
Regiment (London, 1977); J. Stewart, A Brief History of the Royal Highland Regiment, The Black Watch 
(Edinburgh, 1924); J.C. Stewart, The Black Watch.  A brief story of the Regiment from 1725 to the present 
day (Derby, 1991); Royle, The Black Watch; J.B. Kirkwood, The Regiments of Scotland.  Their histories, 
badges, tartans etc (Edinburgh, 1949) and F. Adam, The Clans, Septs, and Regiments of the Scottish 
Highlands, (London and Edinburgh, 1965). 
25 J. Prebble, Mutiny.  Highland Regiments in revolt, 1743-1804 (London, 1975), p.35. 
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taken.”26  The romanticised view of the Highlander and Highland culture further affected 
common perceptions when Stewart aided Walter Scot in creating a Highland festival for 
George IV’s visit to Edinburgh in 1822, “executed with such admirable art, that, like the 
historical plays of Shakespeare, they superseded history.”27  It is this common perception 
that resonates still with Scottish Nationalists, creating an interest amongst historians in 
the themes of identity and nationality of the Highlander.28 
 
The influence of Stewart and Scott and of the rise of Scottish Nationalism has 
been to create an image of the Highlander as the tragic victim of the Jacobite period and a 
concomitant disdain of their oppressors, the British army – and the Duke of Cumberland 
in particular – for their brutal conduct after Culloden.29  Significantly, the majority of 
books written about the British army in Scotland during the first half of the eighteenth 
century are focused on its actions against the Jacobites.  Reid’s contribution to the 
literature concerning the British army during the ’45 is remarkably detailed concerning 
the structure, make up, weapons and uniforms of those involved.30  However, except in 
1745: a military history (2001),31 his works are unreferenced, which limits their use for 
                                                 
26 Stewart of Garth, Sketches of the Character, I, p.252 and I. Macpherson McCulloch, Sons of the 
Mountains.  The Highland Regiments in the French & Indian War, 1756-1767 (New York, 2006), 2 vols, I, 
p.xvi. 
27 Macpherson McCulloch, Sons of the Mountains, I, p.xv. 
28 Prebble, Mutiny; R.A. Houston, Scottish Literacy and the Scottish Identity.  Illiteracy and Society in 
Scotland and Northern England 1600-1800 (Cambridge, 1985); Clyde, Rebel to Hero; Brander, The 
Scottish Highlanders; Broun, Finlay and Lynch, Image and Identity; S. Murdoch and A. Mackillop (eds), 
Fighting for Identity: Scottish Military Experience c.1550-1900 (Leiden, Boston and Köln, 2002); 
Macpherson McCulloch, Sons of the Mountains, I; Macpherson McCulloch, Highlander in the French-
Indian War 1756-67 (Oxford, 2008); P. Manod, M. Pittock and D. Szechi (eds), Loyalty and Identity.  
Jacobites at Home and Abroad (Basingstoke, 2010). 
29 Adam, The Clans, Septs, and Regiments, p.69, 70, 71 and J. Prebble, Culloden (Harmondsworth, 1972).  
30 S. Reid, British Redcoat (Oxford, 1996) and S. Reid, Cumberland’s Army: the British Army at Culloden 
(Leigh-on-sea, 2006). 
31 S. Reid, 1745: a military history of the last Jacobite rising (Staplehurst, 2001). 
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further investigation.  Duffy’s The ’45 (2003),32 however, is an excellent and thorough 
examination of the British army during the ’45 as is Black’s Culloden and the ’45 
(1990)33and Szechi’s 1715 (2006)34 for the 1715 Rebellion.  Both Black and Szechi 
provide a good mixture of military, political and European history.  Still, studies of the 
British army in the eighteenth century are often dominated by the continental and inter-
continental conflicts of the century.  The Oxford History of the British Army (2003) 
edited by Chandler and Beckett35 is one example.  For the 1702 to 1714 period, 
Chandler’s chapter is entirely devoted to the Duke of Marlborough during the War of the 
Spanish Succession and makes no mention of the Jacobites or Scotland, while Guy’s 
chapter on the period 1714 to 1783 makes only brief mention of the military response to 
the ’15 and ’45.36  
 
In studies of the British army as an institution, its deployment in Scotland is 
largely ignored.  Guy’s Regimental Agency (1980)37 refers to the ’45 rebellion once in a 
footnote, focusing on the 1740s, despite a start date of 1715, and only mentions Ireland as 
an exception to the English norm, making no specific reference to Scotland.  Manning’s 
An Apprenticeship in Arms (2006)38 contains only a handful of examples from Scotland.  
Fortescue’s thirteen volume A History of the British Army (1899-1930)39 provides, 
                                                 
32 Duffy, The ’45. 
33 J. Black, Culloden and the ’45 (London, 1990). 
34 Szechi, 1715. 
35 D. Chandler and I. Beckett (eds), The Oxford History of the British Army (Oxford, 2003). 
36 D. Chandler, ‘The Great Captain General, 1702-1714’ in D. Chandler and I. Beckett (eds), The Oxford 
History of the British Army (Oxford, 2003) and A.J. Guy, ‘The Army of the Georges, 1714-1783’ in D. 
Chandler and I. Beckett (eds), The Oxford History of the British Army (Oxford, 2003). 
37 A.J. Guy, Regimental Agency in the British Standing Army, 1715-1763: A Study of Georgian Military 
Administration (Manchester, 1980). 
38 R.B. Manning, An Apprenticeship in Arms.  The Origins of the British Army 1585-1702 (Oxford, 2006). 
39 Fortescue, A History of the British Army, I and II. 
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amongst a peerlessly wide coverage of continental campaigns and wars, a narrative of the 
events of the Jacobite rebellions and addresses the government’s strength in Scotland, as 
does his Military History (1923)40 though to a lesser extent.  A more recent example that 
does not ignore the army’s role in Scotland is Black’s Britain as a military power (1999), 
which both approaches the British army as an institution and includes its involvement in 
Scotland during the period of Jacobite activity.41 
 
Significantly, the recent historians of the British army of the early eighteenth 
century also tend to be connected with the British army.  Beckett, Chandler, Duffy and 
Holmes were lecturers at Sandhurst, while Holmes was a former officer in the Territorial 
Army.42  Hogg43 was also a retired Brigadier and former Assistant Master-General of the 
Ordnance at the War Office and Director of Technical and Military Administration at the 
Ministry of Supply, and Guy was the curator of the National Army Museum.  This has 
influenced the recent focus of military history towards the concerns of a post-Second 
World War British army engaged in counterinsurgency (COIN) in Malaya, Cyprus and 
Northern Ireland.  Consequently, recent military history commonly examines historical 
events through the issues of COIN.  Relations with civilians and native inhabitants and 
issues of brutality are, therefore, brought to the fore.  These combine to create an interest 
in the reputation of the British army and the conduct of its soldiers, who are viewed as 
representatives of the British army and thus the British state.  This change in focus has 
                                                 
40 J.W. Fortescue, Military History.  Lectures delivered at Trinity College, Cambridge (Cambridge, 1923) 
and ODNB, Sir John William Fortescue by Brian Bond. 
41 J. Black, Britain as a military power, 1688-1815 (London, 1999). 
42 R. Holmes, Redcoat (London, 2002). 
43 O.F.G. Hogg, The Royal Arsenal.  Its Background, Origin, and Subsequent History (London, 1963), 2 
vols, I. 
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also brought a desire for a more realistic view of the Jacobites.  The British army’s 
presence in Scotland and its dealings with the Jacobite rebels between the Union and 
Culloden present an ideal topic for a combination of this interest in COIN and the recent 
revisionist reaction to the romanticisation of the Jacobite.  Both Speck in The Butcher 
(1981)44 and Oates in Sweet William or The Butcher? (2008)45 re-examine the role of 
Cumberland in the aftermath of the ’45.  Oates in particular attributes Cumberland’s poor 
reputation less to butchery after Culloden and more at the hands of his political enemies 
in later life, as well as re-addressing the behaviour of the army in Scotland during the ’45 
in the context of similar contemporary events. 
 
Studies that focus on Scotland are frequently limited to the Highlands, as the 
influence of Scottish Nationalism is to emphasise anything which is unique to Scotland.  
Clyde, Murdoch and Mackillop lead the field here and contribute much-needed detailed 
primary research to an understudied area, though this is done to the exclusion of the many 
Lowland regiments and soldiers that Scotland produced.46  In many cases, this focus on 
the Highlander becomes even more narrowed by the use of ‘Gael’ as a designator, that is, 
those that were Gaelic speakers.  Clyde’s From Rebel to Hero (1995),47 Murdoch and 
Mackillop’s Fighting for Identity (2002)48 and Mackillop’s ‘More Fruitful Than The Soil’ 
(2000)49 are very Gael orientated, frequently using Gaelic terminology and phrases.  
Mackillop, however, does address the wider social, economic and political context of 
                                                 
44 W.A. Speck, The Butcher.  The Duke of Cumberland and the suppression of the ’45 (Oxford, 1981). 
45 J. Oates, Sweet William or The Butcher?  The Duke of Cumberland and the ’45 (Barnsley, 2008). 
46 S. Murdoch, Scotland and the Thirty Years War 1618-1648 (Leiden and Boston, 2001); Clyde,  Rebel to 
Hero; A. Mackillop, ‘More Fruitful Than The Soil’. Army, Empire and the Scottish Highlands, 1715-1815 
(East Linton, 2000) and Murdoch and Mackillop, Fighting for Identity.  
47 Clyde, Rebel to Hero. 
48 Murdoch and Mackillop, Fighting for Identity. 
49 Mackillop, ‘More Fruitful Than The Soil’. 
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Scottish soldiers of the eighteenth century, although only one chapter is devoted to the 
period 1715 to 1746. 
 
Scottish Nationalism has also tended to brand the study of Scotland as part of the 
British state as imperial history and therefore old fashioned.  Examination of the Scottish 
element of the British army as an institution of that state is left to military historians.  
However, the received military history of the British army in Scotland has, as already 
explained, many limitations.  Narrower regimental histories generally lack a wider 
context and provide little more than details of postings and events.50  These studies are 
also less objective, as they are often written with the aid of the regiment in question or 
their authors are connected to the army or the regiment.  Several are introduced, revised 
or written by former British army officers or colonels of those regiments.51  Very few 
contain footnotes, references or bibliographies, and newer regimental histories often 
closely follow older versions in structure, content and even wording.  Brander’s Famous 
Regiments (1976)52 and Kirkwood’s The Regiments of Scotland (1949)53 echo Simpson’s 
Three Hundred Years (1938)54, while Royal’s The Royal Scots (2006)55 is an 
abbreviation of Paterson’s Pontius Pilate’s Bodyguard (2001).56  Non-regimental 
elements when discussed, are often generalised in detail and chronology.  Lenman’s 
                                                 
50 Mackillop, ‘More Fruitful Than The Soil’, p.1. 
51 Stewart, The Black Watch; A.M. Brander, Famous Regiments.  The Royal Scots (The Royal Regiment) 
(London, 1976); P. Howard, The Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) (The 42nd Regiment of Foot) 
(London, 1968); T. Royle, The Royal Scots.  A Concise History (London and Edinburgh, 2006) and H.J. 
Simpson, Three Hundred Years.  The Royal Scots (The Royal Regiment) (Edinburgh, 1935). 
52 Brander, Famous Regiments. 
53 Kirkwood, The Regiments of Scotland. 
54 Simpson, Three Hundred Years.. 
55 Royle, The Royal Scots.   
56 R.H. Paterson, Pontius Pilate’s Bodyguard.  A History of The First or Royal Regiment of Foot, The Royal 
Sots (The Royal Regiment) (Edinburgh, 2001) 3 vols, I.  
 12 
chapter ‘Militia, fencible men, and home defence, 1660-1797’57, within MacDougall’s 
Scotland and War (1991)58, contains only three pages dedicated to the 1707 to 1745 
period.  This is despite Lenman’s remark that it is “odd” that Robertson’s The Scottish 
Enlightenment and the Militia Issue (1985)59 “is silent about the practical role of the 
militia”60 and concentrates on the militia issue debate, a subject Lenman then addresses 
for four pages.  
 
It is clear from the preceding literature review that the historiography of the 
British army in Scotland in the first half of the eighteenth century is often examined as 
separate topics: military events, the structure of the army, and the development of the 
army.  Their focus is often limited to either Scotland or England.  Often a study of Britain 
has an implicit focus on England, in which Ireland and Scotland only feature when 
different, and studies of Scotland focus on Highlanders to the exclusion of other Scots.   
 
The aim of this thesis is to provide a unified study of the disparate factors shaping 
the Scottish element of the British army, from both a Scottish and British perspective.  
The British army as an institution is examined to reveal structures, powers and 
responsibilities – and the Scottish soldiers themselves.  This detail builds a broad picture 
of an army at time of change driven both by the Union and subsequent Jacobite 
rebellions.   
 
                                                 
57 Lenman, Militia, fencible men. 
58 N. MacDougall (ed), Scotland and War AD 79-1918 (Edinburgh, 1991). 
59 J. Robertson, The Scottish Enlightenment and the Militia Issue (Edinburgh, 1985). 
60 Lenman, Militia, fencible men, p.187-8. 
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Research questions 
In 1707, the Act of Union between England and Scotland created the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and transformed Scotland into ‘North Britain’.61  While 
Scotland’s legal system and church remained separate, its parliament was transferred to 
London.62  By contrast, the army was virtually ignored by the Union Treaty beyond 
transferring its financial and administrative affairs from the Scottish Establishment to the 
new British Establishment.  This raises questions about the impact the Union had on the 
army: was it the Union or other events, such as the Union of Crowns, Restoration or the 
Glorious Revolution, that had the greatest influence, or was it simply that more time was 
needed by the army to adjust to these changes?  This thesis, therefore, addresses the 
British army at the start of the eighteenth century, both as an institutional body and its 
soldiers.  The reduction, at the Union, of the number of Scottish MPs to forty-five and the 
number of Scottish peers from 160 to sixteen (becoming known as Representative 
Peers)63 severely curbed the opportunities for Scots to contribute to the establishment and 
development of the new Great Britain.  For many Scots, from the lowest to highest 
orders, the army became the best way to gain a state position and continue to contribute 
to the future of their country.  This appears in contrast to the anti-Union riots across 
Scotland that greeted the Union and the anti-Union rhetoric of the Jacobites.64  In this 
thesis a closer examination of the Scots who supported the state will create a more 
balanced picture when taken in conjunction with the existing literature. 
                                                 
61 Act ratifying and approving treaty of the two Kingdoms of Scotland and England, 1707, Article III. 
62 Act for securing of the Protestant Religion and Presbyterian Church, 1706; W. Ferguson, Scotland’s 
Relations with England.  A survey to 1707 (Edinburgh, 1994), p.253 and Act ratifying and approving treaty 
of the two Kingdoms of Scotland and England, 1707, Article XIX. 
63 Royle, The Royal Scots, p.51; Act ratifying and approving treaty of the two Kingdoms of Scotland and 
England, 1707, Article XXII and Ferguson, Scotland’s Relations with England, p.265. 
64 Ferguson, Scotland’s Relations with England, p.267-9. 
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A further key research question relates to Colley’s work on the creation of 
nationality and a sense of ‘Britishness’.65  Her premise states that ‘Britishness’ spread as 
a result of the common threat from France over the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  
This thesis will examine the impact of the threat presented by the Jacobites and the earlier 
sense of unity it engendered within the newly formed Great Britain.  The experience of 
Scots serving in the British army provides a microcosm of Scotland’s relationship with 
the newly formed Great Britain.  How did issues of their nationality affect them as 
soldiers?  When set in a backdrop of Jacobite unrest that predominantly occurred in 
Scotland, how did this affect the perceptions of the government and public towards the 
loyalty of Scottish soldiers?  In answer to Colley’s comment that she had “concentrated 
on civilian responses [to the growing idea of a British nationality], rather than attitudes in 
the armed forces, which desperately need separate and detailed attention”66 this thesis 
addresses the emerging theme of nationality amongst the Scots of the British army. 
 
Chapter summaries 
Answers to the preceding questions are developed in the five chapters of this 
thesis, as aspects of an examination of the various ways the British army was involved in 
Scotland and of the experience of Scottish officers and other ranks within the British 
army.   
 
                                                 
65 L. Colley, Britons.  Forging the nation, 1707-1837 (London, 2003). 
66 Ibid, p.7. 
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Chapter One: ‘Scotland’s Professional Soldiers’, gives a broad perspective of the 
experience of Scots as soldiers in the service of foreign powers and traces their 
integration into the British army.  To understand contemporary attitudes towards the 
Scots in the years between the Union and Culloden, it is necessary to appreciate how they 
gained their military reputation.  Contemporaries judged the Scottish soldiers of the 
British army from their past behaviour.  The chapter opens with an examination of the 
Scot as a mercenary, whether Highlander, Lowlander, gentleman or from the lower 
orders, and considers the many variants this service could take.  The extent of the 
Scottish contribution to foreign armies is analysed, along with the factors that drove army 
expansion through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.  Britain’s case is reviewed to 
establish the reasons why its experience of growth was slightly different from its peers.   
Additionally, the Scottish proportion of these armies is explored to provide evidence for 
why Scots were recruited in such great numbers.  The change from foreign to home 
service is then analysed through a sample of Scottish regiments and individuals, 
examining when and why Scots were attracted to or were sought out for service within 
the British army.  Scottish soldiers in the service of the Covenanting armies of the Civil 
War are included, establishing their long history of providing military service to powers 
other than Scotland.  
 
Chapter Two: ‘The Scottish Soldier’s Experience’, examines the recruitment, 
training and billeting of Scottish soldiers, as well as the duties they were given, in order 
to ascertain whether Scots were dealt with as ordinary British soldiers or as a cohort that 
required special treatment.  In cases of the latter, the reasons for differentiation are 
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investigated to discover who instigated such policies and why they were deemed 
necessary.  To what extent were Scottish soldiers hampered by their nationality and what 
was required of them to overcome such stereotypes?  The role of Scottish soldiers within 
Scotland is focused upon, rather than their continental use in conventional warfare.  From 
this the level of trust with which London viewed them can be determined.  Military duties 
in aid of civil authority placed soldiers in conflict with civilians and this is examined to 
discover the impact this had on the reputation of soldiers and on civil-military 
relationships.  The impact of their use against civilians is also relevant to establish the 
extent to which the British army of the eighteenth century was a continuation of the 
government’s use of the army to implement unpopular measures by force, as experienced 
under Charles I, Cromwell, Charles II and James II.  Conversely was the use of Scottish 
soldiers within Scotland a form of self-governance?  Cases of the use of the military 
against civilians are included to discover the degree of military power used and the 
position of the law in controlling this.  As the Union brought changes to the lives of 
Scotland’s soldiers, identity and loyalty are traced to reveal how regiments behaved in an 
internecine environment during the period of Jacobite activity in Scotland.  
 
The theme of identity and loyalty is continued in Chapter Three: ‘Scottish 
Soldiers and the British State’, but with a greater focus on the individual and the officer.  
Methods of securing a military position, as well as motivations for doing so, are 
examined through a sample of Scotland’s elite.  How individuals sought advancement 
and the reasons for the success and failure of their careers are discussed.  Particular 
attention is given to the relevance of nationality.  To want extent did country of birth, 
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family history and connections aid or hinder promotion?  The complexities of loyalty 
faced by Scots when family, regiment and nation were important but not necessarily 
mutually compatible are considered, and placed in the context of London’s ‘rebel’ or 
‘loyal’ view-point.  The problems this created, as well as how individuals overcame this 
conflict, are surveyed.  Additionally, this chapter follows the example of Brown in 
MacDougall’s Scotland and War (1991)67 using the careers of the 2nd Duke of Argyll and 
the 2nd Earl of Stair to demonstrate how Scots were increasingly successful under 
William III.  However, unlike Brown, this chapter will also use the diplomatic, political 
and military aspects of several individuals’ careers to explain how the many facets of a 
Scot’s life influenced each other, and specifically, his military career.68  
 
The inclusion of Chapter Four: ‘Scotland’s Auxiliary Forces’, remedies the lack 
of recent research into the military formations that were outside those listed on the 
Establishment but which aided the British army in Scotland.  Improving on Lenman’s 
chapter in MacDougall’s Scotland and War (1991),69 this chapter draws on a wide range 
of primary sources not previously utilised to discover the use and legitimacy of the 
various forms of auxiliary forces deployed in Scotland in the eighteenth century.  Though 
the context of the militia debate is included, being relevant to the way Scots and London 
viewed these forces, the main focus is on their structure, role and make up, which is 
under-researched.  Although Holmes, amongst others, claimed that: “There was no militia 
in Scotland until 1797, not least because of the risk of distributing weapons to a society 
                                                 
67 Brown, From Scottish Lords to British Officers. 
68 Ibid, p.149. 
69 B. Lenman, Militia, fencible men. 
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that had only recently been disarmed”70, there were more forms of militia in Scotland 
than in England; militias, fencible regiments, voluntary regiments, corporation regiments 
and city guards.  This chapter examines these different forms, broadening the typical 
definition of the ‘army’.  It includes a wider range of the Scottish population than are 
normally characterised as soldiers, thus demonstrating how the number of Scots that 
desired to serve the British state was greater than the army Establishment allowed by 
Parliament.   The formation, use and differences between these formations are explained, 
attempting in particular to examine the fencibles.  Pre-dating and different from the 
Fencible Regiments raised in the 1750s and 1790s, their precise definition remains 
elusive but is considered from different angles.  The legal status of the Scottish militia 
dating back to the seventeenth century and the effects of the legal ambiguity which 
surrounded it are explored especially in relation to the Scottish response to the Jacobite 
rebellions.  A particularly careful re-appraisal of the known sources, including the 
seventeenth century acts referring to the Scottish militia, was undertaken.   
 
The final chapter, Chapter Five: ‘Scotland’s Military Installations’, provides a 
study of the military structures and infrastructure built for the British army between the 
Union and the aftermath of the ’45, ranging earlier when necessary for clarity.  Beyond 
discussing how and where they were built, the significance of the location, design and 
age of these forts, castles and garrisons are examined to reveal how they reflected the 
                                                 
70 Holmes, Redcoat, p.101; J. Gibson and A. Dell, Tudor and Stuart Muster Rolls.  A Directory of holdings 
in the British Isles (Birmingham, 1989); G. Thomas, The Record Office Readers’ Guide No. 3.  Records of 
the Militia form 1757.  Including records of the Volunteers, Rifle Volunteers, Yeomanry, Fencibles, 
Territorials and the Home Guard (London, 1993) and A. Morrison, The Defense of Scotland.  Militia, 
Fencibles and Volunteer Corps.  Scottish sources 1793-1820 (privately published, 2000).  This last 
mentions briefly that militias and fencibles were used between 1690 and 1746 but then focuses entirely on 
the 1790s onwards. 
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fluctuating levels of interest and involvement London had in Scotland.  The role and 
positioning of these fortifications, and the roads that linked them, are explored to 
ascertain whether they were solely a means of military repression.  This chapter also 
takes advantage of the Ordnance Office maps, plans and designs of Scotland’s 
fortifications, as well as personal visits to the sites and archaeological reports of their 
remains.71  Studies of the fortifications of Scotland have rarely been examined in the 
context of the Ordnance Office and government that ordered their construction.  
Architectural historians and historians of the evolution of the Ordnance Office have come 
close, but are often heavily focused on construction or the Royal Arsenal or the period 
between Restoration and turn of the eighteenth century or end with the Hanoverian 
succession.72  Many historians also exclude Scotland and Ireland as administratively 
separate until the unions of 1707 and 1801.73   
 
Methodology 
Taking a broader time-frame than the usual study of one event, such as a 
particular rebellion, this thesis covers the first half of the eighteenth century to allow 
assessment of the impact of the Union in 1707 on the creation of a ‘British’ army.  Where 
appropriate, references are also made to events after the Union of Crowns, Restoration 
                                                 
71 GUARD (Glasgow University Archaeological Research Division), Fort William and Inverlochy 
Archaeological Project (Historic Conflict in the Highlands), data structure report.  Project 2348 (Glasgow, 
2007) and A.G. and M.H. Beattie (eds), ‘Pre-1855 Gravestone Inscriptions in Lochaber and Skye’, Scottish 
Genealogy Society (Edinburgh, 1990). 
72 C. Tabraham and D. Grove, Fortress Scotland and the Jacobites (London, 1995); I. MacIvor, Edinburgh 
Castle (London, 1993); A. Saunders, Fortress Britain.  Artillery Fortification in the British Isles and 
Ireland (Liphook, 1989); C. Duffy, Fire & Stone.  The Science of Fortress Warfare, 1660-1860 (London, 
1996); J. Donet, British Barracks 1600-1914, Their Architecture and Role in Society (Norwich, 1998); 
Hogg, The Royal Arsenal, I; J. West, Gunpowder, Government and War in the Mid-Eighteenth Century 
(Suffolk, 1991). 
73 Hogg, The Royal Arsenal, I and H.C. Tomlinson, ‘Guns and Government.  The Ordnance Office under 
the later Stuarts’, The Royal Historical Society, 15, 1979. 
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and the Glorious Revolution, in order to establish to what extent an unofficial ‘British’ 
army existed prior to the 1707 Union.  The thesis ends with the aftermath of the last 
Jacobite rebellion in 1746, though occurrences during the rest of the eighteenth century 
will be referenced as longer-term consequences when relevant.  The Jacobites, their plots 
and rebellions, will feature heavily, as the army’s largest domestic threat, though their 
role here is as antagonists and catalysts to change: the events during and after the 
rebellions have been adequately covered elsewhere.74  This thesis takes a more widely 
encompassing view of the Scottish soldier than the traditional focus on Lowlander, 
Highlander or Gael.   
 
Certain topics are examined only as far as they relate to this study.  The Board of 
Ordnance is mentioned in relation to the building of fortifications in Scotland, but it is 
beyond the scope in this thesis to study the department, structure and staff of the Board.  
Similarly, this is not a history of the Jacobite movement, which has been adequately 
covered, in its military aspects, by Reid, and from the political and diplomatic 
perspectives by Szechi.75   
 
Sources 
To achieve the aims of the methodology, a broad range of sources are used.  
Official documentation is a vital part of a study, especially when of a state institution and 
of its attitudes and decisions.  However, the British army expanded later than its 
continental contemporaries, as is discussed in Chapter One: Scotland’s Professional 
                                                 
74 Szechi, 1715; Duffy, The ’45; Speck, The Butcher and Oates, Sweet William. 
75 Reid, Highland Clansman; Reid, The Scottish Jacobite Army 1745-46 and S. Reid, Culloden Moor 1746; 
D. Szechi, 1715; D. Szechi, The Jacobites and D. Szechi, Jacobitism and Tory Politics. 
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Soldiers.  Therefore, though administrative development was needed to manage the 
earlier small ‘guards and garrison’ force of Charles II and James II, it was not until the 
mid- to late-eighteenth century that the increasingly ‘standing’ nature of the British army 
and the reforming desire of the Hanoverian kings were able to improve and standardise 
the administration behind the army.  Consequently, earlier records were only sporadically 
made and kept.  The Army List, for example, only began to be published from 1754, 
though fortunately Dalton has compiled pre-1727 lists of commissioned officers.76  
Discharge papers, muster rolls and pay lists only began in 1760.  This limits a systematic, 
quantitative study.77  However, an adequate and representative study can be made using 
sample data.  Moreover, documents from the State Papers at The National Archives 
provide valuable information concerning the government.  Family papers of the key 
individuals involved in the army and militia held, for example, in The National Archives 
of Scotland and the National Library of Scotland, provide valuable detail of those 
responsible for implementing policy and orders from London.  These family papers also 
provide more background on the practical administration, planning and policy discussion 
of the military and government elite in Scotland than are contained in the records of 
government in London. 
 
Another valuable resource is the published diaries, memoirs, pamphlets, ballads 
and broadsheets of those in and affected by the British army.  Unlike government records, 
they give qualitative evidence for opinions and beliefs, and how these changed over time.  
However, it must be remembered that publication, especially at a time of mass printing 
                                                 
76 C. Dalton, English Army Lists and Commission Registers, 1661-1714 (London, 1898), 6 vols and C. 
Dalton, George the First’s Army 1714-1727 (London, 1910), 2 vols. 
77 NAM Information sheet 2; Soldiers records 1660-1913. 
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and no copyright, gives no indication of the extent of sales and readership.  If print runs 
are known – a study in itself and beyond this thesis – then circulation gives some measure 
of interest and agreement within the population.  Diaries and memoirs have their own 
limitations, particularly if pseudonyms were used.  The subject of Memoirs of the life and 
gallant exploits of the old Highlander, Sergeant Donald MacLeod (1791)78 was most 
likely a pseudonym for William Thomson (1746-1817), a former Presbyterian minister, 
in the same manner that Mother Ross was believed to be a pseudonym of Daniel 
Defoe’s.79  The authenticity of Donald McBane, author of The Expert Sword-Man’s 
Companion Or the True Art of Self-defence (1728)80 remains unverified.  However, 
McBane’s existence appears more likely than Macleod’s, as his memoir is only a brief 
accompaniment to McBane’s sword-fighting manual.  Had McBane been fictitious, the 
‘real’ author would have been more likely to follow the example of other fictitious stories 
where adventure, and not a training manual, was the focus.  Unfortunately for this thesis, 
whether genuine memoirs or impostures, the desire to attract an audience places 
scandalous events as the centre of attention.  McBane’s fights, women and private 
businesses and Macleod’s long life and military adventures overshadow and limit 
references to McBane’s time in Scotland as a soldier and invalid gunner and Macleod’s 
service as a sergeant of Lovat’s Independent Highland Company.  Similarly, the 
publication of McBane’s memoir in Glasgow ensures that the focus lies with exotic 
                                                 
78 W. Thomson, Memoirs of the life and gallant exploits of the old Highlander, Sergeant Donald MacLeod, 
who, having returned, wounded, with the Corpse of General Wolfe, from Quebec, was admitted an out-
pensioner of Chelsea Hospital, in 1759; and is now in the CIII.d year of his age (London, 1791). 
79 ODNB William Thomson by T.W. Bayne rev. S.R.J. Baudry and ODNB Christian Davies by Dianne 
Dugaw.  Other works by Macleod neither confirm nor deny his authenticity.  D. Macleod, A treatise on the 
second sight, dreams and apparitions…By Theophilus Insulanus (Edinburgh, 1763). 
80 D. McBane, ‘The Expert Sword-Man’s Companion Or the True Art of Self-defence.  With An Account 
of the Authors Life, And his Transactions during the Wars With France.  To Which is Annexed, The Art of 
Gunnerie By Donald McBane’ (Glasgow, 1728) in M. Rector, (ed), Highland Swordsmanship.  Techniques 
of the Scottish Swordmasters (Union City, 2001).  
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Ireland and the continent rather than Scotland.  An additional flaw of diaries and 
memoirs, as illustrated through the diary of Colonel John Blackader (1664-1729), a 
career officer in the Cameronians,81 is that despite “how altogether rare spiritual 
autobiography was until well into the early modern period,”82 the focus on salvation 
rhetoric leaves Blackader’s references to the army tantalisingly brief.  Despite their 
weaknesses, the diary of Blackader and the memoirs of Macleod and McBane, provide 
too valuable an insight into army life to be excluded.  
 
It is also an aim of this thesis to provide a social, as well as military and political, 
analysis of the Scottish soldier in the British army.  Therefore, Chapter Two: The Scottish 
Soldier’s Experience and Chapter Three: The Scottish Soldier and the British State, in 
particular, draw on a wide range of sources to investigate the Scottish soldier’s 
experience within the army.  As well as the traditional sources, physical remains, such as 
gravestone inscriptions, and the under-used memoirs of McBane and Macleod will be 
used.83  The broad range of individuals studied in Chapter Three: The Scottish Soldier 
and the British State is practicable thanks to the comprehensiveness of the Oxford 
Dictionary of National Biography. 
 
The breadth of this thesis has required a rather large range of sources to be used.  
This has included private correspondence, state papers, family papers, songs, poetry and 
literature.  Primary source accounts such as diaries and memoirs, trial transcripts, laws 
                                                 
81 A. Crichton, The Life and Diary of Lt. Col. J. Blackader (London, 1824). 
82 D.B. Hindmarsh, ‘”My chains fell off, my heart was free”: Early Methodist Conversion Narrative in 
England’, Church History, 68:4, December 1999, p.913. 
83 Only two have mentioned McBane; Brander, Famous Regiments, p.13 and Paterson, Pontius Pilate’s 
Bodyguard, I, p.62. 
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and order books will all be used.  Additionally, the use of Ordnance Office design plans 
as well as visits to the sites of barracks, forts, roads and graveyards, redresses gaps in 
existing studies, which often imply that “because of the paucity of archival material on 
the day-to-day activities of the army in Scotland we shall have to deal with that country 
rather quickly.”84 
 
Terminology 
To avoid confusion between the various contemporary spellings of locations and 
names, this thesis follows the convention of Szechi and use current spellings.  However, 
within the descriptions of primary source material in footnote references, and in quotes, 
the original spelling and abbreviations are retained without the addition of ‘sic’.  When 
clarification is needed or to preserve grammar, square brackets are used.  Throughout the 
thesis, Islay is used for the 3rd Duke of Argyll, even after he succeeded his brother, the 2nd 
Duke, who is referred to throughout as Argyll, so that both brothers can be referred to 
simultaneously without confusion.  To avoid misunderstanding between contested titles, 
Jacobite titles are not honoured.  Therefore, the Jacobite Duke of Atholl is referred to as 
the Marquess of Tullibardine.  The title James II is retained after the Glorious Revolution, 
but James Edward and Charles Edward Stuart are referred to by name to avoid the use of 
more biased terms such as James III or Old Pretender.  The terms ‘rebel’ and ‘rebellion’, 
as well as ‘Gaelic’ and ‘Erse’ are used to avoid monotonous repetition but reflect no 
personal bias.  Unless otherwise specified, the New Calendar is used.  Similarly, 
reference to currency is made after each monetary amount and remains unconverted to 
current value. 
                                                 
84 J.A. Houlding, Fit for Service.  The Training of the British Army, 1715-1795 (Oxford, 1981), p.34. 
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The terms ‘Scotland’, ‘England’, ‘Britain’ and ‘North Britain’ have been used to a 
specific end in this thesis that does not necessarily reflect conventional use.  Therefore, 
when ‘Scotland’ or ‘England’ is specified, the countries as they are understood today are 
being referred to.  ‘North Britain’ will only be used in a geographical context to highlight 
the altered border that newly encompassed Carlisle, Berwick and Hull, or when referring 
to the concept of North Britain as it was understood after the Union as an intellectual 
attempt to create a British identity.85  ‘Great Britain’ denotes England, Ireland, Scotland 
and Wales after the Union, but ‘Britain’ refers to the largest island of Great Britain, 
specifically England, Scotland and Wales, even when referring to it before the Union of 
1707.  This will allow a distinction to be made that excludes Ireland because of that 
country’s separate Establishment, and its unique and different history that falls outside of 
the scope of this thesis.  Despite the validity in using the ‘War of the Three Kingdoms’, 
the brevity of ‘the Civil War’ ensures its use here.  Lastly, the distinction of 
‘Establishment’ and ‘establishment’ is taken from Guy and used here.  The former 
denotes, prior to the Union, the three Establishments of England, Ireland and Scotland, 
and after the Union, the two Establishments of Britain and Ireland.  However, 
‘establishment’ refers to the paper strength of a unit.86  For convenience, maps displaying 
the pertinent towns and battles of North Britain, the location of fortifications discussed in 
this thesis and depicting the ‘Highland line’ are included as appendices.87 
                                                 
85 R.J. Finlay, ‘Caledonia or North Britain?  Scottish Identity in the Eighteenth Century’ in Broun, Finlay 
and Lynch, Image and Identity, p.145, 152-3. 
86 A.J. Guy, Oeconomy and Discipline.  Officership and administration in the British army, 1714-63 
(Manchester, 1985), p.viii. 
87 Appendix No.1:  Map depicting the ‘Highland line’ including major towns and the fortifications 
discussed in this thesis and Appendix No.2:  Map of ‘North Britain’ including battlefields. 
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CHAPTER ONE: SCOTLAND’S PROFESSIONAL SOLDIERS 
Introduction 
It has been said that, for the Scottish, warfare was “not a way of life but…a part of 
life.”1  The particular nature of Scotland’s geography, weather and isolation, especially in 
the Highlands, promoted an independent and self-sufficient society.2  From this a culture 
of honour, duty and orientation around the family and extended community was formed - 
especially among the Highland gentry.3  The strength of clan and family ties, especially 
with the lack of control from Edinburgh and later London, led to greater independence of 
power than elsewhere in Britain.  Therefore, Highland feuding and Lowland reiving were 
common.4  Such customary habits had their origins in the middle-ages.  Scottish nobility 
and freeholders were obliged by ‘Free Service’ or ‘Knight Service’ to provide military 
service for the crown, while ‘Scottish Service’ was the feudal levy that applied to every 
common man in Scotland aged between sixteen and sixty to serve the crown for up to 
forty days each year.  It was this style of force that provided the armies for William 
Wallace and Robert the Bruce.5  This obligation of military service continued past the 
decline of feudalism elsewhere in Britain and fostered a strong sense of military duty and 
a precedent for following a chief, or his representative, into battle.6  However, a clan 
could only support a limited number of warriors and it is not surprising that, as an 
alternative, military service abroad was common.  There the Scottish martial spirit was an 
                                                 
1 P. Cochrane, Scottish Military Dress (London, New York and Sydney, 1987), p.9. 
2 D. Stewart of Garth, Sketches of the character, Institutions, and Customs of the Highlanders of Scotland 
(Inverness, London and Edinburgh, 1885), p.6-7. 
3 M. Brander, The Scottish Highlanders and their Regiments (Edinburgh, 1996), p.49. 
4 R.B. Manning, An Apprenticeship in Arms.  The Origins of the British Army 1585-1702 (Oxford, 2006), 
p.284.  Reiving was the Scottish term for stealing or raiding.  See Glossary. 
5 J. Robertson, The Scottish Enlightenment and the Militia Issue (Edinburgh, 1985), p.2 and Cochrane, 
Scottish Military Dress, p.11, 14. 
6 Brander, The Scottish Highlanders, p.14. 
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asset not a liability to domestic peace.7  From the fourteenth to the eighteenth century, 
‘Scottish Service’ was adapted to take advantage of the practise of issuing commissions 
on the basis of an ability to raise men, encouraging gentlemen of both the Highlands and 
Lowlands to form regiments from among their clans and tenants for service outside 
Scotland. 
 
This persistence of the military culture was unique to Scotland amongst the 
nations of Great Britain.  The continuation of Highland clan feuding and raiding and 
Lowland border reiving into the seventeenth century ensured that whilst the society of 
England, Wales and Ireland were increasingly pacified in every-day life, Scottish society 
retained a military ethos.8  Scottish men of all social levels commonly wore arms while 
the English court did not display military identity until late in the eighteenth century, 
though military men were more likely than civilians to wear swords at social functions.9  
Consequently, during the Bishops’ Wars and Civil War, Scotland was able to field 
remarkably large armies.  Alexander Leslie, 1st Earl of Leven (1580-1661), introduced the 
Swedish model of recruitment to the Covenanter army.  Therefore, by 1620, the 
Covenanters could raise one in ten men for twenty years service.  This meant that by 
1640 the Covenanter army was 24,000 strong, increasing to 30,000 only four years 
                                                 
7 Stewart of Garth, Sketches of the character,(1885) p.26, 42, 72. 
8 J. Kenyon with J. Ohlmeyer, ‘The Background to the Civil Wars in the Stuart Kingdoms’ in J. Kenyon 
and J. Ohlmeyer (eds), The Civil Wars.  A Military History of England, Scotland and Ireland 1638-1660 
(Oxford, 2002), p.5. 
9 J. Black, The Military Revolution?  Military Change and European Society 1550-1800 (London, 1991), 
p.88-9; I.D. Whyte, Scotland’s Society and Economy in Transition, c.1500-c.1760 (Basingstoke and 
London, 1997), p.90 and J. Brewer, The Sinews of Power.  War, Money and the English State, 1688-1783 
(Massachusetts, 1988), p.58-9. 
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later.10  This led to the recognition of Scotland as a considerable military power, as 
demonstrated by their “crucial” presence at Marston Moor in 164411 and the decision by 
both Charles I and II to seek Scottish help in 1648 and 1650.12 
 
As the feudal levy armies described above were raised by a form of conscription, 
they are not the focus here.  This chapter concentrates on Scots as professional 
mercenaries abroad and their transition to professional career soldiers within the British 
army.  In order to place the Scottish soldiers of the British army in the context of the first 
half of the eighteenth century, a broader chronology than the rest of the thesis is taken 
here.  This chapter begins with an examination of the factors that altered armies from 
feudal levies to standing armies.  The impacts of these changes on Scots’ military service 
are then investigated.  Through the examples of several individuals, regiments and 
countries the different uses of, and behaviour towards, Scottish soldiers are examined to 
discover the reasons and consequences for these attitudes.  The motivations of Scots 
abroad are also analysed to establish why service abroad was sought at certain times and 
service at home sought at others, as well as establishing what other push and pull factors 
caused this change.  A study of the numbers of Scots in service with various states, 
including Britain, reveals when and why Scottish soldiers ceased service abroad and 
turned to employment in the British army.  As case studies of Scottish regiments on the 
Scottish, and then British, Establishment, the final section examines and analyses the 
history, role and make up of four regiments.  These are the Royal Scots, a foot regiment; 
                                                 
10 E. Furgol, ‘The Civil Wars in Scotland’ in J. Kenyon and J. Ohlmeyer (eds), The Civil Wars.  A Military 
History of England, Scotland and Ireland 1638-1660 (Oxford, 2002), p.43, 44. 
11 P. Young, Marston Moor 1644: The Campaign and the Battle (Kineton, 1970), p.103-6 and Furgol, The 
Civil Wars in Scotland, p.54. 
12 Ibid, p.63, 65. 
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the Scots Fusiliers, a fusilier regiment; the Scots Greys, a dragoon regiment; and the 
Independent Highland Companies, which became the 43rd (Highland) Regiment of Foot.  
This illustrates the experiences of a broad range of Scottish regiments from the 
Restoration to the end of the ’45.  To establish the extent of the impact of nationality, 
particular attention is given to the ways in which mercenary regiments and the four 
sample regiments behaved during peace and war, and the ways in which they were treated 
differently, whether in deployment, uniform or composition.  In order to avoid confusion, 
the term ‘Independent Highland Companies’ is used until their embodiment in 1739, 
when they became ‘the 43rd’.  Despite the practice of naming regiments for their colonels 
and the name and numbering changes that occurred at times of re-structuring, the terms 
‘the Royal Scots’, ‘the Scots Fusiliers’ and ‘the Scots Greys’ are used for the sake of 
clarity.  Similarly, the term ‘Dutch Brigade’ is used here to avoid confusion with the 
many other regiments whose names include ‘Scot’ or derivatives, though it was and is 
variously referred to by the name of its commander or as the Dutch Brigade, Scotch, 
Scottish or Scots Brigade or Scots-Dutch Brigade.   
 
The changing nature of armies 
The first half of the eighteenth century was a crucial time in the history of the 
British army.  The Act of Union in 1707 created the British army and provided the 
centralisation of administration which gave the opportunity for increased central control.  
Without that control, standardisation and development could not have been implemented, 
and the British army could not have developed into a military force capable of 
commanding respect amongst its continental contemporaries and of controlling an empire 
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that would cover a third of the world’s surface.  It is the earlier period of trial and change 
which is the focus of this thesis.   
 
The conduct of warfare in the early eighteenth century was a product of the 
changes that had been gradually occurring from the fifteenth century.  It is disputed 
whether this process should be described as a ‘military revolution’ or a ‘military 
evolution’.  The immediate impact of technological improvements such as the creation of 
the bayonet that allowed pike-men to be replaced by increasing numbers of musket-
armed infantry argues for the former definition, however, the presence of the many small 
alterations that allowed a process of trail and error that led to such developments suggests 
an evolutionary development.13  The end result either way was still technological change 
that demanded new drill, and tactics such as volley firing, and called for developments in 
state administration to take advantage of them.    This coincided with and encouraged 
stronger central royal courts that allowed for the growth of an administrative system that 
could aid a ruler and focus the resources of a state towards funding and controlling a new 
and larger army.14   
 
Britain, however, was atypical in its adoption of these changes when compared to 
the continent.  It adjusted to the technological and tactical developments along with its 
neighbours, and had a central power base suitable for administering the army; but the 
army in peacetime seventeenth and eighteenth century England and Scotland remained 
                                                 
13 Black, A Military Revolution? p.20, 22 and J. Childs, Warfare in the Seventeenth Century (London, 
2001), p.16-7, 211-2, 153-4. 
14 J. Adamson, ‘The Making of the Ancien-Régime Court 1500-1700’ in J. Adamson (ed), The Princely 
Courts of Europe: 1500-1750 (London, 1999), p.x and Childs, Warfare in the Seventeenth Century, p.16. 
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smaller than elsewhere in Europe.15  While continental powers in the seventeenth century 
were reliant on their armies to protect their borders, the British state could rely on the 
Royal Navy and the island nature of Britain to repel aggression.  Home forces were 
limited to protection of the Royal Household and to a small force of ‘guards and 
garrisons’ liberally spread around England and Scotland,16 for reasons traceable to the 
continuing effects of the Civil War and Interregnum.  Charles I and Cromwell, especially, 
had used soldiers against civilians to impose their will.  At the Restoration, both public 
and politicians were reluctant to allow similar opportunities to recur.  In Scotland, the 
situation was further exacerbated by the use of soldiers against civilians in the reigns of 
Charles II and James II to suppress religious dissent.17 
 
The end of the seventeenth century and the start of the eighteenth was also a time 
of change that altered political opinion towards a standing army.  The earlier reliance on 
the Royal Navy had been largely espoused by the Tories.  As mainly landowning gentry, 
they objected to the added taxation needed to fund armies and preferred a ‘blue water’ 
policy.  The Glorious Revolution in 1688 and Hanoverian Succession in 1714 brought the 
Whigs to dominance.  Their commercial background was combined with their support for 
William III, George I and George II, all of whom had personal interests in the military 
and their responsibilities to the United Provinces and Hanover meant greater involvement 
                                                 
15 Black, A Military Revolution? p.6-7, 20. 
16 Manning, An Apprenticeship in Arms, p.263.   
17 Kenyon and Ohlmeyer, The Background to the Civil Wars, p.16, 20, 23-4; Furgol, The Civil Wars in 
Scotland, p.63; S. Reid, Scots Armies of the English Civil Wars (Oxford, 1999), p.33; B. Lenman, ‘Militia, 
Fencible Men, and Home Defence, 1660-1797’ in Scotland and War AD79-1918 (Edinburgh, 1991), p.180; 
J. Buchan, The History of the Royal Scots Fusiliers (1678-1918) (London, Edinburgh and New York, 
1925), p.4-6 and Robertson, The Scottish Enlightenment, p.5. 
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in wars concerning the continental balance of power.18  The Glorious Revolution, the 
Nine Years War, the War of the Spanish Succession, the War of Jenkins’ Ear and the War 
of the Austrian Succession created a need for a larger British standing army, which 
translated into a steady increase in army size during war over the first half of the 
eighteenth century.19   
 
Accurate data on this increasing size of the British army, particularly in relation to 
the population and in comparison to its contemporaries, is hampered by the lack of 
systematic record keeping.  It was not until the latter half of the eighteenth century that 
organisational improvements remedied this. Despite the attempts of the Duke of 
Cumberland (1721-1765) at reform between 1748 and 1755, the army needed the loss of 
the Americas and the threat of Revolutionary France to allow the Hanoverian desire for 
control and regulation to overcome the endemic ‘custom of the army’.20  Therefore, for 
the first fifty years of its existence, the British army was dominated by the belief that 
greater royal control would risk a repeat of the oppression of Charles I and the 
Interregnum, while continuing the ‘customs’ of the army, whereby colonels had greater 
control over their regiments than the government or the crown, was the best way to 
prevent tyranny.  Indeed, Cumberland’s attempts at reform triggered the old fear of 
standing armies and pamphlets that compared Cumberland to Cromwell.21  Early 
systematic collection of data focused only on the accuracy of musters to combat endemic 
corruption.  Therefore, returns of the number of other ranks and half-pay officers 
                                                 
18 Brewer, The Sinews of Power, p.59-60, 168, 170. 
19 Black, A Military Revolution? p.28-9. 
20 A.J. Guy, Oeconomy and Discipline.  Officership and administration in the British army, 1714-63 
(Manchester, 1985), p.29, 149, 162. 
21 ODNB William Augustus, Duke of Cumberland, by W.A. Speck. 
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dominate the records.22  A comparison of army size to the wider population is made 
difficult by a lack of population censuses until 1801.  Even then, the use of this first 
census is limited because its purpose was to provide data to ascertain the accuracy of the 
Reverend Thomas Malthus’s Essay on the Principle of Population, published in 1798.23  
The London Statistical Society was not founded until 1825, the first of its kind in Britain, 
marking a new era in which such matters were considered vital.24  However, Alexander 
Webster’s Account of the Number of People in Scotland in the Year 1755, an unofficial 
census but “thoroughly done, and done by a man of ability”25 places Scotland’s 
population around 1750 at 1,265,000, compared to a possible population of 6,935,000 in 
England and Wales.26 
 
The Civil War was a turning point for army size in Britain.  Before its start, the 
pre-standing army force of ‘guards and garrison’ numbered around 1,000.  Within one 
year of fighting, 100,000 men were in arms on both sides.27  After the Restoration this 
number was dramatically reduced but was still higher at the end of the Nine Years War in 
1697, at around 7,000 men, than during Charles I’s reign.28  From a peak of over 75,000 
men in 1711 during the War of the Spanish Succession, the British army was reduced to 
only 23,000 after the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713.29  In terms of regiments, these numbers 
                                                 
22 Guy, Oeconomy and Discipline, p.32-3. 
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26 Ibid, p.198, 200. 
27 Guy, Oeconomy and Discipline, p.4, 5. 
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translate to twenty-eight regiments at the start of the War of the Spanish Succession, to 
seventy-nine regiments (or seventy-two, depending on sources) at its peak, to a peacetime 
strength of fifty-three regiments in 1714.30  
 
Temporary increases in strength also occurred as military responses to Jacobite 
rebellions in Scotland.  At the start of the ’15, twenty-nine regiments were added to the 
British Establishment, consisting of fourteen regiments of dragoons and nine regiments of 
foot, re-raised from regiments disbanded after Utrecht, and six newly raised regiments of 
foot.31  In 1716, the number of British army soldiers in Scotland stood at 12,000.32  Of 
these, six regiments of dragoons and five regiments of foot were disbanded in 1718.33  
The start of the War of Jenkins’ Ear in 1739 triggered army expansion.  Two regiments of 
horse, ten regiments of marines and twenty-three regiments of foot were added to the 
British Establishment.34  In response to the ’45, thirteen regiments were raised 
specifically to counter the threat.35  By the end of the rebellion, 13,000 government 
soldiers were present in Scotland.36  These extra regiments were reduced in 1748 leaving 
the British army with seventy-six regiments.37 
 
By continental standards, the British army was unusually small, especially in the 
earlier period from the Restoration to Anne’s accession.  At just less than 35,000, 
                                                 
30 Scouller’s figures, based on C. Dalton (ed), English Army Lists and Commission Registers, 1661-1714 
(London, 1904), p.1-14, shown in brackets.  J.A. Houlding, Fit for Service.  The Training of the British 
Army, 1715-1795 (Oxford, 1981), p.8 and R.E. Scouller, The Armies of Queen Anne (Oxford, 1966), p.97. 
31 Houlding, Fit for Service, p.8-9. 
32 Ibid, p.43. 
33 Ibid, p.8-9. 
34 Ibid, p.10. 
35 Ibid, p.10. 
36 Ibid, p.43. 
37 Ibid, p.11. 
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Sardinia, for example, had a standing force similar to Britain, despite the latter’s greater 
responsibilities at home, on the continent and in its colonies.38  At the Glorious 
Revolution, the people and government of Britain had most recently experienced the 
army as the method of implementation by force of the policies of Cromwell, Charles II 
and James II.  Consequently, the Revolution Settlement in 1688 stipulated that certain 
powers be removed from the crown to parliamentary control.39  Therefore, despite the 
desires of William III, George I and George II, the decision to expand the standing army 
was the prerogative of parliament, which was dependent on a change in attitude towards 
soldiers and standing armies.    The connection of William III to the United Provinces and 
the Hanoverians to Hanover, and therefore to the Holy Roman Emperor, drew the British 
army more frequently into wars over continental power-balance from the Glorious 
Revolution onwards.  This increased the need for soldiers as the army’s responsibilities 
grew and gave those soldiers a chance to demonstrate their improved discipline and 
professionalism through military victories.  Therefore, though the standing army was 
always reduced on the return to peace by political and public desire, larger standing 
armies during war were increasingly tolerated.  This change in attitude amongst the 
people and politicians coincided with a series of other factors favouring expansion of the 
army.  In 1694 and 1695 respectively, the Bank of England and Bank of Scotland were 
established, allowing speculation on new stocks and shares that was part of the increased 
financial organisation that developed into a fiscal-military state.40  The rapid population 
growth of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries permitted larger scale 
                                                 
38 Houlding, Fit for Service, p.9. 
39 Black, European Warfare, p.106-7. 
40 Ibid, p.109-10, 129, 130-1.  Britain’s fiscal-military state was not truly effective, however, until the War 
of Austrian Succession (1740-48).   
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recruitment without endangering agriculture or industry.41  Consequently, the size of the 
army during the Nine Years War (1688-97), when the government and public were wary 
of standing armies, stood at 76,404, compared to the 92,708 men during the War of 
Spanish Succession (1701-1714).42   
 
Scots in service abroad 
For Scots, developing attitudes to armies, their numbers and deployments, also 
transformed mercenaries from ‘swords for hire’, levied or recruited by a mercenary 
captain for temporary service, to full-time, professional soldiers recruited or enlisted in 
regiments raised by treaty and sent abroad by the authority of others.  It is this later group 
that is the focus of this chapter.  Though the speed of this change was different for 
Highlanders and Lowlanders, and for officers and other ranks, the end result for all was 
the decline of mercenaries in favour of increasing opportunities as professional soldiers in 
armies of their own nations.  
 
Contemporary use of mercenaries was controversial, as the public and politicians 
worried that their use removed the need for militias drawn from the domestic population, 
a process which encouraged the population to contribute to the security and stability of 
the nation they lived in.43  The commercial nature of mercenaries created a prejudice that 
they only had loyalty to money and this was the only factor maintaining their discipline.  
It was this belief that is evident in the 1650 Alien Act in England.  Those awarded leave 
                                                 
41 Black, European Warfare, p.92-3. 
42 G. Holmes, The Making of a Great Power.  Late Stuart and Early Georgian Britain, 1660-1722 (New 
York, 1993), p.439. 
43 P.H. Wilson, Europe’s Tragedy.  A History of the Thirty Years War (London, 2009), p.144. 
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to remain in the country were those with a trade, apprenticeship or contract as a servant 
and were therefore deemed productive.  Mercenaries were specifically excluded from this 
group along with delinquents and the disaffected, thus branding them as men without use 
or ties to the country.44  As this belief resonates with modern perceptions that nationhood 
and patriotic duty are the true guarantors of loyalty, it persists to today.  However, these 
concepts were alien to sixteenth and seventeenth century soldiers who would regard 
loyalty to a paymaster as normal, especially in a period when regiments and companies 
belonged to their commanding officers.   
 
The reasons for the prejudice against mercenaries, both their greater loyalty to 
money than the state and the role they denied to militias, were obsolete even in the 
sixteenth century, as the ‘military revolution’ brought organisation and structure.  In fact, 
using mercenaries often proved wise, especially for smaller countries that needed to 
balance their need for soldiers against their need for labourers.  An army relied on the 
stability of industry and food production to allow a fiscal-military state to exist, and it 
was the labourers for this that were taken for armies made up of home nationals.  A 
contemporary French general commented that every foreign soldier was worth three 
Frenchmen because it freed one Frenchman to work and pay tax at home, one to fight for 
France and removed one that could fight against France.45  
 
                                                 
44 BL 669.f.15(49) (Microfiche), ‘Instructions to Commissioners of the Militia for the County of [blank 
space] concerning giving licence to some of the Scottish Nation to remain in England.  August 21st 1650’. 
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In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Scottish mercenaries in service abroad 
were the traditional ‘free-booters’.  Scottish gentlemen and their sons, for whom military 
service abroad provided money and prestige, would raise men from their estates and offer 
their services to different rulers, changing allegiance as pay and peace dictated.  
However, such mercenaries were a greater problem to civil peace when unemployed.  
Other contemporary mercenary groups were more anchored, such as the Scottish 
regiment led by John Stewart of Darnley, in French service during the Hundred Years 
War, and the Scots who followed Joan of Arc in 1429.46  As the ‘military revolution’ 
progressed, military service was increasingly regarded as an essential part of a 
gentleman’s education and so the passage of time increasingly brought a desire for 
improvement and discipline.47  Scotland had a long history of service with France dating 
back to 1295 when a shared desire to counter English hostility created the ‘Auld 
Alliance’.48  Four companies of Scots were quickly formed, becoming the Gardes du 
Corps and, later, the Garde Écossaise as royal bodyguards.49   
 
The practise of mutual loaning of troops between France and Scotland continued 
when the ‘Auld Alliance’ was renewed in November 1512 by James IV of Scotland 
triggered by the alliance between England, the Holy Roman Empire and the Vatican 
against France.  Scotland’s traditional friendship with France made an invasion from 
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Scotland likely.50  As a consequence of the renewal of the ‘Auld Alliance’, Scots fought 
for France during the Italian Wars of 1495-1544.51  In return, France sent men to 
reinforce Scottish troops during the ‘rough wooing’ of 1523 to 1546 and at the siege of 
Haddington from July 1548 to September 1549 when 12,000 Frenchmen joined the 
Scottish army to re-take the castle whose capture in February 1548 gave England control 
over the Tweed valley.52  Nearly a century later, French soldiers also assisted the Scots 
during the Bishop’s Wars of 1639-40.53  After Charles I’s execution many Royalist Scots 
sought service in France as a continuation of their Royalist service, aided by the French 
Dowager Queen.54 
 
Another example of Scottish mercenary service as a loan of professional soldiers 
was the Dutch Brigade.  The Brigade’s first incarnation was as the ‘Anglo-Dutch 
Brigade’ in 157255 which contained three English and three Scottish regiments.  The 
United Provinces sought independence from their Habsburg masters in order to gain 
religious freedom.  The common Protestant background of England and Scotland created 
a desire to aid a Protestant state.  At this early stage the Brigade was formed of a series of 
semi-independent companies similar to the Independent Highland Companies discussed 
later.  These companies were more closely affiliated to themselves and each other than 
their Dutch masters, a position reinforced by the role of their officers in recruiting, 
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arming, clothing, training, feeding and caring for the men and their families.56  From 
1628, developments in the structure and control of the Dutch army meant that three 
Scottish regiments had emerged which became the backbone of the Dutch Brigade – a 
structure that would remain the same for nearly 200 years.57  It was these regiments, 
commanded by Mackay, Balfore and Ramsey, along with three English regiments that 
joined William III’s invasion fleet in 1688.  After serving in Scotland under General 
Mackay during the 1689-1690 Jacobite rebellion, the three Scottish regiments were 
returned to Dutch service in 1697, now under Murray, Lauder and Walter Philip Colyear.  
Three new Scottish regiments, under Strathnaver, Hamilton and Sir David Colyear, were 
also sent to the United Provinces to replace the English regiments of the Brigade that had 
been absorbed into the English Establishment after the Glorious Revolution.  These 
additional three regiments remained in Dutch service until they were disbanded in 1714.58  
Until its eventual final disbandment in 1783, the Brigade remained three regiments 
strong, with the addition of an extra regiment, commanded by the Earl of Drumlanrig, 
from 1747 to 1751.59  The size of these regiments within the Brigade varied, as all 
regiments did, with war and peace.  The 1742 Terms of Service stipulated that a company 
contained ninety men, though in reality the number varied from thirty-four men in 1714, 
to seventy-seven men three years after the start of the War of Austrian Succession in 
1742.60 
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During the Thirty Years War, Donald Mackay, Lord Reay, (1591-1649) recruited 
3,600 Scots for service under Christian IV of Denmark and 10,000 for service under 
Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden.  This opened a new path for ‘free-lance’ officers gaining 
commissions in foreign service and then forming their own regiments, with responsibility 
for the recruitment, training and fate of the Scottish soldiers within them.61  Mercenary 
companies such as these straddled the change from feudally raised companies of the 
middle ages and the regimented and integrated examples of the Dutch Brigade and Garde 
Écossaise.  As such they appear as the older ‘free-lance’ groups but in reality had more in 
common with the Scottish regiments on the French Establishment.  By 1631 Gustavus 
Adolphus had organised and regimented the Scottish mercenary companies into a Scots 
Brigade.  This consisted of four regiments one of which was made up of Highlanders, 
another of musketeers and the final two of Scottish foot.62  They quickly gained a 
reputation for bravery and stood firm at the storming of Frankfurt-an-der-Oder on 3rd 
April 1631 and were publicly thanked by Gustavus.63 
 
The second peak in Scottish service abroad occurred between the Glorious 
Revolution and the end of the ’45, when the two to three generations of Scots, exiled by 
direct and indirect Jacobite activities, sought military service abroad.64  France was a 
popular choice, especially as Louis XV created two regiments specifically for exiled 
Scottish Jacobites after the ‘45.  The first was effectively formed from the survivors of 
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the regiments raised by Lord David Ogilvy (1725-1803) during the ’45, and known by the 
French name ‘le regiment de’Ogilvie’.  The second regiment, ‘le regiment d’Albanie’, 
was given to Cameron of Lochiel to compensate for the loss of his estates whilst in 
Jacobite service.65  However, by 1763, Scots amongst the rank and file of both regiments 
were so rare that Louis XV amalgamated them with the Irish regiments, arguing that his 
original promise to keep the regiments embodied to provide employment for exiled 
Scottish Jacobites was invalid as only the commissioned grades were still Scottish.66   
 
Service with the Prussians was also common.  This was especially true in the 
1740s when Field Marshal Keith (1696-1758) used his influence with Frederick the Great 
to ensure that officers and privates were found from the exiled Scottish community and 
recruited from Scotland.67  Keith himself was a typical example of a Scottish gentleman 
exiled for joining the ’15 rebellion.  After failing to gain a commission from Russia, he 
took by necessity one in Spain.  Despite nearly a decade’s service, he found his Protestant 
faith, though Episcopalian, a bar and so transferred his services to Russia in 1728.  Nearly 
twenty years later he entered Prussian service after the Russian court, already suspicious 
of foreigners, became jealous of his success.  In Prussian service, from 1747 to his death 
in 1758 at the Battle of Hochkirch, Keith rose to the rank of Field Marshal and gained the 
friendship of Frederick the Great.68   
 
                                                 
65 McCorry, ‘Rats, Lice’, p.31-3. 
66 Ibid, p.22, 30, 32-3 and R. Chartrand, Louis XV’s Army (3).  Foreign Infantry and Artillery (London, 
1997), p.9. 
67 Bulloch, ‘Scots Soldiers under the Prussian Flag’, p.109-10. 
68 ODNB, James Francis Edward Keith, by Paul Dukes. 
 43 
This diverse and complex involvement of Scottish soldiers abroad demonstrates 
how much more they were than simple ‘swords for hire’.  Mercenaries could be nobles, 
younger sons of gentlemen and men from the lower orders looking for the same 
outcomes: career, adventure and independent means.69  Though military service abroad, 
like any other profession, was primarily to gain wealth and position, Scotland’s gentry 
knew that these were not guaranteed.  Sir Donald Mackay of Strathnaver, Lord Reay, had 
to sell land in 1626 to fund recruitment for his regiment in Swedish service.  Such 
expenditure was rarely, if ever, reimbursed.70  Many also had to negotiate to receive their 
pay in arrears.71  Military service abroad from an early date also provided, and later 
reinforced, Scotland’s imperial image.  In the second half of the sixteenth century, John 
Knox argued that Scotland must seek a greater identity than simple independence from 
England, therefore military service gave Scotland an ‘imperial’ impact.  As this period 
coincided with the growth of Presbyterianism in Scotland, service abroad, most often in 
the United Provinces and Sweden with their shared Protestantism, was a way for Scots to 
contribute to the development of Scotland’s international standing.72  Religion was held 
so highly that, in 1574, during the Livonian War (1558-83), violence followed the 
attempt of 1,500 Lowland Scottish mercenaries in Swedish service to convert the 
inhabitants of Reval, now in Estonia but then a conquest of Sweden, to Presbyterianism.73  
For Protestant Scots, service with Gustavus Adolphus during the early years of the Thirty 
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Years War provided a way to defend Protestantism in the face of Catholic Imperial 
aggression.74  
 
Colley’s argument that national loyalty was formed by a common fear of France 
ignores the earlier evidence of mercenaries who, despite spending their adult lives in 
service abroad, demonstrated an acute and active interest in the religious and 
constitutional issues of their home.75  The act of leaving their country did not remove the 
connection they had with it, and their desire to remain involved in moulding the outcome 
of change is clear in the numbers that returned to Scotland to fight at the outbreak of the 
Bishops’ Wars.  For example, twenty-six colonels and officers asked permission to leave 
the service of Sweden in September 1640 during the Thirty Years War.76  Similarly, the 
political nature of who Scots chose to serve is also a demonstration of the Scots’ desire to 
affect the development of Scotland.  At home, the political decision of Jacobite Scots to 
participate in rebellions represents an obvious attempt to change and mould Scotland 
despite the risk to titles, lands, safety and security.  When these attempts failed, the 
number of Scottish gentlemen who chose to continue opposing the British government 
and the Glorious Revolution is demonstrated by the peak in Scottish exiles in foreign 
service after each rebellion.  
 
For many Scots in the other ranks, service abroad rather than within English or 
Scottish regiments was partly due to the lower number of regiments in the pre-Civil War 
and Restoration armies, and partly because of the attraction of service under France and 
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the Dutch.  The former offered a fixed period of service rather than the effective life long 
duty expected in Britain and both paid foreign troops more than their native troops.  
France held particular attraction for its less severe methods of punishment compared to 
German service.77  Officers, however, more commonly spent a lifetime abroad, serving in 
a regiment made up of family members and settling in that country on retirement.78  
James Keith, Marshal Keith, (1696-1758) for example, served in Prussia with his older 
brother, George, the 10th Earl Marischal (1692/3-1778) from 1747 to their deaths, though 
George’s role was diplomatic.79  Lieutenant-General Hugh Mackay, Colonel of the Dutch 
Brigade, owed his entrance to military service to the cultural memory and family stories 
of Scots fighting abroad with Gustavus Adolphus and the Protestant Princes of 
Germany.80   
 
The presence of family links bred their own loyalty and stability.  Families 
frequently settled in the countries they served and this encouraged later generations to 
continue the service.  The officers and men of the Dutch Brigade were often drawn from 
men of Scottish descent whose ancestors had settled in the United Provinces at the end of 
their own military careers abroad.81  The Calvinist Scots of the Dutch Brigade had a 
greater tendency to integrate, even among privates on short term service contracts, 
because both their religion and superiors encouraged chastity or marriage, resulting in a 
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high proportion of marriages with Dutch women.82  George Benedict Ogilvie is an 
example of a second generation Scot who followed his family’s example and made his 
career serving Peter the Great of Russia (1672-1725) from the 1660s onwards.  Ogilvie 
was the son of General George Ogilvie, a former mercenary in the Thirty Years War 
under the Swedes who remained as the commander of the fortress at Spielberg.83  Peter 
the Great was renowned for collecting a ‘court’ of mainly Scottish mercenaries: Patrick 
Gordon (1635-1699), William Drummond (1617-1688), Alexander Crawford and Sir 
Alexander Leslie of Auchintoul (not 1st Earl of Leven, who served in Sweden).84  
 
It was the longevity and stability of the Dutch Brigade, and of Scottish soldiers’ 
service in it, which allowed the Brigade to change from ‘free-lance’ mercenaries to 
professional soldiers in foreign service.  This change was from an itinerant group, 
contractually bound to a series of employers, to a specialist unit in foreign service, 
officially raised, recruited, armed, clothed and paid.  The status of the Brigade as 
regiments of the line, with a longstanding and therefore well established reputation, and 
its Scottish identity, made service with the Dutch Brigade an accessible military 
apprenticeship for the son’s of gentlemen: “Long were the armies of the princes of 
Orange esteemed the best military schools in Europe.”85  The United Provinces’ position 
as a new state under near-constant aggression from more powerful neighbours 
encouraged its army to develop and improve, becoming a leader in the ‘military 
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revolution’ during the period of the Brigade’s existence.  Many successful British officers 
of the eighteenth century began their military careers in the Dutch Brigade, benefiting 
from this environment.  These included Brigadier James Ferguson, who in 1704 was one 
of the four Scots on Marlborough’s staff,86 Colonel Graham, secretary to Queen Anne, 
and General James Murray, Governor of Quebec after Wolfe’s death.87  Military 
apprenticeships were also gained in the service of Sweden – another leader in the 
developments of the ‘military revolution’ in the seventeenth century.  Scottish soldiers 
such as Colonel Alexander Leslie, 1st Earl of Leven (1583-1661) and Colonel Alexander 
Hamilton (half-brother to the 1st Earl of Haddington), were able to use a lifetime in Dutch 
and Swedish service to Scotland’s benefit when they returned at the outbreak of the 
Bishops’ Wars and Civil War.88  Hamilton was responsible for bringing artillery 
expertise, and Leslie the skills and experience needed to organise otherwise amateur 
armies, which were essential for a country that Parker claimed was “untouched” by the 
developments of the ‘military revolution’.89   
 
The high calibre experience gained by Scottish mercenaries in such continental 
service was correspondingly beneficial to their next employer.  For example, during 
Colonel Alexander Hamilton’s service with Gustavus Adolphus, he developed a 4-
pounder cannon that could be drawn by two horses and thus gave Gustavus superior 
artillery mobility compared to his contemporaries such as Louis XIII whose army still 
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used 24-pounders that needed thirty-two horses.90  The employment of Scottish officers 
was especially prized for the recruitment potential they opened up to their foreign 
masters.  Sir Donald Mackay of Strathnaver, Lord Reay (1591-1649), was known as the 
‘recruiting sergeant for Gustavus in Scotland’ and did the same for Christian IV of 
Denmark.  He raised and paid for a regiment of 3,600 men in 1626 for service in 
Denmark during the Thirty Years War, another 2,000 in the winter of 1627-8 and a 
further 2,000 in early 1630 for Swedish service.  In 1643, he raised a new regiment of 
1,000 men for service in Denmark.  A mark of the esteem in which Scottish mercenaries 
were held by foreign leaders is shown by the medals struck by Gustavus Adolphus for 
Colonel Alexander Leslie to commemorate his defence of Stralsund in 1628.  Also 
indicative of this is the personal intervention of Christian IV in gaining the release of 
Lord Reay when he was captured attempting to bring arms to the Scottish Royalists in 
1644.91  Similarly, Peter the Great was unusual amongst his Russian contemporaries for 
his desire to learn from the combined experience and knowledge of the mercenaries in his 
service.  Mercenaries were treated warily in late seventeenth and early eighteenth century 
Moscow, where all foreigners were obliged to live in the ‘German Quarter’ to prevent the 
‘westernisation’ of Russian clothing or commerce.92 
 
Rather than the threatening image of the barely controllable ‘sword for hire’, by 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries mercenaries closely resembled regular regiments 
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of the line.  Their only distinguishing features were the ‘foreignness’ of their officers and 
men and their outward appearance.  The Dutch Brigade, for example, had several 
outward symbols of both their difference and their Scottish origins.  This was indulged by 
the Dutch policy of keeping foreign regiments separate from their own regiments.  
Consequently, the Brigade played The Scots March during battles, wore the red coats of 
the British army, and carried their own regimental colours and the Union flag but nothing 
representing the United Provinces.93  Its Union flag also had a Scottish thistle in the 
centre while the Brigade’s colours were green with a thistle and a scroll bearing the motto 
‘Nemo me impune lacessit’94 surrounded by a wreath, and a further scroll bearing 
‘Scottish Brigade’ below that.95  The Brigade was also permitted chaplains and ministers 
of their own religion, a move in keeping with the religious sympathies of the Dutch and 
of concessions made to their contemporaries, the Cameronians, in the British army.96   
 
The Highland regiment of the Scots Brigade in Swedish service during the Thirty 
Years War had the distinction of kilted uniforms, and this, along with the green clothing 
and standards of its other regiments, gave them the epithet of the ‘Green Brigade’.97  
Similarly, the two French regiments created by Louis XV for Scottish Jacobite exiles 
after ’45 were permitted pipers.98  Some soldiers of the Dutch Brigade are known to have 
worn kilts as early as the Battle of Reminant in 1578.  However, it is interesting that the 
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distinctiveness of the Brigade was as much due to the British nature of their uniform and 
regimental insignia as to the Scottish or Highland elements within it.99 
 
The use of these symbols of separatism were actively defended, such as in 1719, 
1720 and 1750 when the Dutch Brigade protested the use of their own regimental pall at 
funerals rather than the ones supplied by the local churches.100  Such identifiers enhanced 
loyalty to the Brigade, demonstrated by the effort made in protecting the colours in the 
retreat from Bergen-op-Zoom in 1747101 and emphasised their elite status and reputation.  
The Brigade was so well known for being trustworthy and courageous that its reputation 
spread to other Scots outside the Brigade.  Frederick Henry called them the ‘Bulwark of 
the Republic’ in 1629 and the Dutch General Baron d’Ayla always treated the regiment to 
“the most distinguished favour [that it]…disobliged not only the Germans and the Swiss, 
but his own countrymen.”102 
 
The extent of the concept of nationality and identity among Scottish soldiers 
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is hotly debated.103  The Dutch Brigade, 
for example, used a plethora of symbols to promote their individuality and 
distinctiveness.  However, what they saw as their identity is less clear.  Their red coats 
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and Union flag showcased their British identity, while the use of The Scots March and 
thistles on flags showed Scottish affiliations.  However, the use of tartan, kilts and pipes 
are indicative of a Highland identity that did not represent all their backgrounds.104  
Mackillop provides a tantalising explanation in his theory of cyclical identity.  Scots had 
a series of concentric identities and loyalties that could co-exist without conflict and 
could encompass affiliation to family, clan, community, regiment, Scotland and 
Britain.105  However, without evidence regarding the origin of the decision to use such 
symbols, it is impossible to know whose idea of ‘Scottishness’ was being represented by 
the appearance of the Dutch Brigade. 
 
It is clear that a simple classification of nationality would not realize the complex 
ideas of identity present in the eighteenth century where the application of nationality was 
used and abandoned as the need suited.  When the two Scottish regiments in the French 
army were amalgamated in 1763, only the officers and men born in or of the first 
generation from England, Ireland and Scotland were transferred.  The remaining 
nationalities were disbanded.106  Yet when one of these regiments had been raised in 
1747, petty corruption had occurred when nationalities on the muster rolls were tampered 
with to overstate the ‘Scottishness’ of many other ranks to take advantage of Louis XV’s 
promise of thirty livres extra for each man brought over from Scotland.107  Similarly, 
despite the attempts of the Dutch Brigade to maintain its separatism, the longevity of the 
Dutch Brigade and the soldiers’ existence in the United Provinces led to increased 
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integration.  Originally, Scottish officers and men were always in the majority, although 
other nationalities were permitted to serve within it, just as Scots served in other Dutch 
regiments.  However, intermarriage with local people and the daughters of Scottish 
soldiers, who were one, two or even three generations removed from Scotland, changed 
the make up of the Brigade over time.  In the seventeenth century, Scottish officers 
preferred Scottish witnesses at the baptisms of their children, but by the beginning of the 
eighteenth century, Dutch names as witnesses were increasingly common.108  Anne’s 
support for the preservation of the Scottish nature of the Dutch Brigade,109 extended to 
ordering Marlborough to warn the Dutch of her disapproval of their appointment of a 
non-Scottish major ahead of several other Scottish applicants.110  By contrast, the Brigade 
itself had a less nationalistic approach to its Scottish identity.  The practical terms of 
service from 1742 stated that Irishmen were not permitted to serve in the Dutch Brigade 
unless they were born in Scotland of Irish families or resident in Scotland for a year and a 
day.111  This suggests an uncomfortable battle between a desire to remain a Scottish 
regiment and a need to find recruits.  
 
The different recruitment processes for regiments in service abroad is indicative 
of the changing nature of mercenaries.  The ‘Auld Alliance’ between France and Scotland 
meant that from a very early date regiments were raised and lent between the allies.  This 
provided the precedent for the lending of regiments to other nations in the seventeenth 
century.  Despite the length of its existence, the Dutch Brigade was officially on loan 
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from Britain.112  The authorities in Edinburgh, and later in London, displayed mixed 
feelings regarding the use of Scotland as a recruiting ground for foreign powers.  The 
Union of Crowns gave greater central control so that recruitment for Danish and Dutch 
service had to receive prior approval from the Scottish Privy Council.  This practice 
continued after the Restoration and Union of 1707 and applied to all recruiting in 
Scotland.113  The exceptions to this were the illegal recruiting of Scots for service in 
Prussia discovered in 1743 when Britain and Prussia were opponents during the War of 
the Austrian Succession, and the illegal recruiting for Jacobite forces prior to rebellions 
or for service in France after the ’45.114 
 
It was competition for manpower that made the Duke of Marlborough suggest an 
end to Dutch recruitment in Scotland in 1703.115  Initially Anne refused and championed 
the continuance of the Dutch Brigade.116  However, the order “for bringing her national 
regiments up to their full number to all the parishes of Scotland” in March 1709 created 
an untenable level of competition in a country “already greatly depopulated.”117  
Presumably a short ban on Dutch recruiting followed, as occurred in 1713 when Anne 
barred Dutch recruitment for a year after the government and social elite of Edinburgh 
worried about the dramatic loss of manpower.118  A further infringement on the Dutch 
ability to recruit in Scotland occurred in the aftermath of the ’45.  Fearing that former 
rebels could escape justice by enlisting with the Brigade, the government decreed that 
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every recruit had to be presented to a local magistrate and then to an especially deputised 
officer, created by the Commander-in-Chief in Scotland, who would collect a certificate 
from the magistrate and a local minister to prove their well-affected status.119  In the 
long-term, after the rebellion, the government seemed happy to have potentially 
troublesome Scots removed to the United Provinces, as the allowances permitted to the 
Dutch Brigade were increased in 1747.120  The Dutch continued to recruit in Scotland for 
another decade, offering reliable pay and a shorter service than the British army.121  
However, this proved too much competition for recruits for the Scottish regiments on the 
British Establishment.  Therefore, in February 1757, the Brigade’s right to recruit in 
Scotland was abolished by William Pitt the Elder.122 
 
In Britain, the wars under William, Anne and George I and II saw the impact of 
the changes caused by the ‘military revolution’, as standing armies were increasingly 
tolerated during war and they gradually increased in size.  Consequently, the desire for 
mercenaries declined and professional soldiers were sought.  Additionally, the balance of 
power on the continent was changing so that nations such as Sweden, which in the 
seventeenth century had been a major employer of Protestant Scottish mercenaries, 
ceased to be a major European power by 1721.  This removed a large avenue of 
employment.123  The expansion of warfare to the Americas and the East Indies brought a 
different scale and conduct of warfare, which coincided with a growing acceptance of 
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standing armies amongst the British public and government.  This allowed a new 
commitment to trans-Atlantic war and an embryonic empire that meant competition was 
stronger than ever for British soldiers to serve in the British army.  Scotland’s elite 
offered regiments drawn from their tenants and clans in order to gain commissions.  This 
was either to rehabilitate themselves for past disloyalty or to contribute to the future of 
the British state through the most accessible state institution, the army.  In many ways, 
the motivations for serving in the British army was a continuation of the motivations for 
service abroad; careers and financial independence, and the defence of religion, politics 
and state.124  The need for men, exemplified by Pitt the Elder’s speech in 1762: “I sought 
for merit wherever it could be found.  It is my boast that I was the first minister of the 
Crown who looked for it and found it in the mountains of the North”125 meant that the 
earlier suggestions to raise regiments of the line from Highlanders made in 1738 by 
Duncan Forbes, Lord President, could be implemented.126  At a stage when Highlanders 
were gradually proving their loyalty and dependability, their use overseas was viewed by 
the British elite as the perfect balance of utilising their military culture while keeping 
them at a safe distance.  This mixed compliment towards Highlanders’ military abilities 
also made them disposable, as Wolfe’s quote in 1751 reveals: “they are hardy, intrepid, 
accustomed to a rough country, and no great mischief if they fall.”127 
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The significantly increased British demand for Scottish soldiers had a dramatic 
effect on nations still looking to Scotland for recruits.  In 1763, Louis XV disbanded the 
regiments raised to accommodate Scottish Jacobites citing the declining number of 
Scottish privates.128  Even the Dutch Brigade had struggled to maintain its contingent of 
Scottish-born soldiers, and was increasingly officered and manned by men of Scottish 
descent.129  Relations between Britain and the United Provinces had been deteriorating, 
as the Dutch refused to release the Brigade for service in the Americans in 1755 and 
1780, and in September 1780 Britain learned that the United Provinces had been aiding 
the American rebels since 1777.  The Dutch, who had struggled for constitutional 
freedom from Spain 200 years before, found their affiliation with the Americans’ desire 
for independence was stronger than a fading alliance with Britain.  By December 1780 
Britain had declared war, creating the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War, forcing the Dutch to 
demand that Scottish officers swear an oath of allegiance and that the regiments be 
subsumed into the Dutch Establishment.  The uniforms, music and regimental colours 
that marked their difference were removed.130  Fifty-three officers remained sufficiently 
British (or Scottish) to resign their commissions in protest.131  In 1782, the Dutch Brigade 
was disbanded, although the Dutch retention of recruiting rights in Scotland up to this 
point attests to the continuing desirability of the Scots as soldiers.132 
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However, the Jacobite cause provided another stimulus to Scots serving abroad.  
The reintroduction of the 1641 Penal Laws in 1695, the Oath of Allegiance in 1689 and 
the Oath of Abjuration in 1701 sent Catholics, Episcopalians and Non-Jurors into exile.   
Many fled acts of attainder and the consequent forfeiture of their lands and civil liberties 
for rebelling or sought sympathetic nations that supported their belief that renunciation of 
the Stuart right to the throne was incompatible with the divine, hereditary and 
indefeasible rights of kings.  As these oaths and laws effectively barred public service, 
private professions and land ownership in England, Scotland and Ireland, many looked to 
France and Spain for a career.133  Consequently, in addition to the existing Scottish 
regiments already on the French Establishment, the Garde Écossaise mentioned above, in 
1747 France created two further regiments, ‘le regiment de’Ogilvie’ and ‘le regiment 
d’Albanie’, specifically for Scottish Jacobite exiles as “a haven…[for] most of the 
refugees from the [Jacobite] army…seeking further military service.”134  At its 
embodiment in 1747, ‘le regiment de’Ogilvie’ had all but one Scottish Jacobite officer 
and just under half the other ranks were Scottish Jacobites.135  ‘Le regiment d’Albanie’ 
was raised second and therefore fewer exiles were available.  In one company, for 
example, of the sixty-one men only three were Scottish.  Of the regiment as a whole, only 
forty-seven of the 620 men were Scottish, six Irish and three Englishmen.  The rest were 
French, Swiss or German.136  A year later, the nationality of the Scottish regiments on the 
French Establishment was still less Scottish.  In one company of Ogilvie’s Regiment, 
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eighty-six privates were French, Dutch and German compared to the fifty-one British 
privates.  Of these, one was English, eleven were Irish and thirty-nine were Scottish.  
Though the Scots dominated the British portion of the regiments, the nominally Scottish 
character of the regiments was not represented by its soldiers.137 
 
The Dutch Brigade, with its almost 200 year history, runs in parallel with many of 
the regiments mentioned above.  However, it represents a different type of mercenary 
tradition.  Its official status on indefinite loan to the Dutch gave it a stability that fostered 
a high level of professionalism and a reputation as an elite amongst its contemporaries, 
and allowed the creation of a dynasty of soldiers who were Scottish by descent who could 
mix with ease with both their Dutch neighbours and the Scottish-born fellow soldiers and 
officers.  This absorption, however, had the effect of diluting the Scottish make up of the 
Brigade, a process accelerated by the eighteenth-century competition for Scottish recruits 
and the 1782 amalgamation into the Dutch Establishment.  In the place of records of 
nationality, the ability to speak Scots or Gaelic can provide an indicator of country of 
origin.  In 1726, this linguistic ability was so commonplace that the commanding officer 
of Willemstad had simply to ask for some ‘Scottish officers’ to be sent to communicate 
with Scots soldiers.138  Similarly, in 1747 orders to the other ranks had to be given in 
English and then Gaelic so they could all understand.139  However, by 1784 only two 
captains in one regiment of the Brigade spoke Scots-Gaelic.  Significantly, the only other 
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speakers were three lieutenants listed as retired.  This suggests that ability with the 
language was slowly dying out the longer the Brigade was on the Dutch Establishment.140 
 
Scots in British service   
The original quota of other ranks for the Royal Scots at its embodiment in 1633 
was drawn from men who had served under its colonel in Swedish and French service or 
were recruited from Scotland.  The officers were drawn from among those Scottish 
officers in French service.141   As the eighteenth century progressed, this nominally 
Scottish regiment became increasingly integrated as a British regiment.  By 1757, the 
Royal Scots was made up of 1,124 men of whom 462 were Scottish, the equivalent of 
forty-one per cent, 444 were Irish – thirty-nine per cent – and the remaining 218 were of 
unknown origin, but presumably a large proportion were English.142  Highlanders became 
a target for recruitment to regiments of the line after 1739 when the first exclusively 
Highland regiment, the 43rd, was raised.  This marked a watershed, as although 
Highlanders had long been raised for service, as the presence of kilts in Swedish and 
Dutch regiments attests, the 43rd became a precedent for an increasing number of 
Highland regiments.143  Though the next specifically Highland regiment, Loudoun’s 
Highlanders, was not raised until 1745, between 1739, the establishment of the first 
Highland Regiment, and 1799, when the last regiment, the 93rd Sutherland Highlanders, 
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was raised, fifty-nine Highland regiments (most of short duration) were raised by the 
British army, representing around 70,000 men.144   
 
The creation of so many Highland Regiments speaks of the change that had 
occurred in public and political opinions regarding the Scottish soldier by the mid- to end 
of the eighteenth century.  Britain’s fear of standing armies inherited by the religious and 
political turmoil and violence of the seventeenth century had faded.  This, with increasing 
involvement in continental and colonial wars, meant Britain needed a larger army, in turn 
providing greater opportunities for officers and privates.  The effective end of the 
Jacobite movement and the need to use the Scots as a source of manpower in this 
expanding army meant that Scots were more tolerated in the other ranks and 
commissioned grades of regiments.  These changes coincided with changes in the 
European balance of power.  The power of Austria, Sweden, Spain and France was 
transferring to Britain, Prussia and Russia, which changed the demand for mercenaries in 
European conflicts.145  It was therefore natural that Scots seeking military service would 
change from continental to British masters.  
 
Raised in 1633, the Royal Scots were intended for service in France.  Charles I’s 
royal warrant to Sir John Hepburn, its first colonel, took advantage of his military 
experience.146  Between 1634 and 1678 Hepburn’s served with the French and Swedes, 
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absorbing other Scottish regiments in Swedish service.147  At the Restoration the 
regiment was given the distinction of maintaining a Second Battalion even in peace.148   
Recalled to face the Covenanter threat in 1678, they were deployed to Flanders for the 
Nine Years War and the War of the Spanish Succession, where they were present at all 
major battles.149  Service in Ireland and the West Indies followed.150  In August 1745, 
two supernumerary companies, raised the previous summer, were ambushed and captured 
at Highbridge while marching to reinforce Fort William.  This was the first engagement 
of the ’45 and triggered the recall of the Second Battalion from Ireland.151  After fighting 
at Falkirk on 17th January 1746, the Royal Scots joined Cumberland’s army marching 
north and fought at Culloden.152  By June 1746, they were encamped at Perth and 
remained in Scotland until 1749 when they were deployed to Ireland.153 
 
The Scots Fusiliers was raised in 1677 or 1678 (depending on the source) by the 
5th Earl Mar for domestic security.  When ordered south to defend James II’s hold on 
England in 1688, they declared for William III. 154  They served in Flanders from early 
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1689 to 1697 and from 1702 or 1708 – sources disagree – to 1714.155  During the ’15, the 
Scots Fusiliers fought at Sheriffmuir156 and remained in Britain until 1742.157  After three 
years fighting in the continent, the Scots Fusiliers returned with the majority of the 
British army under Cumberland to assist in the suppression of the ’45.158  They formed 
part of the force that re-took Carlisle, fought at Culloden and provided a garrison for 
Blair Castle.159  After a year of service on the continent in 1747, they returned to Britain 
for garrison duty for the next three years.160  
 
By royal warrant of 25th November 1681, two troops of dragoons created in 1678 
with the addition of an extra troop were raised onto the establishment as the Royal 
Regiment of Scots Dragoons, here known as the Scots Greys. 161  Its commander until his 
death in 1685 was Lieutenant-General Thomas Dalyell (also spelt Dalzell) of The 
Binns.162  They had an early history of facing rebellions, first against Argyll’s Rebellion 
in Scotland in 1685, demonstrating that, pre-Union at least, there was no difficulty feared 
in sending Scots to fight Scots.163  They also deployed to England to prevent the invasion 
of 1688, but joined William III and were sent to Scotland to face the 1689 Jacobite 
Rebellion under Viscount Dundee and saw action at Cromdale in April 1690.164  From 
1694 to 1697, 1702 to 1713, and 1742 to 1749, the Scots Greys formed part of the army 
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on the continent in the Nine Years War, the War of the Spanish Succession and the War 
of the Austrian Succession.165  During peace they were recalled to Britain and were part 
of the domestic force that faced the Jacobites in skirmishes at Kinross and Dunfermline, 
and fought at Sheriffmuir in 1715, and again at Glenshiel in 1719.166  
 
The 1609 Statutes of Icolmkill made chiefs responsible for the actions of their 
clans and encouraged them to take control of policing and punishing lawlessness.167  This 
was reiterated in the royal warrant of 1667 that charged the 1st Marquess of Atholl to 
create the first companies to keep “a watch upon the braes.”168  The Independent 
Highland Company that fought the Jacobites at Killiecrankie in 1689 so impressed the 
Commander-in-Chief of the forces in Scotland, General Mackay that he caused five 
companies to be added to the Scottish Establishment.169  Between 1690 and 1717, the 
number of companies fluctuated as more were added at times of unrest, such as in 1701 
after poor harvests and rumours of invasion, or removed, as in 1690 as an economising 
measure.170  The three companies extant during the ’15 were not involved in the Battle of 
Sheriffmuir, but assisted escorting arms for the militias and were responsible for 
persuading clans not to join the rebellion and tracked fleeing rebels in its aftermath.171  
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Though recognised as useful for their hardiness, by 1717 the level of petty corruption and 
suspicions regarding many chiefs’ loyalties meant that the Independent Highland 
Companies were disbanded.172  The creation of six new companies was one of General 
Wade’s many proposals for increasing the security of Scotland in his 1725 report.173  In 
1739, these companies and ten new ones were raised onto the British Establishment as the 
43rd Regiment of Foot or Crawford’s Regiment named for its first colonel.174  After the 
necessary training at Aberfeldy in May 1740 and three years home service, the 43rd was 
ordered to march south for deployment abroad.  Suspecting deployment to the diseased 
West Indies, insulted at the lack of a royal review and believing that they had been raised 
for home service only, 120 men deserted to return to Scotland.175  After being re-captured 
and tried, three were chosen by drawn straws to be shot and the rest transported to 
regiments in Gibraltar, Minorca, the Leeward Isles and Georgia.  The remainder of the 
regiment was deployed to Flanders.176  In 1745 the ‘43rd returned to Britain under 
Cumberland when the rebellion began but did not join the army in Scotland.  Three 
supernumerary companies were recruiting in Scotland but were only partly assembled 
when two were captured at the fall of Fort George on 20th February 1746.177  After 
Culloden, the 43rd returned to Flanders and then saw service in America and Ireland, and 
did not return to Scotland for another thirty years.  The Regiment became the 42nd in 
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1749 and added ‘Royal’ to its title marking its bravery at Ticonderoga in 1758.  It did not 
gain the official epithet ‘The Black Watch’ until 1861.178 
 
The Scots Greys, Scots Fusiliers and Royal Scots were regular regiments of the 
line, and were used as such in continental warfare.  Similarly, the use of the Scots 
Fusiliers and Scots Greys during the ’15, at Sheriffmuir179, and the Royal Scots during 
the ’45, was a simple extension of their role as field regiments.  The Scots Greys’ 
presence as part of the standing army garrisoned in Scotland between 1715 and 1742 was 
typical of other regular regiments of the line, and enabled them to be part of the force sent 
against the joint Spanish-Jacobite force that invaded in 1719 and participate in the 
government victory at Glenshiel on 10th June 1719.180  However, regiments in Scotland 
were expected to fulfil other duties away from set-piece battles.  In 1678, the Royal Scots 
were recalled from service abroad, and the Scots Fusiliers and the Scots Greys were 
raised specifically to counter the Covenanter threat.181  The Scots Greys were quartered 
as small detachments, first in the capacity to find and stop conventicles, and later, 
between 1681 and 1685, to ensure that the oath for the Test Act was administered, which 
had to be sworn by every office-holder by 1st January 1682.182  This is different from the 
attitude towards Independent Highland Companies.  While they were used in much the 
same way as the three case study regiments mentioned, stationed in small detachments in 
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Jacobite areas to suppress plotting and rebellious activity, they were rarely judged 
experienced enough to take part in battles, and were limited to auxiliary roles.    
 
The growing power of parliament since the Glorious Revolution, and the military 
interest of William III, George I and George II, led to an increasingly centralised 
administration, which sought greater organisation and standardisation of the British army.  
The developments in tactics and technology during the ‘military revolution’ made 
maintaining control in close-order formations, which gave effective volley fire and 
operational mobility on the battlefield, a priority for the army.  Consequently, as the 
eighteenth century progressed, the need for soldiers who could act independently was 
decreasing.  When Jacobite plotting and rebellions in Scotland called for men with the 
requisite skills and ability to act in independent detachments this capacity had, therefore, 
been largely removed from Scottish foot regiments like the Royal Scots and Scots 
Fusiliers, despite their original role.  This is clear from their lack of knowledge about 
Scotland.  Whilst the Independent Companies were disbanded between 1717 and 1724, 
four informal ‘companies’ of Highlanders had to be kept at each fortified barrack to act as 
guides for regular regiments.183  By April 1746, along with two other English regiments, 
the Royal Scots, despite being a Scottish regiment, had to be allocated a civilian guide.184  
Any native knowledge had been lost by their long service abroad and their domestic 
service in the Lowlands.  It was the Independent Highland Companies and other auxiliary 
forces that the army turned to.185  During the ’15, the Independent Highland Companies 
were used as auxiliary forces working with the regular regiments in Scotland.  They 
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guarded baggage, acted as guides and tracked rebels after Sheriffmuir.  Their presence 
persuaded clans and individuals, such as Duncan Campbell of Lochness and the Stewarts 
of Appin, not to join the rebels, forced the surrender of the Mackenzies and escorted 
munitions from Glasgow and Inveraray.186   
 
An advantage of the Independent Highland Companies was their similarity to 
their Jacobite opponents.  The British army, during the ’45 for example, used the 
marching column formation of a ten file wide platoon or a twenty-four file wide division 
as set out by Major General Humphrey Bland in his Treatise of Military Discipline, often 
in one or two columns.187  The Independent Highland Companies, as Highlanders, 
marched with a width of only three files.188  Independent Highland Companies, therefore, 
could be deployed to troublesome areas more quickly than regular troops.  Though 
Cumberland reorganised the British army’s marching formations during the 1745 
campaign so that they were able to form up to engage the enemy twice on the march to 
Drummossie Muir, Independent Highland Companies were still relied upon to search the 
Highlands in the months after Culloden.189 
 
Furthermore, the Independent Highland Companies had superior knowledge of 
clan politics, local culture and topography of the Highlands, and were more skilled at 
manoeuvre through, and survival in, the Highlands than standard regiments of the line.  
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This made them more successful at patrolling the Highlands.  Indeed it was MacDonald’s 
and Macleod’s Companies that got closest to capturing Charles Edward as he fled 
Culloden to the Isle of Skye in June 1746.190  The British army displayed awareness of 
the value of their Highland soldiers’ unique skills through the rare concessions made to 
their uniform.  The sanction of kilts, at twelve yards of fabric, provided the men of the 
Independent Highland Companies with enough material for use as camouflage and 
blankets.191  Therefore, while regular regiments required two rest-days a week during 
marching, as well as an addition one or two weeks on long marches, and their routes 
across the country were determined by terrain, season and the availability of inns as 
billets, the soldiers of the Companies had greater manoeuvrability because of their ability 
to sleep in their plaids.192  Consequently, although when on the move regular regiments 
covered around thirteen miles per day, overall they covered less because of the rest-days, 
achieving an average speed of seven or eight miles per day.  Highlanders, by comparison, 
were able to cover twelve miles a day.193  Even if this contained the same rest days, as 
they were also part of the British Establishment, the Highlanders would still march fifty 
per cent faster than regular soldiers.194 
 
As with any military unit in Scotland, a major part of a Scottish regiment’s role 
was to ensure domestic peace.  The use of the Royal Scots, Scots Fusiliers and Scots 
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Greys against Covenanters in the 1670s and the use of garrisons of Royal Scots in Ireland 
between 1715 and 1737 to counter Catholic and Jacobite disaffection set a precedent for 
regiments being positioned to discourage Jacobite activity.195  In Scotland, the 
Independent Highland Companies had particular value because their unconventional 
tactics and small-scale detachments made them ideal for patrolling the Highlands.  
During the ’45, eighteen Independent Highland Companies were positioned in disaffected 
areas in order to restrict the Jacobites’ freedom of movement, revenue collection and 
recruitment.196  Their deployment across the Highlands made them ideally suited to 
enforce the Disarming Acts of 1715, 1726 and 1746 co-ordinated from Fort William and 
Blair Atholl.197 
 
The importance of status and patronage in clan society meant that the promise of a 
commission to lead an Independent Highland Company was, in itself, a great draw for 
chiefs.  Being allocated a Company also gave power to award further commissions – 
another attractive incentive.  At the outbreak of rebellion in 1745, Duncan Forbes of 
Culloden, Lord President of the Court of Session, was charged with distributing twenty 
new commissions; a delicate diplomatic task that was a mixed success.198  Traditionally 
loyal clans were rewarded, including two commissions to the 17th Earl of Sutherland, 
while traditionally Jacobite clans, such as the MacDonalds of Sleat and the Mackenzies 
under the Earl of Seaforth, were enticed by two and three respectively in return for 
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service to the Government.199  The disadvantages of using Independent Highland 
Companies as an enticement for prevaricators and former Jacobites, was that some 
traditionally loyal chiefs, such as the Grant of Grant, were insulted whey they received 
only one commission.  Consequently, Grant of Grant, though definitely not a Jacobite, 
did the minimum required of a Hanoverian.  On the pretence of protecting his home, he 
rarely let his men leave to engage the Jacobite parties moving near or on his estates.200 
 
The Union of Crowns in 1603 brought the control of the Highlands to London for 
the first time.  James I and IV passed the Statues of Icolmkill in 1609 which gave the 
Highland chiefs a self-regulatory responsibility for their clans and lands.201  This 
succeeded, except that the increase in power turned larger clans into mini-kingdoms, 
while their companies became corrupt and riddled with bribery.202  After the Restoration, 
Charles II continued his father’s policy and gave the Duke of Atholl a warrant to raise a 
company from his clan to “watch upon the braes [and] to be a constant guard for securing 
the peace in the Highlands” on 3rd August 1667.203  The suspicion that reiving, clan-
feuding and petty lawlessness had links to Jacobitism meant that the Independent 
Companies stationed at the four fortified barracks against Jacobite activity were also 
there to act as aids to civil peace.204  The role continued to be one of importance as in 
1731 Major Scipio Duroure, whose role it was to inspect the Independent Highland 
Companies and the detachments on road building duty, drew up standing orders for 
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Companies on policing duty.205  As the Jacobite threat lessened, attention shifted to 
smuggling and illegal whisky distilleries.  Between 1715 and 1742, the Scots Greys were 
stationed throughout Britain to help prevent smuggling; however, they made little impact.  
Despite the presence of Independent Highland Companies at Drumden for the seven 
previous years, smuggling was still flourishing in 1736.206 
 
The army’s presence in Scotland, where the containment of Jacobite disaffection 
and the domestic peace needed to be actively maintained, ensured that the garrisoning of 
soldiers had more in common with the occupation of enemy territory than merely 
billeting on home soil.  From the Statues of Icolmkill to the Highland Host, the use of a 
military presence to subdue and control the population was a common strategy in 
Scotland.  The Scots Fusiliers spent the first decade of their existence garrisoned across 
the Lowlands to suppress conventicles – the illegal field preaching of Presbyterians after 
the Episcopalian Church was restored by Charles II in 1660 – while the Independent 
Highland Companies were focused on the Highlands.207  Following Killiecrankie, 
Captain Robert Menzies and his company garrisoned Castles Menzies and Meggernie in 
the 1690s while Grant’s Company formed part of the garrison at Fort William along with 
Hill’s Regiment, which included the recently amalgamated men from Weem’s 
Company.208  Following the Union, their role remained the same; a company was based 
at Inverlochy in 1707 to ensure control over that isolated area and in 1708 Colonel 
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Grant’s Company was stationed on the north-east coastline to guard against invasion.209  
During the ’15, a company garrisoned Seaforth’s home at Brahan Castle near 
Inverness.210  The six Independent Highland Companies created by Wade in 1725 were 
garrisoned in detachments across Scotland in Fort Augustus, Inverness-shire, Ross-shire, 
Sutherland-shire, Strathspey, Badenoch, Atholl, Breadalbane, Lochaber and Appin.  They 
were all co-ordinated by the Governor of Fort William.211  In this respect, the 
Independent Highland Companies were employed in just the same way as regiments of 
the line, as the Scots Fusiliers spent 1748 to 1751 on garrison duty within Britain.212  
 
A comparison of the nationality of the colonels of the case study regiments 
demonstrates to what extent nominally Scottish regiments were Scottish in composition, 
and when this changed.  The Royal Scots had five Scottish colonels from 1633 to 1688.  
Its first non-Scottish colonel was the 1st Duke of Schomberg, a native of the Palatinate, 
friend of William III and Huguenot exile from his adopted French home.  He, however, 
proved unpopular and was soon replaced by the Scottish Sir Robert Douglas of 
Glenbervie.213  Two further Scottish colonels followed to the end of this study’s 
chronology.214  During the ’45, the Second Battalion of the Royal Scots was led in 
Scotland by its Lieutenant-Colonel, John Ramsey.  Its colonel, from 1737 to his death in 
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1762, was James St. Clair, Lord Sinclair.215  The Scots Fusiliers had three Scottish 
colonels until 1704, when the death of Brigadier-General Archibald Rowe at Blenheim 
saw Viscount Mordaunt, eldest son of the Northamptonshire 3rd Earl of Peterborough, 
inherit command.216  After an interim of two years under the command of a Huguenot, 
Mordaunt returned until his death in 1710.217  It is interesting to note that the two 
Huguenot colonels of the Scots Fusiliers had only brief colonelcies of the regiment, 
suggesting that though they shared a common religion with their Scottish officers and 
other ranks, nationality had some importance.  From 1710 to mid-century, the Scots 
Fusilier’s colonels’ origins varied from English, Scottish and Irish, to Irish and European 
with Scottish antecedents.218  After 1704, only one colonel was Scottish, though many 
had a link to the country. The Scots Greys had Scottish colonels from their establishment 
in 1678 to 1688, when the colonelcy was awarded to Sir Thomas Livingstone, 1st 
Viscount Teviot.219  Teviot was of Scottish descent but was born and brought up in the 
United Provinces, and had served his entire career, along with his father, in the Dutch 
Brigade.220  In 1704 the colonelcy was bought by a Scot and remained in Scottish hands 
until 1714 when it was bought by Sir David Colyear, 1st Earl of Portmore, who was 
Dutch of Scottish descent.221  In 1717, the colonelcy returned to Scottish ownership and 
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remained so under various individuals to the end of the chronology of this study.222  The 
Independent Highland Companies were enlarged and raised onto the Establishment in 
1739 under Lieutenant-General John Lindsay, 20th Earl of Crawford.  As a Lowland Scot, 
he was trusted to remain impartial to the rivalries of the clans.  In 1741, Hew Sempill, 
12th Lord Sempill, bought the colonelcy and sold it to Lord John Murray in April 1745.  
Murray kept it until his death in May 1787.223  Consequently, the 43rd Regiment was, 
therefore, conspicuous for its consistently Scottish colonels. 
 
The nationality of the rank and file is harder to establish.  Records of recruits were 
limited to incidental comments or numbers in returns of regimental strengths.  Soldiers’ 
origins were not recorded until the 1790s.  Records from the Seven Years War go 
furthest, occasionally recording a man’s place of origin.224  It is difficult to establish, 
therefore, how ‘Scottish’ the other ranks of Scottish regiments were.  The pre-Union 
existence of the Royal Scots, Scots Fusiliers and Scots Greys probably ensured that 
before 1707 they were exclusively or at least largely Scottish.  The Royal Scots, for 
example, were originally made up of 600 veterans of Hepburn’s Company that had 
served with him in Bohemia, Holland and Sweden and, at Hepburn’s insistence, from 
recruitment in Scotland to be commanded by Scottish officers presently in French 
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service.225  The Independent Highland Companies, prior to their embodiment in 1739, 
would also have been exclusively Highland in make up.  The company captains gained 
their commissions because of their clan’s loyalty, and were expected to recruit from their 
clans.  After their embodiment, men could be recruited “in any County or Part of Our 
Kingdome of Great Britain.”226  This is contrary to Stewart of Garth’s efforts at 
romanticisation, editing the 43rd’s recruitment orders to “the men to be natives of that 
country and none other taken.”227  It is doubtful, however, that non-Gaelic speaking, non-
tartan wearing men would have actively sought enlistment with them.  No official policy 
existed to maintain Scottish exclusivity in Scottish regiments.  However, it was 
considered advantageous to target Scotland for its manpower, and later Highlanders, for 
their supposedly natural war-like abilities.228  Therefore, the main recruitment area 
continued to be Perthshire, Braemar, Atholl and Breadalbane.229  The Independent 
Highland Companies created at the start of the ’45 were drawn from the lower orders of 
their officers’ clans, as the commissions were not awarded until the company strength 
was complete.  This encouraged officers then, as earlier, to take advantage of the old 
custom of ‘Scottish Service’ to gain rapid recruitment.230  Such links were undoubtedly 
used and abused in the other Scottish and Highland regiments of the mid- and late-
eighteenth century, to maximise recruitment.231  The only example of particularity to 
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Scots in Scottish regiments was shown by Cumberland during the ’45, when recruits 
raised by the Scots Fusiliers in England were transferred to two English Regiments, and 
the Scots Fusiliers ordered to recruit replacements from Glasgow as the only ones who 
could identify loyal Scots from disloyal.232 
 
Regimental strength varied considerably, depending on the generosity of the 
treasury for that year, the state’s position in war or peace and the political and military 
situation of the time.  Independent Highland Companies, such as Grant’s Company, could 
vary from the sixty men in 1701 to eighty in 1710.233  By 1739, when the 43rd was raised 
onto the Establishment, it numbered 850 officers and other ranks.234  The addition of four 
new companies of 100 men each in 1745 gave the 43rd a total paper strength of 1,215.  
Only 400 of these were in Scotland during the ’45, a tally closer to the numbers of 
privates of the Second Battalion of the Royal Scots and the Scots Fusiliers at Culloden. 
They numbered 401 and 358 rank and file respectively.235  The internal structure of an 
Independent Highland Company was a scaled-down version of a regiment of the line.  
The former contained only a captain, a lieutenant and an ensign, supported by four 
sergeants, four corporals, a drummer and a piper.236  The number of private men varied 
with the Jacobite threat, from thirty and sixty in the companies raised by Wade in 1725, 
                                                 
232 BL Hardwick Papers Add.MS.36257 f.11, Orderly Book of Joseph Yorke. 
233 Simpson, The Independent Highland Companies, p.93; Ross, The Historic Succession of the Black 
Watch, p.45. 
234 McAulay, The First Battalion of the Black Watch, p.56; Parker, Black Watch, p.15 and P. Howard, The 
Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) (The 42nd Regiment of Foot) (London, 1968), p.17. 
235 Reid, Culloden Moor, p.27 and S. Reid, Cumberland’s Army.  The British Army at Culloden (Leigh-on-
sea, 2006), p.39. 
236 Mackay Scobie, ‘The Highland Independent Companies’, p.8 and Ross, The Historic Succession of the 
Black Watch, p.36. 
 77 
to 100 in each of the eighteen companies raised by Forbes in 1745.237  This can be 
compared to a return of the Scots Fusiliers from 1727 which contained a colonel, one 
lieutenant-colonel, one major, ten captains, twelve first lieutenants, eleven second 
lieutenants, an adjutant, a quartermaster, a chaplain, a “chirurgeon”238 and his mate.  
Each of the twelve companies contained three sergeants, three corporals, two drummers 
and sixty private men.239  
 
The most notable differentiation received by the Independent Highland 
Companies, and the 43rd after them, was the right to wear tartan and bear traditional arms.  
Such matters were increasingly important to Scots after tartan, bagpipes and bearing arms 
were forbidden by the Disarming Acts of 1715, 1726 and 1746.240  It is more likely that 
the British army’s aim was that such concessions would attract recruits rather than a wish 
to preserve or respect national distinctiveness.  Indeed, once kilts proved unsuitable to 
campaigns in North America in 1762 they were quickly replaced with breeches.241  Until 
the regulations of the 1740 Clothing book and the Clothing Warrant of 1768, uniforms 
were similar through convention rather than through central control.242  As in regular 
regiments, commanders were responsible for providing clothing and consequently 
variations occurred because of poor supplies, inconsistency of command, petty corruption 
and a lack of a regiment’s continuity of existence.   
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The men of the 43rd were meant to wear green, blue or black coats combined with 
the traditional plaid and blue bonnets.  Their officers wore scarlet coats with yellow or 
buff facings.243  In reality, though, they often wore their own clothing, as they had as 
Independent Companies or when a company was raised quickly.244  This was not 
unusual; the Scots Fusiliers were raised so quickly in 1678 that no time was available to 
order uniforms.  Consequently, they were clothed in locally produced cloth and gained 
the nickname ‘Mar’s grey-breeks’.245  The use of tartan by both loyal and Jacobite 
Highlanders caused problems distinguishing between them during the ’45.  After Falkirk, 
soldiers had to be reminded that loyal clansmen wore a black cockade to differentiate 
them from the white-cockade wearing Jacobites.246   
 
Concessions made to Scottish regiments of the line demonstrate both an 
awareness of nationality and the irrelevance of nationality to the British army.  Most 
obviously, recognition of their Scottish background was given in their names; each of the 
regiments used here included Scots (or North British) in their names.  Similarly, the Scots 
Fusiliers were permitted to wear a badge depicting a green thistle on a red background 
enclosed by a yellow border, rather than the usual white horse of Hanover; an obvious 
statement of their Scottish origins.247  However, the Royal Scots was also the 1st 
Regiment of Foot, an important position of seniority that demonstrated the importance of 
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age and experience regardless of nationality, which granted them alone the privilege of a 
permanent second battalion.248  Similarly, the Scottish origins of regiments made no 
difference to the rules regarding uniform and appearance.  The Scots Fusiliers wore 
grenadier caps in line with other fusilier regiments and the Royal Scots were awarded the 
same uniform designator of blue linings to their coats when awarded ‘Royal’ status in 
1684.249   
 
The role and positioning of a regiment during a campaign or a battle is revealing 
of the level of trust the British army and its commanders placed in it.  The complexity of 
Scotland’s relationship with England meant that, with Scottish regiments, such decisions 
took into account issues of loyalty, the nationality of the opposition and the geographical 
location of the campaign and battle.  The Royal Scots, Scots Fusiliers, Scots Greys and 
43rd were trusted in conventional wars on the continent.  However, when facing Jacobite 
rebels in Scotland the British army was more wary as Scottish regiments were not 
without evidence of Jacobite sympathies.  Twenty officers and 540 men of the Royal 
Scots had mutinied at Ipswich on 8th March 1689, declared for James II and marched 
back to Scotland.250  A retired soldier, known as Finlay, of the Royal Scots became the 
leader of anti-Union riots in Glasgow in 1706 and Lord George Murray, later a Jacobite 
general during the ’45, held a commission with the Royal Scots from 1710 to 1715 when 
he first joined the rebels.251  In September or October 1715, Lieutenant-Colonel William 
Paul of the Royal Scots was discovered with a commission from James III.  He was 
                                                 
248 Scouller, The Armies of Queen Anne, p.97. 
249 Cochrane, Scottish Military Dress, p.18, 112 and Reid, Cumberland’s Army, p.38. 
250 Ellestad, ‘The Mutinies of 1689’, p.9-11, 16, 17, 19. 
251 W. Ferguson, Scotland’s Relations with England.  A survey to 1707 (Edinburgh, 1994), p.268; Gibson, 
Playing the Scottish card, p.75 and ODNB, Lord George Murray by Murray G.H. Pittock. 
 80 
arrested but cleared by the testimony of others.252    In October 1745, a soldier of the 
Royal Scots quartered at Pontefract “had a thousand stripes given him…for drinking the 
Pretender’s health, and for saying that half the regiment would run away and join him, if 
they were sent to engage; he was almost cut to pieces, none showing him any mercy.”253 
 
Despite all these examples of the mixed loyalties of the officers and men of the 
Royal Scots, they were trusted to fight.  Their Second Battalion were the only Scottish 
regiment of foot at Falkirk in January 1746, positioned in the first line of infantry behind 
a line of dragoons.254  Their position on the right wing at Culloden was a traditional mark 
of honour; its seniority in the regimental hierarchy and proven history of standing under 
fire perhaps outweighing any doubts about its loyalty.255  The Scots Fusiliers fought at 
Sheriffmuir in 1715 despite the Earl of Mar, the son of their founder, commanding the 
opposing Jacobite army256 and were part of the force that re-took Carlisle and fought at 
Culloden in 1746257 despite the conflict of interest when two of its captains, James and 
John Chisholm, faced the charge of Clan Chattan at Culloden led by their younger brother 
Roderick Og Chisholm.258  The Scots Greys were also present in Scotland during the ’15, 
fighting in skirmishes at Kinross and Dunfermline and at Sheriffmuir, and in the Battle of 
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Glenshiel during the ’19.259  From 1726 to 1729, Lieutenant John Roy Stewart had served 
in the Scots Greys but had joined the Jacobites, eventually raising the Edinburgh 
Regiment during the ’45, when he failed to get a commission to the newly raised 43rd.260  
This would have had no bearing on the decision to keep the regiment in Flanders during 
the ’45 but was more likely due to the greater use dragoons had there than in the 
mountainous terrain of the Highlands.   
 
The deployment of the Independent Highland Companies and later 43rd reflects 
the level of trust the British army, and thus the government, held in them as Highlanders.  
In 1689, they formed part of the force that met the Jacobites at Killiecrankie, and were 
used as garrison forces to subdue disaffected activity in the Highlands.261  They were 
trusted with the difficult task of guarding the rear of several retreats in Flanders during 
1747 and 1748 but were mistrusted when placed near to their fellow countrymen.262  
Therefore, though the 43rd was recalled to Britain in August 1745 it was posted along the 
Kent coastline to guard against invasion.263  Despite the lengthy list of Jacobite-related 
incidents in the Royal Scots’ history, and examples of disloyalty during rebellions, their 
positioning during the ’15 and ’45 was unmatched by any other Scottish regiment.  
Similarly, the placement of the 43rd at the furthest end of the country indicates that 
although regiments of the line were trusted, the newly raised and inexperienced 43rd was 
                                                 
259 P. Mileham, The Scottish Regiments, 1633-1996 (Staplehurst, 2004), p.24 and Terry, ‘The Battle of 
Glenshiel’, p.414. 
260 ODNB John Stewart by Stuart Handley and J. Prebble, Culloden (Harmondsworth, 1972), p.70. 
261 D. McBane, ‘The Expert Sword-Man’s Companion Or the True Art of Self-defence.  With An Account 
of the Authors Life, And his Transactions during the Wars With France.  To Which is Annexed, The Art of 
Gunnerie By Donald McBane’ (Glasgow, 1728) in M. Rector, (ed), Highland Swordsmanship.  Techniques 
of the Scottish Swordmasters (Union City, 2001), p.26. 
262 Macpherson McCulloch, Sons of the Mountains, I, p.3. 
263 Duffy, The ‘45, p.146-7. 
 82 
not.  The British army, therefore, clearly regarded evidence of service and ability as more 
important than nationality. 
 
Conclusion 
From the fourteenth to the eighteenth century, a series of changes in power within 
and between western nation states, the impact of the ‘military revolution’ on army sizes 
and the changing attitude towards Scottish soldiers fundamentally altered the Scottish 
mercenary tradition.  The position of Scotland as a vulnerable border nation and its 
enmity with England encouraged early military co-operation with France.  Both led to the 
exchange of troops.  This began the practise of Scots serving in Scottish regiments on 
permanent loan to foreign Establishments.  Scotland’s weak government, its isolation and 
difficult terrain, and its history of internal warfare, led to a highly militarised society.  
These factors were especially prominent in the Highlands, with the added factors of a 
clan system that evolved to protect a community through a strong sense of filial loyalty.  
Subsistence agriculture and little industry meant many men, at all levels of society, 
looked to military service for their livelihood.  Very few beyond the Scottish crown could 
maintain large bodies of troops, therefore many Scots looked for employment abroad.  
The culture of filial and hierarchical loyalty in clan society lent itself to bands of soldiers 
led by clan gentry.  The frequent wars on the continent provided ample opportunity for 
these ‘free-lance’ regiments of mercenaries to find employment.  In turn, foreign rulers 
gained ready-formed regiments.  Scottish regiments were particularly prized for their 
martial culture and, after the Reformation, their religious and moral standards.   
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The technological developments of the ‘military revolution’ changed tactics and 
made disciplined troops a requirement.  Such troops were moulded and perfected in 
repeated wars of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.  The militarily inclined leaders 
of Sweden, Russia and the United Provinces, and the position of Denmark, Prussia and 
France at the centre of those wars caused particular progress towards increasingly 
professional armies.  The religious nature of the seventeenth century conflicts and the 
shared Protestantism of Scotland, Sweden and the United Provinces created an 
environment where Scots were well placed to benefit from the developments being made 
in the art of war.  This added to their reputation and made them more attractive as ‘free-
lance’ regiments in search of employers.   
 
The European responsibilities of William III and the Hanoverians in the frequent 
continental wars of the period ensured that England and Scotland, acting as one since the 
Union of Crowns, became increasingly involved in continental power struggles after the 
Glorious Revolution.  This new need for the army and the improvements in discipline 
demanded by the ‘military revolution’ eventually overcame Britain’s unusual anathema 
towards standing armies.  From the War of the Spanish Succession, the British army was 
expanding, despite reductions in peacetime, and men were needed to fill the new 
regiments and replace casualties.  The reputation Scots had gained amongst continental 
nations now began to attract British politicians.  However, the frequent Jacobite 
rebellions in Scotland and the Jacobite use of tartan that belied the international make up 
of the Jacobite movement prevented the government and crown from trusting 
Highlanders as source of recruitment.  By the 1750s, however, the decreasingly active 
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Jacobites and the demands for soldiers to serve in the trans-Atlantic Seven Years War 
overcame public and political mistrust.  For the first time since the 1739 embodiment of 
the Independent Highland Companies, the government began systematically targeting 
Scots, and Highlanders in particular, for military service in the British army.  This change 
coincided with the growing strength of nation states on the continent, which could now 
raise and maintain armies of their own nationals.  Consequently, those Scots who, for the 
same motives of religion, politics and nation-building as their forbears sought military 
service as a profession could now find opportunities within the British army.  The 
obvious exception to this was the Scots who had chosen service abroad because of 
voluntary or involuntary exile.  Many continued to serve abroad under sympathetic 
governments, though some used the British government’s need for troops in the 1750s to 
their advantage and gained commissions in order to rehabilitate themselves or their 
families for past disloyalty through government service.  
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CHAPTER TWO: THE SCOTTISH SOLDIER’S EXPERIENCE 
Introduction 
This chapter addresses the lives of Scottish soldiers of the rank and file in the 
British army between the Union and the end of the ’45.  Where appropriate, to provide a 
wider context, this interval is extended, with the particular intention to show how the 
Union changed army life.  Though officers are also considered where their experiences 
differ from that of their men, specific focus on their lives and careers is reserved for 
Chapter Three ‘Scottish Soldiers and the British State.’  The present chapter surveys the 
soldier’s life within the British army, from recruitment, training and billeting to his 
function throughout his career.  The first section examines recruitment of the rank and 
file, the methods used to attract volunteers, the laws that allowed impressment, the 
requirements for enlisting and the reasons for enlistment.  This leads to investigation of 
what soldiers could expect upon enlistment, including pay, the provision of equipment 
and uniforms and the opportunity to maintain a wife and family ‘on the strength’.  The 
methods of obtaining a commission by officers are examined and compared: patronage, 
purchase and meritocracy.  The reasons for choosing military service are explored.  
Discipline is investigated to discover why it was needed and how it was enforced.  The 
roles and responsibilities of soldiers are explored to establish their duties with particular 
emphasis on the impact these duties had on the civil-military relationship.  A section on 
billeting examines soldiers’ accommodation and the extent to which it affect their 
relationships with the communities they lived amongst.  Particular attention is given to 
how this changed over the period of interest, including the impact of evolving laws. 
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Joining the colours 
The official method of recruitment was temporarily to empower an officer or 
sergeant to form a recruitment party.  Accompanied by a drummer, or piper in Scotland, 
they moved around a particular area, attracting possible recruits with their music and 
speeches.1   These promoted the success, glory and long history of the regiment, and 
suggested promises of prize money, adventure and secure employment: “The martial 
sights and sound of this little band, felt his heart beat time to the trumpet and drum.”2  
However, recruiting parties had a bad reputation for dishonesty and trickery to achieve 
their quota.  Many claimed they were drunk when they had been recruited.  Colonel 
Blackader’s diary provides unwitting evidence of the typical style of recruitment, when 
he complained on 15th February 1705 “Soberiety itself is here a bar to success.”3   
 
In order to combat these criticisms, recruits were obliged to sign or make their 
marks and hear the Articles of War before they were considered enlisted.  The Articles 
contained all the rules and regulations of the army by which the soldier had to live, and 
the punishments for failing to do so.  Additionally, magistrates and JPs, to whom recruits 
could volunteer if recruiting parties were absent, had their authority extended so that 
enlistment was only considered legitimate once an oath was sworn before them.4  The 
British army preferred volunteers rather than impressed men, unlike seventeenth-century 
                                                 
1 J.A. Houlding, Fit for Service.  The training of the British Army, 1715-1795 (Oxford, 1981), p.117. 
2 W. Thomson, Memoirs of the life and gallant exploits of the old Highlander, Serjeant Donald Macleod, 
who, having returned, wounded, with the corpse of General Wolfe, from Quebec, was admitted an out-
pensioner of Chelsea Hospital, in 1759; and is now in the CIII.d year of his age (London, 1791), p.29. 
3 A. Crichton, The Life and Diary of Lt. Col. J. Blackader (London, 1824), p.236. 
4 Houlding, Fit for Service, p.117 and H.C. McCorry, ‘”Besides, he was very drunk at the time..”: 
Desertion and Discipline, North Britain, 1751-1753’, Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, 
70:283, Autumn 1992, p.190, 191, 192, 194, 196. 
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Sweden and Denmark, where conscription, termed ‘indelningsverk’, was used.5  
Impressment and conscription brought public outrage and disorderliness, as well as 
having a negative effect on the labouring poor, disrupting agricultural production and 
demographics.  Volunteer recruits with skills or trade backgrounds, however, were in 
demand by a self-sufficient army.6  Though the Royal Navy had long used impressment, 
the army usually secured sufficient volunteers and rarely needed impressment or 
conscription.  Its unusually small size by continental standards7 meant it was easier to fill 
the other ranks through voluntary means.  However, occasionally this system needed 
reinforcement.  In unusual circumstances, such as when recruitment numbers dipped or 
during rebellions, contracts for the duration, for three or four years, or for service only 
within Britain, were offered.  Rebellions, especially when they occurred during a war, 
caused a double drain on skilled artisans and labourers, leading to problems in 
agricultural productivity and declining birth rates as recruits for both home defence and 
service abroad were sought.  In the ’15, the army had recently been reduced after the 
Treaty of Utrecht, while in the ’45 it had already been recruiting for six years for the War 
of the Austrian Succession.  Therefore, during the ’15, the army offered service that 
would end three months after the threat had passed, while during the ’45 the army offered 
                                                 
5 T. Munck, Seventeenth Century Europe, 1598-1700 (Basingstoke, 1989), p.398.  
6 V.E. Neuburg, ‘The British Army in the Eighteenth Century’, Journal of the Society for Army Historical 
Research, 61, 1983, p.45; A.N. Gilbert, ‘An analysis of some eighteenth century army recruiting records’, 
Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, 54, 1979, p.40 and BL Hardwick Papers Add. 
MS.36257 f.31, Orderly Book of Joseph Yorke. 
7 L.G. Schwoerer, “No Standing Armies!”  The Antiarmy Ideology in Seventeenth-Century England 
(London and Baltimore, 1974), p.192. 
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three year contracts.8  Volunteers were enticed with a reward of two guineas and a crown 
on enlistment, while those bringing ‘volunteers’ to serve would also receive one crown.9   
 
The usual duration of service was for life, a practice that did not end until 1795.  
This had the potential effect of draining the male population, especially in times of war.10  
In reality service was often shorter.  The legacy of public and political distrust of standing 
armies, and the dislike of spending money to retain them, meant that regiments were 
frequently raised and disbanded as budgets were enlarged or reduced with war and peace.  
Even if a regiment was retained, it was nearly always reduced in size on the coming of 
peace,11 so the rank and file rarely spent more than a few years in the army.  Chelsea 
Hospital documents from 1755 record service lengths of between two and forty-five 
years, with a mean average of nineteen years.12  However, those who wished to make a 
career of military service could choose to re-join other regiments, as Macleod and 
McBane did, four and six times respectively.13  Famous, long-established regiments, with 
seniority in the hierarchy, could promise security of employment, and attracted reliable 
recruits who would consider a long-term commitment to army service.  Newer regiments 
could turn their probably brief existence to their advantage by effectively offering a term 
of service for the duration.  The frequency with which Chelsea Pensioners cited “Old 
                                                 
8 Gilbert, ‘An analysis’, p.40; Houlding, Fit for Service, p.117-8 and TNA SP54/9/90, Printed proclamation 
issued by Argyll, Stirling, 27th October 1715. 
9 BL Hardwick Papers Add.MS.36257 f.104, Orderly Book of Joseph Yorke. 
10 Houlding, Fit for Service, p.118. 
11 Schwoerer, “No Standing Armies!”, p.192. 
12 NWMS M.1975.5, Examination Book of the Chelsea Board held at Perth and Aberdeen.  Figures based 
on records of nine Scottish soldiers examined between 10th and 25th November 1755. 
13 D. McBane, ‘The Expert Sword-Man’s Companion Or the True Art of Self-defence.  With An Account 
of the Authors Life, And his Transactions during the Wars With France.  To Which is Annexed, The Art of 
Gunnerie By Donald McBane (Glasgow, 1728)’ in M. Rector (ed), Highland Swordsmanship.  Techniques 
of the Scottish Swordmasters (Union City, 2001), p.25, 28, 29, 45 and Thomson, Memoirs of the life, p.29, 
43, 75, 76. 
 89 
Age” as a reason for admittance14 suggests that though men enlisted with the knowledge 
that they would probably serve only for the duration, many chose re-enlistment to remain 
in the army for life. 
 
Recruitment took place in the winter when campaigning was not possible, and 
officers could be encouraged to recruitment duty by the prospect of visiting home and 
family.  It also allowed out of work agricultural labourers to be targeted without affecting 
agricultural productivity.15  Rebellions, however, did not fit the timetables of 
conventional warfare, so when the ’15 began in September the army struggled to find 
temporary recruits as the harvest occupied labourers.16  By October, the harvest was 
finished and enlistment increased.17 
 
In order to comply with the requirements for recruitment to the regular army, a 
potential soldier needed to be Protestant, not lame or prone to fits, with full use of both 
arms and legs, not in an apprenticeship or the militia, and be over five foot six inches tall.  
This last requirement was waived during times of acute need for manpower.18  Those that 
entered the army as criminals had to be over seventeen and under forty-five, over four 
foot, four inches tall and Protestant.19  The ‘Orders & Instructions to the Recruiting 
Parties’ as recorded by Cumberland’s ADC on 19th May 1746, specified that recruits had 
to be between the ages of seventeen and thirty, over five foot five inches, unless they 
                                                 
14 NWMS M.1975.5, Examination Book of the Chelsea Board held at Perth and Aberdeen, 12th November 
1755. 
15 Houlding, Fit for Service, p.117. 
16 TNA SP54/8/106, James Cockburne to Mr Pringle, Camp at Stirling, 26th September 1715. 
17 TNA SP54/9/90, Printed proclamation issued by Argyll, Stirling, 27th October 1715. 
18 Houlding, Fit for Service, p.117. 
19 H.C.B. Rogers, The British Army of the Eighteenth Century (London, 1977), p.61. 
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were young enough to still be growing, in which case half an inch grace was allowed.20  
The peacetime stipulation of five foot six inches in height compared to the mid-rebellion 
recruitment condition of five foot five or even only five foot reveals which criteria the 
army considered vital and those on which they were prepared to compromise.  Officers 
were instructed to carefully examine recruits for “sores or Ruptures” – a stipulation 
important enough that if any arrived at the regiment with sores, the charge for enlisting 
that man and his subsistence pay would be taken from the officer responsible for 
recruiting him.21   
 
Once enlisted, a recruit received up to four pounds (Sterling) bounty money.  
Though a good incentive, it also encouraged a culture of ‘bounty-jumpers’ who made a 
living enlisting, deserting and re-enlisting.  Less scrupulous recruiting officers turned a 
blind eye to this, as the enlistment still fulfilled their quota.22  Each recruit entering as a 
private was entitled to wages of 8d per day.23  However, from this, stoppages were made; 
2d for clothing and expenses and further amounts for the regimental agent, regimental 
surgeon and surgeon’s mate.24  In 1708, the Board of General Officers took on the role of 
inspecting uniforms to ensure they were the standardised, approved version, in an attempt 
to reduce corruption, as colonels commonly bought cheaper fabric than they claimed for 
from the government and kept the difference.  Though the 1708 changes reduced 
variations in uniforms, it remained the regiment’s duty to provide them, so both 
                                                 
20 BL Hardwick Papers Add. MS.36257 f.104-105, Orderly Book of Joseph Yorke. 
21 BL Hardwick Papers Add. MS.36257 f.104-105, Orderly Book of Joseph Yorke. 
22 G.M. Trevelyan, England Under Queen Anne.  Blenheim (London, 1930), p.229-30. 
23 R. Holmes, Redcoat (London, 2002), p.309. 
24 Rogers, The British Army, p.309. 
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irregularities and petty corruption continued.25  Standardisation of uniforms and 
equipment was not achieved until the 1750s.26  Expenses for accommodation and food, 
typically bread, vegetables and cheese, were taken from subsistence pay.27  All other 
products and requirements were paid from the remainder of pay, minus stoppages, which 
was usually issued every two months, though a contemporary account recalled payday on 
Wednesdays and Saturdays – further evidence of ‘the custom of the army’ creating a lack 
of standard practise.28  In reality, privates rarely got a minimum amount of 1d per day 
until 1847.29  
 
Uniforms and some equipment were provided by regiments from the money 
allocated to them by parliament and distributed by the Quartermaster-General.30  The 
only obligation on colonels was to provide swords to officers.  Muskets were supplied by 
the Ordnance Office, which began stockpiling separate parts after the 1715 ‘Ordnance 
System of Manufacture’.  However, these were only assembled when needed and the 
Ordnance Office took on average three years to replace worn out weapons.  Each man 
was issued with sixty to 120 charges every year during peace, but training took place 
using ‘squibs’ as charges were expensive.  The lack of standardisation in weapons and 
the lack of opportunity to train with live ammunition meant proficiency was dependent 
on the interest levels and ability of each regiments’ colonel and officers, and could 
                                                 
25 Rogers, The British Army, p.46. 
26 Ibid, p.65. 
27 Ibid, p.83-4. 
28 Ibid, p.47 and T. Jackson (ed), The Lives of Early Methodist Preachers Chiefly Written by Themselves 
(Stoke-on-Trent, 1998), 3 vols, II, p.326. 
29 Holmes, Redcoat, p.309. 
30 Rogers, The British Army, p.45-6, 48 
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deteriorate alarmingly during peacetime.31  Cavalry deductions also included stoppages 
for extra equipment, and so were given extra funds for ‘grass money’.  To compensate for 
the money lost to the extra equipment, horses were put out to graze rather than being 
given cut grass, straw or hay; another example of small-scale but endemic corruption.32 
 
Another entitlement of the rank and file was that some could be accompanied by 
their wives and families.  This number was strictly regulated as they were financially kept 
by the regiment.33  Therefore, four to twelve per cent of wives were kept ‘on the 
strength’.  They alone amongst the camp followers were entitled to follow the army 
abroad and to earn extra money by acting as laundresses, cooks and nurses.34  Early 
smaller barracks in Scotland had no space allocated for wives, but they were permitted to 
live in the villages nearby.  Once larger barracks were built within the new forts wives 
‘on the strength’ could sleep with their husbands within the barracks.  Unofficial camp 
followers, including families, still marched with the army, but without any privileges, the 
toleration of their presence depending on the situation and commander.  Cumberland, for 
example, tolerated them but included them under the same rules and punishments as the 
soldiers.35  Before the battle of Culloden, Cumberland’s order book reveals he issued 
orders to the women just as he ordered his soldiers, commanding “The…Women, to 
                                                 
31 Houlding, Fit for Service, p.138, 140-1, 143, 145, 150. 
32 Rogers, The British Army, p.47. 
33 Ibid, p.98-9. 
34 A. Venning, Following the Drum.  The Lives of Army Wives and Daughters Past and Present (London, 
2005), p.11-2, 61, 131-2. 
35 BL Hardwick Papers Add. MS.36257 f.52, Orderly Book of Joseph Yorke. 
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march & continue wth their Regiments.”36 On 23rd April and 8th July Cumberland ordered 
that any woman or soldier found stealing forage or selling on meal would be whipped.37 
 
Men sought service in the army for many reasons.  A large incentive was to 
escape problems in the civilian world.  Unemployment, debts, poor family life or 
apprenticeships were common reasons that pushed men into the army.38  The memoir of 
McBane includes using deployment to Flanders as a way to escape the vengeance of the 
brothers of a woman he had tricked into a false marriage.39  The standard start of most 
military memoirs is entering the army to escape bad masters in apprenticeships.40  This 
stereotype was widespread in eighteenth century culture despite the army’s strict rules 
excluding apprentices from recruitment and its policy of returning them to their masters 
in order to protect skilled trades.41 
 
A major factor that attracted men to military service was the inducement of 
regular food, pay and clothing, items not easily found in the precarious civilian life of the 
common man.  This promise was, however, stronger than the reality.  Pay was rarely 
regular, brief delays being caused by transportation of money when on campaign, to 
decades of procrastination, the fault of a reluctant parliaments and a parsimonious 
treasury.42  However, for the volunteer aged over thirty with a wife and probably family 
                                                 
36 BL Hardwick Papers Add. MS.36257 f.52 and Add. MS.36257 f.57, Orderly Book of Joseph Yorke. 
37 BL Hardwick Papers Add. MS.36257 f.70 and Add.MS. 36457 f.139, Orderly Book of Joseph Yorke. 
38 J. Calder, The Story of the Scottish Soldier 1600-1914 (Edinburgh, 1987), p.11. 
39 McBane, The Expert Sword-Man’s Companion, p.29-30. 
40 Thomson, Memoirs of the life, p.13-4, 17, 24, 29 and McBane, The Expert Sword-Man’s Companion, 
p.25. 
41 Gilbert, ‘An analysis’, p.41. 
42 Holmes, Redcoat, p.310. 
 94 
to support,43 civilian life offered little job security or opportunity for improvement.  The 
army’s awareness of money as a motivator to recruitment is clear from the emphasis 
placed on bounty and prize money by recruiting parties.  They neglected, however, to 
remind potential recruits that, once prize money was shared within a regiment, a soldier’s 
share was minimal.44  British army pay was lower than the average civilian wage, but, 
unlike seasonal work or fluctuating pay depending on economic circumstance in the 
civilian world, army pay was at least, promised to be consistent.45 
 
The army also offered men a career and comrades, evidenced by the frequent re-
enlistment of men returned to civilian life once regiments were disbanded; McBane and 
Macleod, though both Highlanders, found support when unemployed not from family or 
clan but from the army.46  For many Scots, military service in the British army was a 
continuation of the old Scottish custom of military service to their chief.  Highland chiefs 
and tacksmen – the Highland gentry – were aware of this and took advantage of the 
traditional culture of obedience and deference to the clan elite, and loyalties to clan, 
family and community to maximise recruits.  After the embodiment of the first Highland 
regiment, the 43rd, in 1739, the Highlands were especially targeted.  Here, filial 
allegiances were stronger and more persistent than the mere historical legacy for 
Lowlanders.  Sir James Campbell of Lawers (1680-1745) was specifically chosen as 
recruitment officer for the Scots Fusiliers during the War of the Spanish Succession 
                                                 
43 Gilbert, ‘An analysis’, p.41. 
44 H.V. Bowen, War and British Society, 1688-1815 (Cambridge, 1998), p.15 and Holmes, Redcoat, p.310. 
45 Holmes, Redcoat, p.309. 
46 McBane, The Expert Sword-Man’s Companion, p.25, 28, 29, 45 and Thomson, Memoirs of the life, p.29, 
43, 75, 76. 
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because he could attract his own tenants.47  The Independent Highland Companies, prior 
to their embodiment, employed the same tactic; commissions for companies were given 
to the gentlemen of loyal clans who could then recruit from that clan.  This reassured the 
government – always suspicious that all Scots, especially Highlanders, were potential 
rebels – of the loyalty of both gentlemen and the rank and file.  It also ensured 
recruitment was targeted on a group of Scots not generally sought for regular regiments.48 
 
Even when the clan structure was declining, Scottish officers continued to 
promote the notion of clan loyalties to London in order to get colonelcies and 
commissions.49  Some had a real sense of responsibility for soldiers under their command 
who they had recruited.  In 1783, Norman Macleod of Macleod objected to his superiors 
when he was told to transfer the Highlanders he had recruited from his own clan to other 
regiments.  He feared he would “never again visit my faithful people” because his word 
as a gentleman would be ruined after he had used the remnants of the old powers of 
patronage and protection of clan gentleman over clansmen to recruit them in return for 
promises of protection.50  By contrast, General Fraser showed no obvious reaction to a 
placement in Portugal instead of deploying with his regiment in 1762 to Cuba where 
death from disease was a probability.51  
                                                 
47 ODNB Sir James Campbell of Lawers by H.M. Stephens, rev. by Jonathan Spain and W.L. Burn, ‘A 
Scots Fusilier and Dragoon under Marlborough’, Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, 15, 
1936, p.82-3. 
48 P. Simpson, The Independent Highland Companies 1603- 1760 (Edinburgh, 1996), p.x. 
49 A. Mackillop, ‘For King, Country and Regiment?  Motive and Identity within Highland Soldiering 1746-
1815’ in S. Murdoch and A. Mackillop (eds), Fighting for Identity: Scottish Military Experience c.1550-
1900 (Leiden, Boston and Köln, 2002), p.202, 204, 209. 
50 Ibid, p.200-1. 
51 ODNB Simon Fraser, Master of Lovat, by Stuart Reid and I. Macpherson McCulloch, Sons of the 
Mountains.  The Highland Regiments in the French & Indian War, 1756-1767 (New York and Canada, 
2006), 2 vols, I, p.265, 279-80, 281. 
 96 
 
The army also exploited the attraction of a regiment’s history, reputation and the 
promise of adventure when recruiting.  These were symbolised by the flags and uniforms 
of the recruiting party – a significant fact in a largely illiterate world.52  Each company 
had its own colours, providing a focus for morale and identity, as well as the Union flag 
and regimental colours, which became standardised in 1751.53  Posters were used, 
suggesting better literacy than widely assumed.  Plays and songs were also common 
methods of attracting attention, though they might have had less of an impact on 
Presbyterian Scotland.  More influential was the involvement of ministers and local 
gentry making speeches and issuing proclamations to encourage volunteers, for example 
at the start of the ’15.54  The army, and therefore the government, was aware of the power 
of visual identifiers in recruitment.  Some Scottish regiments from the Restoration, the 
Independent Highland Companies, and later Highland regiments were permitted specific 
privileges including the use of kilts, traditional arms and bagpipers.  The memoir of 
Macleod clearly shows how “the highland dress and music, and…the society of his 
countrymen”55 helped him to enlist in 1720.  These privileges gained extra potency when 
kilts, bagpipes and bearing arms were banned elsewhere by the Disarming Act of 1746, 
which sought to break the independence of the clans to prevent future Jacobite 
                                                 
52 R.A. Houston, Scottish Literacy and the Scottish Identity.  Illiteracy and Society in Scotland and 
Northern England 1600-1800 (Cambridge, 1985), p.8, 11-2, 21-2 and I.D. Whyte, Scotland’s Society and 
Economy in Transition, c.1500-c.1760 (Basingstoke and London, 1997), p.58. 
53 Rogers, The British Army, p.43. 
54 J. McAlear (ed), ‘Ballads and songs loyal to the Hanoverian Succession (1703-1761)’, The Augustan 
Reprint Society, 96, 1962; R. Palmer (ed), The Rambling Soldier (Gloucester, 1985) and TNA SP54/9/90, 
Printed proclamation issued by Argyll, Stirling, 27th October 1715. 
55 Thomson, Memoirs of the life, p.43. 
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uprisings.56  Once these were illegal in civilian life, the only way to continue personal use 
of such traditions was by enlisting in a Highland regiment.    
 
Though a sense of ‘Scottishness’ – loyalty to clan gentry and the wearing of 
traditional clothing – were effective incentives to recruitment, British national identity 
and patriotism were weaker concepts during the first half of the eighteenth century.  
Colley and Bowen argue that the common threat of the French was enough to create a 
sense of ‘Britishness’ that inspired men to enlist.57  However, this threat of republican 
revolution and anarchy was not present until end of the eighteenth century, so it was the 
need to defend homes, families and livelihoods from the Jacobites that encouraged men 
to enlist from the end of the seventeenth century.  This was reinforced by the additional 
threat of French invasion: in only half a century a Franco-Jacobite invasion or threat had 
occurred in 1708, 1715, 1722, 1733, 1744, 1745 and 1759. 
 
A much more effective motivator than patriotism was religion and politics.  In the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries it was impossible to think of one without the other 
as religious principles gave legitimacy to political authority.  These beliefs were so 
strongly held that many were prepared to fight for them.  The Cameronian regiment was 
formed in 1689 specifically to allow the followers of Presbyterian preacher Richard 
Cameron in a ‘Protestant crusade’ to defend the Covenanting values of strong 
Presbyterian religion and civil liberties.  These principles, embodied in the Glorious 
                                                 
56 A first offence was punishable by six months in prison while the second offence meant transportation for 
seven years.  P. Cochrane, Scottish Military Dress (London, New York and Sydney, 1987), p.35. 
57 L. Colley, Britons. Forging the nation, 1707-1837 (London, 2003), p.6.and Bowen, War and British 
Society, p.54. 
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Revolution, were under threat from Jacobite and therefore Catholic and Episcopalian 
rebels.58  The government clearly recognised the value of such motivated soldiers 
because they made a rare concession that the Cameronians could retain Ministers and 
Elders of their church, a concession not allowed to any other regiment.59  The persistent 
doubts felt by Blackader about the conflict between his faith and military service 
demonstrate how important these concessions were for the Cameronians to validate their 
military activities.60  Many joined the army, both on short contracts and in normal 
service, to defend principles and beliefs.  The return of a Stuart dynasty was objected to 
because of the loss of constitutional changes it would entail, changes gained at the 
Glorious Revolution that tamed the power of the crown and created a stronger, protected 
parliament.  It brought the risk of a return to Catholicism and the oppressive foreign 
‘yoke of Rome’.  The Union of 1707 would also be under threat of reversal.  Many Scots, 
who had gained from trade and tax concessions, decided to fight to defend it, and so 700 
men travelled from Glasgow to Stirling in September 1715 to enlist against the threat of 
Jacobite rebellion.61  Many then served under Blackader, defending Stirling during the 
Battle of Sheriffmuir.62  
 
Officers were drawn from the landed gentry class, lesser gentry, educated but 
landless gentlemen, and from those promoted from the other ranks.63  Though officers 
                                                 
58 J. White, The Cameronians (Scottish Rifles) in France (Glasgow, 1917), p.2, 7 and Cochrane, Scottish 
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were expected to be gentlemen, with their natural disposition towards organising and 
ordering and reflecting the strong social hierarchy of society, a surprising number of 
sergeants were promoted to become officers.  Many of these were created to staff the 
newer regiments raised to fulfil increasing colonial commitments in the Americas and 
India.  Between 1739 and 1748, 200 sergeants were commissioned from the other ranks 
for this purpose.64  The recruitment of officers was approached differently from that of 
the other ranks.  Officers required commissions to join a particular regiment, which were 
purchased.  Until the purchase system was finally abolished in 1872, two-thirds of 
officers gained their commissions through purchase using the influences of patronage, 
nepotism, wealth and personal merit.65  The rejection of social rank within the New 
Model Army began the belief that the purchase system encouraged corruption, though 
this was ignored by Charles II and James II who both recognised it as a way to reduce 
government and crown expenditure.66  It was briefly declared illegal in 1684, though 
even James II continued to approve bought commissions.  William tried to control it 
through the 1695 Mutiny Act but the relevant clause had to be removed in 1701.67  Not 
until 1717 did the Board of General Officers agree that the system would be phased out, 
though this too failed as officers protested it would undercut the value of existing 
commissions and many were forced to sell for less than they had originally invested as 
new officers did not know if their purchases would have value at their own retirement.68 
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William III, Anne, George I and George II were against the use of purchase for 
commissions.  They saw an inefficient system that promoted wealth rather than 
professionalism.  Petty corruption of the system also existed as was demonstrated in 1705 
when Anne had to ban the purchase of commissions for children and youths.  Though 
they were bought as investment for the boys’ later military education, such practices 
created a shortage of posts for the current generation.69  Many, however, believed the 
purchase system encouraged a professional attitude towards soldiering.  Men who bought 
and traded on commissions were focused on long-term military careers not the short-term 
service for plunder associated with mercenaries.  Placing a monetary value on 
commissions also allowed officers to invest in their advancement, almost as a form of 
speculation similar to buying shares.70  The tiered scale of value also aided the 
impoverished but ambitious gentleman who could enter the army as the lowest 
commissioned grade and work his way up to titles, posts, wealth and respect, as Field-
Marshal Ligonier had.71   Indeed, the purchase system and the hierarchy of regiments 
provided a way for officers to monitor their own and others’ improvement.  Marlborough 
believed private purchase between individuals prevented government and crown 
interference.  He also saw from personal experience that the sale of a dead officer’s 
commission went to aid his family, to paying outstanding debts which would otherwise 
fall to the regiment and that private purchase was a quicker transaction than if it had to go 
through government and crown approval process.72  The flamboyant style of cavalry 
regiments and the hierarchy of regiments that affected their permanence on the 
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Establishment meant that the cavalry and senior regiments had a plentiful supply of 
applicants.73  This left opportunities open for poorer or younger men to gain commissions 
in less glamorous and therefore cheaper regiments.  
 
As commissions and promotions were dependent on the approval of a regiment’s 
colonel or commander, a major part of buying a commission was petitioning regimental 
agents, colonels or commanders of regiments.  This was usually done through third 
parties, such as family or friends or by gaining the support of an influential patron who 
would look to your interests.74  Within this, personal merit was recognised, as some 
colonels’ desired promotion from within their own regiment only.  When Blackader tried 
to sell the colonelcy of the Cameronians in 1711, he attempted to find the right man to 
replace him who possessed the qualities of character needed to continue the religious 
duty of the Cameronians.  However, this attempt at promotion through meritocracy failed 
because the chosen candidate lacked the funds to buy it.75  Personal merit could be 
promoted in other ways, especially in the field.  The hierarchy of commissions ensured 
that, on the death of senior officers in battle, promotions in the field would promote 
juniors or those who had shown ability.76  Sir Robert Munro of Fowlis and the 1st Earl of 
Orkney were rewarded with their own regiments after demonstrating leadership at 
                                                 
73 Houlding, Fit for Service, p.126. 
74 Holmes, Redcoat, p.109; NWMS M.1992.279.2, George Brown to William Brown, Brussels, 14th 
December 1743; FCA A/AAF/40/30/6/1, Earl of Rothes to Duke of Cumberland, Leslie, 2nd Janurary 1748; 
Earl of Rothes to Ligonier, London, 14th June 1748; Ligonier to Earl of Rothes, Cyndhaven, 23rd July 1748 
and Earl of Rothes to Duke of Cumberland, Leslie, 17th August 1748. 
75 Crichton, The Life and Diary, p.428-33. 
76 Houlding, Fit for Service, p.107. 
 102 
Fontenoy (1745) and Steenkerke (1692), respectively.77  Though both George I and 
George II, in keeping with their desire to replace the British ‘custom of the army’ with 
regulations, tried to abolish purchase, the amount of money already invested in the 
system made it impossible to end.  Consequently, they attempted to control it with 
regulations and promoted the use of meritocracy to encourage increased professionalism.  
This only had long term impact through their descendants.  Both the Duke of Cumberland 
(1721-1765) son of George II, and Prince Frederick, Duke of York (1763-1827) son of 
George III, promoted meritocracy and oversaw dramatic developments in army structure 
that aimed to reduce corruption and inefficiency.78  However, during the first half of the 
eighteenth century, the fate of George Brown was more typical:  
I am pretty well assured if it had depended on him (Mr Douglas of 
Covers) I would have been provided [with a commission].  but how 
can I reasonably expect to be preferred for nothing, when people of 
highest rank & best interests, are every day glad to have preferment 
[promotion] for money.”79 
 
Gentlemen had long viewed service in the army as an acceptable career; the belief 
that the army was filled with the dregs of society applied to the other ranks only.  Military 
service had even greater appeal for younger sons, who would not inherit, and immigrants 
such as exiled Huguenots.  The army provided the opportunity to create their own 
careers, reputations and fortunes.  Ligonier, for example, left France as a young man and 
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worked his way up through the ranks until he became Field Marshal and died an English 
earl.  It was widely known that those with a professional attitude towards soldiering 
would be welcomed in the British army.80  Military service was also acceptable as part of 
a gentleman’s education.  The Earl of Islay, though he later pursued a very successful 
legal career, spent time in Flanders between 1701 and 1705 and was consequently able to 
fight during the ’15.81  The educative role of military service is demonstrated in the 
number of commissions bought for infants and boys as investments; both Argyll and 
Islay were awarded commissions at fourteen and nineteen, and in 1764, seven of the 
cadets registered as attending the Royal Artillery College were still in the nursery.82 
 
For Scots, military service fulfilled several other requirements.  In both the 
Highlands and Lowlands, martial culture had a long history.  Though the Lowlands were 
increasingly de-militarised as reiving and border-conflicts ended in the mid-seventeenth 
century83, both had a cultural history of ‘Free Service’, the gentry’ equivalent of ‘Scottish 
Service’.84  This gave legitimacy to military service as an honourable profession for 
gentlemen.85  Additionally, after a half-century of Jacobite activity, military service in the 
British army also provided an ideal way for Scots to seek rehabilitation with the 
establishment.  Two notable examples were Major-General Simon Fraser, son of the 
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beheaded 11th Lord Lovat, and Lieutenant-Colonel James Murray, a son and brother of 
active Jacobites.  Fraser quickly offered a regiment to the government in 1757 at the start 
of the Seven Years War86 and spent seventeen years of military service in America and 
Portugal repairing the damage done by his father’s treason before the government 
returned the family’s estates in 1774.87  Murray spent fifty-three years serving in the 
army and retired a respected member of the establishment.88  Both these men, and many 
like them, had success in the military by promoting their links of clan and family that 
would ease recruitment of troops from their lands.  Indeed Fraser’s first regiment, 
Fraser’s 63rd Highland Regiment, was largely recruited from Inverness-shire, the area of 
his family’s traditional estates.  As the eighteenth century progressed, the influence of 
clan and family ties were based on increasingly tenuous links to old traditions.  This 
contrasts against the experience of his father, Lord Lovat, who in 1688 raised Fraser men 
for the brother-in-law of his cousin, and therefore his clan chief, the future 1st Duke of 
Atholl, despite his personal dislike of the man and his politics.89 
 
Drill, discipline and punishment 
Discipline was vital for any soldier, especially in the British army because of the 
circumstances that had set public and political attitudes against it.  The cultural memory 
of the army as the oppressive arm of government during the Civil War and Interregnum, 
and as the enforcer of religious conformity in Scotland in the last decades of the 
seventeenth century, meant the army at the turn of the eighteenth century needed to 
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restore a tarnished reputation.  The country’s preference for ‘blue water policy’ and a 
reluctance to pay the taxes to fund a bigger army meant that during the first half of the 
eighteenth century the army had a pressing need to win over public and politicians alike.  
In this respect, discipline – that is control – of soldiers both on and off the battlefield was 
necessary to improve civil-military relations.    
 
Discipline on the battlefield was clearly essential.  Developments in technology 
during the period Roberts termed the ‘military revolution’ had led to new strategies that 
required controlled coordination of firepower and manoeuvre.90  Such control and 
coordination was instilled through drill, therefore contemporary terminology regarded 
training as synonymous with discipline.  To aid this, officers relied on drill books, and 
these were viewed as so vital that their regulation was one of the responsibilities of the 
Commander-in-Chief.91  Though drill books were issued by the army administration from 
the 1670s onwards, no new works were written between 1690 and 1727, and the 
Regulations issued in 1728 were then simply re-published until 1743.92  This stagnation 
had little detrimental effect however, as warfare advanced little over the early eighteenth 
century and the plethora of re-printed older works were invaluable to officers.  
Additionally, as officers were responsible for training, there was flexibility for them to 
adapt the manual to suit their experience and the peculiarities of their regiments.    
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Drill designed for training in conventional warfare against conventional foes was 
ineffectual in Scotland.  The Highland tactics met during the Jacobite rebellions always 
initially wrong-footed the British army.  The reliance on volley fire from a distance 
meant even those who might have been prepared, such as McBane who was raised in the 
Highlands, were shocked by the ferocity of the Highland Charge at Killiecrankie.93  The 
effect of the charge at Prestonpans was enough to force the majority of the British army 
out of Scotland.  Though General Cope was criticised for this, a repeat at the left wing of 
the British lines at Falkirk showed that preparing solely for conventional fighting was a 
liability when faced with the unconventional tactics used by the Jacobites.94   
 
Discipline, both on and off the battlefield, was also vital to reduce desertion rates.  
Two of the few extant weekly returns of the period, both from October 1715, demonstrate 
that desertion was common-place.  On the 1st October, of nine regiments, three had 
deserters, giving a total of nine deserters out of 2,053 troops that week.95  The return of 
29th October reveals fifteen deserters of a total 1,511 troops for the nine (different) 
regiments listed.96  Dealing with desertion could also distract attention from soldier’s 
genuine duties; it took 600 men from the 3rd Foot Guards, fifty from the Horse Grenadiers 
and nineteen locally quartered troops of dragoons four days to intercept and return the 
200 deserters of the 43rd Highland Regiment after they attempted to return to Scotland in 
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1743.97  Once soldiers were able to be barracked together later in the century, supervision 
could be more easily maintained.  However, the boredom of garrison duty often led to 
indiscipline.  This had particular implications for Scotland, as the vast majority of early 
barracks and garrisons were concentrated there.  The army addressed this by employing 
soldiers on extra duties such as road making or as labourers building the barracks 
themselves.  General Hawley wrote in 1726 that to prevent “sloth and idleness,” road 
building “‘twould keep them in good discipline.”98  However, road building duty began 
to break down the barriers of normal army routine and in 1751 an order had to be issued 
specifically addressing road building parties to remind soldiers to salute their officers 
while working.  This order was followed by wider standing orders in 1754, again 
specially addressing road building parties.  Both orders suggest that a high standard of 
respect was expected to be maintained and that in normal army life this was achieved.99 
 
The army was also aware of the potential harm indiscipline could cause to civil-
military relations while soldiers were in billets or barracks.  One legacy of the fear of 
standing armies was that few barracks existed in Britain until at least the mid-eighteenth 
century.  Those that did exist were small and largely focused on coastal or border areas.  
Consequently, when moving across country, men were billeted in towns and villages, but 
were often widely dispersed and separated from their officers.  The consequence of this 
dispersal and consequent absence of authority was reduced control leading to increased 
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drunkenness, fighting and lechery.100  While this behaviour would not have improved the 
public’s perception of soldiers it does suggest that soldiers were better behaved in the 
presence of their officers.  Restored public opinion was needed to correct the impression 
that soldiers were mere mercenaries or recruited from the scum of society.  From 1697, 
debate in Scotland began to question whether standing armies were the best option for 
defence.  Enlightened thinking, based on Renaissance theory and propagated by Andrew 
Fletcher of Saltoun in a series of pamphlets, held that if a nation’s defence relied on 
militias drawn from that nation’s subjects, it would aid society.  It was argued that 
participation in maintaining the peace and authority of the state through militia duty 
encouraged ‘civic virtù’ in ordinary men who, therefore, were invested in the stability of 
their own society.  Standing armies, by contrast, were filled by mercenaries who had no 
connection to the society they fought for, no investment in its continuity and security 
beyond their payment.101  By the eighteenth century, this opinion was out of touch with 
reality, but was still believed because the rank and file were recruited from varied 
backgrounds that contained trouble-makers, adventurers and wild cards.  As a few bad 
experiences and characters are more memorable than a conforming majority, it was these 
stories that spread to sustain the stereotype.102   
 
The poor reputation of soldiers in the British army was not entirely undeserved.  
Cases of murder were common.  Sergeant Anthony Fitzpatrick was tried and found guilty 
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in November 1711 of killing his wife in Glasgow in the summer of 1710.103  It was 
violence between soldier and civilian, however, that confirmed the public’s worst fears 
and stereotypes, such as the two, almost simultaneous but separate, murders of civilians 
by soldiers in 1712 that caused “Turmult and Mob” in Scotland.104  One is discussed in 
relation to the Riot Act of 1715 later in this chapter, the second concerns Corporal John 
Brown of Sir Charles Hotham’s Regiment.  In May 1712, he killed John Bennet in Perth 
and then fled.  Brown returned two weeks later claiming the death was an accident but 
had feared the law.  His fate is unknown, but the Lord Advocate of Scotland, James 
Stewart believed Brown had suffered “insufferable provocations” and that the case 
should be tried elsewhere to ensure fairness, demonstrating sympathy with the difficult 
role soldiers policing civilians faced.  Many soldiers were given reprieves, perhaps 
because trained men were hard to replace, especially during war.105   
 
For Scottish soldiers and regiments, the need to improve reputations was 
particularly urgent, as they laboured under both the general slurs against soldiers, as well 
as the endemic suspicion of their loyalty.  The army had recently turned against Charles I, 
and had abandoned James II for William III, with Scottish regiments and soldiers 
prominent amongst them.  To this was added the fear that since the Stuarts’ repeated 
attempts to regain the throne that focused on Scotland, all Scots were secretly Jacobite 
rebels.  The distance between London and Scotland, the many motivations that created 
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seemingly random divisions between areas, communities and families and the convoluted 
nature of clan and family allegiances meant that few had the knowledge to distinguish 
between loyal and disloyal Scots.  In the army, these suspicions affected the positioning 
of Scottish regiments.  During the ’15 and ’45 rebellions, Scottish regiments that pre-
dated the Union and who had shown adequate evidence of loyalty were trusted in the 
battle lines.106  Others, such as the 43rd Highlanders, were positioned with the baggage at 
Falkirk and Culloden, or kept on the south coast in Kent.107  Again, besides those that 
were genuinely Jacobite, the behaviour of the few indulging in the ‘cultural’ aspects of 
Jacobitism helped give credence to the myth.  Soldiers were often accused of drinking the 
Pretender’s health while drunk, while members of the public made denunciations of a 
regiment’s behaviour.108  The institutional suspicion of Scots reached paranoia under 
Walpole who followed a strongly anti-Jacobite policy.109   
 
In general, stereotypes have a basis in truth, but for the British army between the 
Union and the end of the ’45, the suspicion that soldiers were disloyal, ill disciplined and 
a danger to society was slowly becoming increasingly false and out-dated.  The army was 
entirely conscious of the need to improve the reputation of soldiers.  Regiments 
traditionally performed a public parade on the eve of embarkation.  The review of the 43rd 
Regiment at Finchley Common on 14th May 1743, for example, attracted large crowds 
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eager to see Highlanders in their kilts.110  The event was important enough for a painting 
of the parade to be commissioned that now hangs at the entrance of the officers’ mess of 
The Black Watch, 3rd Battalion, Royal Regiment of Scotland (3 Scots) in Fort George at 
Ardersier.  To emphasise and increase the improvement in the reputation of the British 
army, it focused on improving its control over troops, and so improving the discipline and 
reliability of troops.  The British army approached this through five methods: the issuing 
of orders and punishment to enforce them, the acceptance of duelling, the positive 
association of rewards both during and after service, and through legislation.   
 
The Commander-in-Chief held the most effective position to influence discipline, 
firstly though drill but also through his commands and regulations.111  Marlborough, for 
example, issued two orders in Flanders on 11th June 1708 to protect the local civilians 
and their goods in order to end plundering.  Depending on the severity of the 
infringement of this order, soldiers would either pay back the value of the goods taken or 
be sentenced to death.112  During the ’45, Cumberland issued frequent orders against 
plundering.  In the week after Culloden, for example, five notices were issued and a court 
martial held to punish those who had transgressed them.113  Another part of 
Marlborough’s 1708 orders stated soldiers could not leave camp without permission, 
though McBane’s frequent adventures away from camp at all hours suggests such an 
order was difficult to enforce.114  Even in Scotland in 1746, when the conflict’s status as 
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a rebellion allowed the relaxation of normal rules of engagement, the importance of 
maintaining discipline to protect access of food supplies is still clear.115  After the order 
of 17th April 1746 that the King’s Mills were “not to be damaged”116 had failed to deter 
plunderers, a guard had to be assigned to them on 18th April to “prevent further 
disorders.”117  Consequently, when on 21st April, Cumberland ordered that Lovat’s 
fisheries were out of bounds, the wording and potential punishment was 
uncompromising; the first man “who dares” to enter the fishery or take salmon or anyone 
who fails to stop the entry of salmon into camp would be hanged.118 
 
Punishment was designed to provide not just chastisement to offenders but an 
example to other soldiers.  For example, of the 115 soldiers of the 43rd Highland 
Regiment found guilty of mutiny and desertion in 1743, only three were executed as 
representatives of all those found guilty.  The remaining Highlanders were sent to serve 
in regiments in Gibraltar, Minorca, Georgia and the Leeward Isles, except the two who 
died in prison before transportation.  Such deployment, the fear of which was one of the 
reasons the soldiers had deserted, was regarded as equivalent to the death penalty.  The 
regiment in the Leeward Isles remained there for the next thirty-three years, while the 
regiment in Georgia were reduced by disease from 5,000 to 500 before being 
relocated.119  Therefore humiliation as well as pain was meted out.  The public nature of 
punishments, conducted in front of the regiment, with the choice and severity of 
punishment at the regimental level court martial’s discretion, ensured that one soldier’s 
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crime affected all and so let down the whole regiment.  In this way punishment was 
feared to the extent that one of the main excuses given for desertion at courts martial 
between 1751 and 1753 was the fear of punishment due.120  Punishments themselves 
depended on the severity of the crime, varying from corporal to capital.  In an ascending 
scale, punishments included the ‘bastinade’, when the soles of the feet were beaten, 
floggings, being drummed out of the regiment with your crime written on a sign around 
the neck, to the death sentence carried out by hanging or being shot.  Cases with possible 
capital punishment were decided by General Courts Martial and the sentence had to be 
approved by the Commander-in-Chief.121  Rather than extreme, such punishments were 
regarded as fair, and were therefore respected, because they mirrored civil punishments. 
Between 1688 and 1800 offences with a potential death penalty in civilian law had 
dramatically increased to 200, in what became known as the ‘Bloody Code’.122  
 
Another, somewhat surprising, method of discipline was the tacit acceptance of 
duelling.  This involved both officers and other ranks from Colonel Gardiner, Lord 
George Murray and Colonel Blackader to Sergeants McBane and Macleod.123   Duelling 
was illegal in the eyes of both civil and military courts.  Article XIX of the 1718 Articles 
of War stated that “Nor shall any Officer or Soldier presume to send a Challenge to any 
other Officer or Soldier, to fight a Duel, upon pain of being Cashier’d, if he be an Officer, 
or suffering the severest Corporal Punishment, if a Non-Commission Officer, or Private 
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Soldier.”124  However, the culture of duelling had been brought to the army from civilian 
life (and interestingly survived in the army long after it declined from civilian life)125 and 
was not easily ignored, especially when the necessity of fulfilling ‘behaviour befitting a 
gentleman and an officer’126 made duelling so common that even the pious Blackader 
was court-martialled for duelling in December 1691.127  The experiences of McBane and 
Macleod and the Article’s inclusion of soldiers suggests that duelling amongst the other 
ranks was so widespread that London was aware of it.128   Tacit acceptance could stray 
into active support.  As a new soldier in 1690, McBane’s officer informed him “if any 
difference fell out betwixt two soldiers, they were obliged to decide it with their 
swords.”129  Even twenty-one years later, in 1711, when conscious efforts were underway 
to improve the discipline and order of the army, McBane’s officer sent him temporarily 
to another garrison to protect him from his vengeful business competitors.130  Recent, 
unpublished research has confirmed that duels among the other ranks functioned as an 
unofficial method of justice.  This method was clearly consciously chosen by officers to 
settle small disputes and relieve tensions without resorting to higher regimental controls 
such as courts martial. 131  The continuation of duelling in the British army long after it 
was proscribed by civil and military law, and its role as a form of justice sanctioned by 
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officers but external of the army structure, reveals the weakness of central power in the 
army of the early eighteenth century.  However, it provided strength at lower levels of the 
army that ensured an efficient, inexpensive method of relieving tensions and solving 
disputes that, unfortunately, left few records.   
 
The British army in the early eighteenth century also sought to improve discipline 
through positive association.  The knowledge that long service in the other ranks could be 
rewarded with a place in an invalid company or as a Chelsea Pensioner, kept soldiers and 
their families loyal to their regiment and the regime, and financially invested in the 
future.132  The Chelsea Hospital (founded in 1684) cared for wounded soldiers both as in- 
and out-patients.133  Of a sample of twenty-seven Scottish former soldiers examined in 
1755 who had first been admitted to the Hospital between 1715 and 1754, the mean 
average length of time soldiers received a pension was ten years.  The longest length was 
forty years and the shortest was one year.  Of the sample, seven were wounded during the 
’45 and one during the ’15, though admissions for consumption (tuberculosis), old age 
and Gravell (kidney stones) were also considered sufficient to gain the army’s financial 
support.134 
 
For officers, the purchase system gave individuals a personal investment in their 
careers and long-term service, as the sale of their final rank provided their pension.  
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Financial gain became increasingly linked to career advancement rather than the short-
term gain of looting, leading to an increasingly professional army.135  The rank and file 
could aspire to this, as promotion from the ranks was a common reward for good service.  
Sergeant Terence Molloy of Lee’s (55th) Regiment was promoted to lieutenant in the 
winter of 1745-6 after defending Ruthven from a Jacobite attack in August 1745 with 
only one corporal and twelve men.136  In order to improve ability, meritocracy and self-
advancement, officers were encouraged to improve the soldiers under their command in a 
manner very similar to the nineteenth century introduction of education and moral 
welfare under the Duke of York and Edward Cardwell.137  In the eighteenth century 
races, competitions for the fastest or most accurate shot, and other games were used to 
encourage personal pride in themselves, their skills, and their regiment.  It also reduced 
boredom that could lead to indiscipline, such as in the months after Culloden around Fort 
Augustus.138  The more formal education given to artillery officers and engineers at the 
Royal Military Academy at the Royal Arsenal at Woolwich from 1721 aimed to create 
not only a “complete officer”, competent in arithmetic, mechanics, gunnery, magazine 
and artillery technology, bridge building, surveying, land levelling and drainage, and 
French,139 but also a more mentally disciplined officer class that were invested in their 
career.  
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Spiritual guidance also provided a private form of discipline that could also 
provide another method of control exercised by the army.  As already noted in Chapter 
One, Scots were well-known for their strong morals, and Scots continued to show 
evidence of strength of principle when serving in the British army.140  Blackader even 
continued to act for the Cameronians after his retirement, defending their right to their 
own mode of service at the General Assembly in 1714, when it was threatened to bring 
the Presbyterian service inline with the English manner of service.141  The governor of 
Fort William even went to some trouble to find a Gaelic speaking chaplain for Fort 
William in 1715.142  Cumberland ordered a “Divine Service of Thanksgiving” for the 20th 
April 1746, the first Sunday after Culloden, with compulsory attendance, as was weekly 
attendance for all officers and soldiers as stipulated by the 1718 Articles of War.143  The 
extent of religion’s aid to the discipline of the majority of soldiers is debatable however, 
as Blackader’s frequent lamentations about the immorality of the soldiers of the British 
army attests.144 
 
Victory in battle also provided a way for the army to reward good behaviour and 
discipline on the battlefield.  Those wounded were usually rewarded with ‘smart 
money’,145 a tradition adapted by the Earl of Findlater who donated twelve guineas to 
buy broth for each soldier injured at Culloden.  The City of London also used financial 
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rewards by raising £4,000 (Sterling) for the men, NCOs and Argyllshire Militia who had 
fought or guarded the train during the battle.146  Cumberland personally paid sixteen 
guineas to those who captured colours and standards, half a crown for each musket or 
broadsword captured and a guinea to each man who, when captured by the Jacobites, 
refused to join them.147  Gestures such as this signalled an official mark of appreciation 
and acted as a replacement for plundering.  Similarly, the completion of a military road 
between 1725 and 1760s was traditionally celebrated with a hog roast, occasionally 
attended by General Wade, as a sign of achievement and appreciation.148  Such actions 
were largely at the discretion of the individual officer as the emphasis on the regiment the 
military system meant that central power to provide guidelines was weak.  Such examples 
do not, therefore, pre-suppose similar behaviour in all regiments.  However, they do 
demonstrate that there was a clear desire to reward good behaviour as well as punish poor 
behaviour in the British army in the first half of the eighteenth century.149   
 
The final way the establishment sought to improve discipline in the army was by 
addressing weaknesses in related laws, the first of which was the 1689 Mutiny Act.  
William III, disturbed by the failure of soldiers to re-assemble after the army was 
dissolved immediately after the Glorious Revolution, suspected many were indifferent to 
him or secretly hostile.150  His suspicions were confirmed in early March 1689, when 800 
men and most of the officers of the Royal Scots deserted from Ipswich.  Almost 
                                                 
146 BL Hardwick Papers Add. MS.36257 f.61 and 128, Orderly Book of Joseph Yorke. 
147 BL Hardwick Papers Add. MS.36257 f.59, 61, Orderly Book of Joseph Yorke. 
148 R. Lamont Brown, ‘General George Wade, 1673-1748.  Roadmaker in the Highlands’, History Today, 
29:3, March 1979, p.151, 154. 
149 Rogers, The British Army, p.58, 63. 
150 C.D. Ellestad, ‘The Mutinies of 1689’, Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, 53, Spring 
1975, p.4-7, 8. 
 119 
simultaneously, but separately, the Scots Horse, Prince George’s Regiment and around 
200 men from various other regiments deserted and began to return to Scotland.151  
William III therefore sought ways to increase control over the army and brought a bill to 
extend the Articles of War to times of peace.  Submitted to parliament on 13th March 
1689, the Mutiny Act extended military trials and punishments applicable under the 
Articles of War to peacetime, replacing the previous system that left peacetime crimes to 
civil law tried as a felony.  The 1689 Mutiny Act was intended to be temporary but was 
annually re-enacted and permanently changed the nature of crime and punishment in the 
army.152   
 
Between the Glorious Revolution and the first quarter of the eighteenth century, 
the army was increasingly constrained by new laws that fundamentally altered the army’s 
legal position when serving within Britain.  However, though the introduction of the 
Mutiny Act and Riot Act represented a difference from the late seventeenth century 
perception that the army operated outside of the law, it took longer for the public to 
appreciate this.  The Mutiny Act, first enacted in 1689, and the 1715 Riot Act ensured 
that when soldiers were tried for civil or military crimes, they were often found guilty, 
despite the sympathy shown by members of the Scottish establishment such as Sir James 
Stewart, Lord Advocate and their officers.153  That many were then reprieved is not 
unusual considering the number of reprieves awarded in civilian courts.154  The changed 
legal framework did indeed ensure that trials took place and that guilty soldiers were 
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punished.  Even officers were publicly bound by the law.  The governors of Forts George 
and Augustus were both court-martialled after the loss of their forts during the ’45.  
Although General Courts Martial had been in place for years, they were not a formality.  
Major Grant, former Governor of Fort George, was found guilty in June 1746 for “a 
Breach of the 7th Article of War in shamefully abandoning his Post, and delivering Fort 
George to the Rebels” and was “Cashier’d…and render’d incapable of ever serving His 
Majesty in any military Employment.”155   
 
Despite the measures put in place to improve discipline and control, success was 
neither quick nor without lapses.  Continuing problems with desertion, mutiny, murder 
and petty crime perpetuated the poor reputation of standing armies and caused the social 
and political elites to continue to question their reliability.  In 1705, the 1st Duke of Atholl 
disliked having unknown, undisciplined Independent Highland Companies on his lands 
and requested they be deployed to Flanders, complaining: “they are filled with all the 
most notorious rogues and thieves in the Highlands.”156  Despite Atholl’s prejudice 
against Highlanders, formed by a life-time of feuding with Lord Lovat, the archetypal 
Highland chief,157 it is still true that Highlanders were less disciplined than regular 
soldiers.  However, this is due to the different set of conventions in Highland society that 
created different norms.  The traditional form of Highland feuding involved brief raids 
and the custom of ‘Scottish Service’ was limited to only forty days service a year, so that 
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remaining in the field for prolonged periods was an unfamiliar concept.158  A rare 
individual who did see their value was General MacKay, Commander-in-Chief of 
Scotland (1689-91).   This was despite his Lowland background which viewed 
Highlanders with as much, if not more, distrust than Englishmen.  After witnessing 100 
men from Menzies Company in his army at Killiecrankie in 1689, he obtained 
commissions for them and later recommended the creation of ten companies of 
Highlanders to police the Highlands, believing they could do it more effectively than 
regulars.159  
 
The mutiny of the 43rd Highland Regiment in May 1743 is often held as an 
example of Highland unreliability.  However, many reasons have since been given to 
explain their actions.  In an era of irregular rotation, the prospect of deployment to the 
West Indies was viewed as a death sentence, a fear exacerbated by a recent meeting with 
the Royal Scots, much depleted since their yellow-fever ridden deployment to the West 
Indies.160  The large number of gentlemen volunteers resented their treatment as ordinary 
soldiers, especially after two gentlemen-volunteers were not recognised as such when 
they were summoned to London to be displayed to George II and his court.161  The rank 
and file believed they had entered into an agreement for home service only, in the mould 
of their traditional ‘Scottish Service’ to their chiefs and as an extension of their duties as 
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Independent Companies.162  Additionally, Highlanders had a strong sense of honour and 
many felt slighted by the lack of royalty at their review.163  These reasons appear clichéd 
in the aftermath of Victorian romantic reinvention.  However, similar reasons given in 
Macleod, published in 1791, suggest that there is truth to these explanations.164  English 
and Lowland Scottish soldiers had an understanding that enlistment removed 
individualism, making way for the discipline, order and obedience needed for formal 
drill.  Highland behaviour, in contrast, appeared wild, unreliable and entirely unsuitable 
for conventional continental warfare.  In many ways, this contrast is clearer in the 
Jacobite army.  During the ’45, highlanders demonstrated poor discipline at sieges and 
during periods of inaction, when they reverted to traditions of sixteenth and seventeenth 
century inter-clan skirmishes and returned home on the promise of returning when 
fighting recommenced.  However, they also achieved a good level of co-ordination and 
logistical ability both when marching and fighting.165   
 
Duties of a soldier 
The key role of soldiers in Scotland was as a police force.  The unique presence of 
‘broken-men’,166 border reiving and inter-clan feuds in the Highlands meant a police 
force was needed earlier than elsewhere in Britain.  From 1603, Scots were used to help 
police themselves.  Independent Highland Companies, composed of loyal clans, raised 
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and disbanded as needed, had more success in accessing and patrolling the hostile 
environment of the Highlands than regular regiments.  Cattle reiving surged with the 
failed harvests of the 1690s and continued, to a lesser extent, into the eighteenth 
century.167  Macleod relates that, from 1720, he spent twenty years “hunting after 
incorrigible robbers” in Lovat’s Independent Highland Company.168  He relates a world 
in which the return of cattle and horses stolen is preferable to the arrest and hanging of 
the reiver – a solution which left the reiver’s family destitute and a burden to the parish.  
Consequently, rather than arrests, deals were struck to return goods because “As the 
British laws, made since the Union, had not yet free course in the Highlands, and 
depended, for their execution, on military aid, a great discretionary power in all cases of 
this kind, was assumed and exercised by military officers of all ranks.”169  
 
After the 1689 rebellion, the responsibility to monitor reiving was joined by the 
duty to monitor and suppress disaffected behaviour.  Regular regiments were also 
increasingly augmenting the Independent Companies, as continuing Jacobite activity 
confirmed further the poor opinion London officials had of Highland reliability.  
Independent Highland Companies, however, were still heavily relied upon to assist with 
the implementation of the Disarming Acts in 1716, 1726 and 1746, confiscating weapons 
and arresting those wearing kilts.170  In this last task, soldiers were rarely successful, 
partly because of a lack of support from Scottish magistrates and judges.  The letters of 
James Erskine, Lord Grange, the younger brother of the 6th Earl of Mar, attained in 1716 
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for leading the ’15, reveal how soldiers were undermined by Scotland’s officials.171  Of 
the “act of parliament discharging use of plaid & phillibeg”, Grange, a former Judge and 
suspected Jacobite, wrote in 1748, advising his acquaintances in legal and civil 
authorities to give ordinary Scots plenty of warning of the ban, preferably by leaving 
notices on church doors written in Erse, should the government strictly enforce it.172  
However, Grange went further to advise them how they might re-interpret the law:   
You make take all the opportunities you can of letting it be known 
that tartan may still be worne in cloaks westcoats, breeches or trews, 
but that if they use loose plaids they may [be] of tartan but either all 
of one colour, or strip’d with other colours than those formally used, 
and if they have a mind to use their old plaids, I don’t see but they 
may make them into the shape of a cloak and so wear them in that 
way, which tho’ button’d or tied about the neck, if long enough, may 
be taken up at one side and throwne over the other shoulder by 
which it will answere most of the purposes of the loose plaid.  And if 
they could come in to the way of wearing wide trousers like the 
sailors’ breeches it would answere all the conviences of the kilt and 
philibeg for walking or climbing the hills.173   
Either Grange was very persuasive or his sentiments were echoed by others, because the 
outcome seems to have been in favour of allowing the loophole.  “Duncan Mcgrigor, 
Donald Mcgrigor, John Cameron, Alexr Robinson and John Cameron” arrested near 
Rannoch for “wearing Highland Clothes contrary to Act of Parliament”, ten men “some 
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of them dress’d in Tartan Trowzers & Petticoats, short Coats & shoulder straps, & one 
man completely dress’d in Tartan Clothes & Trowze” were brought before “Mr Campbell 
the Sheriff deputy of that place dismissed them all.”174  Additionally, two further men 
who were brought before Campbell were dismissed because their kilts were “closed” – 
that is, sewn up the middle as trousers – despite the testimony of several soldiers that the 
kilts had been open when they were arrested.  The unrecorded author of this report ends 
with the frustrated: “I must be oblig’d to send my prisoners for the future to Perth, as that 
Gentleman seems Resolv’d not to commit any of them.”175   
  
As the eighteenth century progressed, countering smuggling became an increasing 
part of the army’s policing role.  The Revenue Service, established in 1683, was still in 
its infancy.  Faced with the scale of smuggling across Britain, which was endemic in 
Scotland thanks to its vast coastline and lax attitude to unpopular laws, the Revenue 
Service lacked the numbers and authority to be effective alone.  Consequently, the army 
formed the third line of defence in the strategy of catching smugglers.  Should smugglers 
get past the Royal Navy patrolling the sea, and the Revenue patrols on the beaches, which 
soldiers were seconded to assist, then army patrols within Scotland were designed to 
search and apprehend smugglers and their illicit goods.176  Prevention of smuggling was 
taken very seriously by the government and army because of the threat that Jacobite 
agents, money and arms could be brought in as well as brandy.  This fear was reinforced 
by Sussex smugglers convicted of swearing oaths of loyalty to the Stuarts in 1740s, 
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though this was clearly a case of using the obvious opposition to anger the establishment.  
This link was extended to Scotland by the belief that “in Scotland, smuggling and 
Jacobitism seems to have gone hand in hand.”177  However, it was an unpopular duty 
with the soldiers and resented by the public.  In 1735, a soldier was killed in Fraserburgh 
supporting Customs and Excise officials searching for smuggled goods and a year later, 
providing assistance to Customs and Excise officials in Dundee proved a “Duty…so hard 
his Soldiers are not able to bear it” forcing their CO to beg to be re-assigned.178 
 
The contrasting public behaviour towards two apprehended smugglers, Andrew 
Wilson and George Robertson, and the City Guards who guarded them in the days 
leading up to the Porteous Riot in Edinburgh in 1736 clearly show the effects of using the 
military in a civilian context.  As was common, the smugglers had instant public appeal.  
After failing to break them out of the Tolbooth on the 9th April, the sympathetic public 
then failed to stop Robertson when he escaped during their final church service on 11th 
April, during which Wilson’s popularity increased when he fought and detained all four 
City Guards, allowing Robertson to escape.  By contrast, the City Guards at the church 
and guarding the scaffold were viewed as villains and received no public support or 
sympathy.  Indeed, the crowds gathered to watch Wilson’s hanging on 14th April stoned 
the City Guards, triggering a retaliation of musket fire that killed six, eight or nine 
                                                 
177 C. Winslow, ‘Sussex Smugglers’ in D. Hay (ed), Albion’s Fatal Tree.  Crime and Society in Eighteenth 
Century England (London, 1975), p.156. 
178 C. Whatley, ‘How tame were the Scottish Lowlanders during the Eighteenth Century?’ in T.M. Devine 
(ed), Conflict and Stability in Scottish Society 1700-1850 (Edinburgh, 1990), p.8. 
 127 
people, depending on sources, for which their captain, Porteous, was held accountable by 
the public, and was later lynched.179 
 
In the increasingly politically aware but unenfranchised society of the eighteenth 
century, an important mode of expressing views or protest was through public 
demonstration.180  As these frequently ended in rioting, the government and elite 
regarded them as disruptive to domestic peace.  In addition to the many Stuart 
anniversaries the Jacobites used to show dissent, rioters for unrelated issues often used 
their conspicuous iconography, such as tartan, to highlight their disapproval of the 
government.181  The government, especially under Walpole, took the view that any 
protest that criticised the government or crown was dangerous.  The connection to 
Jacobitism cemented the view that riots were tantamount to treason.  It was the change 
from Stuart to Hanoverian rule, and the potential for Jacobite unrest in retaliation, that 
triggered the introduction of the 1715 Riot Act.  Once magistrates had read the Riot Act 
to a mob, they had one hour to disperse peacefully.  Continuing to form a mob past that 
hour would constitute a felony and magistrates could call in the army or militia to break 
up a mob by force.  Prior to its introduction, those gathered in a mob were committing a 
misdemeanour under common law.  The authorities had only limited powers to stop 
misdemeanours allowing mobs time to expand and fester, so their escalation to a riot was 
almost inevitable.  Rioters were unprotected by common law, because once a mob used 
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violence and became a riot, their crime automatically changed from a misdemeanour to a 
felony.  This permitted both private individuals and the authorities to respond with force 
with immunity from punishment if any rioters were killed or injured.182  
 
What was less understood by contemporaries was that if violence was committed 
within the hour force could still be used under common law, thereby giving indemnity to 
civilians and soldiers for action taken before or after that hour.183  This ignorance applied 
to the public, army, magistrates and politicians alike.  Guides published for the 
magistrates who would face the issue of when to call in military assistance were vague 
and impracticable.184  Consequently, magistrates used the army with more caution than 
was necessary.  During the 1725 Malt Tax riots in Glasgow, magistrates delayed calling 
in Lord Deloraine’s regiment so allowing the rioters to take such control of the town that 
the soldiers were forced to conduct a fighting retreat.185  Political understanding was also 
poor.  A member of the Commons commented in the aftermath of the Porteous Riot in 
1736, that “I doubt much if a magistrate would be indemnified, even by this law [if] by 
ordering his assistants [ie the army] to fire among them [ie the mob] and should thereby 
kill any person who had committed no overt act of resistance.”186   
 
The power of decision to deploy soldiers was transferred from the army to the 
magistrates, so making the intervention a civil not military matter.  Commanding 
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officers’ failure to understand, or have explained to them, their powers under the Riot 
Act, and the indemnity they enjoyed through the provision of common law and the Act, 
left them overcautious.  This, and the change in command structures, especially involving 
government officials, whose diligence and ability varied, frequently hampered the army’s 
response.  It delayed the decision process and produced confused command structures 
that encouraged mistakes.187  During the Porteous Riot in Edinburgh in 1736, the 
presence of the garrison in the Castle, and of troops quartered just outside the city walls, 
had no effect on the rioters as both bodies refused to act without the written authorisation 
of Edinburgh’s magistrates.  The mob separated the magistrates from the Castle, while 
the local MP sent to summon the troops outside the city walls had only his word of 
honour that the magistrates required them.  General Moyle, their commander, refused, 
citing General Wade’s orders not to use regular troops in civil disturbances unless 
presented with a magistrates’ warrant and with a magistrate present to command and 
advise him.188   
 
The new indemnity, however, did not give soldiers permanent immunity from the 
law.  Sergeant Davies was inspecting his troops in Glasgow during the night in early May 
1712, when Robert Park and some friends argued with him, resulting in Davies killing 
Park.  After Park’s funeral the crowd “gathered in the streets and offered indignities to 
the Guards”189 and, to placate them, Davies was taken into custody.  Despite the 
testimony of other soldiers as witnesses, the opinion of the Lord Advocate, Sir James 
Stewart, that the mob were “some idle fellows, servants & women” and that it was “an 
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accidental scuffle,” Davies was found guilty in January 1713 and sentenced to hang on 
27th May.190  The key factor in his guilt was because the Riot Act had not been read when 
Park was killed.191  Similarly, in September 1737, Private Thomas McAdams and 
Corporal James Long were found guilty and sentenced to be hanged for the murder of 
Hugh Fraser of Bellnain.  On 4th June 1735 Fraser had been killed during a struggle when 
nine soldiers including McAdam and Long had attempted to board the suspected 
smuggler’s boat.  The soldier’s warrant, which had been issued by their commanding 
officer, Lieutenant Cawfield, Fort-Major and CO of Inverness-shire, not the local 
magistrate, was pronounced invalid and the killing, therefore, was murder.192 
 
The policing duties of the army also included involvement in maintaining the civil 
peace.  In 1724, six regiments of dragoons were used to prevent dispossessed tenants 
from damaging cattle and dykes in protest in the first Levellers’ Revolts in Dumfriesshire 
and Galloway.193  The use of soldiers could also be abused, such as in the 1722 elections 
in Cupar in Fife.  When protesters objected to the political monopoly of the local Leslie 
family, the army was called to force their dispersal on the grounds that the protest must 
have been Jacobite influenced as the Leslie family were Whig.194   
 
                                                 
190 TNA SP54/4/68, Sir James Stewart to unknown, 20th May 1712; SP54/4/92, Sir James Stewart to 
unknown, Edinburgh, 14th June 1712 and SP54/5/44, Sir James Stewart to unknown, Edinburgh, 31st 
January 1713. 
191 TNA SP54/5/68, James Stewart, Lord Advocate of Edinburgh, to unknown, 20 May 1712; SP/54/5/92, 
Stewart to unknown, 14 June 1712 and SP54/5/44, Stewart to unknown, 31 January 1713. 
192 NAS GD50/216/37, ‘Extract of the Proceedings before James Graham of Airth Esq Judge of the High 
Court of Admiralty in Scotland, in the Action at the insistence of Duncan Forbes Esq His Majesty’s 
Advocate and Mr Hugh Forbes Advocate Procurator Fiscal of the said High Court, Against Thomas 
McAdam soldier and James Long Corporal in the Regiment of Foot commanded by Colonel Hamilton Laid 
before the House pursuant to their Lordship’s Order April 18 1737’. 
193 T.C. Smout, A History of the Scottish People, 1560-1830 (London, 1970), p.325-7. 
194 Whatley, Scottish Society, p.152. 
 131 
From the first Jacobite rebellion in 1689-90 until the last decades of the 
eighteenth century, a major part of the British army’s role was domestic security, 
specifically countering Jacobite activity.  This involved both the suppression of internal 
discontent and preventing invasions from outside.  When not combating a rebellion, the 
army’s role was to prevent disaffection and future rebellion.  The steady increase in the 
size and number of barracks during the eighteenth century reflected the growth in 
military strength in Scotland and also the decision to place permanent barracks there, 
despite their unpopularity.  These provided secure bases for patrols and served as 
administrative centres for security purposes.  Networks of roads were built to link these 
and allow faster movement across the country.  Both barracks and roads were designed to 
end the autonomy of chiefs inclined to pro-Jacobite activity.  Soldiers were involved not 
just in a policing and security roles, but also as the builders of barracks and roads, making 
military activity in Scotland in the first half of the eighteenth century a clear statement of 
intent to end disaffection. 
 
Initiatives such as road and fort building to occupy soldiers in periods of 
inactivity have been mentioned in the context of discipline.195  In Scotland, providing 
labour for road and fort-building and their maintenance between 1725 and the 1760s 
provided extra pay, as well as diversion.196  It was hoped this “‘twould keep them [the 
men] in good discipline” rather than sitting in billets where “sloth and idleness” would 
spread.197  This plan was not infallible however, as the mutiny at Fort William in the 
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winter of 1690 was partially due to overwork from building the new fort.198  The 
Independent Highland Companies were encouraged to act as guides and translators, 
continuing in that role even in the periods when the Companies were disbanded.199 
 
The consequence of using the army as a police force and suppressor of 
disaffection in Scotland was that it made those soldiers the face of the army and de facto 
representatives of the government in London.  For civilians who did not support the 
Union or were Jacobite, the army remained the oppressive arm of a distant government 
and, as such, echoed the army of occupation of the Interregnum.  The army’s position 
enforcing the Riot Act also put soldiers in direct confrontation with ordinary people, 
undermining many of the army’s attempts to improve the reputation of soldiers and the 
army in general, and to cultivate a better civil-military relationship.  This was especially 
difficult when soldiers were sent to end protests that were genuine demonstrations of a 
legitimate grievance.  The riot that ended in the lynching of Captain Porteous was a 
protest against London overturning local justice.  Queen Caroline, acting as regent, had 
suspended the sentence decided by the court in Edinburgh, representing interference from 
London.200  Similarly, the Malt Tax Riots in 1725 and the accompanying protest by 
Edinburgh’s brewing industry were expressions of opposition to taxes imposed by 
London.201  
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The above examination of the role of soldiers in Scotland reinforces the picture 
revealed by the case studies of the Royal Scots, Scots Fusiliers, Scots Greys and the 
Independent Highland Companies.  By the time the Union of 1707 created the British 
army, Scottish and English regiments had been working closely together for forty years.  
In 1660, the presence of George Monck in both the army of the Interregnum and Charles 
II ensured the structural developments created in the New Model Army survived the 
Restoration.202  Although the Union of Crowns in 1603 brought both Scottish and English 
Establishments under the same royal control, it was at the Restoration that, for the first 
time, a standing army existed and was controlled by one crown.  During the Seven Years 
War and early years of the War of the Spanish Succession, English and Scottish 
regiments were deployed in an identical manner, for serve together.  Change, therefore, 
had happened as part of the natural evolution in the years since the Restoration, rather 
than with the artificial watershed of the political Union.  Even the establishment of the 
Revenue Service in 1683 pre-dated the Union and its expansion to deal with the boom in 
smuggling between 1700 and the 1730s ensured that soldiers assisted against smuggling 
even before the Union.203  The few changes in the Scottish soldier’s role that occurred 
after the Union were because of later changes in the law, such as the Riot Act in 1715, 
but this was not influenced by the Union itself. 
 
Billeting and barracks 
Billeting soldiers in Scotland in the eighteenth century was a delicate and 
complex matter after the violence of the previous century.  As the century progressed, 
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Britain’s new obligations to the United Provinces and Hanover, and the changes brought 
by the ‘military revolution’ led to larger armies as the ‘no standing armies’ debate and the 
legacy of the army as the oppressive arm of the government during the Civil War and 
Interregnum faded slowly from memory.  Additionally, the creation of the Jacobite 
movement by the Glorious Revolution and its focus on Scotland, where support could be 
found in the gentry excluded from power and position by religious and constitutional 
factors, called for an expansion in the establishment of Scotland.  This required billets.  
However, building purpose-built fortifications was unacceptable to those who 
remembered the standing armies of the Interregnum.  Barracks were not only expensive 
but represented the acceptance of the permanence of a standing army.   
 
The housing of soldiers depended on location and the context of other events.  
Soldiers were billeted depending on local geography, local population, the wider 
economic situation and the level of social unrest.  Accessibility both by road and by sea 
was also a factor.204  In Scotland, this last factor was especially significant given the 
Jacobite threat and had a considerable impact on where and when barracks were built, or 
whether they were built at all.  Earlier in the century the absence of permanent barracks 
in Britain was justified because there were few regiments and these were abroad during 
war and disbanded at peace.  This meant that billeting was commonly conducted on a 
temporary basis, usually as soldiers were on the march.  By common agreement, in the 
seventeenth century, soldiers were only billeted in private homes with the owner’s 
permission and payment.  This arrangement gained more authority from a royal 
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proclamation in 1689 although it was not made law until the 1715 Mutiny Act.205  
However, as the proclamation pre-dated the Union, Scotland’s position remained 
confused.  Scots clearly felt the law should apply to them.  When Alexander MacDonald 
of Glengarry complained about unpaid expenses from soldiers billeted on him in 1704, he 
added “which in time of Peace is directly contrary to the Law of Scotland.”206  However, 
after queries were made, the Lord Advocate advised that billeting was permitted if the 
threat from the Pretender constituted a state of war, which only the Scottish Parliament 
could decide.  Another point of contention was the definition of what constituted a 
‘private’ dwelling.  The government decreed that as “Tower castles or fortalices” were 
held communally, owners become hereditary keepers in times of war.  Therefore they 
were ordered to be kept stocked with food and artillery in anticipation of their use on pain 
of having the property seized.207  Some protested that they owned the building, making it 
private, and worried about the cost incurred.208  Similarly, whilst permission had to be 
obtained in order to billet on private homes,209 the power of the government to extort 
billets either as a show of loyalty or as punishment for past disloyalty undermined the 
significance of permission given.  This was a particular issue in Scotland, where loyalty 
often had to be proved.  William Duff of Bracco, for example, offered Balverie Castle in 
1715 as “ideally placed” between the Highlands and Lowlands.210  Soldiers could also be 
billeted upon the property of landowners who were in arrears to the government.211 
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Billeting on civilians, therefore, was a further strain on an already fraught civil-
military relationship.  The expense, the poor reputation of soldiers and the violence and 
disease that were associated with an army made soldiers unwelcome in private homes not 
just in Scotland but across Europe.  McBane’s behaviour when billeted on a farm in 
Ireland is a case in point.  He tricked the farmer’s daughter into a false marriage, lived as 
her husband for two weeks before using his embarkation to Flanders to abandon her.212  
A further example was the impact of Louis XIV’s ‘grandes dragonnades’ on Protestant 
communities between 1681 and 1685, forcibly converting them before the revocation of 
the Edict of Nantes in 1685.213  Consequently, the use of inns was preferred and was 
authorised in the 1699 Mutiny Act.214  Inns in England were also conveniently located 
along roads and so could be chosen to fit with marching routes.215  In order to maintain 
discipline through contact, the army attempted to billet men together in the same town or 
village.  Using inns rather than barracks also kept a military presence temporary.  This 
reduced the burden on communities in an era that lacked a regular system of regimental 
rotation and prevented soldiers from ‘going native’, becoming attached to people or 
places and therefore difficult to move on.216 
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When billeting on the public or in inns was not possible because of geography, 
the political situation or on campaign, the army used temporary accommodation such as 
tents and huts.  In Scotland tents were frequently used when extra troops were sent north 
to deal with a rebellion and the existing accommodation was filled.  Tents allowed 
flexibility of location and mobility, providing the faster reaction time needed during 
conflicts.  They were also vital when travelling into the Highlands as there were few inns 
north of the larger towns of the Lowlands and Border areas.  Consequently, the extra 
soldiers sent to Stirling Castle during the ’15 were billeted in tents outside the walls even 
though their fighting ability may have “suffered for spending so much time in tents.”217  
A description from July 1746 describes an army tent as follows: “outward ornamentation 
of tents to be alike in each regiment and according to colour of facings; tent poles to be 5 
feet in length, 8 feet high, then full length of tent 14 feet, breadth 10 feet, height of half 
wall 4 feet with door at end as usual.”218  Tents or temporary huts were used to 
accommodate soldiers in road-building parties between 1725 and the late 1760s as the 
path of roads, by design, often passed through uninhabited and inaccessible areas.  Some 
of these huts became the first inns in the Highlands and eventually made travel and 
tourism easier.  They inadvertently finished what the road access began for the military, 
allowing more English and Lowland visitors.  In this way cultural isolation was reduced 
and the integration of the independent, isolated Highlands into Great Britain was 
furthered.219 
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Barracks were built in Scotland only when the government decided that too many 
rebellions were occurring and the first purpose-built, self-contained barracks to be built in 
Britain were four fortified barracks, commissioned in 1717.  As the century progressed 
and Jacobite activity and rebellions continued, existing castles were improved and new 
forts were built, increasing in size, expense and capacity until Fort George at Ardersier 
was begun in 1753.220  There had to be a specific requirement to justify such building 
work, however.  Berwick, for example, was the key embarkation point between London 
and Scotland whilst the four fortified barracks were necessary for policing the Highlands.  
The three forts of the Great Glen and the old castles of Stirling and Edinburgh provided 
the administrative and accommodation requirements for a force needed to counter the 
Jacobite threat.  Their architecture and presence also provided a visual statement of intent 
that the Protestant Succession was permanent.   Updating existing castles provided a 
compromise between the need for accommodation and the undesirability and expense of 
building barracks.  Corgarff Castle in Aberdeen and Braemar Castle were both forfeited 
by the Earl of Mar after the ’15 and bought by the government in 1748 for 
accommodating soldiers.  Those quartered in the former applied the Disarming Act.  
Those in the latter operated as an outpost until 1779, when it was used against smuggling 
until 1832.221  It was easier for the public in the south and government to accept 
permanent barracks in Scotland as a volatile area and susceptible to invasion.  That it was 
popularly held to be a wild, ungovernable area made it easier to make it an exception to 
the belief that civilised places should not have permanent barracks imposed upon them.   
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The billeting of soldiers within or near a community was often an inevitable 
opportunity for ordinary people to re-assess or confirm their old prejudices both of 
soldiers and other nationalities.  The religious violence of the late seventeenth century 
and the past behaviour of the army during the Civil War and Interregnum, made barracks 
and the presence of soldiers the largest area of contention between the civil and military 
worlds.222  Scotland felt this tension more acutely as garrisons had previously been 
limited to the Lowlands by sheer necessity.  The only attempt to build forts in the 
Highlands had been Cromwell’s four citadels, which were torn down, only partly 
completed, on the Restoration.223  By contrast, parts of England, particularly on the south 
and south-east coast were familiar with a military presence.224  The main difference lay in 
the intention behind the garrison; those in England were mainly intended to protect 
against foreign invasion, while Scotland’s garrisons were provided to police and suppress 
Jacobitism.  It was this seemingly aggressive intent that placed soldiers in direct 
confrontation with civilians and caused resentment of the need to billet soldiers, no 
matter where it was.  As the eighteenth century progressed, and the Jacobite threat 
diminished, standing armies were gradually accepted.  Barracks and garrisons became 
less a burden and instead an asset to the local economy and were seen as part of the 
community.   The financial burden represented by the permanent use of Berwick as a 
transit port, in which billeting on the public or inns was not replaced by barracks until 
1705, gave way to a sense of integration into the community.  Fort William, for example, 
founded Maryburgh to house the families of the soldiers and the army sutlers who 
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provided its provisions.  Even the garrison’s graveyard at Craig’s Cemetery (on today’s 
A82) suggests a close community, with stones dedicated to soldiers’ wives and their 
friends.225   
 
However, despite this progress, the army’s attitude towards Scotland is revealed 
in the prioritisation of military requirements during rebellion above any gains made in the 
civil-military relationship in peacetime.  In a precedent that, with local variations, was 
applied to Scotland, Marlborough commanded in 1708 that civilian goods be protected in 
allied countries, but enemy land would be subjected to ‘scorched earth’ for strategic 
purposes, such as on his approach to Bavaria in 1704.226  During the ’45, although 
General Campbell of Mamore established food and equipment stores for the British army 
across Argyllshire and the west of Scotland in order to leave the land of well-affected 
clans untouched, Cumberland ordered the systematic collection of cattle in the months 
after Culloden to deprive the Jacobites of subsistence in case of an ongoing guerrilla-style 
war with the full knowledge of the effect it was having on civilians.227  Therefore, 
Cumberland acted as if the army were in an area of hostility, while Mamore as a Scot was 
attempting a less intensive approach to clearing Scotland of Jacobites.   
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The nationality of billeted forces provoked still unresolved tensions between north 
and south.  In September 1715, Islay’s request for more troops to counter the ’15 came 
with the stipulation that “If there is any assistance to be had from the Elbe, it is certain, 
that foreign or German Troops…would be more popular here [in Scotland] by far than 
the English themselves.”228  Conversely, it was not until 1766 that the presence of the 
Scots Greys on anti-smuggling duty in Sussex was viewed as “typical.”229  A greater 
factor than billeting in the integration of national groups and the creation of an 
overarching ‘British’ nationality was unity through a threat from a common enemy.  
Colley argues that: “They [the English and Scottish] came to define themselves as a 
single people not because of any political or cultural consensus at home, but rather in 
reaction to the ‘other’ beyond their shores.”230  For Colley, this threat is the French.  
However, this overlooks the common threat the Jacobites had provided since 1689.  It 
was through military service against the Jacobites that the Scots could show their loyalty 
to the government and therefore to the survival of Great Britain.231  The issue is also 
more complex than the acceptance of Scots into Great Britain and the evolution of a 
British identity, as there was little integration between Highland and Lowland Scots.  The 
experience of Lowland Scots in the Highlands, such as the all-Scottish battle at 
Killiecrankie,232 and the fervour with which Lowlanders behaved in the months after 
Culloden233 demonstrates the disunity and natural conflict between Highlanders and 
Lowlanders.  It was, in fact, differences of religion and politics that separated and united 
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Scots, not nationality.  The experiences of English, Irish, Lowland or Highland soldiers 
barracked in Jacobite country reveal the true ‘other’ that united Great Britain.  The road-
building parties between 1724 and the 1760s were more likely to find billets in private 
homes in the Lowlands but had to rely on tents in the Highlands.234  The engineers of the 
Ordnance Office also enjoyed far greater cooperation from locals in the loyal Lowlands, 
than in the crypto-Jacobite Highlands between 1747 and 1752.235  These experiences 
demonstrate that the tension between English and Scots was less due to nationality than 
to attitudes created by the legacy of the ‘no standing army’ debate, the cultural memory 
of soldiers’ behaviour during the seventeenth century, and the political tensions of split 
allegiances between Jacobites and non-Jacobites. 
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, an examination of the experiences of ordinary soldiers reveals 
much regarding their behaviour and their influence in changing attitudes towards 
standing armies.  The increasing presence of soldiers in Scottish civilian communities, as 
barracks became more common, spurred the army to work actively towards improving 
the behaviour and discipline of its soldiers.  Officers were encouraged to take 
responsibility for the care and betterment of soldiers under their command, using rewards 
as well as punishments.  As the century progressed this led to an increase in army control 
that benefited not only the army’s performance on the battlefield but their behaviour and 
reputation in times of peace.  This was especially marked in Scotland, where the law 
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regarding billeting on private homes was left unclear at the Union and the army presence 
was larger and more obvious than elsewhere in Britain.   
 
This improving trend benefited from the progressive rise of professionalism 
amongst army officers.  The purchase system encouraged them to view their careers as 
long-term investments and fostered a desire to improve and advance.  A growing 
recognition of personal merit, under the influence of William III, Anne, George I, George 
II and Cumberland, furthered the rise in professionalism in officers both on and off the 
battlefield.  Change was slow, however, as small-scale corruption remained endemic in 
army life.  Similarly, lax central control hampered standardisation and facilitated petty 
corruption.  Such weaknesses demonstrated that further reforms were needed but, under 
Cumberland in the 1750s, were impossible in the face of the strong ‘custom of the army’.  
Only the growing urgency towards the end of the eighteenth century permitted the Duke 
of York’s reforms of the 1790s. 
 
An examination of soldiers’ lives in military service is also revealing of similarly 
slow progress in civil-military relations.  The unpopularity of uncontrolled recruitment 
was addressed by bringing civil powers into the process.  The involvement of JPs and 
magistrates was an attempt by the government to ensure recruitment was kept in check by 
civil rather than military hands.  Similar attention was given by the government to reduce 
the army’s poor position as the direct controller of public demonstrations.  The soldiers’ 
role as police in preventing smuggling and rioting perpetuated their poor reputation with 
their civilian neighbours, exemplified by the violence of the Malt Tax Riots in 1725 and 
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the Porteous Riot of 1736.  The army and government attempted to improve this with the 
introduction of the Mutiny Act in 1689 and the Riot Act of 1715.  As the trials of 
McAdam, Long and Davies attest, this not only made soldiers accountable for their 
actions but also placed civil authority above military authority.  The strengthened role of 
magistrates was a clear attempt to reduce the feeling that the army was the oppressive 
force used to implement control from London.  This had occurred during the Interregnum 
and during the religious violence experienced by the Lowlands in the late seventeenth 
century.  However, the effectiveness of the new laws was limited, which delayed their 
ability to reduce tension since they were often misunderstood and misapplied by 
magistrates and military commanders.  They failed to prevent civil disturbance and 
Jacobite success in Glasgow in 1725 and Edinburgh in 1745.  This is evidence of the lack 
of clear leadership and control from either London or a central army command.  Laws to 
regulate billeting on civilians were a positive move to improve the reputation of the 
British army in Scotland and to benefit the civil-military relationship.  This advanced 
further as the need for soldiers was accepted and overcame the old prejudices against 
standing armies.  Barracks were increasingly used in Scotland and by the mid-eighteenth 
century, their use – rather than billeting on civilians – combined with new laws, had 
begun the process of integrating soldiers into the community. 
 
Lastly, Chapter Two reinforces the lack of changes that occurred in the British 
army because of the Union of 1707.  Instead the Restoration marks greater co-ordination 
between the Scottish and English Establishments.  The start of an effective standing army 
and the continuation of the authority of the Union of Crowns meant that Charles II and 
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James II used the regiments of each Establishment as one force, as an unofficial ‘British’ 
army forty years prior to the creation of Great Britain and the British army.  Such a unity 
was solidified by the use of this force under William III in continental conflicts.  
Disparate regiments and establishments were unified by a common enemy, both France 
and her allies, and the Jacobite threat, and by the common experiences of war long before 
the Union created an administrative amalgamation.   
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CHAPTER THREE: THE SCOTTISH SOLDIER AND THE BRITISH STATE 
Introduction 
In this chapter, the lives and careers of Scottish officers of all ranks are examined 
to establish the relationships Scots had with the British state.  This contrasts with the 
focus on other ranks in Chapter Two.  A range of individuals is examined to show how 
Scotland’s senior soldiers joined the army, how their careers progressed and how they 
were regarded by their superiors and the political elite in London.  Using a range of 
sources a comparison of individuals’ principles, influences and motivations is made, to 
reveal why and how they functioned within the British system – socially, militarily and 
politically.  Contrasting factors are also examined to discover how this determined 
loyalties and influenced career decisions.  Specifically, the impact of the continuous 
Jacobite threat, as well as rebellions and invasions, is investigated to ascertain the effect 
the movement had on perceptions of Scottish loyalty and any subsequent effects this had 
on careers.  This also reveals the extent that nationality was a factor in defining identity 
and loyalty, and its impact on Scottish military careers.  Common themes such as family 
backgrounds, career expectations and social norms, and differences such as personal 
motivation and religion, are examined.  This reveals the divergent lives that would 
otherwise have coexisted without the impact of the Jacobite movement. 
 
To facilitate this investigation, a broader time span is employed than elsewhere in 
this thesis.  This is necessary to explore the lives of a number of men which extend 
outside 1700-1750.  Examples include Simon Fraser, 11th Lord Lovat, John Dalrymple, 
2nd Earl of Stair, John Campbell, 2nd Duke of Argyll, Archibald Campbell, 3rd Duke of 
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Argyll, Duncan Forbes of Culloden and the Munro brothers, whose life-spans spread 
from the 1660s, 1670s and 1680s to the 1740s and 1760s.  They are typical of a cohort 
that witnessed dramatic changes in constitution, monarchy and politics, which put them 
in unique situations requiring decisions with serious consequences.  The proliferation of 
studies focused around events, specifically Jacobite rebellions, means that individuals are 
usually portrayed in their set roles of ‘loyal’ or ‘rebel’ when they have already made the 
decision of who to support, presenting a ‘ex post facto’ view.1  Whilst valuable studies in 
themselves, a broader investigation that takes in individuals’ earlier lives and careers will 
provide a deeper understanding of how decisions of loyalty were made and why they 
chose military service to demonstrate it.  Similarly, by taking a thematic approach, this 
determinist attitude towards loyalty will be replaced by an examination of similarities as 
well as differences, a departure from many sources traditionally used to investigate these 
individuals.  The simple transcript form of the diary of Blackader provides useful primary 
evidence but its narrative nature emphasises the inevitability of their decisions and 
eventual loyalties.  Doddridge had a Protestant Christian message that detracts from the 
accurate portrayal of Gardiner and the Munro brothers whom he sought to 
commemorate.2  Lastly, the continuing existence today of Scotland’s elite families 
impacts on historians’ objectivity; Tomasson’s obligation to the estate of the dukes of 
Atholl for access to the papers of Lord George Murray comes at the cost of objectivity in 
the ongoing debate of whether he or O’Sullivan was to blame for the final Jacobite 
defeat, while Fergusson’s family link to the Campbells impacts on his sympathetic stance 
                                                 
1 D. Szechi, 1715.  The Great Jacobite Rebellion (New Haven and London, 2006); C. Duffy, The ’45 
(London, 2003) and S. Reid, The Scottish Jacobite Army 1745-46 (Oxford, 2006). 
2 P. Doddridge, The Life of the Hon. Colonel Gardiner, who was slain at the Battle of Prestonpans.  With 
an appendix, relating to the ancient family of the Munro’s of Fowlis (London, 1813). 
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towards General Campbell of Mamore and against the scheming of the 4th Earl of 
Loudoun.3  To avoid the traditional labels of ‘Jacobite’ and ‘government’, different 
terminology will be used, with political leanings in mind, to highlight both the 
complexity of loyalty and the large grey area of allegiance that is rarely acknowledged in 
studies of this topic.  The individuals studied will still be split into groups, but the 
recurring themes between groups will highlight the similarities between individuals 
regarded as enemies. 
 
Stalwarts 
The careers of Scots who served in the British army are a microcosm of the 
experiences of Scots who worked with the British Government.  Many mentioned in this 
chapter lived and served before and after the Union and were forced to make difficult 
decisions about their loyalties in the frequent domestic conflicts caused by the Jacobite 
movement.  Such scenarios both demonstrated the loyalty of Scots to the Union and the 
Protestant Succession, and provided the paranoid Government in London with examples 
of why even Whig Scots were untrustworthy.  This first section deals with those 
individuals who were clear Whigs, loyal to the Protestant Succession and Glorious 
Revolution and all the changes that occurred because of them.  Though party loyalty was 
a loose tie, as parliament often broke off into different factions to achieve particular 
purposes, these individuals were loyal to the state in its post-Revolution form.   
 
                                                 
3 K. Tomasson, The Jacobite General (Edinburgh and London, 1958) and J. Fergusson of Kilkerren, Argyll 
in the Forty-Five (London, 1951). 
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Regardless of how it was interpreted by London, their example shows how 
service in the British army was one of the few ways in which many Scottish gentlemen 
could demonstrate their loyalty and contribute to the formation of the new British state.   
Greater competition for posts existed in the political sphere, where the Union had reduced 
the number of Scottish MPs to forty-five and the number of Representative Peers from 
160 to sixteen, so military service allowed greater opportunities.4  It also allowed 
Protestants to continue the Covenanting tradition, as they viewed military service for the 
state as, “an ordained duty, sanctioned by God and thus to be conducted in a religious 
manner and with religious objectives.”5  The seventeenth century struggle for dominance 
between the Presbyterian and Episcopalian churches gave the cohort of men active in the 
first half of the eighteenth century a background of sacrifice in the defence of religious 
principles.  Fighting to defend the Protestant Succession, therefore, became an extension 
of fighting during the Covenanting wars and during what Wodrow termed the Killing 
Times.  Robert Wodrow’s The History of Sufferings of the Church of Scotland from the 
Restoration to the Revolution, published in 1721-22, has fuelled this legacy both amongst 
modern perceptions and amongst the cohort of men studied here.6  Therefore, military 
service provided a way to defend and further the political structure, religion and dynasty 
in which individuals believed.  The memoirs, diaries, letters and biographies written both 
by and for these men, combined with a detailed contextual investigation, reveal the 
reasons for their choice of military service and demonstrates how nationality, family 
                                                 
4 Act ratifying and approving treaty of the two Kingdoms of Scotland and England, 1707, Article XXII and 
W. Ferguson, Scotland’s Relations with England.  A survey to 1707 (Edinburgh, 1994), p.265. 
5 S. Murdoch and A. Mackillop, ‘Military Identity and Multiple Identities’ in S. Murdoch and A. Mackillop 
(eds), Fighting for Identity.  Scottish Military Experience c.1550-1900 (Leiden, Boston and Köln, 2002), 
p.xxxiv.   
6 R. Wodrow, The History of Sufferings of the Church of Scotland from the Restoration to the Revolution 
(Glasgow, 1836), 4 vols.  This is also discussed in subsection ‘Billeting and barracks’ of Chapter Two: The 
Scottish Soldier’s Experience. 
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background, connections and ability affected their career paths.  Given the tempestuous 
relationship between England and Scotland, inflamed by the Jacobite threat, their 
successes and failures as soldiers become a case study for the success or otherwise of the 
Union, Scotland’s ability to integrate into Great Britain, and Britain’s willingness to 
receive them. 
 
For most Scottish Whig gentlemen, early entry to the army was a time-honoured 
and respectable avenue to status, advancement and independence.  John Blackader (1664-
1729) first joined the Cameronians aged twenty-five, influenced by a family background 
of strong Calvinist beliefs.7  John Campbell, later 4th Earl Loudoun (1705-1782), was 
twenty-two when he entered the army as a cornet in the Scots Greys in 1727 and within 
ten years had risen to the army rank of Lieutenant-Colonel in the 3rd Foot Guards.8   
James Gardiner (1686/8-1745) followed his family’s military lead as a cadet in Dutch 
service at fourteen.9  For Gardiner, slow but steady promotion followed in a series of 
regiments, including a post as Stair’s ADC in 1714-1720.10  Sir Robert Munro of Fowlis 
(1684-1746) joined the Royal Scots as a gentleman volunteer at eighteen, quickly gaining 
promotions to a captaincy in 1714.11  His younger brother George (1685-1746) also 
joined the army as a young man and took part in the suppression of the ’15, actively 
pacifying the Highlands in his brother’s Independent Company.12  John Dalrymple, later 
                                                 
7 A. Crichton, The Life and Diary of Lt. Col. J. Blackader (London, 1824), p.33, 72 and ODNB John 
Blackader by T.F. Henderson revised by Jonathan Spain. 
8 ODNB John Campbell, 4th Earl of Loudoun by Stephen Brumwell. 
9 Doddridge, The Life of the Hon. Colonel Gardiner, p.30. 
10 His passage from cadet to captain took thirteen years.  ODNB James Gardiner by James Falkner and 
Doddridge, The Life of the Hon. Colonel Gardiner, p.30, 36-7. 
11 ODNB Sir Robert Munro by Stuart Handley and Doddridge, The Life of the Hon. Colonel Gardiner, 
p.234. 
12 Doddridge, The Life of the Hon. Colonel Gardiner, p.246-7. 
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2nd Earl of Stair (1673-1747), began his military career at fourteen with service under the 
Prince of Orange in the United Provinces.13 
 
Both Blackader and Robert Munro entered the army as gentlemen volunteers, as 
young men in their early twenties, a path they shared with Loudoun, George Munro and 
Stair.14  Such entry, without the necessity of purchasing a commission, was a popular 
way to gain early military experience on the understanding of promotion to the lowest 
vacated rank.15  Gardiner, Stair and Loudoun had commissions, that of Gardiner and Stair 
in Dutch service.  As shown in Chapter One: Scotland’s Professional Soldiers, foreign 
service was a long-established option for generations of Scots of all ranks who found 
greater opportunity for employment abroad during the seventeenth-century, until the 
growing conflicts on the continent and the appreciation for a standing army felt by 
William III and the Hanoverian kings allowed for a larger British army that could employ 
them in greater numbers.  In this regard Loudoun’s superior background probably 
assisted in gaining a commission in a prestigious regiment such as the Scots Greys in 
1705.  Purchase of a commission was a sign of status, as suggested by the colonelcies 
awarded to John and Archibald Campbell (later 2nd and 3rd dukes of Argyll) when aged 
fourteen and nineteen (1680-1743 and 1682-1761).16  Entry as gentleman volunteers was 
still a respectable avenue, however, as skill at arms was regarded as part of a gentleman’s 
education.  Military service often ran in families; Gardiner’s father, maternal uncle and 
                                                 
13 G.G. Cunningham, A History of England in the Lives of Englishmen (London and Edinburgh, 1853), 7 
vols, IV, p.156-7. 
14 Crichton, The Life and Diary, p.33, 72 and ODNB John Blackader by T.F. Henderson rev. Jonathan 
Spain and Cunningham, A History of England, IV, p.156-7. 
15 As discussed in sub-section ‘Joining the colours’ in Chapter Two: The Scottish Soldier’s Experience. 
16 Both John and Archibald’s commissions were awarded as a sign of royal favour to their father.  ODNB 
John Campbell, 2nd Duke of Argyll by Alexander Murdoch and ODNB Archibald Campbell, 3rd Duke of 
Argyll by Alexander Murdoch. 
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brother were all in the army, and the deaths of the latter two, at Steenkerke in 1692 and 
Namur in 1695, did not deter him from enlisting.17   
 
Scottish gentlemen, such as Robert and George Munro, and the politically 
ambiguous Simon Fraser, 11th Lord Lovat (1687/8 – 9th April 1747),18 frequently sought 
military careers for advancement, as more openings existed for Scots in the army than in 
politics.19  Opportunities blossomed during times of conflict, allowing the Munro 
brothers to gain positions and promotions; probable unrest in Scotland in 1714 brought 
Robert an appointment as Lieutenant-Colonel and a Captaincy of an Independent 
Company, while his appointment as Lieutenant-Colonel of the newly embodied 43rd in 
1739 was precipitated by the War of Jenkins’ Ear.20  After serving on the continent, 
George too found favour in the military during the ’15 and the ’19,21 and was rewarded 
with his own Independent Company during the ‘45.22  Similarly, Stair’s promotions and 
colonelcies came after various battles23 and his valour at Oudenarde won him the honour 
                                                 
17 Gardiner’s father was to die of his wounds after the battle of Blenheim in 1704 two years into his son’s 
career.  Doddridge, The Life of the Hon. Colonel Gardiner, p.26-7. 
18 Lovat belongs in the ‘Trimmer’ sub-section below. 
19 R. Mitchison, ‘The Government and the Highlands, 1707-1745’, in N.T. Phillipson and R. Mitchison 
(eds), Scotland in the Age of Improvement.  Essays in Scottish History in the Eighteenth Century 
(Edinburgh, 1970), p.28-9. 
20 ODNB Sir Robert Munro by Stuart Handley and Doddridge, The Life of the Hon. Colonel Gardiner, 
p.246. 
21 At Glenshiel “…they [the Munro clansmen] distinguished themselves by the gallantry of their behaviour, 
driving the enemy before them in a sharp action, in which many of them were killed and more wounded; 
and amongst the rest the Captain [George Munro] himself in a very dangerous manner”.  Doddridge, The 
Life of the Hon. Colonel Gardiner, p.246-7. 
22 Doddridge, The Life of the Hon. Colonel Gardiner, p.248. 
23 For example, his success leading a brigade of infantry at the battle of Ramillies (23 May 1706) led to his 
appointment as Brigadier-General on the English establishment on 1st June 1706.  ODNB John Dalrymple, 
2nd Earl of Stair by H.M. Stevens rev. William C. Lowe. 
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of presenting the dispatches at court.24  Such successes raised his profile, aiding his 
advancement in the military, at court and in parliament. 
 
Military service, as well as providing a career for to gentlemen’s sons,25 also 
allowed them to fulfil a moral duty inherited from a background of religious obligations 
and divisions during the seventeenth century.  The religious background to the turmoil of 
the Civil Wars, when Covenanters used military service to defend their religion, and the 
continuance of religious violence in late seventeenth century Scotland, as Charles II used 
the army to control the Presbyterians, linked military service with the defence of religious 
principle for many Scots.26  It inspired the followers of Richard Cameron to form their 
own regiment, the Cameronians, which, on the return of the Presbyterian Church to 
dominance, then joined the Scottish Establishment.  For the Cameronians and many 
Protestant Scots, service with the British army was a continuation of the role of the 
Covenanters.27  The cohort of Scottish officers who joined the army in the early 
eighteenth century was also influenced by the Scottish Enlightenment.  The relative 
merits of the militia and standing armies were a frequent and contentious topic but most 
agreed that it was the duty of all Christian gentlemen, as well as every citizen, to 
participate in the defence and policing of their country in order to ensure the stability and 
peace of its society.28  Consequently, many saw military service as a moral duty not just a 
                                                 
24 ODNB John Dalrymple, 2nd Earl of Stair by H.M. Stevens rev. William C. Lowe. 
25 D. Allan, Scotland in the Eighteenth Century (London, 2002), p.110-1. 
26 J. Robertson, The Scottish Enlightenment and the Militia Issue (Edinburgh, 1985), p.1 and A. 
Cunningham, ‘The Revolution Government in the Highlands’, The Scottish Historical Review, 16, 1918, 
p.29-51 and B. Lenman, ‘Militia, Fencible Men, and Home Defence 1660-1797’ in N. MacDougall (ed), 
Scotland and War AD 79-1918 (Edinburgh, 1991), p.171-4, 180. 
27 Robertson, The Scottish Enlightenment, p.5. 
28 Lenman, Militia, Fencible Men, p.176-7, 187-9 and Robertson, The Scottish Enlightenment, p.22-32.  An 
example of Fletcher of Saltoun’s work is A. Fletcher, A discourse concerning Militias and Standing 
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career.  Blackader is perhaps most illustrative of this, as his diary focuses so strongly on 
the religious aspects of his life. 
 
For Blackader, the role of Colonel-proprietor was a moral duty.  These ranged 
from choosing the regiment’s chaplain in July 170229 to mixing training with moral 
improvement during the winter of 1706-7.30  He especially disliked swearing31 which he 
frequently complained of: “[the soldiers] speak just such language as devils would do.”32  
Even after retirement, Blackader still represented his old regiment at the General 
Assembly of the Church of Scotland; in May 1714, he spoke against the plans to bring 
the Cameronians’ church services in line with the English pattern.33  While this level of 
engagement was unusual for British army officers, the Covenanting background of the 
Cameronian regiment, and its ongoing spiritual concerns, made such a duty clear to its 
officers.  It is significant however, that such tolerance for Presbyterian religious ideals 
existed at a time when the state was deeply concerned with unity and regarded Catholic 
beliefs as threatening because of the control the Pope could wield over a faithful 
population.  The concessions made to the Cameronians’ religious beliefs demonstrate the 
appreciation felt by the Government for the contribution of the regiment.  It has been seen 
how in 1739, this was echoed when the 43rd was allowed kilts and bagpipes, rather than 
                                                                                                                                                 
Armies; with relation to the Past and Present Governments of Europe and of England in particular 
(London, 1697). 
29 Crichton, The Life and Diary, p.178. 
30 Ibid, p.292-4. 
31 Ibid, p.238, 252, 281, 293, 312, 342-3, 380-1, 507, 536, 556-7, 22nd April 1705, 12th July 1705, 19th May 
1706, winter 1706-7, 1st May 1708, 8th July 1709, 27th April 1710, 8th January 1720, 26th September 1724. 
32 Ibid, p.197, 18th June 1703. 
33 Ibid, p.447. 
 155 
the usual uniform.34  Blackader’s religious zeal continued in his later life.  Care for both 
the garrison of Stirling Castle as Deputy-Governor35 and the wider community as a JP not 
only fulfilled his personal sense of duty but reflected the dual nature of his official 
responsibilities over the garrison and local civilians. 
 
Indeed, the Christian element of military service was so interlinked that 
Doddridge dedicated his Life of the Hon. Colonel Gardiner to junior officers who should 
use Gardiner’s example as a moral guide in the vice-filled army.36  However, Doddridge, 
an Independent minister in England, had a clear agenda in highlighting Gardiner’s 
spiritual journey rather than his military career.37  Additionally, the importance of 
Gardiner’s social and military rank and the connotations of shame surrounding his fatal 
wounding at Prestonpans38 ensured Gardiner’s death was solemnised.  Charles Edward’s 
visit to his sick bed39 and rumours that Charles had taken Gardiner’s horse and rode it 
during the retreat from Derby40 turned this attention to posthumous celebrity.  
Doddridge’s inclusion of the three Munro brothers, who with Gardiner all died in 
                                                 
34 J. White, The Cameronians (Scottish Rifles) in France (Glasgow, 1917), p.9 and P. Cochrane, Scottish 
Military Dress (London, New York and Sydney, 1987), p.35. 
35 Crichton, The Life and Diary, p.496, 514, 518, 531. 
36 Specifically named was David Gardiner, Gardiner’s son, a cornet in Sir John Cope’s Dragoons in 1747, 
who had been tutored as a youth by Doddridge.  Doddridge, The Life of the Hon. Colonel Gardiner, p.17-9, 
25. 
37 Gardiner experiences two spiritual conversions; one when left for dead on the field of Ramillies and the 
second when in Paris with Stair in 1718.  Doddridge, The Life of the Hon. Colonel Gardiner, p.31-2, 50-60. 
38 C. Duffy, The ’45.   Bonnie Prince Charlie and the untold story of the Jacobite Rising (London, 2003), 
p.23 and P. Sumner, ‘The 13th Dragoons at Prestonpans, 1745’, Journal of the Society for Army Historical 
Research, 28, 1950, p.144-145. 
39 Gardiner was reported to have told the Chevalier that he was searching for a temporal crown, while he, 
Gardiner, was going to get a Crown of Glory.  NLS Gardiner papers MS.3648 f.46(b), Gardiner to 
Doddridge, Ghent, 24th May 1743. 
40 Duffy, The ’45, p.314. 
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government service in Scotland combating the ‘45, was an open attempt to glorify their 
sacrifice in the defence of the Protestant Succession.41   
 
Despite being neighbours, it was the strength of Gardiner’s fame that caused his 
inclusion in the Reverend Carlyle’s Autobiography, whose “extensive range of 
connections, coupled with his prodigious memory and acute observations, account for the 
enduring reputation of his Autobiography as one of the most important first-hand 
accounts of cultural activity in eighteenth-century Scotland.”42  Carlyle’s recollections 
are heavily influenced by Gardiner’s fate and quasi-beatification, so that their 
conversations before the battle have a fatalistic edge.  Therefore, Carlyle’s recollection of 
his last meeting with Gardiner on the 18th September linked his demeanour to the ensuing 
battle: “He looked tired and dejected…I began to ask him if he was not now 
quite…confident that they [the British army] would give account of the rebels.  He 
answered dejectedly that he hoped it might be so, but – and then made a long 
pause…[and said] I’ll tell you in confidence that I have not above ten men in my 
regiment whom I am certain will follow me.  But we must give them battle now, and 
God’s will be done!”43  However, his appearance could have been partly due to illness, as 
Gardiner’s correspondence in June, July and August 1745 makes more reference to his 
health than to military matters.44 
                                                 
41 Colonel Sir Robert Munro was killed at Falkirk, 17th January 1746, along side his brother Dr Duncan 
Munro who was serving as regimental surgeon, and Captain George Munro was killed in an ambush in a 
case of mistaken identity on 31st August 1746.  Doddridge, The Life of the Hon. Colonel Gardiner, p.223. 
42 ODNB Alexander Carlyle by Richard B. Sher. 
43 A. Carlyle, Autobiography of the Rev. Dr Alexander Carlyle Minister of Inveresk Containing Memorials 
of the Men and Event of his time (Edinburgh and London, 1860), p.131-2. 
44 NLS, Transcripts of Gardiner correspondence Acc.11647(b) Lady Gardiner to Gardiner, Bankton, 6th 
July 1744; Acc.11647(c) John Mitchell to Lady Gardiner, London, 20th June 1745 and Acc.11647(d) 
Gardiner to Lady Gardiner, Thirsk, 3rd August 1745.  
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Gardiner, the Munro brothers and Blackader, following the lead of the 
Covenanters, believing it was the duty of every Presbyterian to defend, by force of arms 
if necessary, the Presbytery and their religious freedom.  Consequently, both Doddridge 
and Carlyle saw their deaths defending the Protestant Succession as a worthy sacrifice 
and this coloured their publications.  This in turn influenced their subsequent portrayal; 
later paintings dramatically depict Gardiner’s fatal wounding,45 while a history published 
six years later erroneously recorded: “Sir Robert Munro was wounded and…taken 
prisoner, together with his Brother [Duncan]…both of which…the Rebels murdered in 
cold Blood.”46  Several monuments exist commemorating both Gardiner and Munro at 
their burial sites and the battlefields where they fell, in stark contrast to the focus on 
Jacobite commemoration at other Jacobite related sites, especially Culloden.   
 
Any subsequent reference to Gardiner, the Munro brothers, and to a lesser extent 
Blackader, has to bear in mind an ulterior motive - to decry the Jacobites’ barbaric 
behaviour and highlight the tragic deaths of the government’s loyal servants.  
Doddridge’s emphasis on religion,47 though illustrative of their personal motivations, 
similarly detracts from the military reasons for certain events.  For example, his 
attribution of Gardiner’s promotions to “his exemplary diligence and fidelity in 
                                                 
45 The Battle of Prestonpans painted in 1842 by Sir William Allan (1782-1850) depicts the death of 
Gardiner.  It is reproduced on the cover of B. Lenman, The Jacobite Risings in Britain 1689-1746 (London, 
1984). 
46 J. Ray, A compleat history of the rebellion, from its first rise, in 1745, to its total suppression at the 
glorious battle of Culloden, in April, 1746.  By James Ray,…With a summary of the trials and executions of 
the rebel lords, &c. (Bristol, 1752), p.249-50. 
47 Doddridge, The Life of the Hon. Colonel Gardiner, p.77-8, 180. 
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everything that related to the care of the troops over which he was sat”48 highlights his 
moral strengths, but ignores the influence of patronage and the recognition of ability.  
Indeed, Gardiner’s first commission was bought by his godfather Brigadier-General 
Rue,49 and later promotions came through the friendship of the Earl of Stair,50 in 
recognition of his actions under Marlborough and at Preston in 1715.51  His family’s 
history of loyal service combined with their Lowland origins ensured he was well 
received in the army.52  However, the army features only peripherally in Doddridge’s 
biography, such as in Gardiner’s insistence that his men attend Dissenting services in 
England,53 or in relation to the complex position of the honour code and duelling 
amongst officers.54  The influence of the Germanic school of military conduct on the 
British army after 1714 and George I’s and II’s personal interest in their British soldiers 
would have encouraged Gardiner to provide welfare beyond simple fighting fitness for 
soldiers under his command.55 
 
On the other hand, as contemporary sources, Gardiner and Blackader unwittingly 
reveal opinions that are of interest to the historian.  Despite the rise in Scottish 
Nationalism since the 1970s and the consequent focus on nationality, it is not blind 
                                                 
48 Doddridge, The Life of the Hon. Colonel Gardiner, p.114. 
49 Doddridge, The Life of the Hon. Colonel Gardiner, p.29. 
50 Promotion put Gardiner in a position to offer patronage in turn; offering to find a youthful Rev. Carlyle a 
cadet’s commission.  Carlyle, Autobiography of the Rev. Dr Alexander Carlyle, p.51 and Doddridge, The 
Life of the Hon. Colonel Gardiner, p.38 and ODNB James Gardiner by James Falkner. 
51 Doddridge, The Life of the Hon. Colonel Gardiner, p.113. 
52 Ibid, p.26-7. 
53 Ibid, p.115. 
54 Gardiner writes; “I fear sinning, though you know I do not fear fighting”, Doddridge, The Life of the 
Hon. Colonel Gardiner, p.29.  A.N. Gilbert, ‘Law and Honour among Eighteenth-Century British Army 
Officers’, The History Journal, 19:1, 1976, 75-6, 80-1.  For more on duelling, see Chapter Two: The 
Scottish Soldier’s Experience in sub-section ‘Drill, discipline and punishment’. 
55 A.J. Guy, Oeconomy and Discipline.  Officership and administration in the British army, 1714-63 
(Manchester, 1985), p.20, 29, 149, 162. 
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loyalty that is revealed, but rather the complexity of loyalties experienced by Scottish 
Whigs.  When Blackader was ordered to Scotland to counter the 1708 invasion attempt, 
his use of pronouns reveals a common mix of sympathy for his fellow Scots and 
abhorrence of the rebels: “Conserned for the public affairs, and the work of God in 
Scotland. I trust their confusions and troubles shall ultimately turn out for their good, and 
the disappointment of their enemies”.56  Of the ’45, Gardiner saw its causes in the “sad 
state of things as to religion and morals.”57  Both focused on the religious not the 
nationalistic significance of the rebellions.   
 
Also inspired by a long family history of defending the Presbytery, Duncan 
Forbes of Culloden (10th November 1685 – 10th December 1747), Lord Advocate of 
Scotland from 1709 and Lord President from 1738 to 1746, saw his actions during the ’45 
for the preservation of the Government as the only way to save Scotland.58  Loyalty 
through national identity, however, was in its infancy in the first half of the eighteenth 
century.  Forbes’s refusal to participate in the trial of Jacobites in Carlisle in 1715 and 
instead to raise money for their defence was due to Christian duty rather than issues of 
nationality: “It is certainly Christian and by no means disloyal to sustain them in their 
indignant estate, until they are found guilty.”59  Both Forbes and Blackader’s feelings 
reveal how religion not nationality is their focus; to both, the rebels’ guilt is unquestioned 
despite a common country of origin.60  Forbes also advised Walpole against the mass 
                                                 
56 Crichton, The Life and Diary, p.308. 
57 Doddridge, The Life of the Hon. Colonel Gardiner, p.155. 
58 J.H. Burton, Lives of Simon Lord Lovat, and Duncan Forbes, of Culloden.  From original sources 
(London, 1847), p.367. 
59 H.R. Duff (ed), Culloden Papers (London, 1815), p.58, 69. 
60 Crichton, The Life and Diary, p.308.  
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execution of the Scottish Jacobites during the ’15, not through political sympathy, but 
rather because he knew grass-roots Scottish pride would not be won over to Hanoverian 
loyalty by wanton bloodshed.61 
 
An imprecise notion of national identity is revealed in the fluid terminology used by 
Blackader, Donald Macleod (1688-c.1791) and Donald McBane (1664-c.1728).  
Blackader refers to Germans rather than Hanoverians, and uses “English” in 1709, after 
the Union of 1707, but “British” in 1704.62  The distinctions of nationality only become 
specified when religion is involved, as when his pious ideals are frustrated by the English 
soldiers and officers: “A sad Sabbath…in the middle of an English army.  I need say no 
more to give a notion what a hell on earth it is”.63  His attempts at correcting them go 
unsupported and unappreciated, emphasised by national divisions:  
One of the worst days I ever had in this employment…with villany 
and abominations of all sorts, both against the laws of God and man.  
Cursing, swearing, drunkedness, robbing, thieving, mutiny, &c.  I 
made some severe examples of punishment, but was ill assisted by 
some officers, who rather encouraged the villains; so that I believe I 
shall not be so well liked among many of the English; but I shall be 
glad to be hated by such.64   
                                                 
61 Burton, Lives of Simon Lord Lovat, p.290-4. 
62 Crichton, The Life and Diary, p.216, 354, 218. 
63 Ibid, p.314.  This example is in 1708, suggesting a slow standardisation to the designation of English or 
British. 
64 Ibid, p.312-3. 1st May 1708.  On 20th June 1709, he again records his unpopularity with the other officers 
for his strict stance on punishment for “immortality and scandals”. Ibid, p.341. 
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Interestingly, although Blackader provides evidence for the fluid and unformed nature of 
the terminology of nationality, he does frequently stereotype by nationality. 
 
That is not to say that Scotland’s military elite remained heartless regarding the fate 
of their rebel countrymen.  Loudoun was regarded as a man of honour, in part thanks to 
his behaviour following Culloden, when he acted with humanity to those who 
surrendered, issuing certificates of protection signed by Cumberland.65  Loudoun in turn 
possessed a pragmatic faith in other loyal Highlanders which was more influenced by 
realism and experience of soldiers than by notions of a unity through common 
nationality.  He argued against disarming well-affected clans after Culloden, placing 
more faith in them than London and John Campbell of Mamore, Islay’s agent in 
Scotland,66 but was well aware that hastily raised loyal clans were mainly formed from 
farmers who would desert rather than leave their lands.67  
 
Despite the importance of the legacy of Covenanting zeal in defending the 
Protestant Succession, strong religious principles were, in many ways, an impediment to 
life in the army.  Blackader found “I am the unfittest for it [recruiting] of any man in the 
army, and have the least talent that way…I see the greatest rakes are the best recruiters. I 
cannot ramble, and rove, and drink, and tell stories, and wheedle, and insinuate, if my life 
                                                 
65 The certificates were not always respected by the officers on the ground however.  ODNB John 
Campbell, 4th Earl of Loudoun by Stephen Brumwell, Fergusson of Kilkerren, Argyll in the Forty-Five, 
p.203 and J. Oates, Sweet William or The Butcher?  The Duke of Cumberland and the ’45 (Barnsley, 2008), 
p.134. 
66 Fergusson of Kilkerren, Argyll in the Forty-Five, p.188.  John Campbell of Mamore is discussed further 
below in this sub-section. 
67 The comment was directed against the Earl of Sutherland’s men when ordered to leave Sutherland and 
follow Cumberland’s army in March 1746.  Duffy, The ’45, p.458-9. 
 162 
were lying at stake.”68   Similarly his role as Governor of Stirling Castle in 1720 came 
with associated social engagements that led to situations where his principles and social 
obligations came into conflict: “Went out in the morning with the Duke [of Argyll] and 
other gentlemen a-fowling…at night there was music and dancing…I laid a restraint upon 
myself for fear of going too far, and joined but little, only so as not to shew moroseness 
or ill-breeding.”69  Blackader’s diary, as Protestant mode of self-examination to identify 
“problems of conscience and their resolution,”70 does focus on his fear of the corrupting 
nature of military life: “There is now so much tyranny and knavery in the army…it is a 
wonder how a man of a straight, generous, honest soul can live in it.”71  However, even 
this conscious fear was not enough to prevent him joining the army in 1689 and 1715 in 
order to protect his religion.72  That he was prepared to socialise despite the risk of 
sinning, therefore, clearly shows the importance of social interaction and an officer’s 
personality.  Command, it seems, was inextricably linked with society, whether recruiting 
in taverns or dining with the Commander-in-Chief.73   
 
Advancement, whether in society or service to the crown, relied heavily on family 
ties.  The strong hierarchy of eighteenth-century society required an individual to be 
socially acceptable before he could make the contacts necessary to gain a patron and thus 
advancement.  Most often this entrance was gained through introductions by influential 
                                                 
68 Crichton, The Life and Diary, p.236.  15th February 1705. 
69 Ibid, p.236.  12th September 1720. 
70 D.B. Hindmarsh, ‘”My chains fell off, my heart was free”: Early Methodist Conversion Narrative in 
England’, Church History, 68:4, December 1999, p.929. 
71 Crichton, The Life and Diary, p.197. 
72 In a letter to the magistrates of Glasgow dated 29th November 1715, Blackader says “…I have long 
wished…of doing any Service to the Good Town of Glasgow.  They have shewn so much Zeal and 
Forwardness for theses valuable Interests.”   P. Rae, The history of the late rebellion; rais’d against His 
Majesty King George, by the friends of the Popish Pretender (Drumfries, 1718), p.312-4. 
73 Crichton, The Life and Diary, p.236, 462.  15th February 1705 and 17th September 1715 
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family members or their network of friends.  Therefore, the reputation of an individual’s 
family could open or close doors in an officer’s pursuit of a career.  In an age of limited 
government, social interaction was a key pathway to gain or give influence, so 
personality, wit and charm were greatly prized.   Loudoun benefited from a connection to 
clan Campbell and, through his mother, to the 2nd Earl of Stair.  The Munro brothers’ 
maternal uncle, Duncan Forbes of Culloden,74 undoubtedly aided their appointments to 
Independent Companies, as Forbes suggested the idea and allocated the commissions.75  
Their rise from gentlemen volunteers, however, suggests ability too.  Indeed, the then 
GOC of North Britain, William Cadogan, stated that Robert was “the first man in this 
kingdom who took arms for his majesty [in 1715]…the preservation of Inverness is very 
much owing to his vigilance and resolution…and not less useful in Parliament than in the 
field”76 and so ensured the government respected Robert’s opinion sufficiently to task 
him with reporting on the state of Scotland in April 1716, for which he was handsomely 
rewarded.77 
 
Family ties also meant that the friendship between Duncan Forbes, as uncle to the 
Munro brothers and neighbour of the ‘trimmer’ Lord Lovat, brought a friendship between 
Robert Munro and Lovat.  Though this appears unlikely, considering both found their 
deaths on opposing sides in the same conflict, it is another example of the complex 
internecine nature of the Jacobite conflict.  Their connection came from a common 
rivalry over land and inheritance disputes against the Earl of Seaforth and Mackenzie of 
                                                 
74 ODNB Sir Robert Munro by Stuart Handley. 
75 P. Simpson, The Independent Highland Companies 1603-1760 (Edinburgh, 1996), p.122-3 and Burton, 
Lives of Simon Lord Lovat, p.373. 
76 BL Add.MS.61161 f.228 in ODNB Sir Robert Munro by Stuart Handley. 
77 ODNB Sir Robert Munro by Stuart Handley. 
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Fraserdale.  Prior to Lovat’s overt alliance to the Jacobites in late 1745, their friendship 
had been strong enough for Munro to banter over the misleading nature of Lovat’s 
version of his inheritance as inscribed on his father’s monument.78  Munro was also one 
of the men that provided money and surety for Lovat’s bail in 1715.79   
 
Prior allegiances and enmities also continued uninterrupted by rebellions or the 
creation of the Union.  Robert Munro and Lord Lovat took advantage of Seaforth and 
Fraserdale’s suspect status following the ’15 by advising the government to take a 
stronger stance in order to gain an advantage in land disputes with them.80  Similarly, 
when cut off on Skye in 1746, Loudoun’s request for arms from General Campbell of 
Mamore, calling on their family link, only angered Mamore as, besides the presumption 
of the request, the link dated back to the thirteenth century.81  This clearly contradicts the 
nineteenth century romanticised notion of blind loyalty to clan ties.  Interestingly, 
Doddridge made no mention of the friendship between Robert Munro and Lovat or of the 
Munros’ Highland background.  This was either because the complex political and social 
relations of the Scottish elite were beyond his English comprehension, or because a 
connection to a condemned traitor was incompatible with his portrayal of Munro as a 
Protestant martyr.  
 
                                                 
78 D.W. Kemp, (ed), ‘Tours in Scotland, 1747, 1750, 1760.  By Richard Pockocke, Bishop of Meath, From 
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80 Mitchison, The Government and the Highlands, p.30. 
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The institution of the army was no different from political circles where family and 
social connections were of paramount importance in the network-driven world of the 
eighteenth century.  Blackader was promoted to lieutenant within two months of 
volunteering82 thanks to the patronage of the regiment’s commander, Colonel William 
Cleland, a college acquaintance, who would naturally look to the interests of friends and 
family.83  Once a career was established with the aid of patrons, meritocracy ensured that 
ability was promoted, and Blackader’s service in the War of the Spanish Succession 
provided the opportunity for friendship with General Cadogan and the Duke of 
Marlborough.84  Similarly, the “great promises of friendship both from the Duke [Argyll] 
and the General [Wightman]”85 obtained after they served together during the ’15, 
ensured his appointment as Deputy-Governor of Stirling Castle.86   
 
The Hanoverian kings, especially George I, favoured the promotion of ability and 
recognition of merit over the purchase system.   As the century progressed, a system of 
meritocracy increasingly challenged the importance of patronage.87  Stair’s career shows 
how his early diplomatic experience88 and military ability89 gained him an appointment 
                                                 
82 Crichton, The Life and Diary, p.73. 
83 ODNB John Blackader by T.F. Henderson rev. Jonathan Spain. 
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as Second Lieutenant-Colonel in the Scots Foot Guards on 12th May 170290 and brought 
him to the attention of the Captain-General: “Marlborough honoured Colonel Dalrymple 
with his particular notice, though, by nation prejudice, not very fond of encouraging 
Scotsmen.”91  After 1703, steady promotion followed thanks to a position as ADC to 
Marlborough, who became his patron and mentor.92   
 
Loudoun’s choice of patrons reveals both the pragmatism and necessity of 
patriotism.  When Stair, his maternal uncle, was out of royal favour and in political 
opposition in the 1730s,93 he played the Campbell card.  However, once Islay fell from 
favour after the ’4594 he turned to Cumberland as a Dalrymple.  The nature of eighteenth-
century politics and society gave power to individuals who gathered support by personal 
ability and charisma.  These individuals gained position and power, and in turn sought 
protégés to continue their work.  Therefore patronage, and the personality, ability and 
background of an individual, were of great importance.  Argyll’s charisma amongst the 
public, court and camp,95 together with Islay’s skill as, “an astute political manager, who 
knew not only how to use patronage but also how to approach individuals to make them 
receptive to his needs”96 allowed the Campbell brothers to gather followers, creating the 
‘Argathelians’.   Bound by mutual dependence, the Argathelians acted as the Campbells’ 
                                                                                                                                                 
89 Such as at the battle of Steenkirk (3rd August 1692) where he stood out for rallying his troops for a new 
charge.  Cunningham, A History of England, IV, p.157. 
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unofficial civil service in Scotland, often managing the daily business of politics.  Key 
amongst them was Duncan Forbes and Andrew Fletcher, Lord Milton.97  Both proved to 
be valued advisors, intelligence gatherers and representatives in Edinburgh, especially 
when Argyll or Islay or both were in London, for example, at the start of the ‘45.98  The 
inter-connected nature of the gentry, as civil and military authorities, landowners and 
politicians, and the importance of reputation and influence was such that personality was 
as important as ability.  Between 1750 and 1794, 208 officers were also MPs, fifty-six of 
which were also Scottish, demonstrating that the Scottish military elite and Scottish 
political elite were drawn from the same pool.99  Similarly, many, such as Stair, Islay and 
Campbell of Mamore (after inheritance of the dukedom of Argyll) were also 
Representative Peers, a post that demonstrated royal and governmental trust.100  Argyll, 
knowing that the re-election of Representative Peers could act as a check on his 
independence, demanded an English title in return for acting for the Union during 
negotiations with the Estates and so sat in the Lords as the 1st Duke of Greenwich.101  The 
additional power of seats in the Commons and Lords provided the Scottish military elite 
with another avenue to contribute to the continuance of the British state and another way 
to influence how that state was moulded through legislation.  The ability to gain 
influential friends and then draw the able younger generation to you to build a network of 
supporters that gave a secure power-base was vital when power was needed to gain posts 
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and influence decisions.102  Though examined here as soldiers, Scotland’s social elite 
were multi-faceted; educated and experienced in all branches of leadership whether in 
politics, diplomacy, the military, economics or estate-management.   
 
The Campbell dominance in Scotland and the importance of long-standing links 
between families made them the logical agents to fulfil London’s plans in Scotland.  With 
the government-given power of patronage, they dominated all aspects of Scottish society 
and administration, most significantly through army commissions.  In turn, their wider 
family benefited; both John Campbell of Mamore (1693-1770) and his son John ‘Jack’ 
Campbell (1723-1806) were anglo-centric Scots who shared their cousins’ belief that the 
future was ‘British’.  They strove for a Scotland equal to England in social, military and 
political fields, as well as through industry and improvement.103  It was this patronage, 
combined with military success on the continent and personal connections in the army 
and court, which gave Mamore sufficient influence to successfully advise London in 
October 1745 to permit the raising of voluntary regiments to counter the ‘45.104  Jack also 
followed his father into a prosperous career in politics at the start of the ’45 as MP for 
Glasgow under Islay’s influence.105  Both prospered in the army, rising to the rank of 
General and Field-Marshal respectively.106 
 
                                                 
102 Argyll in particular learned before adolescence that others held his father in awe for the position he held 
with the king, and that this position had been earned against the odds after his own father’s execution for 
treason.  Dickson, Red John of the Battles, p.22. 
103 Mamore and ‘Jack’ were Argyll and Islay’s first and second cousins respectively, who became the 4th 
and 5th Dukes of Argyll. 
104 Fergusson of Kilkerren, Argyll in the Forty-Five, p.34. 
105 Ibid, p.16. 
106 Ibid, p.251-2. 
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However, as Islay’s star waned during and after the ’45, Loudoun’s choice of 
Cumberland over Campbell was wise.  Cumberland provided Loudoun with a strong 
royal patron, who, as Captain-General, ensured that in 1756 he was appointed 
Commander-in-Chief of North America, Governor-General of Virginia and Colonel-in-
Chief of the Royal American Regiment.  Cumberland’s close relationship with his father 
also ensured George II “spoak well of Loudoun and said he would take care of [him].”107  
Any prejudice against his nationality was outweighed by Loudon’s family’s strong Whig 
and Protestant position.  The religious sacrifices of his grandfather, who had been exiled 
for refusing to sign a bond of religious conformity, and the political loyalty of his father, 
both ensured that Loudoun was an acceptable candidate for the political appointments he 
received on his inheritance.108    
 
The practice of conducting politics on an individual level using individual 
relationships could also hamper advancement.  John Maule (Whig MP for Aberdeen) and 
former confidential secretary to Islay, informed Mamore on 12th April 1746: “I hope 
when [Loudoun] comes to you, he will not be imbarassing you with his schemes and 
disturbing your own.  What he has done, has been wrong from beginning to end.”109  
Thus a MP in Aberdeen was biased against Loudoun because of Loudoun’s behaviour 
towards Mamore, who was the nephew and heir of Islay.  Once such factionalism had 
begun, political game-playing followed; Maule later wrote to warn Mamore that Loudoun 
was taking Mamore’s ideas as his own when presenting them to Cumberland.110   
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These splits also impacted on the command structure of the army at an operational 
level.  On 26th April 1746, Colonel Loudoun ignored General Mamore’s order to remain 
in the west to search for arms and fleeing rebels, and instead followed Cumberland’s 
orders to join him at Fort Augustus.  This then placed an overwhelming burden on the 
magazines placed across south-east Scotland from October 1745 by Mamore, and by 
extension Islay, to support the Argyll Militia in anticipation of ‘mopping up’ the 
Highlands when the rebellion was quelled.111  Loudoun’s repeated failure to respect the 
purpose of these magazines and his failure to reimburse or replace items personally paid 
for by Mamore was symptomatic of the post-rebellion split between Cumberland and 
Islay.  As the relationship deteriorated, Loudoun gained increasing favour with 
Cumberland.  Consequently, his ideas were heard above Mamore’s, causing confusion 
and inconsistency in the orders issued at this time.  For example, on 23rd April Mamore 
had ordered all clans be disarmed regardless of loyalties.  Loudoun, however, persuaded 
Cumberland to trust the loyal clans, who issued another order on the 3rd May to disarm 
only the disaffected clans.112  The change of orders, however, did not reach Mamore until 
16th May, creating both inconsistency of policy and forcing Mamore to write a grovelling 
letter to Cumberland begging forgiveness for his mistake.113 
 
Political game-playing also hampered co-operation and communication.  On 
several occasions during the search for Charles Edward, the men under Mamore’s 
command arrived to find that Loudoun or Captain Fergusson of the Furnace had been 
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there just before them under Cumberland’s orders.  This situation kept recurring despite 
Mamore’s frequent letters complaining that such events were unhelpful, inefficient and 
wasteful of resources.114  Similarly, communication between Loudoun and Mamore was 
so poor that when Jack Campbell, his son, was away from his regiment (Jack was 
Lieutenant-Colonel of Loudoun’s Highlanders), from May to June 1746, Mamore was 
left without a channel of communication.115  That a General (Mamore) could have so 
little control over a Colonel (Loudoun), and that a Commander-in-Chief (Cumberland) 
contradicted one of his Generals so frequently, speaks eloquently of the undeveloped 
nature of command in the British army in the mid-eighteenth century. 
 
Stair also benefited from royal patronage.  His family’s standing ensured an early 
friendship with William III116 which brought a colonelcy in the winter of 1690-1 and the 
friendship of Marlborough.  This in turn led to an introduction to Anne who favoured him 
with political and diplomatic posts.117  Stair’s example also shows the limitations of 
patronage, royal or otherwise.  When Marlborough was in favour, Stair’s stature rose in 
proportion; when Marlborough fell, Stair sank with him.118  Stair in his turn tainted those 
around him while he was out of favour during his years of opposition in the 1730s.119  
His kinsman, Lord Cathcart, took four years to achieve political acceptance by distancing 
himself from Stair, while Cathcart’s father-in-law, Sir John Shaw, who wanted nothing to 
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do with Stair, was damned by association and was assured he “would never receive the 
King’s favour again.”120  Stair’s career was also hampered by vagaries in royal favour 
and priorities.  He was successful under William III and George I, both men who 
appreciated military ability, as well as under Anne, thanks to Marlborough’s introduction; 
Stair fell out of favour under George II, whose dislike of his father led him to reward his 
father’s enemies and ignore his friends.  Even patronage had its limitations given the 
importance of the individual in politics; Queen Caroline was responsible for Stair’s 
removal from the Vice-Admiralty of Scotland in April 1733 as punishment for his 
tactlessness in repeating private conversations between them.121  
 
For all gentlemen of this period, family was an important factor in choice and 
success of a career.  Even with the beheaded traitor, Lord Lovat, as their father, Simon 
Fraser (1726-1782) and Archibald Campbell Fraser (1736-1815) could call on family 
links to Argyll and Islay.122  Islay’s guardianship ensured that both received good 
educations and progressed to legal careers, political appointments and military 
commissions.123 
 
Pragmatists 
So far Whigs with clear political convictions have been addressed.  The following 
section concentrates on more moderate Whigs, be they Squadrone or Argathelians or 
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neither, who were not disaffected but held opinions that were determined by other factors 
as well as political obedience.  It has been seen that for many Scottish gentlemen, service 
in the British army offered an opportunity for redemption.  Simon and Archibald Fraser 
both spent a lifetime making amends for the disloyalty of their father.  Simon became an 
advocate,124 and Archibald a diplomat.  Both became MPs, Simon from 1761 to his death 
in 1782, when Archibald took over his seat until his own death two years later.125  
Simon’s loyal government service, in the army, politics and the law, was aimed at 
recovering his family’s forfeited lands and titles.  His greatest asset, his ability to raise 
large numbers of men from the Highlands, allowed him to seek rehabilitation through the 
army.  At a time of recurrent wars when the prevailing attitude mirrored General Wolfe’s 
1750 sentiment that Highlanders were hardy but expendable,126 military service from 
1757 allowed the Government to overlook his family history.  Other Scottish gentlemen 
‘tainted’ by Jacobitism followed Simon Fraser’s example.  Lieutenant-Colonel James 
Murray (1722-1794), fifth son of the Jacobite Lord Elibank and brother to three active 
Jacobites, including the perpetrator of the 1752 Elibank Plot, used service in the 
American War of Independence to prove his loyalty.127  John Mackenzie (1727-1789), 
son of the Jacobite Lord Cromarty, had fought, been captured and tried alongside his 
father, but had been pardoned on 22nd January 1748.  Rehabilitation came when the need 
for men during the American War of Independence gave him the opportunity of raising a 
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regiment and later a second battalion led by his younger brother George (1741-1787). 128   
It was not until 1771 that Simon Fraser felt secure enough to begin petitioning for the 
return of the Fraser estates, forfeited after the ’45.  Though they were returned a decade 
before the disbandment of the Annexed Estates Board in 1784 when the remaining 
forfeited estates were returned, including that of John Mackenzie,129 it took three years of 
petitioning and the payment of £20,983 (Sterling) to finally achieve.130  Despite Simon 
and Archibald’s service, the title was not reinstated until 1857, to Archibald’s heir.131  
The establishment had remembered the 11th Lord Lovat’s disloyalty for two generations 
and three inheritances.  It is little wonder that Archibald felt the need to use his mother’s 
maiden name as a reminder of his loyal maternal ancestry.   
 
For much of the eighteenth century, the government suffered from an intrinsic 
suspicion of the loyalty of Scotland, suspecting all of Jacobite sympathies.  This affected 
not only the careers of Scots but the security and effectiveness of government.  Duncan 
Forbes of Culloden (1685-1747) had both personal knowledge of the Highlands and a 
strong family background of Protestant, Whig loyalty.132  The family’s estates and 
influence around Inverness gave him strong links to the Highland chiefs, while their 
status as landowners rather than chiefs made them acceptable to Lowland and English 
                                                 
128 ODNB John Mackenzie by Stuart Reid and ODNB George Mackenzie found within John Mackenzie by 
Stuart Reid. 
129 John still had to pay £19,000 (Sterling) compensation fee.  ODNB John Mackenzie by Stuart Reid. 
130 ODNB Simon Fraser, Master of Lovat by Stuart Reid.  The fine covered the expenses of the Forfeiture 
Committee. 
131 ODNB Archibald Campbell Fraser of Lovat by Robert Clyde. 
132 A life-times knowledge was cemented by personal surveys of the country conducted during his recovery 
after the 1725 Malt Tax Riots.  Burton, Lives of Simon Lord Lovat, p.327-330. 
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peers and to the government.133  This was invaluable during his career as Lord Advocate 
and Lord President, serving both Scotland and London, as is best shown during the ’45.  
His reach, through personal acquaintances, relations and neighbours, allowed him to 
influence as many Jacobites as possible to remain loyal or, at least, neutral.134  Burton’s 
work highlights this role, featuring Lovat’s and Forbes’s correspondence with each 
other.135  Forbes’ made a point of maintaining a wide correspondence, recognising its 
necessity to advancement.  Without it, suggestions for the fortification of the Highlands 
by a loyal former Lord Lieutenant but political nonentity, John Campbell, 3rd Earl of 
Breadalbane (1696-1782), lacked weight and credibility.136 
 
Even so, recommendations to the government concerning legal matters from taxes 
to the location of ports were generally welcomed, usually because they occurred during 
peace when the government was amenable.  General John Campbell of Mamore’s 
suggestions, by contrast, though equally knowledgeable, found the government of 1745-6 
less receptive.137  Equally, though Forbes’ knowledge of Corrieyairack’s geography 
meant he knew General Cope was right not to engage the Jacobites there in September 
1745, the government, shocked by Prestonpans and the fall of Edinburgh, did not want to 
hear that truth.138  Similarly, despite support from the Argathelians and Walpole, 
                                                 
133 Forbes great-great-grandfather moved north in the seventeenth century after the era of new clan 
formation.  Burton, Lives of Simon Lord Lovat, p.269-272. 
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Forbes’s suggestion in 1738 for four or five Highland regiments to be raised for the war 
with Spain and France was ignored.139  War on the continent had yet to be declared and 
Highlanders, regardless of past loyalties, were still regarded with widespread suspicion. 
 
Powerful Scots also worried London.  Walpole in particular often found the dukes 
of Argyll and their followers, the Argathelians, too powerful and would favour Tory 
agents such as the Marquess of Tweeddale in order not to become dependent on the 
Campbell hegemony.140  Power also attracted enemies; many used the ’15 to criticise and 
force the brothers out of favour, despite the sense in their argument that harsh 
punishments would not endear former rebels to the establishment.141  What English 
politicians saw as Jacobite sympathy was actually an awareness, from personal 
experience, that families accused of treason in one generation could be masters of 
Scotland in the next.142  Though their Scottish rivals could probably understand these 
arguments, indeed, after the ’15, the feeling of gratitude to those who helped ensure 
pardons was a major factor in the long period of peace until the ’45, they also saw that 
granting the Campbells power to give surrendered rebels pardons would leave even more 
                                                 
139 The War of Jenkins Ear (1739-42) and the War of the Austrian Succession (1742-8).   
140 J.M. Simpson, ‘Who steered the gravy train, 1707 – 1766?’ in N.T. Phillipson and R. Mitchison (eds), 
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1970), p.58. 
141 TNA SP54/9/101B, Argyll to Stanhope, Camp at Stirling, 31st October 1715; SP54/10/18A, Argyll to 
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Scottish families in personal debt to them and thus reinforce their already dominant 
position.143  
 
The tightrope that Forbes, Argyll, Islay and Mamore could walk between London 
officials and Highland chiefs gave them the rare ability to engage with both parties.  
Therefore, Forbes could act for and not just advise the government.  During the ’45, he 
obtained many promises of loyalty, or at least neutrality, raising and arming many of the 
local clans.144  It was ironically the Jacobites who recognised Forbes’ contribution in both 
time and money by the backhand compliment of friends’ warnings in early 1746 “by their 
[the Jacobites’] discourse here, you was the chief object of their resentment.”145  
However, despite repeated examples of loyalty, of which Forbes’s behaviour is but one 
instance, the government’s inability to distinguish between loyal and disloyal Scots had 
ensured that, as long as the Jacobite threat existed, any Scot criticising the government 
was distrusted and marginalised: “Already every man of our country is looked on as a 
traitor – as one secretly inclined to the Pretender, and waiting but an opportunity to 
declare.  The guilty and the innocent are confounded together.”146  Just as Argyll’s desire 
for moderation towards the Jacobites after the ’15 was viewed as a lack of zeal, so 
Forbes’ attempts for moderation after Culloden were ignored.147  Legend tells of 
Cumberland’s response to Forbes’ desire to respect the laws of the country: “The laws of 
                                                 
143 Sankey, Jacobite Prisoners of the 1715 Rebellion, p.xiv-xv, 108-9, 150, 153-5. 
144 After the council at Derby, the Jacobites claimed that if the Mackenzies and the Macdonalds and 
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145 Burton, Lives of Simon Lord Lovat, p.377. 
146 Andrew Mitchell to Duncan Forbes, 23rd October 1746.  Ibid, p.382. 
147  TNA SP54/9/101B, Argyll to Stanhope, Camp at Stirling, 31st October 1715; SP54/10/18A, Argyll to 
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the country! My lord, I’ll make a brigade give laws, by God.”148  The recurrent 
contemporary phrase ‘lack of zeal’ was used as a less than subtle suggestion of 
disaffection or sympathy for the Jacobite cause that was synonymous with treason, and 
appears in this thesis with regularity.  Scotland’s political and military elite were often 
forced into actions by the threat of showing a ‘lack of zeal’ and were frequently obliged 
to protest their ‘zeal’ in advance of a request for men or money, for fear of being thought 
indifferent to the state.149 
 
Stair’s tendency to act against the government during the 1730s, opposing the 
Excise Bill in 1733 and the Mutiny Bill in 1734 causing the loss of his posts,150 was 
viewed as opposition rather than sedition, thanks to his own151 and his family’s record of 
loyalty,152 his genuine belief that his actions were for the benefit of the country153 and, 
most crucially, because they occurred in times of peace in Scotland.154  This ensured that 
while he lost posts due to his “tactless”155 behaviour, George II in 1744 “wish[ed] my 
                                                 
148 Burton, Lives of Simon Lord Lovat, p.381-2. 
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Lord Stair was in Flanders” and re-instated him as Commander-in-Chief of South Britain, 
as a Representative Peer, and as Colonel of the Scots Greys in the summer of 1745.156   
 
Despite the inconsistent attitude the government took towards their Scottish 
servants’ behaviour, many Scottish Whigs besides Forbes, such as Loudoun, Campbell of 
Mamore, Stair, Argyll and Islay, showed leniency to their fellow Scots following 
rebellions.157  The government, however, wanted to set an example, believing that 
leniency after the ’15 had allowed the Jacobites to re-group.158  However, Forbes knew, 
as Argyll did after the ’15, that negotiation would ensure surrender, and that defeated 
rebels were less likely to rise again if obliged to their contemporaries for their pardon.159  
Therefore, he continued to act on behalf of captured Jacobites despite the damage this 
caused to his reputation.  The Rev Henry Etough interpreted such actions negatively: 
“His private character as a man of notice and good temper enabled him to protect the 
vilest of his countrymen…he was a true Highlander.”160  The confused notion of identity 
is again demonstrated here: as an Englishman, on perceiving a Scot attempting to defend 
another Scot, he immediately branded him as a ‘Highlander’ with all the implications of 
barbarity associated with it.   
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However, this should not be confused with feelings of blind national loyalty.  
Islay demonstrated great compassion to both friends and strangers, including his old 
friend and open Jacobite, Lockhart of Carnwarth, interceding for many after the ’15.161  
However, Szechi suspects that it is no coincidence that one of the few Scottish prisoners 
executed for treason after the ’15 was not just hung but also, unusually, drawn and 
quartered, Archibald Burnet of Carlops, had personally promised Islay to remain 
uninvolved and then broken his word.162  Similarly, the traditional rivalry for dominance 
between Campbell and Dalrymple163 interrupted all other mutual loyalties towards 
government and Britain or Scotland, when Stair delayed the government’s reaction to the 
Jacobite landings in July 1745164 by pushing unsuccessfully to allow loyal Lowland 
gentlemen to raise their own regiments, as was being done in England.165  This put him in 
direct conflict with Islay who wanted to raise the loyal Highland clans.166   
 
To make the relationship between the government and its loyal servants more 
difficult, the task facing Scotland’s officials wishing to bridge the Scotland-London 
divide was a constant balancing act between fulfilling Scottish expectation without 
overstepping government-given authority.  This is best illustrated through Forbes who, as 
Lord Advocate and Lord President, found that tension existed between London’s view of 
him as a government servant, and the Scots’ belief that the role retained the power and 
                                                 
161 Szechi, 1715, p.246. 
162 Ibid, p.236. 
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166 Fergusson of Kilkerren, Argyll in the Forty-Five, p.33. 
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authority it had under the Privy Council.167  This was a matter made more difficult as 
Forbes needed the traditional position the post gave in society to achieve his goals, whilst 
not appearing to London as if he were abusing his power or favouring Scots over the 
interests of the government.168  During the inquiry into the Porteous Riot in 1737, for 
example, the government saw conspiracy in the unusually organised mob and subsequent 
lack of suspects.169  Frightened, they brought a bill of heavy penalties on Edinburgh, 
threatening the Union itself.170  Forbes in the Commons and Argyll in the Lords led the 
opposition despite government pressure.  Both wished to defend the Union and remain 
loyal to the government but recognised that Scotland would not tolerate such penalties.171  
This balance had failed after the July 1725 Malt Tax riots in Glasgow.  Scandal had 
followed Forbes’s removal of rioters to Edinburgh using his power as JP of Lanark, when 
the ‘Squadrone’ faction, the proto-party opposed to the Argathelians in Scotland, ensured 
that the rioters were pardoned by claiming that Forbes had acted without magisterial 
permission and outside of his Lanarkshire jurisdiction.172 
 
Such a balance of power was a delicate game.  Despite their equal ability, 
connections and concern for Scotland’s future, Argyll was overlooked for the post of 
                                                 
167 ODNB Duncan Forbes of Culloden by John S. Shaw. 
168 Burton, Lives of Simon Lord Lovat, p.357. 
169 General Wade summed up such opinions in a speech to the Commons at the inquiry: “If we take a view 
of the whole proceedings in that barbarous murder, we find nothing in it that looks like the precipitate 
measure of a giddy mob; no, they went coolly and regularly to work, and for my share, I never was witness 
to or ever hear do any military disposition better laid down or more regularly executed than their murderous 
plan was.”  Burton, Lives of Simon Lord Lovat, p.349. 
170 Ibid, p.349-56. 
171 Ibid, p.349-53 and ODNB Duncan Forbes of Culloden. 
172 Fergusson of Kilkerren, Argyll in the Forty-Five, p.315-20 and Allan, Scotland in the Eighteenth 
Century, p.12, 20. 
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unofficial Secretary of State for Scotland in 1725, in Forbes’s favour.173  Significantly, 
Walpole felt Argyll had too much clan-based power, while Forbes was a neutral Scot 
detached from the clan system and thus suitable for the post.  Additionally, his family’s 
position in the Highlands as landowners and not as clan chieftains was more acceptable to 
London.174  Walpole distrusted Scottish loyalty, suspecting Scots had greater ties to their 
extended families and local political alliances than to the government in London.175   
 
Forbes, like Argyll, Islay and Mamore, and despite a proven career of loyalty and 
usefulness to London, was still frustrated by government prejudice against Scots and 
Scotland.  This meant a slow reaction to events and to his advice during the ’45.   Despite 
his prompt preparations, he could not act officially until October 1745 when he received 
blank commissions (dated 4th September 1745) for twenty Independent Highland 
Companies to offer as inducements to ensure loyalty.  This was clearly too little too late 
for Lovat and the Earl of Cromarty, both of whom Forbes had been corresponding 
with.176  Unsupported in Edinburgh, Forbes had to fill all possible roles; political, legal, 
judicial and military.  Only in a private letter written after the rebellion did he let this 
burden show: “[after Prestonpans] I found myself almost alone, without troops, without 
arms, without money or credit; provided with no means to prevent extreme folly, except 
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pen and ink, a tongue, and some reputation.”177  Even more frustratingly, Forbes and 
many other Scottish Whigs’ suggestions for pacification became increasingly 
incompatible with the government policy of ignoring Scotland until it became a problem 
and then applying heavy-handed methods to suppress it.  This occurred both before, and, 
more overtly, after the ’45, and led to his marginalisation and resignation in 1746.  He 
died in 1747, disillusioned and indebted.178   
 
Trimmers 
The last group of this chapter are the ‘trimmers’, so named for their practise of 
“fluctuating between two parties…For men to pretend that their will obeys that law, 
while all besides their will serves the faction: what is this but a gross, fulsome juggling 
with their duty, and a kind of trimming it between God and the devil.”179  Just like their 
contemporaries discussed above, the men who would eventually turn Jacobite or who 
would play the political game of ‘trimming’, entered the army in their youth to gain a 
traditional military education.  John Sinclair, the Master of Sinclair (1683-1750),180 
joined Preston’s Regiment with a commission as Captain-Lieutenant “without the consent 
of my Father…But…I lookt on all other ways of living as unworthy of a man of 
qualitie.”181  His younger brother James (1687/8-1762), was first commissioned aged six 
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in 1694 as an ensign in 1st Royal Scots.182  Both brothers served in Flanders under 
Marlborough.183  David Wemyss, 6th Lord Elcho (1721-1787) was educated at the 
military academy at Angers.184  Arthur Elphinstone, 6th Lord Balmerino (1688-1746) 
began his career with a commission commanding a company in Shannon’s Regiment – a 
post he regretted on the scaffold.185  Lord George Murray (1694-1760) became an ensign 
in the 1st Royal Scots in 1711 aged seventeen186 and accompanied his older brother 
Charles (1691-1720), who was a cornet in the 5th Dragoons,187 to Flanders, arriving at the 
end of July 1714.188  His military experience was limited, however, as he spent the winter 
in the sick-bay at Dunkirk and the next two years in peacetime soldiering.189  George 
Keith, Earl Marischal (1692/3-1778) and his younger brother James Francis Edward 
Keith (later known as Marshal Keith, 1696-1758) both served in the British army.  After 
serving under Marlborough from 1708-11, in February 1714 Earl Marischal was 
appointed Captain of a Scottish troop of Horse Grenadier Guards.190 
 
These men came from the same society, with the same attitudes, as those who 
loyally served the Protestant succession.  Duelling, for example, was as much a part of 
their lives as it was for their eventual political and military opponents, and often was 
apolitical.  John Sinclair, for example, duelled with brothers Hugh and Alexander Shaw 
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in 1708, fighting accusations of cowardice in British service in Flanders.191  Seven years 
later Sinclair fought another duel against George Murray during the ’15.192  At some time 
between 1720 and 1724, George Murray fought a duel against Campbell of Glendaruel 
whilst attending the Paris Academy at James Edward’s expense.193  The unformed nature 
of nationality also appears apolitical.  George Murray’s letters to his wife reflect his 
world conscious view, though he had a very British outlook.194  Similarly, from 1728 
onwards, he lived as a country gentleman acting as his brother’s Deputy Lord Sherriff 
and improving the family’s mining, agricultural and fishery interests.195  In 1743, he also 
insisted his son be educated at Eton, despite causing a breach with his older brother, 
William, Marquess of Tullibardine (1689-1746).  Tullibardine had advised a continental 
– that is pro-Jacobite and Francophile – education “with the right principles.”196   
 
Despite these commonalities, all mentioned in this section turned Jacobite.  
Balmerino fought for the Government at Sheriffmuir but, finding this “against his 
conscience,” 197 he deserted and fled to France.198  Lovat had held commissions in the 
army in 1683199 and 1716,200 was Governor of Inverness Castle,201 and the Sheriff for 
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Inverness-shire.202  He ended his life as the last peer to be beheaded for treason.  Lovat’s 
life is a pertinent case study of ‘trimmers’.  In a life-long pattern he was vocally loyal to 
the government but remained an active plotter against it.  In 1700 he met both James II at 
St. Germain and William III at Loo, assuring both of his loyalty.203  On finding 
indifferent support amongst Scottish Jacobites in 1703, he turned against them in what 
became the Queensbury Plot204 and in 1719 he both encouraged and acted against the 
Spanish-backed invasion.205  Later, he joined with several other Scottish gentlemen in 
1739 and 1740 to sign Associations promising their support to the Jacobite court and 
inviting an invasion of Scotland.206  By the 1730s it was widely known that Lovat was 
corresponding, if not plotting, with Jacobites207 and his Sheriffship and Independent 
Company were removed.208  During the ’45, he continued to protest his loyalty, even as 
he raised 700 of his clan for the Jacobites,209 blaming the impetuousness of youth when 
he forced his son to lead them.210  Lovat is usually dismissed as purely self-interested.  
His life, spanning the Restoration period to the end of the last Jacobite rebellion, shows 
the difficult position his generation were in, as society, constitution and dynasty changed 
about them.  Lovat’s character mirrored that change, remaining both the archetypal 
Highland chief, who actively sought to retain the old feudal world of the clan system, 
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while embracing the new powers of the law.  He used his legal education as much as the 
custom of Dùthchas and his Heritable Jurisdictions, was multi-lingual and a charismatic 
courtier.211  However, he, and others of his generation, struggled to reconcile old loyalties 
to new dynasties, and to fit old, clan-orientated outlooks to the age of improvement. 
 
‘Trimming’ behaviour earned only distrust from both sides.  In 1745, George 
Murray informed the Duke of Perth that if the Jacobites landed he would bring out his 
men for the government and then take them over to Charles Edward.  The Jacobites did 
not believe him after his acceptance of a pardon in 1725 and twenty years of peaceful life 
in Atholl, so both sides were surprised by his actions when he did just that.212  Playing 
both sides was not unusual, especially at a time when the elite were closely linked by 
inter-marriage, community and political allegiance.  That Lovat and Forbes continued 
corresponding even after the Frasers had risen for the Jacobites is indicative of how the 
elite of eighteenth-century Scotland knew that governance had longer term implications 
than the present crisis.  The tortuous career of the 1st Duke of Argyll provides a 
significant example.213   Open correspondence was an acceptable, if delicate, practice.  
The Duke of Marlborough, for example, maintained correspondences with William of 
Orange despite being in James II’s inner circle, but later kept a secret correspondence 
with his nephew, the Duke of Berwick, code-named the ‘00’ letters.214  This successfully 
kept him informed of both sides and was only dangerous when taken advantage of by 
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opponents.215  Thus, it is unsurprising that Lovat was corresponding with both courts 
from 1737 onwards.216 
 
This complex network of family, friends and neighbours within Scotland’s elite 
proved vital to many ‘trimmers’ when those acquaintances sought pardons for them after 
the ’15 and ’45.  Beyond the role of Forbes and Islay, who saw the government’s 
approach as damaging, many simply responded to the needs of kinsmen.  The women of 
Scotland’s social elite were particularly important in flooding London with petitions for 
pardons, appearing at court begging for mercy and even aiding rebel prisoners with food, 
blankets or escape.217 
 
It was recognised by individuals in London and the army that patronage, with the 
connotations of obligation, could act to ensure loyalty.  Thus it was Lovat’s obligations to 
the 16th Earl of Sutherland and John Forbes (Duncan Forbes’ elder brother) for their 
support in gaining his freedom from arrest for treason in 1715 that ensured his assistance 
in relieving Culloden House for the government during the ‘15.218  He dispersed the force 
of Clan Chattan that controlled the area,219 re-took Inverness220 and negotiated the 
surrenders of the Duke of Gordon and the Earl of Seaforth.221  His incentive for 
government service was the unspoken promise that such acts of loyalty would be – and 
                                                 
215 Marlborough’s letters were only an insurance policy in case of Stuart restoration and accusations that he 
was more active in plots were never proven.  C. Hibbert, The Marlboroughs.  John and Sarah Churchill 
1650-1744 (London, 2002), p.54, 63-6, 71, 290.    
216 ODNB Simon Fraser, 11th Lord Lovat by Edward M. Furgol. 
217 Sankey, Jacobite Prisoners of the 1715 Rebellion, p.28-33, 100-103, 108-9; M. Criag, Damn’ Rebel 
Bitches.  The Women of the ’45 (Edinburgh and London, 1997), p.29, 88-93 and Szechi, 1715, p.245. 
218 Burton, Lives of Simon Lord Lovat, p.115-6. 
219 ODNB Simon Fraser, 11th Lord Lovat by Edward M. Furgol. 
220 Burton, Lives of Simon Lord Lovat, p.117. 
221 Fergusson, Major Fraser’s Manuscript, II, p.83-4. 
 189 
were – rewarded with a full pardon on 10th March 1716.222  The Governorship of 
Inverness Castle223 and the captaincy of an Independent Company from August 1716224 
were added extras.  Most importantly for Lovat, the government also took his side in his 
ongoing claim for the disputed Fraser of Lovat lands.225  For twenty years, George 
Murray’s 1725 pardon kept him loyal to the government, even taking the Oath of 
Allegiance in order to aid his half brothers, John and Frederick (in the Army and Navy 
respectively), with re-election in Perthshire in 1739.226  Balmerino’s pardon in 1734 and 
his father’s role in negotiating it, was clearly a government expectation that such favour 
would ensure his loyalty.  This was a forlorn hope, however, as on the scaffold, 
Balmerino explained how his father’s actions “very much surprised me”227 and that he 
only accepted it with James Edward’s approval.228 
 
Despite many successful outcomes, the government’s use of patronage through 
commissions and obligations to ensure loyalty could not be expected to succeed in all 
cases.  Following Lovat’s pardon in 1716, he remained loyal while he received 
government favour.  However, as these initial benefits expired he increasingly turned to 
the Jacobites.229  By 1719 he was encouraging the Earl of Seaforth to lead a Jacobite 
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invasion.230  George Keith, Earl Marischal, clearly had Jacobite sympathies even while 
serving in the British army; his offer to proclaim James Edward king at the head of the 
regiment after Anne’s death was refused “[as] the timidity of the Jacobite party would not 
permit [it].”231  Shortly afterwards, after leaving232 or losing his commission, he and his 
brother James joined Mar in Scotland at the start of the 1715 rebellion.  Significantly, 
James was on his way to London to lobby for promotion, suggesting he was unhappy 
with his current rank in government service and was, therefore, open to his brother’s 
persuasion that the Jacobites could offer more.233   
 
One major reason why the loss of patronage caused disaffection was that being 
the recipient of patronage gave men the ability to exercise patronage in turn.  This was an 
important part of self-identification and a measure of status.  For Lovat, the loss of power 
and credibility caused when Walpole removed his sheriffship and Independent Company 
in 1739234 was sufficient that, “if Kouli Khan had landed in Britain, he thought that 
would have justified him to have joined him with his clan.”235  The power that lay in 
arming his clansmen and dispensing patronage by way of officers’ commissions to his 
tacksmen236 was vital to both his sense of identity as a chief and to his standing with his 
clan.237  Consequently, to Lovat, his policy of switching allegiance as the situation suited 
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him was entirely justified if it furthered his personal quest for power.  It was this aim that 
decided Lovat’s allegiance during the ’15 and in the Queensbury Plot,238 and the lack of 
advancement with the government drove both Mar (in the ’15) and Lovat (in the ’45) into 
the Jacobite camp.   
 
That men did change allegiances, in so doing breaking bonds of obligation often 
to close friends and family, does not mean that they did so easily.  George Murray, in a 
letter to his (loyal) brother James, 2nd Duke of Atholl, on 3rd September 1745, just prior 
to joining the Jacobite army, wrote “If I err, it is only with respect to you.  I owe 
obligations to nobody else – I mean the Court of London.”239 His further comment “I 
never spoke or interfered with any of the Athollmen”240 demonstrates how important it is 
that his brother should not think he took advantage of his pardon to plot whilst obligated 
to him.  Such breaks with bonds of obligation were rare, however.  Most felt obliged to 
the government for past favour or pardons and so remained neutral during the ‘45, as the 
Duke of Seaforth did after his pardons following the ’15 and ’19, or joined the 
government forces, as Lord Adam Gordon did (c.1726-1801), entering the British army 
as an ensign in 1741 after his mother was sustained by a government pension despite the 
presence of his father and grand-father amongst the Jacobites.241   
 
Whilst many politicians and military men in London recognised that using 
patronage and showing favour was a proven way to ensure loyalty, it was not always 
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followed by those in government.  The usual level of paranoia over Scottish loyalty 
increased at times of unrest, often hampering Scotland’s military and political elites just 
when such a policy would have had most effect.  The Earl of Stair lamented after the ’45: 
“I own to you my opinion would always have been, preferable to everything, to have 
disarmed the Frasers, and to have secured my friend Lord Lovat, which I should have 
imagined would not have been disagreeable to him.”242  However, the only official 
government attempt to secure the loyalty of Lovat, and other disaffected Scots, in the 
form of commissions for Independent Companies, took too long to be sent to Scotland.  
Duncan Forbes had attempted to gain Lovat’s neutrality, if not loyalty, during the ’45 by 
offering him, George Mackenzie, 3rd Earl of Cromarty (c.1703-1766) and his son John 
(1727-1789), command of these Independent Highland Companies with the power to 
issue commissions.243  However, the commissions’ arrival on 10th October 1745, dated 4th 
September 1745244 – ten weeks after Charles Edward had landed – was too late to 
persuade them.  By contrast, the Jacobites were quick to use the same tactic of preferment 
to gain loyalty.  David Wemyss, 6th Earl of Wemyss (1721-1787), known as Lord Elcho, 
was given Jacobite appointments and army ranks before acting as a Jacobite agent in 
Scotland in April 1744.245  Cromarty, his pride hurt by the lack of commissions for 
himself and his son, was open to the flattery of a personal request from Tullibardine to 
bring his 300-400 men to the Jacobites.246  Similarly, George Murray rapidly rose to 
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Major-General after he, and his elder brothers William (Marquess of Tullibardine) and 
Charles, joined the Earl of Mar in 1715, despite his lack of active service experience.247  
 
The personal motivations of those considered ‘trimmers’ reveals much about the 
genuine beliefs that decided their allegiance and the poor understanding contemporaries 
had of these reasons.  Instead of simple explanations of disloyalty or slavery to Rome and 
France, the ideological aspirations of a pre-Union Scotland were strong.  George Keith 
made James Edward promise to restore Scotland’s rights taken by Anne in return for 
proclaiming him at Edinburgh.248  John Sinclair joined the ’15 despite knowing Mar was 
militarily unskilled because he considered himself a patriot and was anti-Union.249  His 
memoirs recall witnessing “with horrour” the Union making Scotland “a contemptible 
province to a neighbouring Nation.” 250  The final insult was to witness the 
Representative Peers “beg[ging]” at court for their £100 (Sterling) expenses: “My God!  
How concerned I was to see those who pretended to be of the anciet Scots Nobilitie 
reduced to beg at ane English Court!” 251  Anti-Union feeling was not universal, however.  
George Murray saw that the Union could help Scotland contribute to his “desire that the 
prestige of Great Britain should be upheld among the nations of the world.”252  Some, 
such as John Sinclair, felt they had been pushed to rebellion by the behaviour of 
England’s politicians: “I lookt on the Whigs as a set of men very capable to serve their 
countrie, but their morals so vitiated that they had not the least inclination.  As for the 
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Tories, I believed them willing to serve their countrie without the least 
capacitie…But…the love of countrie was extinct and forgot by both.” 253  Similarly, 
George Murray found Britain increasingly corrupt under Whig administration, especially 
after a visit to London in 1743.  His letters made no mention of meeting George II.254  
Those in power did not match his own high morals; he, for example, never bought 
smuggled goods and was disappointed to find such corruption rife.255  Despite later 
criticism that Cromarty was “one of the slippery correspondents”, 256 his decision to join 
the Jacobites in 1745 was not whimsical.  He had promised support since 1740 when he 
signed the proclamation of support.257 
 
Some Jacobites were clearly influenced by personal gain; Lovat’s support, such as 
the two associations he signed in 1739 and 1740 inviting the court in exile to invade 
Scotland,258 was always in return for a dukedom.259  Lovat’s life long motivator had been 
to acquire and retain land, influence and power.  Even his 1716 and 1724 proposals to the 
government to create Highland regiments with specific policing powers260 and the 
appointment of sheriffs with a strong position in the community261 were less than 
altruistic.  All his suggestions gave greater power to chiefs like himself.  However, 
others, such as George Murray, demonstrated a greater integrity and strength of belief in 
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the Jacobite cause.  George’s letter to his brother James, 2nd Duke of Atholl, before 
leaving to join the Jacobites, reads:  
My life, my fortune, my expectations, the happiness of my wife and 
children are all at stake…and yet a principle of (what seems to me) 
honour, and my duty to King and Country, outweighs everything…I 
never did say to any person in my life that I would not engage in the 
Cause I always in my heart thought just and right, as well for the 
interest, good, and liberty of my country.262   
Indeed, the strength of Tullibardine and George Murray’s convictions is revealed in their 
letters discussing the siege of their ancestral home, Blair Castle, between 18th March and 
1st April 1746.  Tullibardine’s reply to George’s statement “If we get the Castle I hope 
you wil excuse our demolishing it” shows the depth of their commitment to the Jacobite 
cause and the unlikelihood of a tactical split in loyalties within the Murray family.  
Tullibardine’s reply is just as dedicated to the Jacobites: 
Brother George…you may do what…[you] think fit with the Castle.  
I am in no concern about it.  Our great-great-grandfather, 
grandfather, and father’s pictures will be an irreparable loss on 
blowing up the house.  But there is no comparison to be made with 
these faint images of our fore-fathers and the more necessary public 
service which requires we should sacrifice everything.263 
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Motivation was also strongly influenced by family, friends and neighbours.  John 
Sinclair’s father was the only Scottish peer to object to the Act of Settlement of William 
and Mary264 and he later wrote, “I am of a Familie who, at all times and upon all 
occasions, were attached to the Crown of Scotland…I was earlie instructed in the 
principles of an indispensable duty and fidelitie towards my Prince.”265  Elcho’s family’s 
traditional Stuart loyalties determined his visit to Rome between October 1740 and April 
1741, and introduced him to Jacobite contacts.266  Balmerino, too, was influenced by his 
father’s politics; both were “determined anti-Unionist[s]” 267 and had a background of 
“fierce Episcopalian nationalism.”268  A desire to find religious toleration and to regain 
an independent Scotland were two of the fundamental desires that united Jacobites.  
George Keith followed the family influence of his Episcopalian father and Roman 
Catholic mother,269 while George Murray (and by extension, his brothers Tullibardine 
and Charles) became Episcopalian in reaction to the oppressive influence of their 
Calvinist grandparents and parents.  Their father, the 1st Duke of Atholl, blamed their 
Episcopalian and Jacobite paternal aunt, Lady Nairn, who they turned to instead of 
him.270  Ironically, it was likely the same desire to escape the Calvinist family home that 
led all three brothers into Britain’s armed forces.271  Similarly, friend and neighbour Lord 
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Lovat “was instrumental in getting the weak and inept Earl of Cromartie to rise”272 while 
Elcho was persuaded towards Jacobitism by his friend Sir James Steuart of Coltness and 
Goodtrees in 1738, rather than follow the advice of his father’s third cousin, John, Master 
of Sinclair, that he petition for a government commission.273  
 
Many men, now remembered as Jacobites to the core, actually displayed a 
pragmatic attitude towards action.  Their motivation ranged from a desire for self-
protection or a wariness of risking their families and estates,274 to a practical, less 
emotional sense of acting at an optimal time.  George Murray felt both ideological 
passion for the Jacobite ‘cause’ and objectivity.  Of the 1744 invasion attempt, he wrote: 
“I cannot consieve how the French can think of making so desperate an attempt, 
especially Sir John Norris lying in the Downs, who doubttless will give a good account of 
the transports and men-of-war too, if he meet them”275 but on the eve of joining the 
Jacobite army in 1745 wrote: “My life, my fortune, my expectations, the happiness of my 
wife and children are all at stake…and yet a principle of (what seems to me) honour, and 
my duty to King and Country, outweighs everything.”276  Similarly, Lovat faced many 
situations where ideology and practicalities clashed.  When besieging and defending the 
town of Inverness in November 1715, for example, he negotiated with Macdonald of 
Keppoch, the 2nd Duke of Gordon and the 5th Earl of Seaforth, rather than engage them 
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militarily.277  Though he recognised that government favour sprang from victory over the 
Jacobites, he perhaps wished to prevail with minimal damage to those he knew and 
respected.  As Major Fraser recorded, Lovat “had very little inclination for the work… 
He was more attached to the other party, had not necessity obliged him to draw to the 
King’s and he was not yet sure of obtaining his pardon”.278  Both Lovat and George 
Murray demonstrated their own caution in the advice they gave others regarding active 
Jacobite service, motivated by a realistic awareness of the strength of the government’s 
army and navy and the precariousness of their own position.  Lovat, therefore, thought 
Cameron of Lochiel was “ower rash” for declaring so soon,279 while Murray advised 
Lord Strathallan against involvement in the 1744 attempt: “I told him he had too good 
sence to join in any such design or attempt…for the French wanted only to embroil 
Britain to gain their ends elsewhere.” 280  This interesting evidence of cynicism regarding 
France’s assistance to the Jacobites shows that even the popularly viewed common 
enemies of Britain were not always united. 
 
In some cases, a simple desire to increase or preserve power was the motivator.  
Lord Lovat used both the government and the Jacobite cause to increase his position and 
power over his clan, as opposed to Argyll, Islay, Forbes and Stair, who used similar 
tactics and determination but to become part of the British state.  He clung to the clan 
system, using the traditional fiery cross during the ’45281 and requesting a coronach and 
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that all the pipers from John O’Groats to Edinburgh attend his funeral,282  long after 
others - like Argyll, Islay, Loudoun and Forbes - had begun to abandon the feudal 
structure.283  He also used the powers of the new, centralised, legalised Scotland.  Law-
pleas were used to consolidate and expand his estates.284  His Sheriffship extended his 
legal control outside his clan.285  This was largely due to the age Lovat lived in, which 
straddled many political and social changes.  The strong Highland clan system of his 
youth, where John Murray, 1st Duke of Atholl, Lovat’s cousin-in-law, thought nothing of 
calling on family by marriage to aid recruitment in 1683,286 had changed into a country 
increasingly centrally governed, where the power of law and the Enlightenment had 
changed Scotland.   
 
Hindsight and historians have distorted how those who turned Jacobite are 
remembered.  The received Whig version of history makes them appear almost fated to 
become Jacobite, ignoring the complex nature of their decisions, the influence of 
countervailing family, religious and political loyalties, as well as the impact of genuine 
ideology.  Some historians, such as Burton writing in the mid-nineteenth century, were 
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scathing of Kilmarnock and Cromarty, who repented their crimes, and were not “martyrs 
of conscience and principle”.287  Balmerino’s unrepentant attitude and loyalty to Charles 
Edward, even on the scaffold,288 gained him the respect and sympathy of the public, and 
the posthumous reputation as man of integrity with Horace Walpole and, later, Robert 
Burns.289  
 
Similarly, our understanding of Lord Lovat is coloured by his eventual fate.  His 
arrest, trial and execution bred a public desire for increasingly salacious details of his 
colourful life, represented by the popularity and tone of Hogarth’s portrait.290  
Consequently, there are as many legends about him as there is documented evidence.  
These include, for example, that he slept every night on his journey south to be tried with 
two Highland women at the head of his bed and two Highland men at its foot. 291  His 
public appeal was such that a stranger offered to be executed in his place.292  This 
retrospective distortion has affected the accuracy of the real events in his life.  His 
marriages, for example, read like fiction.  While sufficient testimonials from his trial for 
rape survive to confirm his conduct towards the Dowager Lady Lovat, the circumstances 
surrounding his marriage to Primrose are less clear.293  The legend that Lovat lured her to 
a brothel in order to compromise her reputation and force a marriage is so widely 
believed that it is recorded in his entry in the Oxford Dictionary of National 
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Biography.294  Yet, the existence of their marriage bonds shows the usual negotiations 
over a four-month period.295  It is also unlikely that Lovat would have risked losing the 
support of the present and three future dukes of Argyll by this reckless action.296  
However, for the Whig historians, such tales provided proof that Lovat was destined to 
become a ‘bad’ Jacobite. 
 
Memoirs and letters of people who met Lovat are also coloured by hindsight.  
Carlyle’s recollections, published in 1860, recall Lovat as a larger than life, abrasive, 
intemperate man, something which has become his legacy.297  Donald Macleod’s 
Memoir,298 Walter Scott,299 King, in Munimenta Antiqua,300 and Captain Edmund Burt301 
(all published after Lovat’s death) feature Lovat as the embodiment of Highland 
hospitality rather than the complex character most Scottish gentlemen were.  Irrespective 
of their eventual fate or political allegiances, many were chief and courtier, educated and 
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298 W. Thomson, Memoirs of the life and gallant exploits of the old Highlander, Sergeant Donald MacLeod, 
who, having returned, wounded, with the Corpse of General Wolfe, from Quebec, was admitted an out-
pensioner of Chelsea Hospital, in 1759; and is now in the CIII.d year of his age (London, 1791), p.47-8.  
See the Introduction for further debate regarding the authorship and authenticity of Macleod’s Memoirs.  
299 W. Scott, Tales from a Grandfather.  Being stories taken from Scottish history (London and Glasgow, 
1923), 3 vols, III, p.255. 
300 E. King, Munimenta antiqua; or, Observations on antient castles : including remarks on the whole 
progress of architecture, ecclesiastical, as well as military, in Great Britain ; and on the corresponding 
changes, in manners, laws, and customs ; tending both to illustrate modern history ; and to elucidate many 
interesting passages in various antient classic authors (London, 1799-1805), 4 vols and Burton, Lives of 
Simon Lord Lovat, p.173. 
301 A.J. Youngson (ed), Beyond the Highland Line.  Three Journals of Travel in Eighteenth Century 
Scotland, Burt, Pennant, Thornton (London, 1974), p.66-7. 
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well travelled but also at ease in the clan world, which was commonly perceived as 
barbaric.  With no sense of hypocrisy, gentlemen could be ‘all things to all men’.  Multi-
professions were the norm.  Even the gentry of Britain outside Scotland were frequently 
soldiers during campaign season, MPs and courtiers during the winter, and leading 
members of the community, as JPs, Lords Lieutenants and Sheriffs.  Gentlemen such as 
Forbes were lawyers by trade, administrators by nature, soldiers by necessity but also 
mathematicians and theologians for pleasure.302  Highland gentlemen merely extended 
this ability between more visually and socially diverse worlds.  The legacy of the Whig 
historians was to tar all Highland gentlemen with the brush of Lovat’s jaundiced legacy, 
so that the polymath, Enlightened gentlemen of Scotland, regardless of eventual loyalty, 
are remembered as backwards at best and uncultured, oppressive chiefs at worse.303 
 
Conclusion 
The benefit of hindsight and the comprehensive work of the Whig historians have 
successfully created polarised images of ‘rebel’ and ‘loyal’.  Jacobites became noble 
Highland savages, preserved as the romantic ‘lost cause’ while the government army 
became oppressors.  This chapter shows, however, that the situation was much more 
complex.  Those gentlemen that became Jacobite and those that fought against them in 
the government forces had very similar up-bringing, education and early military careers.  
Most entered military service at a young age, often as gentlemen-volunteers.  Many were 
friends, neighbours or related to those they would eventually fight.  The close community 
                                                 
302 B. Lenman, The Jacobite Risings in Britain 1689-1746 (London, 1984), p.132 and ODNB, Duncan 
Forbes by John S. Shaw. 
303 D. Szechi, The Jacobites.  Britain and Europe, 1688-1788 (Manchester and New York, 1994), p.5; T. 
Macaulay, The History of England from the Accession of James the Second (London, 1860), 6 vols, I, p.185 
and G.M. Trevelyan, England Under Queen Anne.  Blenheim (London, 1930), p.153. 
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of Scotland’s elite, and their knowledge that political and social favour could twist 
repeatedly within generations, taught them to treat their enemy with pragmatism.  
Therefore, government soldiers sought pardons for defeated rebels, recognising that 
today’s defeated enemy could be tomorrow’s leader.  Similarly, pardons based on 
obligations to Whig family and friends after the ’15 remained strong even in the face of 
another rebellion. 
 
The individuals considered in detail also demonstrate the complexity of choosing 
loyalty.  Far from supporting England or Scotland, Scots were divided in allegiance and 
motivation.  The impact of the religious struggles between the Presbyterian and 
Episcopalian churches in the seventeenth century were still being felt when the 
government implemented the Oaths of Allegiance in 1689 and the Oath of Abjuration in 
1701, forcing many to decide loyalties instead of remaining neutral.  Their religious as 
well as political nature made swearing these oaths unpalatable to the conscience and had 
constitutional implications for the legality of the Glorious Revolution and Hanoverian 
Succession.  Considering the martyr mythology of the Killing Times in the 1680s, when 
Scots died rather than convert, it was unlikely that Catholic and Episcopalian Scots could 
easily accept the removal of the Stuart dynasty.   
 
Equally, those who were loyal to the government were passionate about the civil 
liberties Britain enjoyed after the Glorious Revolution.  The new balance of power 
between Parliament and Crown reassured many that they were protected from oppressive 
rule.  Many equated the return of a Catholic crown as a return to the ‘yoke of Rome’ and 
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the dominance of a distant Papacy.  In this context, the continuation of the Covenanter 
military tradition through the Cameronian Regiment and the transformation of Gardiner 
and the Munro brothers into Protestant martyrs was a natural reaction for men who feared 
for the stability of their religion, society, government and constitution.  For these men, 
military service represented a way to contribute to the continuance of the British state, 
either in temporary service during rebellions for the short-term end of the threat, or in the 
British army for the long-term aim of creating a powerful Great Britain that could prevail 
on the continent and in the colonies. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: SCOTLAND’S AUXILIARY FORCES. 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the various auxiliary forces active in Scotland during the 
first half of the eighteenth century.  This includes volunteer regiments, corporation 
regiments, city guards and fencibles.  However, the largest and most widely deployed 
body, the militia, is the main focus of this chapter.  In order to establish the purpose and 
effectiveness of the Scottish militias, their development, duties and the process by which 
they were authorised, raised, armed, trained and deployed are considered.   
 
Particular attention is focused on the early eighteenth century to explore the 
impact of the Union Treaty on the Scottish militias and the other factors that shaped their 
development.  Laws regarding the militia in Scotland prior to the Union are particularly 
relevant to the different development of the Scottish militia compared with its English 
counter-part as the Scottish legislature and legislation remained separate after the Union.  
A study of these laws adds to the available literature, particularly concerning the legal 
confusion regarding who had authority to raise and arm the Scottish militia which has 
lead to misunderstandings by contemporaries and historians.   
 
A separate investigation of ‘fencibles’ is then conducted in order to establish how 
militias and fencibles varied from each other and whether a definition can be applied to 
each.  Finally, the auxiliary forces in Scotland are considered together in order to 
determine their military significance and relationship with the British army and 
Scotland’s public as regards their military ability and reputation. 
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The development of the militia 
In England, the use of militias can be traced to the levies of men raised by King 
Alfred to help repel Danish invasions.  This Anglo-Saxon Fyrd required able-bodied men 
aged between fifteen and sixty to provide military service in defence of their shires in 
times of need.1  The militia retained such a purpose, with a few alterations, until the early 
eighteenth century.  In the Middle Ages this feudal service evolved into two branches; an 
army raised for specific wars at home or abroad, with a permanent but small army of 
‘guards and garrisons’ and a county-based militia, known as ‘trained bands’, that could 
reinforce them at times of need.2  In Scotland, the picture was less clear.  During the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, in times of need the crown could call upon armed 
retinues, usually kept by Highland chiefs and Lowland families for feuding and reiving, 
and a feudal levy of able-bodied men aged between sixteen and sixty who provided up to 
forty days service.3  However, the former depended on the goodwill of the chiefs and 
were a liability during peace, while the latter were a drain on the population and 
impractical for more than immediate battle as a campaign was rarely finished within forty 
                                                 
1 J. Gibson and A. Dell, Tudor and Stuart Muster Rolls.  A Directory of holdings in the British Isles, 
(Birmingham, 1989), p.4. 
2 Each parish was responsible for raising, training and controlling these ‘trained bands’, which were 
replaced with militias by the 1662 Act (PA Rot. Parl.14. C.II.p.1.nu.3, An Act for ordering the Forces in the 
several Counties of this Kingdome, 1662).  They are universally reported to have been retained only in 
London, where Charles II and later James II felt they could maintain control over them.  However, for the 
first time it can be shown that they continued in Scotland after the Union as well, appearing as part of the 
defences of Edinburgh during the ’45 in the trial transcript of Archibald Stewart, the Provost of Edinburgh.  
As little can be easily found of them for the methodological reason mentioned above, it was beyond the 
scope of this thesis to investigate further, but remains a subject for further enquiry.  Gibson and Dell, Tudor 
and Stuart Muster Rolls, p.5; R.B. Manning, An Apprenticeship in Arms.  The Origins of the British Army 
1585-1702 (Oxford, 2006), p.266, 293, 305-6 and A. Stewart, The Trial of Archibald Stewart Esq; late 
Provost of Edinburgh, before the High Court of Judiciary in Scotland, For neglect of Duty, and 
Misbehaviour in the Execution of his Office, as Lord Provost of Edinburgh, before and at the Time the 
Rebels got Possession of that City in the Month of September 1745 (Edinburgh, 1747), p.15, 31.   
3 J. Cooper, Scottish Renaissance Armies 1513-1550 (Oxford, 2008), p.18. 
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days.4  During the Civil War the system of feudal levy was adapted so that the central 
government in Edinburgh re-arranged the local musters to create practical regiments, 
which were raised, armed and paid by regional Committees of War.5  The last proved a 
great burden in extra tax and led many regiments to demand free quarters and 
‘subsistence money’ from their hosts, partly causing the poor reputation of soldiers that 
would haunt the British army into the eighteenth century.6   At the Restoration, 
something new was desired as a reaction to this and the brutality experienced in Scotland 
under Cromwell’s standing army during the Interregnum.  In 1662 and 1663 the Estates 
General proposed a bill entitled A Humble Tender to his Sacred Majestie of the duetie 
and loyalty of his ancient Kingdome of Scotland suggesting 20,000 foot and 2,000 horse 
to be raised as a levy at the expense of the nobility, at a cost in accordance to the value of 
their property, to serve for domestic defence for a maximum of forty days.7  Though 
Lenman believes this was rejected by Charles II, it appears as law within the wording of 
the 1669 Militia Act.8  The 1669 Act made crown appointed Commissioners of the 
Militia responsible for organising ‘wapenshaws’9 on pre-appointed days, maintaining 
muster lists and fining those absent or without the correct arms, while the 1672 
                                                 
4 Cooper, Scottish Renaissance Armies, p.18-9. 
5 Reid, Scots Armies of the English Civil Wars, p.10-1, 24. 
6 Ibid, p.24, 33. 
7 PA Rot. Parl.14. C.II.p.1.nu.3, An Act for ordering the Forces in the several Counties of this Kingdome, 
1662 and Rot. Parl.15 C.11.p.2.nu.3, An Additional Act for the better ordering the Forces in the severall 
Counties of this Kingdome, 1663. 
8 B. Lenman, ‘Militia, Fencible Men, and Home Defence, 1660-1797’ in Scotland and War AD79-1918 
(Edinburgh, 1991), p.174 and T. Murrat (ed), The laws and acts of Parliament made by King James the 
First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Queen Mary, King James the Sixth, King Charles the First, King 
Charles the Second who now presently reigns, kings and queen of Scotland : collected and extracted, from 
the publick records of the said kingdom (Edinburgh, 1681), p.112. 
9 The Old English name for a weapon-showing, where the state of weapons were inspected.  See Glossary. 
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amendment assured men on this service exclusion from other duties and was limited to 
only the shire where they were raised.10 
 
However, neither Charles II nor James II trusted the Scottish or Irish Militias, 
keeping them as small and as inactive as possible.  Instead they used a small force termed 
‘guards and garrisons’ that was closer to an internal security force than a standing army.  
This provided garrisons, domestic security and responded to discontent, but was not 
intended as a field army.  It was intended to be semi-passive but was called out more 
often than expected by the Restoration regime as political and religious tension persisted 
in Scotland.  In 1665, the Second Anglo-Dutch War (1665-7) brought public disquiet 
amongst the Presbyterians at fighting a Calvinist power.  The majority of Scots were also 
unhappy at fighting a traditional trading partner in a war begun for reasons that only 
affected England.11  Continuing religious dissent culminated in the Pentland Rising in 
November 1666.  A mob of discontented Presbyterians marched on Edinburgh and were 
defeated by soldiers of the government’s ‘guards and garrisons’.  To finally suppress the 
Covenanters, Charles II decided “to settle a militia in that our auncient kingdome for the 
good of our service and preservation of peace ther.”12  Commissioners of Excise and JPs 
would organise this force in key shires under the control of a trusted local elite whose 
extended family would serve as officers and administrators.  When the Third Anglo-
Dutch War began in 1672, despite the offer of £864,000 (Scots) from the Scottish Estates, 
ordinary Scots were again unhappy at fighting the United Provinces and Charles II was 
                                                 
10 Murrat, The laws and acts of Parliament, p.112-3, 141-2. 
11 Lenman, Militia, Fencible Men, p.175-6 and Manning, An Apprenticeship in Arms, p.291. 
12 Lenman, Militia, Fencible Men, p.176. 
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still wary of Scottish support in the matter,13 favouring the use of the ‘guards and 
garrisons’.  Their use to uncover and prevent trade with the Dutch and Presbyterian 
religious dissenters caused friction, especially in the Lowlands, and did nothing to 
alleviate the public’s anxiety regarding standing armies.  Charles’ lack of trust in the 
militia was intensified when part of the militia under the Earl of Callander mutinied on 
religious grounds in September 1674 in protest at swearing the Oath of Allegiance.  
Despite this wariness, its embodiment continued and three further regiments were created 
after peace with the Dutch in 1674 as religious dissent amongst the Presbyterians 
continued.14   
 
The presence of the Argyll Militia in the rebel ranks following the 9th Earl of 
Argyll in the Scottish adjunct of the Monmouth Rebellion in April 1685 again brought 
fears of the militia’s reliability to the fore.  Militias in disaffected areas were disbanded in 
June 1685 and those of nearby areas used to police them, further reducing the reputation 
of soldiers and the militia in Scotland.15  James II used the worsening civil-military 
relationship as an excuse to abolish the Scottish militia in June 1685, though in reality he 
sought to curtail the military power of the Scottish nobility, one of the main principles of 
Restoration policy in Scotland.16  The disbandment of the militia was also motivated by 
their mixed success at Bothwell Bridge in 1679 and against the Monmouth Rebellion in 
1685.  At the former, the militia had shown its worth as a police force as part of the 
                                                 
13 Murrat (ed), The laws and acts of Parliament, p.145-6 and Lenman, Militia, Fencible Men, p.177-9. 
14 Lenman, Militia, Fencible Men, p.177-9. 
15 Ibid, p.183, 184. 
16 Manning, An Apprenticeship in Arms, p.291, 304 and Lenman, Militia, Fencible Men, p.184. 
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Highland Host, but it was unequal to the task of battle, necessitating the presence of a 
regular army under the then loyal Duke of Monmouth.17   
 
James II attempted to re-raise the militia once William of Orange’s invasion 
ambitions became clear, though by then it was too late to pre-empt the change of 
allegiance amongst senior military figures.  In Scotland, any response was delayed by 
crossed-orders from London and Edinburgh and the ‘guards and garrisons’ force 
remained tactically neutral, neither preventing the taking of the Estates in Edinburgh nor 
joining the invading force.18  Following the Glorious Revolution there was little change 
in the structure or composition of the militias.  Though William III distrusted them, the 
need for extra men to counter remaining resistance in Ireland and Scotland meant that on 
30th March 1689 a proclamation announced the re-establishment of the militia “to be put 
in a posture of defence, for resisting any foreign invasion, and suppressing any 
internecine commotion that may arise.”19  William’s attention remained fixed on 
continental matters throughout his reign.  His one attempt to re-establish a larger militia 
force in Scotland with a 1704 Bill of Security was defeated by the issue of Union.20   
 
At the negotiations for the Union, the army was not discussed and did not feature 
in the Act.  The 1708 Bill ‘for settling the Militia of that Part of Great Britain called 
Scotland’ was meant to partly address this but was the last bill to receive the royal veto 
                                                 
17 Manning, An Apprenticeship in Arms, p.287. 
18 Ibid, p.373-4 and Lenman, Militia, Fencible Men, p.184-5. 
19 TNA WO68/78, ‘Records of Berwickshire Militia, South-East of Scotland, Royal Field (Reserve) 
Artillery 1685-1909’. 
20 Lenman, Militia, Fencible Men, p.185-6. 
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from Anne.21  Whilst this left the north vulnerable to invasion, as with the Jacobite scare 
of 1708, the constitutional debate posed by the bill was too complex and it was 
consequently set aside.  The Scottish elite resented the imposition of an English style 
militia with government-favoured Lord-Lieutenants, while London remained wary of 
arming and training the Scots, preferring the use of the smaller and more controllable 
Independent Highland Companies it had been using since 1667.22   
 
The veto of the 1708 Bill meant that, as far as auxiliary forces were concerned, 
the Union had no impact.  Consequently, when the ’15 appeared imminent, government 
officials in Scotland were in confusion as to whether they had the authority to raise 
militias, since the veto meant the provisions of the bill, with its English style county-
based Lord-Lieutenants that facilitated military responses to domestic or external threats, 
were apparently lacking in Scotland.23  The last act to specifically refer to the Scottish 
militia was the 1669 Act concerning the Militia, which had only royally appointed 
commissioners.24  As it was unclear if this act still applied, specific warrants had to be 
issued for Scotland in 1715 to create both militias of foot and militia regiments of horse.  
Orders given in October 1715 by 1st Earl Stanhope, Secretary of State for the Southern 
Department, to Sir David Dalrymple, Lord Advocate of Scotland, imply that the militia 
foot and horse were regarded as separate bodies to be raised and organised individually.25  
                                                 
21 BL Hardwick Papers Add.MS.35891 f.242-6, ‘An Act for the settling the Militia of that Part of Great 
Britain called Scotland’.  Transcription available in Appendix No.4. 
22 BL Hardwick Papers Add.MS.35891 f.242-6, ‘An Act for the settling the Militia of that Part of Great 
Britain called Scotland’; Lenman, Militia, Fencible Men, p.186-7 and M. Brander, The Scottish 
Highlanders and their Regiments (Edinburgh, 1996), p.17. 
23 C. Duffy, The ’45. Bonnie Prince Charlie and the untold story of the Jacobite Rising  (London, 2003), 
p.125. 
24 Murrat, The laws and acts of Parliament, p.112-3. 
25 TNA SP54/9/38, David Dalrymple to Stanhope, Edinburgh, 12th October 1715. 
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The previous month, on 29th September 1715, an order for the creation of a militia of 
horse named nine Deputy Lieutenants of Edinburgh, suggesting that warrants giving 
authority were issued piecemeal.26  Once militias were authorised, many were created; 
Haddington,27 Argyllshire28 and Glasgow29 each raised militias, as did the Earl of 
Glasgow in Ayrshire30, the Earl of Rothes for Fife and Kinross31 and Lord Polwarth for 
Berwickshire and March.32 
 
Even though the 1708 Scottish Militia Bill was not enacted, the system of raising 
men, as shown in the 1715 warrant to Edinburgh,33 appears very like the one used in 
England.  Both called for each landowner to supply an armed horseman, a foot soldier or 
a militia man, depending on his wealth.34  The gentry armed and paid the soldiers and 
competed for the officers’ posts.  The Country gentry and Tories favoured temporary 
militias as an expression of the subject’s right to defend the freedoms of the English 
constitution gained at the Glorious Revolution.35  However, despite their active use 
during the ’45, the militia remained a suspect force in North Britain.  George II in 
                                                 
26 NAS GD158/403, Order for the formation of a Militia of Horse by nine named Deputy Lieutenants, 
Edinburgh, 29th September 1715. 
27 TNA SP54/9/49, James Anderson, Postmaster of Edinburgh to John Lloyd, Secretary to Postmaster-
General, Edinburgh, 16th October 1715. 
28 TNA SP54/11/81, Argyll to Townsend, Errol, 2nd February 1716. 
29 TNA SP54/8/68, Argyll to unknown, Edinburgh, 15th September 1715; SP54/9/2A, Argyll to Stanhope, 
Camp at Stirling, 1st October 1715 and SP54/11/106, Argyll to Townsend, Aberdeen 12th February 1716. 
30 TNA SP54/8/9, [2nd Earl of] Glasgow to unknown, Helburn House, 1st September 1715. 
31 FCA A/AAF/40/30/4/1, Kinross Militia payments, 6th February 1716 and A/AAF/40/30/5/6(2), Blank 
commission by the Earl of Rothes as Lord Lieutenant of the shires of Fife and Kinross to be one of the 
Deputy Lieutenants of the shire of Fife, 1716. 
32 NAS GD158/401, Commission for Alexander Lord Polwarth, Lord Marchmont of the shires of March 
and Berwickshire, Redbraes Castle, September 1715. 
33 NAS GD158/403, Order for the formation of a Militia of Horse by nine named Deputy Lieutenants, 
Edinburgh, 29th September 1715. 
34 G.M. Trevelyan, England Under Queen Anne.  Blenheim (London, 1930), p.231 and NAS GD158/403, 
Order for the formation of a Militia of Horse by nine named Deputy Lieutenants, Edinburgh, 29th 
September 1715. 
35 Trevelyan, England Under Queen Anne, p.230-1. 
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particular felt that to arm civilians after the Disarming and Proscribing Acts would be 
counter-productive.  Consequently, apart from when Jacobite activity triggered a need for 
militias in Scotland, no official structure was created until the Militia Act of 1757.36   
 
The size of militias varied.  Often the crown approved a number suggested by the 
civil authorities who would raise the men.37  However, the number mustered was often 
more than the number of muskets available and therefore many militias were immediately 
demobilised.  The Midlothian Militia, for example, consisted of 7,000 men in 1715 but 
less than 100 of these had muskets.38  Official documentation relating to the ‘15 stated 
that each shire (including Edinburgh, Haddington and Berwick) had to provide 800 
infantrymen and seventy-four horsemen for the militia.39  However, this does not imply a 
standard size.  The Argyllshire Militia led by Colonel Campbell of Fonab, for example, 
already numbered 1,100 men in October 1715, and expected five or six hundred more to 
shortly join.40  In the ‘45, the Argyllshire men numbered 400.41   
 
The extent to which the Union altered militias 
A study of the militia, either in England or Scotland for the period 1700-1750, is 
made more difficult by the lack of sound primary sources or historiographical coverage.  
Gibson and Dell state “The first half of the eighteenth century saw the decline and virtual 
disappearance of the Militia”,42 whilst Williams states “It is unnecessary to follow the 
                                                 
36 H.V. Bowen, War and British Society, 1688-1815 (Cambridge, 1998), p.12. 
37 Stewart, The Trial of Archibald Stewart, p.38, 41. 
38 D. Szechi, 1715.  The Great Jacobite Rebellion (New Haven and London, 2006), p.131. 
39 NAS GD158/406, ‘Note conserning the Militia in Scotland’ [1715]. 
40 TNA SP54/9/24, Argyll to Townsend, Camp at Stirling, 7th October 1715. 
41 NAS GD170/943/4, Campbell [of Mamore] to [Colonel Colin] Campbell [of Glenure], Inverary, [1745]. 
42 Gibson and Dell, Tudor and Stuart Muster Rolls, p.5. 
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ups and downs of the Militia during the eighteenth century.  At the time the Force 
appeared to have fallen into a bad state, and there was great difficulty in obtaining 
officers; but the law was enforced and matters were so satisfactorily arranged, that in 
1759 there was another embodiment”.43  These assessments, however, ignore the militia’s 
well documented and significant contribution to the suppression of the ’15 and ’45. 
 
Any change conclusively a result of the Union, however, is masked by a lack of 
detail and clarity in the wording of legislature and the correspondence of those 
responsible for ordering and organising militias.  Although governmental power and 
competence grew in the first half of the eighteenth century, the newness of the Union 
meant that the mechanics of governmental response had yet to develop.  The Union 
Treaty confirmed that Scottish law “must remain entirely the same as well after as before 
the union,”44 so the precedent the government turned to in the ’15 and ’45 was the pre-
Union custom of the ‘fencibles’ – discussed further below – and the Restoration era 
militia acts.  These, however, were vague and imprecise.  Therefore, identifying the early 
eighteenth century government procedure for raising the militias is not clear but must be 
gleaned from orders and letters associated with the formation of a regiment.  This limits 
study, however, to snap-shots in time so it is difficult to establish at what point change 
occurred, if at all, as a consequence of the Union, because so few sources exist between 
the 1689-90 rebellion and the ’15.  Despite the clarity of the Union Treaty, the 
government officials in Edinburgh during the ’15 and ’45, such as David Dalrymple, the 
Lord Advocate of Scotland, and Sir James Steuart, the Solicitor General, were unsure 
                                                 
43 A.B. Williams, ‘The Evolution of the Militia as the basis of the Army’, Journal of the Royal United 
Service Institution, 41:227, January 1897, p.27. 
44 J.D. Ford, ‘The Legal Provisions in the Acts of Union’, Cambridge Law Journal, 66:1, 2007, p.117. 
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where the authority to raise a militia lay; with the pre-Union Acts of 1662 and 1663 and 
their amendments, including the 1669 Act, with the old customs such as fencibles, or 
with specific royal warrants?45 
 
What is apparent from a study of the whole picture, is that the protocols for 
raising a militia appear the same before and after the Union in the documents from 1689 
and 1715.  Royal warrants bestowed authority on trusted local officials, whether that was 
the Estates General authorising Commissioners to appoint officers of the militias, or 
London authorising Lord-Lieutenants to appoint officers.46  Though the 1662 and 1663 
Militia Acts could have provided a precedent for Lord-Lieutenants and their deputies to 
raise militias, the contemporary confusion as to whether the laws applied after 1707 
meant that the government officials during the ’15 and ’45 did not look to them for 
authority.  The only time the Union could have triggered clear change to the Scottish 
militia was if the 1708 Scottish Militia Bill had been enacted.47  Interestingly, its failure 
was more likely due to royal caution at arming Scots in an anti-Union, pro-Stuart climate, 
rather than for constitutional reasons.  Significantly, when militias were formally 
implemented in Scotland in the 1790s, the Scots had ceased to be a rebellious threat.48   
 
                                                 
45 Ford, ‘The Legal Provisions’, p.117 and TNA SP54/9/38, David Dalrymple to Stanhope, Edinburgh, 12th 
October 1715; SP54/9/38, David Dalrymple to Stanhope, Edinburgh, 12th October 1715 and SP54/8/39, 
James Steuart to unknown, Edinburgh, 10th September 1715. 
46 NAS GD50/231/1, ‘Proclomation For calling together the Militia on this side of Tay, and the Fencible 
Men in same Shires’, Edinburgh, 30th March 1689 and NAS GD158/403, Order for the formation of a 
Militia of Horse by nine named Deputy Lieutenants, Edinburgh, 29th September 1715. 
47 BL Hardwick Papers Add.MS.35891 f.242-6, ‘An Act for the settling the Militia of that Part of Great 
Britain called Scotland’. 
48 Lenman, Militia, Fencible Men, p.186-7; Brander, The Scottish Highlanders, p.17 and A. Morrison, The 
Defence of Scotland.  Militias, Fencibles and Volunteer Corps.  Scottish sources 1739-1820 (privately 
printed, 2000), p.6. 
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The purpose of the militia 
The legacy of the ‘no standing army’ debate and the use of the army during the 
Interregnum and the religious violence of the end of the seventeenth century meant that 
the priority in Scotland was to keep a small permanent garrison of regular troops, mainly 
in Lowland strongholds, with scattered Highland bases, so that domestic peace could be 
maintained without the expense that a larger standing army would bring.  The tendency 
of the Jacobites to ferment rebellions in Scotland, however, meant that low level 
domestic peace-keeping could escalate dramatically.  The government relied on its ability 
to augment the forces in Scotland from other sources but, while this was occurring, it 
relied on the militia as a first line of defence.49  Contemporary sources and subsequent 
historians refer to these troops by various terms, including “my Highlanders”,50 
volunteers, militia, fencibles,51 Independent Highland Companies and the companies 
raised as the 2nd Battalion of the 43rd Regiment during the ’45, and often mistake one for 
another.52  
 
The militia had many practical uses, though its main role was essentially to act as 
an auxiliary and supporting force to the regular British army during times of emergency.  
For the militia this role focused on home defence against feared or actual invasions and 
rebellions.53  In Scotland, the Jacobite threat meant that militia service focused on active 
                                                 
49 J.A. Houlding, Fit for Service.  The training of the British Army, 1715-1795 (Oxford, 1981), p.28, 34, 39-
40. 
50 TNA SP54/11/81, Argyll to Townsend, Erroll, 2nd February 1716; SP54/11/89, Argyll to Townsend, 
Dundee, 4th February 1716; SP54/11/106, Argyll to Townsend, Aberdeen, 12th February 1716 and 
SP54/11/144A, Argyll to Townsend, Aberdeen 23rd February 1716. 
51 Fencibles are discussed in greater detail later in sub-section ‘Unravelling the militia-fencible tangle’ in 
this chapter. 
52 J. Fergusson of Kilkerren, Argyll in the Forty-Five (London, 1951). 
53 Morrison, The Defence of Scotland, p.1. 
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service during rebellions and on acing as a deterrent in between them.  Militiamen 
provided an invaluable service, acting as a defence force for an area and augmenting the 
often low strength of the British army, especially in the early days of an uprising before 
regular troops could be transported to Scotland from other locations in Britain or the 
continent.  The militia could also perform many lesser tasks for the Army.  It garrisoned 
outposts, guarded baggage and transported arms, food and prisoners, as well as taking 
part in the fighting.  At the threat of the first Jacobite rising in 1689, the militias on the 
east side of the Tay were called out on 30th March to be rallied by 15th April.  The militias 
of Wigtown, Ayr and Bute were ordered to man beacons along the west coast to warn of 
invasion from Ireland, while the rest were to be ready to muster if the beacons should be 
lit.  Interestingly, the order that any cattle within ten miles of the coast were to be moved 
inland was included in the call to muster, suggesting that one of the militia’s roles was to 
deprive supplies to a potential invader.54 
 
At a time when regular troops were unavailable or over-stretched, militiamen 
relieved the strain and were better than nothing.55  They also boosted numbers on the 
battlefield, as at Sheriffmuir on 13th November 1715, Falkirk on 17th January 1746 and 
Culloden on 16th April 1746.56  Whilst they increased the apparent strength of the British 
army in the field, providing a psychological advantage, this advantage was partly negated 
by their lack of experience and training to fight effectively.  Undoubtedly, the militia 
worked best in conjunction with regular troops.  This provided the reassurance to the 
                                                 
54 TNA GD50/213/1, ‘Proclomation For calling together the Militia on this side of Tay, and the Fencible 
Men in same Shires’, Edinburgh, 30th March 1689. 
55 Bowen, War and British Society, p.12. 
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militia of fighting alongside men who were relatively well trained, disciplined and 
experienced.  As the Jacobites attempted to enter Edinburgh in October 1715, the ill-
armed Haddington Militia and other volunteers were reinforced by Argyll and a 
detachment of dragoons who quickly forced the approaching Jacobites back into Leith.57  
It was unfortunate that the restricted size of the regular army and the ground it needed to 
cover, coupled with the reluctance of the militias to leave their communities, prevented 
them being attached to a parent regiment with consequent benefits to confidence and 
maintenance of order. 
 
The Argyll Militia was an exception to the rule of militias, as it also viewed itself 
as a clan army summoned by its chief, Argyll, and therefore often followed Argyll or the 
British army during the ‘15.  This did bring benefits: its usefulness and trustworthiness 
were honed from an inexperienced, poorly-trained auxiliary force to something 
equivalent to a newly raised second battalion – competent but not elite.  Thus the 
Argyllshire Militia “served us as an advanced Guard to the army since ye march from 
Stirling” in February 171658 and were charged with tracking retreating Jacobites in 
Arbroath after Sheriffmuir and with disarming the common people.59  Similarly, the 
Glasgow Militia were used to man small garrisons in the Lowlands60 and to reinforce the 
garrison at Fort William in 1716.61  Argyll firmly believed that such militia units could 
prove their worth if so employed; in October 1715 he planned to “Garrison three Castles 
                                                 
57 TNA SP54/9/49, James Anderson, Postmaster of Edinburgh to John Lloyd, Secretary to Postmaster-
General, Edinburgh, 16th October 1715. 
58 TNA SP54/11/81, Argyll to Townsend, Errol, 2nd February 1716. 
59 TNA SP54/11/89, Argyll to Townsend, Dundee, 4th February 1716 and SP54/11/126B, Argyll to 
Townsend, Aberdeen, 17th February 1716. 
60 TNA SP54/8/68, Argyll to unknown, Edinburgh, 15th September 1715 and SP54/9/2A, Argyll to 
Stanhope, Camp at Stirling, 1st October 1715. 
61 TNA SP54/11/106, Argyll to Townsend, Aberdeen, 12th February 1716. 
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close to the other side [of] this River [Forth] with three Hundred of the Militia in with 
[which] places if they would but keep the Gates shut, all the World could not take them 
without Battering Cannon”.62  He must have had faith in them, as he believed whoever 
controlled these castles would control the quickest access south, no minor 
responsibility.63   
 
During the ’45 the Sutherland Militia consisted of two regiments, but when sent to 
guard Inverness in October 1745, they found themselves surplus to requirements as the 
Jacobite army left Scotland on its abortive march to London.  Consequently, many of the 
militia returned home, and though the British army viewed this as desertion, the 18th Earl 
of Sutherland, who had raised them, excused their poor discipline as a natural desire to 
return for the harvest.64  In the spring of 1746, the Sutherland Militia’s role was to guard 
the Shin Pass, again near Inverness.  Although not present at Culloden, their presence in 
the pass did hinder the Jacobite army’s movements in the area, ensuring that it had to 
move east out of Inverness, contributing to the choice of Drumossie Moor as the site of 
the conclusive battle.65 
 
Raising a militia regiment 
The Militia Act of 1663 allowed for the raising of 20,000 men and 2,000 horse in 
times of need.  These were to serve within their shires rather than embodied as an army as 
the old feudal levy had been.  However, as the Crown controlled all three of the armies of 
                                                 
62 TNA SP54/9/2A, Argyll to Stanhope, Camp at Stirling, 1st October 1715. 
63 TNA SP54/9/2A, Argyll to Stanhope, Camp at Stirling, 1st October 1715. 
64 W.M. Grant, The Parish of Golspie in the Shire of Sutherland 850 to 1850A.D. (hand typed, 1977), p.60. 
65 Ibid, p.60-1. 
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England, Ireland and Scotland, they could well have potentially been used anywhere 
within the King’s ‘dominions and domains’ – most likely limited as an anti-invasion 
force during the Second Anglo-Dutch War (1665-1667)66 and to counter religious dissent 
amongst Presbyterians in south-west Scotland.67   
 
Recruitment was based on selection by ballot drawn from a muster list of those 
eligible for military service.  The ballot could include any male between sixteen and 
sixty,68 the method making militia service an obligation rather than a choice.  Inclusion in 
the muster lists meant the potential to be called away from home and family just at the 
time when a militiaman might wish to remain closest to them to provide protection and 
support.69  However, as the eighteenth century progressed, those loyal to the government 
and Protestant Succession were drawn together by the common threat of Jacobitism and, 
later, by the threat from Revolutionary and Napoleonic France.70  Consequently, and 
especially in times of conflict, many volunteered to serve in the militia.  Rather than 
taking advantage of the short service terms offered by the army during rebellions, militias 
held the assurance of a domestic posting and the likelihood of less than forty days service 
per year.  This duration of service had the traditional precedent of ‘Scottish service’71 but, 
like many aspects of the militias after the Union, it was unclear what the law was.  In 
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1715, a Lord-Lieutenant wrote “severall of our Judges & Lawyers are of opinion, [that 
the] men cannot be keept together longer, than [the] fourty days.”72 
 
This legally limited period of service seems to have been an inflexible stumbling 
block during the ‘15, as by 31st October 1715, Argyll was urgently petitioning Stanhope 
to find some way of allowing the militia to remain active beyond its customary forty 
days.73  The law was unbending, however, as Argyll complained in early November 1715 
when he faced losing all his militia as their terms of service were rapidly running out.  
Despite the lack of troops which had recently prevented him from pressing his advantage 
and taking Perth back from the rebels, he was powerless to extend the militia’s active 
duty.  Their loss would also impact on wider military organisation, as various garrisons 
would then have to be disbanded as they were entirely made up of militiamen.74 Argyll, 
who was clearly conscious of the Treasury’s reluctance to spend more than necessary, 
agreed that to keep the militia active without a purpose was a waste of money.  He was 
aware that they lacked the training and discipline of regular troops, but he also knew that 
by providing men for garrisons, running patrols and guarding equipment in transit, they 
relieved pressure on the rest of the army.  Consequently, by mid October 1715, Argyll 
agreed with Townsend to discuss the disbanding of the militia but begged to retain those 
garrisoning the outposts that protected the River Forth at Stirling.75  His plea must have 
been heard, as orders were not given to finally dismiss the militia until 20 March 1716.76  
One explanation for this break with both custom and law was that of the militia-men 
                                                 
72 TNA SP54/9/96, Tweeddale to [Mr Pringle], Edinburgh, 29th October 1715. 
73 TNA SP54/9/101B, Argyll to Stanhope, Camp at Stirling, 31st October 1715. 
74 TNA SP54/10/30, Argyll to Townsend, Camp at Stirling, 8th November 1715. 
75 TNA SP54/10/39, Argyll to Townsend, Camp at Stirling, 10th November 1715. 
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mustered, only some had formed the militia, allowing those whose forty day service had 
expired to be replaced by fresh men.  Another possibility is that once the county-funded 
forty days were over, the government took up the payment of the militia.  In practice this 
meant the commanders or Lord-Lieutenants had to continue paying their men in the hope 
of later reimbursement.  As the government lacked the funds during the ’15 to pay the 
pensions of half-pay officers, it is unlikely that many militias remained embodied for 
significantly longer than forty days.77  The government, however, had no liability to fund 
the militia.  Neither the 1663 Act nor the Union made the government responsible.  The 
constant presence of pleas for money and later requests for reimbursement in both state 
and private papers suggests, however, that the gentry felt the militias were an extension 
of the army, a government institution, and therefore, were a government obligation.  It 
was common throughout the century for the government to use the tactic of interpreting 
failure to pay, or complaints about paying, as ‘a lack of zeal’ which discouraged most 
from demanding too much for fear of looking unsupportive of the state.78  Those who 
paid for militias during rebellions also gambled on whether the government would prevail 
in order to reimburse expenses.   
 
There is some confusion between primary and secondary sources regarding the 
offices of Lord-Lieutenants and their Deputies.  Though some secondary sources state 
“Scotland did not have Lord-Lieutenants, such as had been appointed in England since 
1715,”79 primary sources, including both the 1662 and 1663 Militia Acts and 
correspondence between government officials in Scotland, reveal both posts in existence 
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in Scotland during the late seventeenth and first half of the eighteenth centuries.  It was 
they who, like their English counterparts, were the only government officials who had the 
authority to raise and arm militias.80  Lord-Lieutenants and their Deputies were crown 
appointees, often inspired by those who had shown loyalty or had a family history of 
loyalty.  Charles Hay, 3rd Marquess of Tweeddale (1667-1715), had a long history of 
government service and was Lord-Lieutenant of Haddington81 and Patrick Hume, 1st Earl 
Marchmont (1641-1724), supporter of the Union and the Protestant Succession, was 
Lord-Lieutenant of Berwickshire.82  There are also many official documents that mention 
such posts.  For example, in September 1715, the Deputy Lieutenants of Edinburgh 
ordered fifty-seven local nobility and gentry to raise, equip and mount between one and 
three mounted militiamen each.83  Local landowners or gentry were deeply involved in 
the practicality of assembling men and made a natural choice for officers.84  Some, most 
notably Argyll and Islay, were chiefs of clans as well as magnates, and could recruit from 
a larger area of influence.  The gentry were also most able to afford the responsibility of 
arming, clothing and feeding their men.  Raising a militia was, of course, an ideal way for 
local elites to display loyalty to the crown in London, with the hope of gaining favour 
once the emergency had passed. 
 
However, at the outbreak of the ’45, the government officials and social elites of 
Scotland again doubted their status as Lord-Lieutenants and the lack of immediate 
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response from officials confident in their authority meant that loyal Scottish towns were 
not able to quickly raise militias.  In London, any reaction to the invasion was hampered 
by the absence through illness of the 4th Marquess of Tweeddale, the Secretary of State 
for Scotland.  In any case, his refusal to believe the news of the landing of Charles 
Edward seriously delayed a government reaction.  The Lord Justice Clerk, Lord Milton, 
as the government’s second most senior lawyer in Scotland, was left to establish legal 
precedent for allocating authority.  Once the king’s permission had been obtained, 
warrants to raise militias could be issued along the lines of the English volunteer 
regiments, known as ‘Blues’ for the colour of their coats, who were locally raised 
volunteers under the command of a local gentleman.85 
 
Government’s mistrust of militias in Scotland, arising partly from a fear of arming 
Scots and partly from the power it would give Scotland’s elite, debilitated the militias 
enough, but they suffered also from the Treasury’s reluctance to enlarge or to keep the 
militia active on the grounds of economy.  The militia was an expensive body to fund 
unnecessarily.  John Campbell’s militia regiment of 200 men cost £1,736:16:8 (Scots) to 
maintain for the period 31st August 1715 to 19th March 1716.86  This was excluding the 
monies due to Major James Aikman, formally of Brigadier Preston’s Regiment, who 
refused to be paid, and other ‘incidental’ expenses incurred during the rebellion.  These 
included updating the defences of Edinburgh, barricading streets, laying in provisions in 
case of siege, providing arms and ammunition for 1,400 inhabitants, expanding and 
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funding the Edinburgh and Leith Town Guard,87 providing the extra coal and candles for 
the extra guards and, finally, the unspecified expenses incurred in the quest for 
intelligence.88  Like the regular army, it was the responsibility of the militia regiments’ 
colonels to provide for their men and fund these expenses on the government’s behalf.  
Even Argyll, Commander-in-Chief of Scotland during the ‘15, ran the gauntlet of 
accusations of Jacobite sympathy and lack of zeal when he complained in October 1715 
that he was forced to fund the Argyllshire Militia from his own pocket at £140 (Sterling) 
a week.  Though he had made repeated requests for funds and warned his credit had 
limits, he still had to couch his warnings in protestations of loyalty.89  His brother, the 
Earl of Islay, fared better as he was reimbursed for the expense of hiring a frigate.90  For 
wealthy and successful peers like Argyll, these financial arrangements were feasible, if 
inconvenient.  However, for the majority of the landowners and former soldiers who 
raised and led the militia regiments, such expenses were prohibitive, partly explaining 
why they were poorly armed, clothed and fed.   Initial expenses were taken from the 
yearly rent of each shire.  Known as ‘cess’, this was a land tax collected by the 
Commission of Supply of each town or burgh.91  Berwick for example had a yearly rent 
of £23,442:1:8 (Sterling) from which £12,000 (Sterling) paid for twenty-four horsemen 
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and another £12,000 (Sterling) for each foot soldier, at £50 (Sterling) per man.92  This 
proved a great burden, especially as the money was also relied upon to maintain roads, 
bridges and ferries across Scotland.93 
 
Militia officers were often local men of quality who were chosen for status or a 
desire to show loyalty, rather than for their military knowledge or experience.  Those who 
were officers during the ’15 were drawn from the half-pay lists or retired from active 
service from the large demobilisation that followed the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 and 
consequently benefited the militia with their experience.  Some would have been young 
enough to re-enlist, leaving the training and officering of the militias to older soldiers 
whose experience could date from the Nine Years War (1688-97).94  As officers were 
responsible for training or finding someone to train the militia, their personal experience 
could have significant consequences.  This was a particular problem for the militias, as 
officers were often local gentry who had little or no military experience and lacked the 
time to acquire it as new officers did in the regular army.  Fortunately, there was a large 
array of training manuals and drill books available, varying from practical advice to 
reflections on the use, structure and political dangers of a militia. 
 
In 1717, William Breton published Militia Discipline in the hope of making the 
militia “more useful” as “Required by the late Act of Parliament, Anno Primo GEORG I 
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Regis”.  He believed “knowledge begets Courage.”95  His step-by-step instructions on 
drill were, however, based heavily on a 1689 manual and were regarded as too theoretical 
and impractical.96  The anonymous Militia-Man, published in 1740, had more useful 
explanations accompanied by sixty-one prints illustrating drills and firing procedures.  It 
also made the suggestion of training English charity schoolmasters in the art of drill, so 
that they might teach it to their male pupils: “As they aquire a neatness and perfection in 
handling the weapons, so will the love of arms grow up with their skill to use 
them…When the use and love of arms is become common, as this means will greatly 
contribute to make it, there can be no difficulty in keeping full the regiments of militia, as 
the greater number will be volunteers.”97  Whilst those suspicious of a standing army 
might have baulked at inspiring a ‘love’ of arms in so many so young, it is interesting to 
see this as an early precursor of the Scouts or Army Cadets, as an attempt to solve the 
perennial recruitment problem. 
 
Officers were also responsible for providing clothing, weapons and provisions for 
the men under their command, as was the practice in the regular army.  However, unlike 
the regular army the militia frequently lacked the basics of uniform and equipment, and 
also the surgeons and chaplains who were on the establishment of regular regiments.98  
The nature of granting warrants to local gentry who drew on muster lists from that area 
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created geographical ties amongst the militias long before regiments in the regular army 
were localised in the 1870s, giving some benefit from a shared sense of camaraderie and 
common background.99  The Earl of Glasgow, for example, raised 500 men from his 
lands in Ayrshire in September 1715, and offered to “Cheerfully advance my money to 
maintain Fyve Hundred men more, if it please his majesty to call for it”.100  As one of the 
commissioners who negotiated the Act of Union, his loyalties were clear: “For what 
would not A man that hath any sense of Religion and Liberty advance in the defense and 
preservation of a Protostant king and protostant succession to the Crown, and to prevent 
the king overrun with Popery, Hellish Tyranny & slavery”.101 
 
Over the first-half of the eighteenth century, the earls of Sutherland were loyal to 
the Protestant Succession for three generations, and consequently raised two regiments of 
militia from their lands in north-west Scotland during the ‘45.  William Sutherland, the 
17th Earl of Sutherland, raised one consisting of 108 men, mainly the sons of gentlemen, 
who were well clothed, well armed and led by Captain Alexander Gunn.  It boasted its 
own piper, who was remembered as “a drinking silly rascal and quite unfit for that 
charge.”102  The second regiment, led by Captain Patrick Sutherland, was made up of 
common men, who, by contrast, were “poorly clad and there was no fund available from 
which to clothe them.”103 
 
Unravelling the militia-fencible tangle 
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One of the unresolved mysteries of the auxiliary forces in Scotland in the first half 
of the eighteenth century is the confused nature of its fencibles.  The creation of fencible 
regiments in the 1750s and the 1790s in Scotland has ensured that most historians have 
viewed fencibles as a late creation.104  However, both ‘militia’ and ‘fencible’ appear in 
sources from the first half of the eighteenth century.  Historians often confuse the two, 
using the terms as synonyms, or ignoring the more easily confused fencibles altogether, 
especially when dealing with the first half of the century.  Those that do address the 
existence of fencibles simply provide a definition that makes little attempt to distinguish 
them from militias without considering any variations in application.  Calder simply 
states that the fencibles (or defensible men) were a force that served within the British 
Isles after the last Jacobite uprisings were crushed.105  Brander explains that the fencibles 
were used for “internal defence” while the militia served to defend Britain from outside 
attack,106 though this seems more a matter of semantics than a meaningful difference.  
Holmes, though concerned with the period after 1750, defines the Fencibles as a force for 
home defence.107  The National Archives’ Readers’ Guide states that fencibles served 
only within Great Britain, though they could volunteer for service abroad – presumably 
depending on whether they were raised against an internal threat such as the Jacobite 
rebellions, or in times of war such as the American War of Independence.108   
 
Only Brander, Holmes and The National Archives’ Readers’ Guide make an 
attempt to distinguish fencibles from militias.  “Unlike the Militia, Fencible Corps were 
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not a continuous service liability.   Instead, they were raised only at times when the 
regular army, or the major part of it, was serving overseas.”109  This seems to suggest that 
they were designed to fill a vacuum caused by the army’s absence, rather than raised to 
provide auxiliary forces to augment the army during times of need at home.  Szechi uses 
fencible and militia within the same sentence, but implies that ‘fencible men’ were the 
potential strength, while ‘militia regiments’ were those selected to form a force.110  This 
definition is supported by a letter from 1715 in which Islay ordered that a list of the 
fencible men in Parstown, in Aberdeenshire, be made, but later refers to militias of 
various parishes.111  However, the ‘Proclomation For calling together the Militia on this 
side of Tay, and the Fencible Men in same Shires,’ printed on 30th March 1689 in 
Edinburgh, makes a clear reference to both militias and fencibles as if separate entities.112  
This confusion makes any attempt to discover whether a difference exists between them 
very difficult, as secondary sources rarely address the possibility in detail.  This thesis 
provides a contribution to our knowledge of fencibles by examining their occurrence in 
primary sources, something that has not been done before. 
 
It was not until 1535, in the third recorded use, that the first Scottish reference 
was made to fencibles in Buik of the Croniclis of Scotland by William Stewart (c.1499-
1541): “All other men commandit for to tak,/Withoutin hurt other of lyth or lym,/That 
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fensabill war and bring thame all to him.”113   The first use is recorded as “For we have 
herinne, withouten fable,/Syxty thousand men fensable”114 in Richard Coer de Lion 
(1325).   Although the first use of ‘fencible’ was English, it was the Scots who adopted 
both the term and the idea and made it their own.  Therefore by the eighteenth century, its 
use was so wide-spread in the state and family papers of many of Scotland’s elite, that the 
term ‘fencible’ continued to be widely used during the ’15 despite the use of militia 
regiments raised by royal warrant.115   
 
The earliest use of the term fencible in official documentation originating from 
London also occurred during the ’15.116  In Scotland, the term was almost exclusively 
used by Lowlanders, suggesting that the concept had evolved from the ‘Scottish service’ 
clansmen owed their chiefs, once the clan system had disappeared from the Lowlands.  
Beyond that, it is difficult to discern a more detailed geographical divide within the 
Lowlands as the term appears in documents originating in all areas; in Berwickshire, 
Ayrshire, Edinburgh, East Lothian and Perthshire.117  By the ’45 the concept had spread 
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to the loyal towns of the Highlands, with Sutherland and Aberdeen both raising fencible 
regiments.118  Their position above the Highland Line and as towns loyal to the 
government, suggests that the concept of fencibles spread over time and hinged on 
service to the government, not on geography.119  This further reinforces the theory that 
the idea of fencibles originated in Lowland Scotland during the sixteenth century, where 
it was ‘discovered’ and appropriated by London.  The concept then spread to other loyal 
areas either via officials in London or via government officials in the Lowlands.  
 
Another possibility is that the Scottish government officials pragmatically 
followed the custom of fencibles when London referred to militias.  Therefore, although 
Scotland’s military and civic elite were ostensibly following orders from London to raise 
militias, they were working within a more familiar, customary framework.  Many of the 
large landowners and politicians given the office of Lord-Lieutenant and the 
responsibility to raise militias would remember fathers and grandfathers raising men from 
their lands or clans to act as ‘fencible men’ in times of national threat.  To most of the 
public, from whom the other ranks were drawn, it was merely a continuation of a well-
known custom, a familiar obligation, so their officers, who were also their local landlords 
and social superiors, persisted with well-known terms.  Few would have understood the 
subtlety of the legal changes between the Scottish Militia Acts of 1662, 1663 and 1669 
and the need for royal warrants during the eighteenth century.  The distance from London 
and the practice of the government to leave implementation of their orders to their 
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servants in Scotland allowed the Scots to continue to view and refer to militias as 
fencibles. 
 
However, attempts to discern a geographical divide between Scotland and London 
concerning the use and understanding of the term ‘fencibles’ fails when the terms appear 
together as two different bodies of men.  For example, as Lord-Lieutenant of 
Berwickshire in 1715, Alexander Hume, later 2nd Earl of Marchmont, was responsible for 
raising 400 men for the Berwickshire Militia.120  However, in his letter he reported 
himself “bussy modelling our fencible men.”121  Similarly, also during the ’15, William 
Johnstone, the 1st Marquess of Annandale, was Lord-Lieutenant of Dumfriesshire and 
Peeblesshire, which made him responsible for raising the militias of those counties.  
However, he too referred to these men as fencibles.122 
 
Another possible reason why Scotland’s elite might choose to denote militias as 
fencibles is because of the Scots’ long history of trouble with militias.  The use of the 
militia in Scotland to keep the peace during the unpopular Second and Third Anglo-
Dutch Wars (1665-7 and 1672-4) and against religious dissenters in the 1670s had 
occurred within living memory.123  Scottish collective memory would also remember the 
English militias’ role in enforcing the Aliens Act in 1650, when all Scots residing in 
England had to report to their local militia to seek permission to stay and pay a minimum 
fee of £200 (Sterling) in reaction to the Scottish creation of a new Royalist army for the 
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invasion of England in May and June 1650.124  Scots had to have a trade, apprenticeship, 
family or contract as a servant to be given leave to remain, making it clear that the public 
perception of Scots was that of an economic drain.  Those who were denied permission or 
who could not afford the fee by the deadline were hunted down and expelled from 
England by the militia.125  A second Alien Act had been passed in the English Parliament 
in 1705 to pressure the Scottish Parliament to enter into Union negotiations.  Scots in 
England were again treated as aliens and Scottish goods were embargoed until the 
Scottish Estates recognised the Hanoverian succession.126  Both the Scottish public and 
parliament resented this heavy-handed approach and, recalling the behaviour of the 
militias of the seventeenth century, made later billeting of a militia difficult, even during 
times of need during the ’15.127 
 
Another reason for the confusion over the terms militia and fencible is that, at a 
time when spelling varied wildly and dictionaries with definitions were a novelty,128 rules 
of terminology were inevitably flexible.  Spelling, capitalisation and punctuation varied 
according to personal use, presenting the possibility that personal preference affected the 
choice of ‘militia’ or ‘fencible’.  As a group who were ‘capable of defence’, fencible men 
could simply denote an irregular force, raised to counter an internal or external threat.  
This explanation, however, does not take into account the occasions when both terms 
were used together, for example at the start of the ’15, when two government officials 
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discussed whether to raise both a regiment of militia horse and a regiment of fencible 
men of Edinburgh.129  The use of both terms suggests that there were differences between 
them.   
 
Terminology during the first half of the eighteenth century varied.  Argyll, who 
understood the court in London as well as the clan in Scotland, rarely refered to the 
Argyllshire Militia as a militia, though he used both terms regularly.  More commonly he 
wrote of “my men”130 or “my highlanders” in his correspondence with London.131  
However, despite being more clan-like than the other militias raised for the government, 
they were used in a similar manner to the militia proper.  It is likely that Argyll took a 
proprietary pride in highlighting his contribution against the rebels.  Furthermore, some 
confusion is indicated in the draft of a letter by Sir James Steuart, Solicitor General, in 
September 1715, who crossed out the word “militia” and replaced it with “fencible 
men”132 – a significant confusion given the Solicitor General’s senior legal position in 
Scotland.  
 
Other auxiliary forces 
Other auxiliary forces were in use in Scotland during the first half of the 
eighteenth century: city guards, volunteer regiments and corporation regiments, which 
were used to keep the peace and provide extra troops during times of internal trouble, in 
much the same way as the militia and fencibles.  The tradition of military service, based 
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in the old ‘Scottish service’ and ‘free service’ of forty days133 and evidenced by the early 
existence of fencibles, combined with the Enlightened belief that civic service aided good 
citizenship made the adaptation of the militia principle to other forms of service 
unsurprising.   
 
English militias, unlike their Scottish equivalents, had clear legal authority and 
precedence but had declined through lack of use so their efficient use when a Jacobite 
threat occurred was limited.  It was not until the 5th September 1745 that London 
approved their formation, and not until November that the government agreed to fund 
them.  Consequently, the gentry and gentlemen began to form volunteer regiments, the 
‘Blues’, using funds from public subscriptions.  The first, in Derbyshire, became the 
model for the remainder but few had any success against the rebels; the Durham Blues, 
who usefully employed themselves checking travellers and searching for rebels, were far 
from the path of the Jacobite army.134  In a similar vein, fourteen ‘noblemen’s regiments’ 
were raised and officered by earls, dukes and marquesses, for use in areas the Jacobite 
army was expected to pass through on the way to London.135  Volunteer regiments gave 
many an opportunity to demonstrate their loyalty to the government and Protestant 
Succession, without the commitment of joining the army.  The publication of Histories 
by those who experienced the rebellions, often as volunteers, also served to further 
reinforce that loyalty.136  Some, though they give little further personal information, 
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provide more detail that indicates motivation, such as Michael Hughes, who described 
himself as “A Volunteer from the said City [London]; Educated in the Bluecoat Hospital” 
suggesting that the receipt of home and education from the establishment had instilled a 
sense of loyalty or at least obligation.137   
 
The Autobiography of the Reverend Alexander Carlyle contains a more useful 
personal account of his enlistment in the Edinburgh Volunteer Regiment in September 
1745.  He recounts how he joined old school friends in Edinburgh on 13th September and 
joined the College Company of Volunteers that had been embodied the previous day.  
Training was provided once issued with arms, though it was fortunate Carlyle had been 
taught drill by his father, as the commanding officer was absent in London until the 
15th.138  The presence of Carlyle and his school friends suggests that many gentlemen’s 
sons volunteered, perhaps with similar experience of drill training from family members.  
The Edinburgh Volunteers provided some assistance to the army, if only to free other 
troops from the need to guard Trinity Hospital in Leith, the location of Carlyle’s 
company during the night of the 15th September.  This detachment consisted of twelve 
men under the command of a captain, who had two days previously been a merchant and 
was twenty-five or twenty-six, to Carlyle’s twenty-three.139  This, and the local clergy’s 
contention that, by risking their lives, the volunteers were destroying the hope of 
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Edinburgh’s next generation, suggests that the majority of volunteers were young.140  
Ultimately, the Edinburgh Volunteers were disbanded and then scattered by the storming 
of Edinburgh during the night of the 16th September.  It was only through a personal 
connection to Gardiner, the family’s neighbour, that Carlyle was able to join the army 
amassing outside Edinburgh, though, as he spent the day prior to the battle of Prestonpans 
providing intelligence from the steeple of Trenant Church, he slept through the battle.141 
 
The accusations made against Archibald Stewart, Provost of Edinburgh during the 
’45, are even more revealing of a citizen’s options to provide military service in a city’s 
defence.  The main form of enlistment was through the creation of regiments of 
volunteers raised by public subscription, as was Carlyle’s experience.  Stewart was 
alleged to have refused three offers of such regiments in the weeks leading up to the fall 
of Edinburgh, protesting both the expense and the legality of raising and arming men.  
Interestingly, on the third instance, his suggestion that the volunteers take advantage of a 
three-month term of service with the British army led the men to leave in disgust, insulted 
that “being Tradesmen or Husbandmen, [they] did not mean to leave their Occupations, 
and inlist themselves as Soldiers for Hire, but had bravely offered to serve gratis in the 
then present Exigency.”142   
 
Another form of auxiliary regiment which, unlike the volunteer regiments could 
become incorporated into the British army, was the ‘corporation regiments’.  
Corporations or rich individuals could pay to raise regiments on the understanding that 
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the government would reimburse the expense once the regiment had reached full 
strength.  Often this was in return for a commission, following the custom of ‘raising for 
rank’, or to demonstrate loyalty in the hope of receiving royal or governmental favour.  
Should the individual or corporation fail to recruit sufficient numbers to fill a regiment, 
the government was not obliged to reimburse the expenses but still gained the men raised.  
Consequently, there was a great pressure on those who raised a corporation regiment to 
complete its strength and they often forced their tenants to join.  Though the government 
did not need the extra officers created by ‘raising for rank’, it did gain a supply of men, 
with none of the expense of recruiting, who were often ‘drafted’ to fill under-strength 
existing regiments.143   
 
The City or Town Guard was slightly different from the militia, in that it had a 
permanent existence whose purpose was to act as the police force for large cities and 
towns.  Their connection to the civil rather than military establishment meant that only 
towns and cities wealthy enough to afford them and important enough to warrant them, 
such as Glasgow and Edinburgh, had Guards.  The main responsibility of the City Guard 
was to maintain the peace.  In this capacity, they guarded the main gaols and escorted 
prisoners to trial and to execution.144  They were also responsible for detaining beggars, 
who were forbidden within the city-walls.  Those in Edinburgh were known to feed 
detained child beggars, and allowed them to sleep in the Guard-House beside the fire 
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until their fate was decided by the City Council.145  The guard functioned under the 
immediate command of the Guard-Captain and reported back to the Baillies and JPs of 
their town or city.146  Its soldiers received an allowance for every person they detained in 
addition to their pay and received medical cover for duty-related injuries from their town 
or city.147  Their numbers varied; the Edinburgh City Guard had a strength of 100 in 1715 
and forty were added to counter the rebellion, while Leith had a Town Guard of fifty 
men.148  In 1736, seventy soldiers escorted convicted smuggler Andrew Wilson to his 
execution and guarded the scaffold, while by September 1745, ninety soldiers from the 
City Guard joined the volunteers in preparing for the defence of Edinburgh.149  However, 
when Edinburgh fell during the night of the 16th September, only a third of their full force 
were on duty, the usual number for peacetime.  At the Netherbow Port, where the 
Jacobites stormed through, only a small detachment under a sergeant was on duty.150  
Blamed on Stewart at his trial, he denied cutting their numbers and claimed he had 
suggested the addition of thirty sentinels, bringing their full strength to 126 men but had 
feared the Guard “were not in a Condition to do Duty, after the Fatigue they had 
previously undergone”, presumably a reference to preparing the city’s defence.151  It is 
open to question whether the old prejudice against Highlanders played any part in this, as 
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the soldiers “were mostly all Highlanders, from…[the] shire of Inverness.”152  They also 
provided an aid for the Lowland authorities, as the Highland members of the City Guard 
could act as translators.153 
 
Many Guardsmen were retired soldiers drawn from the Dutch Brigade, which 
gave them a military identity emphasised by their contemporary title of “guard 
soldiers”.154  The common perception of the Guard was that they were troublesome and 
ill-disciplined.  This was due to the notoriety of the Porteous Riot and the later adaptation 
of the story in The Heart of Mid-Lothian by Walter Scott which emphasised Porteous’ 
past behaviour and consequent implication that the City Guard was an oppressive force 
over the people.155  Certainly relations between guardsmen and civilians during the late 
seventeenth and first half of the eighteenth centuries were strained and often ended in 
violence.156  However, records of orders responding to public complaints about the 
Guardsmen swearing and cursing demonstrate both that the public felt able to complain 
and that these complaints were acted upon with the threat of stoppages and dismissal for 
continued misconduct.157 
 
The significance of militia use in Scotland  
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Due to widespread fears of the oppressive potential of a standing army, public 
debate in England and Scotland compared the benefits of a militia against those of a 
standing army, and found the militia preferable.  During the Civil War and Interregnum, 
the public learnt to associate a standing army with military oppression.  Fletcher’s 
Discourse Concerning Militias, for example, was constantly in print between 1732 and 
1798, and many broadsheets argued that the country’s defence should be left to the navy 
with a strongly controlled militia for times of need.158  The educated elite, unlike their 
continental neighbours, remained influenced by Machiavelli and the classical political 
philosophers, believing that a standing army would become corrupt and a threat to peace, 
whilst a militia would foster a sense of virtù in its citizen soldiers.159  According to 
Enlightened theories at the end of the seventeenth century, if an ordinary man contributed 
to society through military service with the militia, he was actively participating in the 
continuation of the state and thus ensuring its peace and stability.  However, the use of 
mercenaries or a standing army removed this opportunity and detached citizens from 
aiding the security of their own state and encouraged disaffection and idleness.160  
Though many questioned the wisdom of arming and training ordinary civilians,161 
remembering Cromwell’s use of ‘standing militias’,162 as memories of the Civil War 
faded, the idea of relying on a semi-permanent militia gained acceptability.   
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Raising a militia was the most explicit method of demonstrating a community’s 
loyalty to London.  However, there were other ways that highlighted the desire to defend 
the Union and the Protestant Succession at all levels of society.  In the last four months of 
1745, loyal addresses were sent to the Government from Glasgow, Edinburgh, Stirling, 
Dumfriesshire, Kirkcudbright and Ayr.  Additionally, subscriptions were raised to pay for 
the creation and payment of militiamen as well as regulars in Dumfries and Inveresk and 
by Presbyterian ministers in Angus.  There were also public celebrations to mark George 
II’s birthday in Aberdeen, Dundee and Perth.163    
 
At the outbreak of the ’45, militias were raised in Edinburgh, Glasgow, Paisley, 
Kilmarnock, Stirling, Renfrew, Perth, Linlithgow, Kirkcudbright, Hamilton, 
Renfrewshire, Clydesdale, Aberdeen, East Lothian, Midlothian, Roxburghshire and 
Dumfriesshire.  These are notable for their coverage of the south and south-west 
Lowlands, areas of traditional Whig Presbyterian loyalties.164  Of the Lowland militias 
raised by Lord-Lieutenants, there were around 2-3,000 men at most.  Of the militias made 
up of loyal Whig clans, around 3,000 were active, drawn from the Grants, Munros, 
Gunns, Rosses, Frasers and Campbells of Argyll.165  There was a corresponding lack of 
militias raised from areas with more Jacobite leanings, the region around Inverness for 
example.  Glasgow raised a militia during the ’15 and ‘45.  By mid-September 1715, it 
already had a strength of 700 men166 which had increased to 800 only two days later.167  
Glasgow had benefited from the increased trade opportunities available from the Union 
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of 1707, and was therefore anxious to preserve the dispensation that had allowed trade to 
prosper.   
 
Those in authority seemed mindful of the need to acknowledge and reward this 
gesture of loyalty.  Though Argyll wrote to Stanhope in September 1715 stating “it would 
be the last of follies to have any Dependence upon their [the Glasgow Militia’s] 
assistance”168, he also recognised the significance of the raising of a militia, suggesting 
that someone should write to the people of Glasgow to thank them “for this proof of their 
Duty [as its] so strong a Demonstration of the hearty zeal of these honest People”.169   
Similarly, the Scottish elite recognised the value of raising a militia regiment.  Patrick 
Hume, 1st Earl Marchmont, used his actions raising and paying for a militia at the start of 
the ‘15 to demonstrate his loyalty170 rather than his role during the Glorious Revolution, 
his strong Covenanting background or his support for the Union. 
 
Despite the militia’s weaknesses as an auxiliary force in the eyes of the British 
army, their presence did at least give the impression that steps were being taken for the 
defence of those loyal to the crown.  When not immediately confronting Jacobite forces, 
militias also provided genuine support.  The Glasgow volunteers guarded the bridge 
between the battlefield of Sheriffmuir and Stirling Castle in 1715,171 a Whig volunteer 
cavalry unit fought with Argyll’s regulars at Sheriffmuir and the Edinburgh citizens 
prepared to defend the city as a Jacobite force under William Mackintosh of Borlum 
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marched past in October 1715.172  Indeed, letters written at the start of the ‘15, in the 
wake of another failed Jacobite attempt to take Edinburgh Castle, reveal that for the 
public establishing a militia could go a long way to restoring faith in the safety of those 
who stayed loyal.173  The reaction against Stewart, Provost of Edinburgh, at his trial for 
failing to prepare Edinburgh’s defence adequately in 1745, was visceral.  The men who 
had offered their service as volunteers or their advice regarding repairs to the walls and 
the placement of cannon were not merely angry that Stewart had held them back, they 
were betrayed.174   From this it is clear that the act of contributing to one’s own defence 
was a key psychological boost at a time of great uncertainty.   
 
Another significant limitation on the effectiveness of the militia in Scotland was 
the absence of correct implementation of the Riot Act.  A major part of this was due to 
the lack of government support felt by Scotland’s elite.  The introduction of the Riot Act 
in 1715 ensured that civil not military authority was needed to call out a militia.175  
However, since the veto of the 1708 Scottish Militia Bill, civil authorities were left 
unsure whether they had the necessary power to raise and arm militias.  At the ’15, 
individual warrants had been issued from London providing temporary power but the 
civil authorities in Scotland believed they became invalid with peace.  Therefore, at the 
start of the ’45, the same dilemma existed.  Many towns, counties, shires and clans 
requested permission to raise militias and volunteer regiments.  The letter from the 
Moderator of the Provincial Synod of Dumfries written to Tweeddale, the Secretary of 
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State for Scotland, was typical: “People are ready to take up arms but require proper 
Authority & necessary arms.”176  Similarly, Archibald Stewart, Edinburgh’s Provost, was 
so hesitant of his authority to raise and arm men, as “treasonable or illegal, without 
special Warrant from the Crown,” and unsure whether London would support his actions 
without a warrant, that he delayed for too long and so contributed to the city’s fall during 
the night of the 16th September 1745.177  He was indeed tried for neglect of duty, a charge 
tantamount to treason, and though found not guilty he would have concluded that his 
suspicion that London would not support him had been vindicated.   
 
Though Edinburgh quickly raised at least four companies of volunteers in 
September 1745, totalling 400 men, as well as ninety men of the Town Guard, 100 
volunteers gathered by Bruce of Kennett from his lands and 130 or 140 volunteers from 
Musselburgh and Inveresk, they were disbanded shortly before the battle of 
Prestonpans.178  A young Alexander Carlyle, present as a volunteer in the College 
Company of Volunteers, recorded that this was because of public derision, the vocal 
opinion of the clergy that they were wasting their lives fighting the Jacobites as their 
number was insufficient to change events, and a lack of official support from the Town 
Council.179  Indeed, many contemporaries, Carlyle included, lacking an understanding of 
the complexities behind legal rights to raise and arm men, remained suspicious of 
Archibald Stewart’s allegiance; Carlyle recorded in his Autobiography: “[it] appeared so 
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plainly from the Provost’s conduct and manner at that time, that there was not a Whig in 
town who did not suspect that he favoured the Pretender’s cause.”180 
 
A great handicap for the militia was the confusion surrounding who had the 
authority to raise and arm men.  In the opening weeks of the ’45, Tweeddale, Secretary of 
State for Scotland, was inundated with requests for warrants and promises of support and 
loyalty.  A typical letter from Stranraer in Dumfries and Galloway read: “We are talking 
of raising volunteers, & nothing Hinders but want of Directors...the County here seems 
all Hearty & takes it amiss that they have not an opportunity to rise in Defence of the 
present Govern[ment].”181  Even in traditionally loyal areas such as Glasgow, militias 
took time to assemble.  Confusion over the legal status of militias, authority to arm 
militias and indecisive instructions from above hindered the realisation of the true 
potential of loyal volunteer troops.  The magistrates of Paisley even complained that their 
request to raise men was being ignored.  This was partly because London doubted many 
of the militias would be of any real military use and were concerned about the wisdom of 
arming Scots.182  The confusion caused by the question of legality was compounded by 
the administrative process of dealing with London.  Edinburgh Town Council began the 
process of gaining permission to raise and arm men on 24th August, thirty-two days after 
Charles Edward landed and sixteen days after news of the landing reached Edinburgh.183  
The absence of many burgesses for the weekend caused a further delay, so the meeting to 
approve the application did not occur until the 27th, and was not sent until the following 
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day.  The royal warrant arrived on 9th September which, at best, left a week to prepare the 
city walls and muster, arm and train the militia.184  However, as the quorum’s decisions at 
the meeting of the 9th were not approved until the 13th, it is unlikely that enough time was 
allowed for effective preparations.185    
 
Unlike the regulars, militia regiments did not benefit from drafts of replacements 
and nor were they allowed to raise additional companies.186  This was due to the short 
existence of the volunteer regiments, which made extra recruitment duties unnecessary, 
and the already difficult lack of available arms in Scotland.  The Ordnance Office had 
only 7,000 muskets stored in Edinburgh Castle and another 4,000 that were in need of 
repair.  Therefore, like the Haddington Militia in 1715, most men raised were 
immediately dismissed as there were insufficient arms to provide for them all.  Despite 
initially numbering 800 men, the Haddington Militia was only 400 strong because of lack 
of arms.187 
 
The employment of the militia was indicative of the British army’s level of trust 
in the loyalty and ability of the militia.  The fact that militias were generally positioned at 
the rear of an engagement, as the Glasgow volunteers were at Falkirk on 17th January 
1746, shows the low level of regard in which the militias were held.188  This also put 
them in the same category as Hamilton’s and Ligonier’s Regiments who had fled at 
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Prestonpans, the latter abandoning their colonel, Gardiner, to his death.189  Both could not 
be trusted not to flee again.  However, for Scottish militiamen, the implication was that 
they were being treated like the officers and men who had shown their lack of loyalty by 
abandoning their posts.  Worse, they knew that during the ’15, they had been valued on a 
par with turn-coats; their deployment had been the same as Campbell of Laars and the 
Laird of Leny in Perthshire, who had recently deserted the Jacobites and who Argyll 
suggested should be placed “a little distance from the army”190, despite referring to them 
as “two of my vassals.”191 
 
The main problem of the militia was that what they were asked to do was often 
incompatible with what they were capable of, therefore resulting in failure.  Their 
tendency to retreat without a fight when facing a possible encounter with the Jacobite 
army and when unsupported by regular troops was not due to lack of loyalty, but to a lack 
of discipline, inexperience and insufficient training.  The Haddington Militia, for 
example, quickly retreated to Edinburgh with no resistance when Jacobite troops landed 
in North Berwick on the night of 13th October 1715.192  At the order of their Lord-
Lieutenant, the 4th Marquess of Tweeddale, to return to Haddington, most promptly 
mutinied and deserted.193  The militia’s inability to stand, in the face of the Jacobites’ 
approach, meant that they were regarded as amateurs.   
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This had serious consequences when planning complex manoeuvres as it was 
imperative to know that troops positioned in particular locations would stand fast.  The 
Glasgow Militia under the command of three half-pay officers, for example, was 
deployed to garrison Seton House near Stirling during the ‘15.  They had initially been 
reluctant to spend more than a few days there, instead of the month Argyll planned,194 
and then fled at the Jacobites’ approach so allowing the house to fall into rebel hands and 
providing the rebels with the benefit of a base for around 1,500 troops and a secure 
supply route. Argyll was then obliged to re-establish another supply route for powder by 
sea.195  Argyll and Tweeddale both believed that militias would not stand against an 
approaching army without support from regular troops.196  As Argyll lamented: “In short 
my Lord [Townsend] a Lamb is not more afraid of a Lyon, than these Low Country 
people are of the highlanders.”197   
 
The militia’s inability to stand and defend the area under its protection, one of its 
key roles, not only failed to prevent the Jacobites moving freely around the country, but 
also failed to reassure the local population.  Even those involved with the militia, like the 
Marquess of Tweeddale, lacked faith in their usefulness and repeatedly requested the 
presence of regular troops.  Indeed, even the loyal town of Glasgow had its doubts and 
the University hired its own private guard of 50 men in August 1715, its Principal 
expressing concern at the lack of troops and officers stationed in Glasgow, and that their 
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overstretched and under-strength status left Glasgow vulnerable.198  When the rebels 
attacked Edinburgh during the night of the 13th October 1715, all the militia and local 
volunteers were gathered to defend the city.  However, Lord Ormiston, a Lord Justice 
Clerk and Lord of Session, was pessimistic about their ability to face the rebel army 
without the presence of regular troops.  Indeed, even before he had attempted to engage 
the enemy, he wrote “I can say nothing when or how or from where you shall here next 
from us”, implying that he did not believe he could hold the city.199  A petition from the 
Deputy Lieutenants of Sutherland, signed by ten men and dated 2nd November 1715, 
blamed: “the Misfortune of the present Circumstances of this Country” on a lack of 
regular troops.  Their location at Inverness may have been particularly significant as 
regular troops could have been more effective in preventing local clans from joining the 
Jacobites.  Their petition begged that “some Regular Troops [are]… forthwith sent 
hither”.200  The difference in desertion rates indicates the roles the militias were suited 
for.  The 300 strong Argyllshire Militia under Colin Campbell of Fonab had a low 
desertion rate compared to the Sutherland Militia.  However, the former were involved in 
mopping-up of rebels in February 1716 while the latter suffered mass desertion after a 
close encounter with a Jacobite force under the Earl of Seaforth in early October 1715.201 
 
The militias’ failure to act in the capacity that the army needed meant that their 
morale and reputation were further tarnished.  When Argyll was asked his opinion of 
whether to recruit for the regulars from amongst the militiamen in December 1715, he 
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declared that this could be expensive and disastrous, as “recruits just raised are of very 
little Service, and at the last action [Sheriffmuir] they did more harm then good…I will 
venture to assure you that a thousand of the best Highlanders would drive the whole 
Militia of Scotland before them”.202  Essentially, when militias were raised to counter 
rebellions in Scotland, the army were looking for auxiliary troops to boost their strength 
and presence in disaffected areas.  However, militias were often only capable of 
providing assistance by taking over minor roles, such as guard and transport duty, which 
freed regular troops to be deployed with the main body of the army. 
 
At Falkirk on 17th January 1746, there were around 2,000 men of the Argyllshire 
Militia raised by the Duke of Argyll from his lands and clan.203  It too was kept in the 
rear of the battle on the right and given patrol duty.204  Despite being recruited from 
amongst the most Hanoverian of clans, as an irregular unit it is clear that the Campbell 
Militia was regarded with some caution.  Its composition and lack of formal training led, 
perhaps, to the belief that it lacked the experience and discipline to stand in the line 
during a set-piece battle.  To gain victory, General Henry Hawley, commander of the 
British forces at Falkirk, was relying on his troops’ discipline to hold their fire until the 
Jacobites were disconcertingly close in order to repulse the Highland charge.205  He 
consequently doubted the Campbell Militia’s steadfastness and they were kept from the 
main battlefield, guarding the baggage.206  By the battle of Culloden, however, they had 
proved their worth and were placed opposite the Jacobite right flank in order to outflank 
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it and acquitted itself well in that role.207  However, they had to earn that trust, serving as 
scouts for the main army in February, March and April 1746 and forming the vanguard 
on the morning of Culloden.208  Of the militias raised to counter the ’45, the Argyllshire 
Militia were considered the most able.  However, they were never considered with the 
rest of the army.  When the 5th Earl of Findlater issued one guinea to each company and 
troop as they passed through his lands, it took a week for the army to realise that the 
Argyllshire Militia had been excluded.209  
 
During the ’45, as in the ’15, the city of Glasgow again raised its militia but it 
again fled as the Jacobite army moved into the city on 25th and 26th December 1745.210  
They then took part in the battle of Falkirk that followed, taking a position on the British 
army’s left flank; however, they were amongst the first to flee in the face of the Jacobite 
army’s Highland charge.211  Whilst the Hanoverian loyalties of Glasgow were 
demonstrated by its ability to raise a militia, its value was clearly limited.  On two 
occasions, it was unable to stand when faced by the Jacobite army; when defending 
Glasgow and during the battle of Falkirk.  While this was a fault of their misemployment, 
such incidents were interpreted by London and the British army as evidence of the failure 
of the militia and as a lack of ‘zeal’. 
 
Government behaviour towards militias was a poor return on the risks many Scots 
took in openly displaying their political allegiances in a situation of civil war.  As militias 
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were the most accessible and overt method for ordinary men and gentry alike to 
demonstrate their loyalty, it was especially insulting that militias were often not granted 
permission to form or that the warrants granting permission were fatally delayed because 
London remained suspicious of Scottish loyalty.212  In the years after Culloden, this 
continued to strain relations with loyal Scots, making feelings of resentment not unique to 
crypto- and outright Jacobites.  The loyal Scots who had joined Blakeney’s Regiment in 
Stirling as unpaid volunteers after fleeing Perth following clashes with Jacobite soldiers 
as the town celebrated George II’s birthday on 30th October 1745, were poorly rewarded 
for their loyalty as, years later, their widows and orphans were living off parish charity.  
 
Conclusion 
Scotland in the first half of the eighteenth century witnessed, in addition to the 
regular army, the deployment of a range of auxiliary forces.  One premise was common 
to them all; to demonstrate loyalty to the government and the Protestant Succession.  
Military service was the main expression, though contributing to subscriptions to fund 
forces, and participating in petitions and public celebrations connected to the 
establishment, were other popular manifestations.  These auxiliary forces performed a 
range of services.  Chief amongst them was to relieve pressure on the British army.  
Auxiliary forces could guard baggage, act as scouts, protect cities and form garrisons that 
allowed regular soldiers to join the main army.  Auxiliary forces also participated in 
battles, though it was in this capacity that they received the most criticism.  
Unfortunately, London’s engrained suspicions of Scottish loyalty meant that poor 
behaviour when facing the Jacobite army was blamed on Jacobite sympathies rather than 
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inexperience.  Similarly, officers’ inability to continue funding militia regiments was 
interpreted as a ‘lack of zeal’ that was tantamount to disloyalty.  Such mistaken beliefs 
hindered the creation of auxiliary forces just when they were most needed, at the start of 
a rebellion when regular reinforcements were en route to Scotland.  Legal problems 
caused hesitation among Scotland’s elite who doubted their authority, or the 
government’s support, if they acted improperly.  This delayed the military reaction to 
rebellions through the necessity of applying to London for warrants.  The trial of Stewart, 
the Provost of Edinburgh, showed they were right to be dubious of automatic government 
support. 
 
London’s insistence on issuing warrants, and the paranoia of Scotland’s civil 
elites about acting without them, was most restrictive during the period between the 1689 
and ’45 rebellion.  At this time, the power of law courts was becoming more pervasive 
across the country, and influential by virtue of significant new laws.  The Mutiny and 
Riot Acts gave government officials greater powers than army officers, and the 
Disarming Acts and later abolition of Heritable Jurisdictions demonstrated the 
government’s desire to tighten legal control over its domains.  The new legal authority, 
for all its strength, lacked clarity.  This was the case with the 1708 Scottish Militia Bill, 
and the apparent contradiction between Stewart’s trial and the acceptance of the 
variations of militia that were raised during the rebellions, such as the private guard 
armed by Glasgow University in 1715 without a royal warrant. 
 
A study of auxiliary forces in Scotland in the first half of the eighteenth century is 
complicated by a lack of systematically recorded or preserved state documentation.  This 
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hampers study of the British army of the time and the situation is much worse for 
auxiliary forces as their temporary nature and supra-regular status means that little 
survives that clearly illustrates the protocol for authorising and raising bodies such as 
militias.  Information must be gleaned from personal correspondence, and from 
infrequent warrants and orders.  At best, this gives an impression of the process of how 
auxiliary forces were raised and utilised; at worst, any study will contain gaps where 
extrapolation has to be used.  Despite this, a picture emerges of the auxiliary forces in 
existence in Scotland in the first half of the eighteenth century, contributing to the 
suppression of the ’15 and ’45.  This contradicts many historians’ belief that there was 
little or no militia activity between 1700 and 1750.  It does, however, leave an unclear 
picture of exactly how auxiliary forces were raised, authorised and funded.  Even the 
length of their service is unclear, as practical experience appeared to contradict warrants 
and laws.  Similarly, confusion obscures the definition of a fencible regiment.  The main 
difficulty is that the concept of ‘Fencible Men’ had long existed in Scotland.  This 
confused Scotland’s interpretation and application of orders from London, and their 
service has been viewed as identical to service in the militia or non-existent until its 
reinvention during the Seven Years War, and Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars.  
Consequently, geographical, chronological and terminological dividers fail to supply a 
precise definition.  What is clear, however, is that a variety of auxiliary forces were used 
before and after the Union in Scotland, and that, as the eighteenth century progressed, 
these became more in line with the English model.  Nevertheless, these auxiliary forces 
made a significant contribution to the suppression of the Jacobite threat and in this way 
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fulfilled their military requirement as well as proclaiming the loyalty of a large part of 
Scotland. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: SCOTLAND’S MILITARY INSTALLATIONS 
Introduction 
This chapter examines Scotland’s forts, castles and barracks occupied by the 
British army across ‘North Britain’ or built for it by the Ordnance Office.  After an 
introductory survey of the military structures used to garrison soldiers in Scotland prior to 
the Union, a more detailed appraisal addresses those used, improved and constructed 
between the Union and in the years after the ‘45.  The construction process is 
investigated, particularly in relation to soldiers’ involvement in building and problems 
that arose from the remote locations of these sites.  The locations of fortifications and the 
reasons for their construction are analysed to assess the purpose of these structures and 
their significance for the army.  The composition and strengths of the fortifications are 
assessed to highlight developments between the Union and the end of the ‘45 and the 
reasons causing them.  The successes and failures of the fortifications are studied to 
assess whether they were effective garrisons and effective defences, and what impact 
their presence had on the civil-military relationship.  In order to demonstrate the 
government’s level of attention towards Scotland and its soldiers, the dates of 
construction and the reasons why action was taken are analysed.  Additionally, the 
developments in the principles of fortification design and architectural changes the 
occurred over the first half of the eighteenth century are examined to demonstrate the 
state’s changing attitude towards standing armies and the living conditions of soldiers.   
 
There follows a review of the road building conducted under Generals Wade and 
Caulfeild, encompassing both the method of construction, the routes selected and, most 
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importantly, the reaction of the Scots to these roads.  Finally, to remedy the absence in 
the historiography of a study that covers both fortification building in Scotland and the 
history of the Ordnance Office, this chapter includes an examination of the powers of the 
Ordnance Office in relation to fortification building, the origins and communication of 
orders to build and repair, and the specific role and purpose of Ordnance officials in 
Scotland.  A consideration of the administrative process reveals the balance of power 
between Ordnance Office, government and army, and how this influenced what was 
constructed in Scotland.    
 
A schedule of the citadels, castles and forts at Inverness and Fort William is 
provided in Appendix No.5 to clarify the various forms of fortification built in close 
proximity at the two locations and used simultaneously over the fifty year period covered 
in this thesis.1 
 
Key fortifications, pre- and post-Union 
For much of Scotland’s history, only royalty and the richest of the nobles could 
afford to construct large buildings such as castles.  Some, including those at Edinburgh 
and Stirling, continued in use because of their secure, naturally defensible positions.  The 
rest of Scotland’s nobility, Highland and Lowland alike, relied upon the defences of 
fortified tower houses for security.2  Between the Union of Crowns and the Restoration, 
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various armies stationed in Scotland used these existing castles and tower houses for 
barracking, the co-ordination of Scotland’s defence and patrolling and policing duties.   
 
During the Interregnum the existing strongholds of Edinburgh, Stirling, Dunottar, 
Tantallon and smaller castles like Blair and Dunstaffnage were used.  Men were also 
garrisoned on Orkney, Shetland and the Hebrides, and on the newly improved and 
repaired Castle of Duart on Mull.3  Roxburgh Castle also provided a supply centre and 
accommodation for 441 men.4  Between 1652 and 1656 construction of five citadels 
began at Ayr, Inverlochy, Inverness, Leith and St. Johnston near Perth, in locations 
chosen for their military significance.5  Intended as permanent garrisons with policing 
duties and to provide a statement of the Protectorate’s dominance in Scotland, their 
success was confirmed by their immediate destruction by Charles II.6   
 
Following the Act of Union, the new government of Great Britain continued the 
policy of relying on pre-existing fortifications.  Often these were ancestral castles of 
leading Scottish families who, since the Union of Crowns, had been encouraged to 
barrack troops and take responsibility for the defence and internal security of Scotland.7  
For example, Balvenie Castle belonged to the Stewart Earl of Atholl family, whose 
Heritor8 offered it as a fortified garrison for British army use during the ‘15.9  Selective 
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improvements to existing fortifications were undertaken: Edinburgh Castle continued to 
be a royal palace and military and administrative headquarters through changes in 
government.  The attempt by the 1st Duke of Gordon to hold Edinburgh Castle for the 
Stuarts at the Glorious Revolution and the Jacobites’ repeated attempts to take Edinburgh 
and Stirling during the ’15 and ’45 stands testimony to their importance.10 
 
Following the Glorious Revolution, the remains of the medieval castle at 
Inverness and Cromwell’s citadel at Inverlochy were repaired and used to garrison 
troops.  Their strategic position at each end of the Great Glen, deep in the disaffected 
Highlands with access to the sea, made them invaluable.11  Converted and improved 
tower houses continued to be used.  Blackness Castle, built on a headland on the south 
bank into the River Forth upstream from Edinburgh, used from 1684 to 1833 as a barrack 
and as a prison during the ‘15, and Braemar and Corgarff, bought by the Ordnance Office 
following the ’45, were old tower houses.  Designed to resist raids, many were converted 
and proved effective outposts.12  They became the model for the fortified barracks 
commissioned in 1717.  These barracks and the converted tower houses were an ideal 
compromise at a time when both the government and public feared standing armies and 
resented the expense of sustaining them with permanent barracks.  An exception was the 
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large and significant barracks at Berwick which, though geographically in England was 
put, along with Carlisle and Hull, on the North British establishment at the Union in 
1707.13 
 
Since the border wars of the twelfth to fifteenth centuries, Berwick had been a 
walled town where soldiers were billeted on the public.  Scattered billeting often resulted 
in poor discipline and increased tension between the citizens and soldiers, as discussed in 
Chapter Two.  This lead to the first request by town leaders for the Ordnance Office to 
build a specific barrack at Berwick in 1705.  Purpose-built barracks had previously only 
existed in Ireland, where the relationship between military and civilian was even more 
acrimonious and distant, and barracks had been viewed as militarily essential since the 
seventeenth century.14  At Berwick, these requests were not acted upon until 1717, when 
initial plans were drawn up by Nicholas Hawksmoor.  These were altered by Captain 
Thomas Phillips and Andrew Jelfe, both engineers to the Ordnance Office, who created a 
simpler and therefore cheaper design.15  Further barracks were added in 1740 with the 
conversion of the ‘Clock Block’, the former powder magazine, which was replaced in 
1748, along with other repairs and the strengthening of the curtain walls following the 
‘45.16 
 
                                                 
13 Tabraham and Grove, Fortress Scotland, p.57. 
14 D. Grove, Berwick Barracks and Fortifications (London, 1999), p.3, 5; Tabraham and Grove, Fortress 
Scotland, p.57; T. Bartlett and K. Jeffery, A Military History of Ireland (Cambridge, 1996), p.219-20 and 
Donet, British Barracks, p.33. 
15 Grove, Berwick Barracks, p.4, 6 and Tabraham and Grove, Fortress Scotland, p.57. 
16 J.A. Houlding, Fit for Service.  The training of the British Army, 1715 – 1795, (Oxford, 1981), p.40 and 
Tabraham and Grove, Fortress Scotland, p.59, 107. 
 263 
It was more usual to make use of existing ancient castles as fortifications.  At 
Edinburgh from 1688 onwards, soldiers were housed in the Great Hall using wooden 
galleries.  This also occurred at Stirling, which only reverted to its military use during 
James II’s reign, after acting as a royal residence and nursery since the medieval period.17  
Despite widespread reluctance to spend money on the military or to encourage a standing 
army by providing them with permanent accommodation, in July 1708 Captain Theodore 
Drury, an engineer for the Ordnance Office, began work on an outer defence at Stirling 
that could withstand siege artillery, with dual-purpose casements that provided storage 
during peace and extra barracks in times of emergency. 18   At Edinburgh, Drury created 
the officers’ block – now known as Queen Anne’s Building – and also built 
accommodation for the garrison’s chaplain and gunners.  Plans to repair the outer 
defences were abandoned when no design could be agreed upon, while the permanent 
conversion of the Great Hall into barrack rooms was delayed by twenty-nine years, until 
1737.19   
 
In 1708 Drury also turned to Fort William.  The Cromwellian citadel at 
Inverlochy, as well as the medieval castle at Inverness, had been repaired and re-used 
after the Jacobite insurrections in Ireland and Scotland in 1689-90.20  Rough ramparts had 
been added to Inverlochy Castle, possibly providing temporary billets or an outpost, but 
the new garrison was built on the site of Inverlochy Citadel, closer to the head of Loch 
                                                 
17 Donet, British Barracks, p.18, 19 and J. Goodman and I. Moncreiffe, Debrett’s Royal Scotland (London, 
1983), p.44-5. 
18 L.G. Schwoerer, “No Standing Armies!”  The Antiarmy Ideology in Seventeenth-Century England 
(London, 1974), p.188-9; Donet, British Barracks, p.xiii, 39-42 and Tabraham and Grove, Fortress 
Scotland, p.50 and S. Ross, Scottish Castles (Moffat, 1990), p.158. 
19 Donet, British Barracks, p.18-9 and I. MacIvor, Edinburgh Castle (London, 1993), p.89-90. 
20 A. Saunders, Fortress Britain.  Artillery Fortification in the British Isles and Ireland (Liphook, 1989), 
p.107. 
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Linnhe and was named Fort William in July 1690.21  Built in eleven days, Fort William 
initially consisted of primitive wooden buildings used as barrack blocks, only the outer 
defences gaining stone facings.  Consequently, the garrison at Fort William suffered 
greatly, eventually mutinying on 5th November 1690, until food and wages arrived. 22  In 
1708, therefore, Drury added a powder magazine and governor’s, officers’ and 
storekeeper’s houses.  It was not until 1711 that two barrack blocks finally replaced the 
wooden ones with stone, reflecting the order of priority undermined by the Ordnance 
Office.23  Work was clearly needed to the outer defences of Fort William in the summer 
of 1715, but a lack of funds and the distraction of rebellion meant only temporary repairs 
could be managed.24   
 
Triggered by the ’15, barrack blocks were built between 1716 and 1718 at the 
repaired medieval castle at Inverness.25  It is sometimes stated erroneously that the 
expansion at Inverness during this time caused the change in name to Fort George.26  
This did not in fact occur until 1727 when enough of the planned barracks, quarters for 
gunners, a governor’s house, powder magazine and chapel had been begun for General 
Wade to dedicate it to the newly ascended George II.  Under the management of Captain 
                                                 
21 Tabraham and Grove, Fortress Scotland, p.13, 15. 
22 Ibid, p.40-1, 50. 
23 Donet, British Barracks, p.19 and Tabraham and Grove, Fortress Scotland, p.50. 
24 TNA SP54/7/60A, Ordnance Office to Townsend, 20th August 1715; SP54/7/60B, R. Johnson to 
[Ordnance Office], Fort William, 1st August 1715; SP54/8/94, [Robert Pollock] to [Townsend], Fort 
William, 24th September 1715; SP54/8/116, [Robert Pollock] to unknown, Fort William, 28th September 
1715; SP54/8/119, unknown to [Robert Pringle, Under-Secretary of State for the Southern Department], 
Edinburgh, 29th September 1715; SP54/10/23, Robert Pollock to unknown, Fort William, 5th November 
1715; SP54/10/27, Robert Pollock to unknown, Fort William, 7th November 1715 and SP54/11/54, Robert 
Pollock to unknown, Fort William, 25th January 1716. 
25 Donet, British Barracks, p.21 and MacIntoch, A History of Inverness, p.118. 
26 MacIntoch, A History of Inverness, p.118. 
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John Romer, engineer to the Ordnance Office, building continued until shortly before the 
’45.27 
 
Between 1730 and 1737, Romer also supervised the replacement of the north and 
west curved curtain walls of Edinburgh Castle with the star-traced, bastioned enceintes 
regarded as the design needed to maintain enfilade covering-fire in an age of siege 
artillery.28  The master mason was William Adam of Leith.  He and his three sons, James, 
John and Robert, acted as architects, masons and contractors for the Ordnance Office and 
were responsible for much of the repairs and new construction commissioned in the first 
fifty years of the eighteenth century, including the design for the bridge over the river 
Tay, Wade’s showpiece.29  Unfortunately, the focus on defence of the Highlands meant 
the new perimeter walls at Edinburgh fulfilled only the minimum requirements, and the 
improvements to the barracks in the Great Hall in 1737 and the addition of a governor’s 
house with wings for the master-gunner and storekeeper in 1742, did nothing to improve 
its defensibility. 30  Fortunately for the government, when Charles Edward entered 
Edinburgh in October 1745, he did so without the artillery needed to besiege a castle the 
size and strength of Edinburgh.  Consequently while the castle tolerated the Jacobites’ 
presence and the Jacobites ignored the castle, it remained undefeated.31 
                                                 
27 Tabraham and Grove, Fortress Scotland, p.76-7. 
28 MacIvor, Edinburgh Castle, p.95; C. Duffy, Fire & Stone.  The Science of Fortress Warfare, 1660-1860 
(London, 1996), p.10 and Saunders, Fortress Britain, p.87.  An enceinte is an enclosure or wall of a 
fortified place.  Enfilade is the ability to fire along the length of a formation or position providing total 
covering-fire.  See Glossary. 
29 Tabraham and Grove, Fortress Scotland, p.75, 85, 95 and ODNB William Adam by James Macaulay, 
John Adam by A.A. Tait and Robert and James Adam by A.A. Tait.  FCA A/AAF/40/30/9/2, Proposal by 
John Adam for quartering two troops of dragoons at Blair in Fife, c.1750s. 
30 MacIvor, Edinburgh Castle, p.95 and Tabraham and Grove, Fortress Scotland, p.85. 
31 Whilst the town welcomed the Jacobites, the Castle remained loyal.  After a brief siege, the Castle and 
Jacobite army reached a compromise, in return for the castle battery cessation of fire on the town, which 
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All the previously mentioned barracks, such as those built at Woolwich in 1716 
and at Berwick in 1717,32 were unfortified accommodation blocks, which relied on the 
defences of the castle or fort they were located within for protection.  They were based on 
barracks built in Ireland since the 1680s, where the lack of inns made billeting difficult.33    
The designs for these simple barracks inspired the first purpose-built, self-contained 
fortified barracks.  In August 1717, the Ordnance Office commissioned the construction 
of four fortified barracks to be built in Scotland, the first permanent barracks to be built 
on British soil.  Unlike the barracks at Woolwich and Berwick, where the barracks were 
situated in enclosed military communities, the fortified barracks in Scotland had to be 
defensible and self-contained to survive their role as outposts rather than staging posts.34  
Inspiration was also taken from the tower houses scattered across Scotland that, for 
centuries, had been used by their owners to protect themselves from inter-clan raiding.  
By incorporating their defensive features, such as the corner towers for enfilade fire, the 
Ordnance Office was adapting to the differences and requirements of Highland Scotland, 
using architecture with proven success rates against Highland tactics, essentially creating 
four Z-plan tower houses.35  Ruthven, Bernera at Glenelg, Inversnaid on the north bank 
of Loch Lomond in Stirlingshire and Kiliwhimen at the south end of Loch Ness were 
                                                                                                                                                 
had caused the local citizens to complain to the Jacobites and petition them to leave, the Jacobite army 
would allow the castle to be re-supplied.  MacIvor, Edinburgh Castle, p.96. 
32 O.F.G. Hogg, The Royal Arsenal.  Its Background, Origin, and Subsequent History (London, 1963), 2 
vols, I, p.154 and Grove, Berwick Barracks, p.4. 
33 Donet, British Barracks, p.21. 
34 Ibid, p.21. 
35 MacGibbon and T. Ross, The Castellated and Domestic Architecture of Scotland, I, p.144, 222; 
MacGibbon and T. Ross, The Castellated and Domestic Architecture of Scotland, II, p.5-6, 567-9; 
MacGibbon and T. Ross, The Castellated and Domestic Architecture of Scotland, III, p.33 and Reid, 
Castles and Tower Houses, p.12-3, 17-8, 54.  See Tranter, The Fortified House, 5 vols for the buildings in 
their geographical and historical context. 
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designed as two three-storied barrack blocks, forming two sides of the outside wall.  The 
barrack block’s end walls were linked to form a defensive wall with narrow banquettes,36 
surrounding an enclosure for a small drill ground.  Each barrack was designed to contain 
an internally located well and two latrines, one for officers and one for other ranks.37  
Funding constraints reduced the original plans for a tower at each corner to provide 
complete enfilade fire to the entrance and sally-ports, to two on each of diagonally 
opposite corners.  These towers doubled as guard rooms, store rooms, bake- and brew-
houses and the officers’ quarters.38  Building work was slow on each of the sites; for 
example, building at Bernera lasted from May 1720 to April 1723.39  Delays were caused 
as policing Jacobite activity was prioritised above construction, by the precautions 
needed after the kidnap of masons and quarrymen from Inversnaid in 1718, by disputes 
over design, and the prevarications of Sir Patrick Strachan, Barrack-Master General of 
North Britain.40 
 
Though construction had only recently finished on Kiliwhimen, and plans were in 
hand to build an extended version, Wade’s radical suggestion to instead build a larger fort 
closer to the shore of Loch Ness was duly followed.  Work began in 1729 and Wade 
named it Fort Augustus for the young Duke of Cumberland.41  Again, construction had 
just finished when the destruction of a bastion during the Jacobite siege forced the Fort’s 
                                                 
36 A banquette was a platform behind a parapet from which soldiers could keep look out or fire downwards.  
See Glossary. 
37 Scanned copies of the Ordnance Office design plans for the fortified barracks, as well as Fort William, 
Fort Augustus and Fort George (Inverness) and at Ardersier can be found on: 
http://maps.nls.uk/military/index.html  
38 NLS MS.1648 Z.03/20a, Ruthven of Badenoch, undated; MS.1648 Z.03/20b, Ruthven of Badenoch, 
undated; Donet, British Barracks, p.21 and Tabraham and Grove, Fortress Scotland, p.65. 
39 Tabraham and Grove, Fortress Scotland, p.62. 
40 Ibid, p.61-2. 
41 Donet, British Barracks, p.21 and Tabraham and Grove, Fortress Scotland, p.79. 
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surrender in March 1746, after which the Jacobites used nineteen barrels of powder to 
render it useless, though some rooms, cellars, stables were still sound afterwards.42 
 
In the aftermath of the ‘45, improvements were ordered to Fort Augustus and Fort 
George, the latter of which had surrendered after a Jacobite siege of two days in February 
1746 when its walls were breached.43  Fort Augustus was quickly finished as only 
necessary repairs were made, the barracks at Kiliwhimen continued to be used as extra 
barrack space and the powder magazine remained in its original, vulnerable position in 
one of the four bastions.44  However, the severe damage at the old site of Fort George 
instigated a move to Ardersier on the triangular spit into the Moray Firth, nine miles from 
Inverness.45   Building for both began with the bomb-proof, vaulted casements within the 
ramparts, as had been used at Stirling in 1708, providing extra storage and barracks.46  
While Fort Augustus was considered “rather…as a neat barrack then a fortification”47 the 
new Fort George at Ardersier was “the most considerable fortress and best situated in 
Great Britain.”48   
 
Of two suggested designs for Fort George at Ardersier, General William 
Skinner’s plan won over that of another Ordnance Office engineer, Major Lewis Marcell.  
Begun in 1747, this design was, unusually, faithfully followed to completion twenty-two 
                                                 
42 C. Duffy, The ’45.  Bonnie Prince Charlie and the untold story of the Jacobite Rising (London, 2003), 
p.451 and J. Prebble, Culloden (Harmondsworth, 1972), p.178. 
43 B. Lenman, The Jacobite Clans of the Great Glen, 1650-1784 (Dalkeith, 2004), p.97. 
44 Saunders, Fortress Britain, p.110 and J.G. Dunbar, Sir William Burrell’s Northern Tour 1758 (East 
Linton, 1997), p.95. 
45 Saunders, Fortress Britain, p.110. 
46 Tabraham and Grove, Fortress Scotland, p.49-50 and Donet, British Barracks, p.23. 
47 Dunbar, Sir William Burrell’s Northern Tour, p.95. 
48 Lieutenant-General James Wolfe, 1747, quoted in Tabraham and Grove, Fortress Scotland, p.94. 
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years later.49  Following the shape of the spit, the fort had bastioned curtain walls with a 
large sea battery at the tip.  The landward facing defences were concentrated on the 
narrow neck of the spit, featuring two bastions, a ravelin, and a covered way with a 
batardeau flood-sluice.50  Other ranks, officers and gunners were barracked separately, as 
were the governor and lieutenant-governor.51   Beyond the necessary military structures, 
such as the grand magazine, a casement gun battery overlooking the Moray Firth, 
ordnance and provision stores, and the barracks, additional structures were built, 
including workshops, houses for the garrison staff and a chapel.52  With a capacity of 
1,600 men when finished in 1769, with additional transient troops, garrison staff, fort 
officials, wives and families, Fort George at Ardersier was ‘home’ for 2,000, a 
community approximately a quarter of the size of Inverness.53 
 
The building work was again contracted out to the Adams family, the sons 
replacing the father on his death in 1748.54  Costs and delays were reduced by using local 
quarries and timber, and buying metalwork and tools locally.  These were transported by 
sea, so a harbour was one of the first things constructed. 55  The work force numbered in 
the thousands, provided by both private contract and from regiments seconded from 
Ireland and the Scottish Lowlands.  For example, Barrell’s regiment was detailed “to 
                                                 
49 Tabraham and Grove, Fortress Scotland, p.93-4 and E. Meldrum, From Nairn to Loch Ness.  Local 
History and Archaeology Guidebook No. 1 (Inverness, 1983), p.24. 
50 The Batardeau were damns within a ditch that formed part of a fortifications defences.  When the écluse 
de chasse and éluse de fuite – sluices – were released, water either flooded or drained the ditch.  See 
Glossary.  Donet, British Barracks, p.43; Saunders, Fortress Britain, p.111 and Meldrum, From Nairn to 
Loch Ness, p.24. 
51 Donet, British Barracks, p.44. 
52 Tabraham and Grove, Fortress Scotland, p.97-8 and Donet, British Barracks, p.44. 
53 Houlding, Fit for Service, p.40; Tabraham and Grove, Fortress Scotland, p.98 and Meldrum, From Nairn 
to Loch Ness, p.24. 
54 Tabraham and Grove, Fortress Scotland, p.95. 
55 Ibid, p.95, 96. 
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carry on the fortifications at Ardersier Point” in 1749.56  This followed the same principle 
as those solders who worked on Scotland’s military roads. 
 
The location, purpose and strength of fortifications 
The persistent problem of Jacobite activity and the conduct of Highland chiefs 
and their clans meant that maintaining a military presence was a priority for the 
government.  Geography, therefore, played a large part of the decision making process in 
where to locate fortifications.  At its most basic level, this determined the location of 
Stirling and Edinburgh castles atop natural rock formations, and Ruthven barracks used 
an existing motte from a medieval castle.  Similarly, the natural fault line that caused the 
Great Glen was of strategic significance for ease of movement and access to the east and 
west coasts, as instanced in the Interregnum by the placement of citadels at Inverlochy 
and Inverness.  Consequently, Forts William and George were constructed in those 
localities, if not on the same site in Fort George’s case.  In 1690, 1719 and 1745-6, troops 
garrisoned at the repaired Inverness Castle, later to become Fort George, benefited from 
fast deployment because of Inverness’s geographical position.57 
 
Kiliwhimen58 and, later, Fort Augustus were built as a link in the chain of forts 
along the Great Glen.59  They occupied the same location mid-way up the Great Glen, the 
former as barracks and the latter as a fort, both using their central location to serve as 
                                                 
56 H.C. Tomlinson, ‘The Ordnance Office and the King’s Forts, 1660-1714’, Architectural History, 16, 
1973, p.18 and Tabraham and Grove, Fortress Scotland, p.95 and W. Taylor, The Military Roads in 
Scotland (London, 1996), p.27-8. 
57 MacIntoch, A History of Inverness, p.114-5 and M.W. Grant, The Parish of Golspie in the Shire of 
Sutherland, 850 to 1850 AD (hand typed, 1977), p.47. 
58 Also spelt as Kilicumein and Killichuimen, I shall use Kiliwhimen as this is the commonest spelling. 
59 Forts William, Augustus and George, running west to east up the Great Glen, shall be referred to 
collectively as the Great Glen forts. 
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headquarters of the three other fortified barracks and the outposts that policed Scotland.  
Kiliwhimen was the largest of the fortified barracks for that very purpose and 
Cumberland transferred his army to Fort Augustus in May 1746 “from which he could 
control the Highlands as the hub of a wheel controls the spokes and rim”60 when he 
began a new strategy towards the remaining rebels as it provided an ideal central base to 
co-ordinate searches for those that remained in arms.61 
 
The relative loyalty of a locality was also an important factor in the placement of 
fortifications.  Inversnaid was built on land confiscated from Rob Roy MacGregor, while 
Kiliwhimen and Fort Augustus were built on Fraser of Lovat land, the chief of which, the 
11th Lord Lovat, had loyalties and motivations known only to himself.62  Similarly, 
General Mackay declared Lochaber and the south end of the Great Glen a “cradle for a 
rising”, leading him to instigate the construction of a new fort that became Fort William 
in 1690.63 
 
Fortifications were also located to control and protect strategically important 
routes.  Stirling Castle’s location, controlling the largest pass, and therefore the main 
access route between the Lowlands and the Highlands, gave it great military significance.  
Such access could make or break a military campaign.  For example, when in October 
1715 Mar wanted to move south and link up with the Lowland Jacobite forces, he was 
                                                 
60 Prebble, Culloden, p.164. 
61 J. Oates, Sweet William or The Butcher?  The Duke of Cumberland and the ’45 (Barnsley, 2008), p.108-
9, 119, 120, 160. 
62 For more on Lord Lovat, see Chapter Three: The Scottish Soldier and the State, in sub-section 
‘Trimmers’. 
63 Tabraham and Grove, Fortress Scotland, p.39, 61 and  Donet, British Barracks, p.18, 21-2. 
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unable to do so because Argyll held Stirling Castle with a force of 3,000.64  The British 
government and Ordnance Office were aware of the benefits of controlling natural access 
routes, whether pass, river or coastline.  Fort Augustus’s location mid-way up the Great 
Glen provided a safe stopping point and protection on the main route between Forts 
William and George.  Inversnaid was located to protect the Dumbarton to Atholl road in 
Stirlingshire while Bernera was positioned on the loyal lands of clan MacLeod in Glenelg 
in order to protect the sea crossing from the Sound of Sleat to the Isle of Skye.  
Additionally, it provided a military presence near the disaffected Mackenzie clan led by 
the Catholic and Jacobite 5th Earl of Seaforth.65  Aberdeen provided accommodation to 
those guarding the coastline and port against smugglers and Blackness acted as protection 
for the Firth of Forth, and was sufficiently important that Argyll took the time in the 
midst of rebellion to recommend a Mr Napier to be its lieutenant in November 1715.66  
After the ’45, this strategy of protection continued with the additional purchase by the 
Ordnance Office of Castle Stalker, Dunstaffnage and Taybridge.  The former two added 
links to the chain of the Great Glen forts, and the latter guarded the key route from 
Stirling to Inverness. 67 
 
In addition to fixing a general location, the precise orientation and situation of 
fortifications was important.  Part of General Wade’s task on inspecting the defence of 
Scotland in 1724 was the situation of the forts and garrisons.  He was unimpressed: “It is 
to be wished that during the Reign of Your Majesty and Your Successors, no 
                                                 
64 R. Mathews, England versus Scotland (Barnsley, 2003), p.121. 
65 Tabraham and Grove, Fortress Scotland, p.61. 
66 Houlding, Fit for Service, p.34 and TNA SP54/10/32A, James Cockburn to Mr Pringle, Camp at Stirling, 
8th November 1715. 
67 Houlding, Fit for Service, p.28 and Prebble, Culloden, p.219. 
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Insurrections may ever happen to experience whether the [four fortified] Barracks will 
effectively answer the end proposed.”68  He judged Kiliwhimen too far from Loch Ness, 
and moved the site of the future Fort Augustus closer to the loch edge to provide extra 
defence and ease of relief in case of siege.69  Similarly, Wade rejected the site of 
Cromwell’s old citadel at Inverness as strategically unsound, and continued to use the site 
of the old medieval castle for Fort George.  This, however, proved a mistake as the site’s 
foundations rested on loose gravel that made construction difficult and caused Fort 
George’s surrender in February 1746 as it allowed the easy undermining of its bastion by 
the Jacobites.70  Fort George’s topographical position was also questionable in an age of 
artillery, as Sir William Burrell observed in 1758: “Its situation made it untenable against 
canon (being commanded by a rising ground in front) and like the other 2 forts must be 
rather intended as a checque upon the turbulency of its highland neighbours than 
expected to stand a siege.”71  Consequently, the new Fort George was built at Ardersier, a 
natural spit of land into the Moray Firth nine miles from Inverness.72  This provided ideal 
natural defences on three sides, which improved its resistance to potential siege and 
reduced building costs. 
 
When deciding where to build and improve, the Ordnance Office, working on 
behalf of the government, was reliant for advice from those in Scotland.  Garrison 
storekeepers were charged with regularly reporting on garrison maintenance.  However, 
as pluralism within Ordnance Office roles was common, especially amongst storekeepers 
                                                 
68 Tabraham and Grove, Fortress Scotland, p.65. 
69 Ibid, p.70, 78. 
70 Duffy, The ’45, p.152, 447. 
71 Dunbar, Sir William Burrell’s Northern Tour, p.96. 
72 Saunders, Fortress Britain, p.110. 
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who were usually influential local merchants, regular reports were rare.73  Intelligence 
was often sought from garrison governors, as in a survey of Fort William’s outposts 
requested in June 1715.74  This too was an erratic method, as garrison staffs were usually 
under-manned and over-worked.  Recommendations also came from a wide range of 
Scottish gentry, politicians and military men, but this too could be erratic and unreliable, 
depending on the source.  Argyll, as Commander-in-Chief of the forces in North Britain, 
and Adam Brown, the Provost of Edinburgh, both acted in their official capacities as 
government officials when they recommended improvements to fortifications to 
consecutive Secretaries of State.75  The 1746 recommendations made by the 3rd Earl of 
Breadalbane represented an attempt to make amends for a father and grandfather’s 
Jacobitism.76  Duncan Forbes of Culloden, Lord President of the Court of Session, as 
chief legal advisor to London and a trusted government official, used personal knowledge 
of the Highlands to recommend locations for proposed ports and to report on the 
peacefulness of the country.77  Similarly, the 12th Earl of Glencairn’s advice regarding 
repairs to Dumbarton Castle in August 1715 represented the counsel of a reliable Whig 
Scottish peer, while the memorials of the 11th Lord Lovat were nearly always an attempt 
to gain the favour of the government and further appointments for himself.  Lovat’s 
                                                 
73 Tomlinson, ‘The Ordnance Office and the King’s Forts’, p.12 and H.C. Tomlinson, ‘Guns and 
Government.  The Ordnance Office under the later Stuarts’, The Royal Historical Society, 15, 1979, p.48, 
65-7. 
74 NAS GD220/5/568/1 Robert Pollock to [Duke of Montrose], Fort William, 7th June 1715. 
75 TNA SP54/4/9, [Adam Brown to 1st Earl Dartmouth], Edinburgh, January 1711 and SP54/9/2A, 2nd Duke 
of Argyll to 1st Earl Stanhope, Camp at Stirling, 1st October 1715. 
76 NAS GD112/47/1/6, 3rd Earl of Breadalbane [1746]; “A Number of small Redoubts garrison’d by 30 or 
40 men erected at the principall Bridges and Passes would protect Magazines, preserve the Communicaion 
and prevent any Provisons going into those Countreys without the Government’s Permission.  The principle 
Bridges are Sterling, Tay Brdige, Kinnachan bridge over the Tummel, Spay Bridge near Garremore, High 
Bridge, and the Bridge at the head of Loch Tyne.” 
77 J.H. Burton, Lives of Simon Lord Lovat, and Duncan Forbes, of Culloden.  From original sources 
(London, 1847), p.327-332. 
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involvement with the government shows that even those with allegiances elsewhere 
attempted to gain favour with the crown during periods of peace and Jacobite inactivity.78 
 
Occasionally, the defence of Scotland was considered sufficiently important to 
warrant a general survey, though they were usually in reaction to successful Jacobite 
actions in Scotland.  The succession of James Edward, a younger and more active man 
than his father, which brought hope to the Jacobite cause, and the ongoing War of the 
Spanish Succession, in which Louis XIV could back a Jacobite invasion to distract 
British forces from the continental campaign, led to the commission of a military survey 
in 1703.  Similarly, the unsuccessful Franco-Jacobite invasion attempt of 1708 triggered 
another military survey under Anne and another was conducted after the 1719 invasion 
and brief rebellion.79  Including the survey conducted in 1724, mentioned later, the 
government commissioned four military surveys in twenty-one years, suggesting a high 
interest in the defence of Scotland.  However, of these, nothing recommended by the 
1703 survey had been realised at Anne’s death and the 1719 survey had limited practical 
effect on Scotland as interest in implementing it lessened once the threat of the invasion 
ended.80  This low level of London’s interest was due to many reasons; disinterest in 
domestic military affairs, distractions from abroad, the Tory focus on ‘blue water policy’ 
and a dislike of spending money on the army – both for the survey and to implement its 
recommendations.  However, in 1724 General Wade was dispatched to Scotland to 
                                                 
78 TNA SP54/7/90, Report from the Earl of Glencarn to unknown, 29th August 1715; Burton, Lives of 
Simon Lord Lovat, p.179-80 and W.C. Mackenzie, Simon Fraser, Lord Lovat.  His Life and Times 
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conduct a survey into Scotland’s defences in a rare example of action triggered by 
another source than a Jacobite attack.  The trigger on this occasion was a combination of 
George I’s greater interest in military matters and the submission of Lovat’s Memorial 
concerning the State of the Highlands, which warned of the lack of military provision to 
counter disaffected clans.  On the basis on Wade’s reported findings from his survey, he 
was made Commander-in-Chief of the Forces in North Britain, given £10,000 (Sterling) 
and commissioned to complete a two-year programme of rebuilding, repairs and 
improvements to Scotland’s fortifications, which were to have a significant impact on the 
British army’s presence there.81 
 
The majority of repairs, improvements and re-building were also triggered by 
Jacobite activity.  Improvements were ordered to Edinburgh and Stirling castles and Fort 
William on the basis of the 1708 survey, where the wooden huts built in 1690 were 
finally replaced with stone structures.  However, building speed slowed considerably 
once the invasion threat had passed.82  It was the size and near success of the ’15 
rebellion, the ease of Jacobite recruitment and public support for them, that finally 
shocked the government into greater action.83  A desire to improve the army’s response 
to a rebellion was combined with the slowly changing attitude to standing armies after the 
victories of the War of the Spanish Succession.  This helped improve soldiers’ reputation 
and meant that, as well as additional barracks being built at Inverness and Berwick, 
                                                 
81 Taylor, The Military Roads, p.18-9.  Additionally, Wade re-established the Independent Highland 
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82 Tabraham and Grove, Fortress Scotland, p.46, 50. 
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purpose-built barracks were ordered for the first time on mainland Britain.84  Ruthven, 
Bernera, Kiliwhimen and Inversnaid were commissioned in 1717 as a direct result of the 
’15 rebellion to provide a base in the Highlands that would allow quicker deployment of 
troops during times of trouble and to better police the rebellious element of the Scottish 
population. 
 
The Spanish-backed invasion attempt of 1719 again turned the government’s 
attention to Scotland’s defence.  However, the defeat of the Jacobites at Glenshiel in June 
immediately lessened this, and the only effect was the symbolically significant removal 
of the last vestiges of the royal chambers in Edinburgh Castle and their conversion for 
use as barracks and magazines.85  Unusually, the government was prepared to act 
decisively and extensively when it received Lovat’s Memorial in 1724 because of a fear 
that the increased tension felt in the Highlands in the 1720s was a pre-cursor to another 
rebellion.86  Consequently, the works done under Wade were on a larger scale and more 
expensive than ever before.   Evidently happy with the defensive capabilities of Scotland 
following Wade’s building scheme, very little building work was done until the ’45.  
However, shock and embarrassment that Fort George, Fort Augustus, Ruthven, 
Inversnaid, Kiliwhimen and Bernera could fall to “Barbarians”87 and “Highland 
                                                 
84 J. Breuilly, Nationalism and the State (Manchester, 1993).  Especially Chapter Three, ‘Prelude to 
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85 MacIvor, Edinburgh Castle, p.92. 
86 Taylor, The Military Roads, p.16. 
87 A quote from NRA 3246 f32, in Letter Book vol.35 1746-55, David Watson to Robert Dundas, 1st June 
1746 in R. Hewitt, Map of a Nation.  A Biography of the Ordnance Survey (London, 2010), p.10. 
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Banditti”88 again triggered a survey under the authority of the Earl of Albermarle, 
Commander-in-Chief of the Forces in North Britain after Cumberland’s departure in July 
1746.89  Repairs and improvements were made elsewhere, such as the barrack block built 
at Edinburgh Castle in 1755.  However, the increasing size of the British army and a 
growing tolerance of standing armies allowed the creation of a true statement of military 
presence and administrative control in Fort George at Ardersier.90  Even there, where the 
full principles of Vauban-inspired design were used, the threat, in 1759, of a Franco-
Jacobite invasion caused London to deploy an additional artillery company to Ardersier.  
This scare also prompted General Skinner, Chief Engineer in North Britain, to re-assess 
the fort’s defensibility from the sea.91 
 
Whether castle, fort or purpose-built barrack, a major role of fortifications in 
Scotland was to quarter soldiers, both as a permanent garrison and temporarily in times of 
trouble.  The fortified barracks’ sole purpose was barracking, space only being provided 
for activities that would make them self-sufficient in an emergency, such as bake and 
brew houses.  The few additions to Stirling Castle in 1708 and 1715 were all aimed at 
increasing its capacity.92 Inverness Castle’s barracks commissioned in 1716 were 
designed to hold an additional 500 men93 while £7,000 (Sterling) was spent on improving 
                                                 
88 J. Ray, A complete history of the rebellion, from its first rise, in 1745, to its total suppression at the 
glorious battle of Culloden, in April, 1746.  By James Ray, of Whitehaven, a Volunteer under His Royal 
Highness the D. of Cumberland (Bristol, 1752), p.382. 
89 Prebble, Culloden, p.219.   
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91 A. Murdoch, ‘The People Above’.  Politics and Administration in Mid-Eighteenth-Century Scotland 
(Edinburgh, 1980), p.90-1; Tabraham and Grove, Fortress Scotland, p.97; Donet, British Barracks, p.43. 
92 TNA SP54/10/18A, Argyll to Townsend, Camp at Stirling, 4th November 1715; SP54/10/18B, List 
entitled ‘At the Duke of Argylls arrivall at Stirling, 18th September 1715, encamped…’ and Tabraham and 
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Edinburgh Castle’s ability to quarter men during emergencies between 1727 and 1728.94  
This desire continued despite the apparent defeat of the Jacobites in 1746, resulting in 
another accommodation block at Edinburgh Castle in 1755.95  To ensure an effective 
presence of men needed for policing and responding to disaffection, Berwick, the four 
fortified barracks and the Great Glen forts were indispensable as secure accommodation.  
Demand was such that, despite the addition of barracks at Berwick that could house 600 
men and thirty-six officers in 1717, and another for a further 600 men in 1721, they were 
almost immediately over crowded; hence the addition of the ‘Clock Block’ in 1740, as 
well as the use of a nearby house as a hospital, to free space in the main barracks for 
more men.96  These alterations were fortuitously timed, as Berwick was soon under 
pressure as a staging post, as Hanoverian troops were mobilized and transported to 
Scotland to counter the ’45.   
 
Stirling and Inverness castles were important bases for administration and military 
co-ordination.  Their position, guarding the entrance to the Highlands, allowed them to 
assist the British army in monitoring and policing the Highlands.  In 1691, for example, 
troops were deployed from Inverness to prevent religious violence when Episcopalians 
attempted to bar the entry of Presbyterian ministers to their churches.97  Indeed, in 1719, 
William Gordon, Lord Strathnaver, son of the 16th Earl of Sutherland, experienced the 
same advantage of fast and ready deployment when he rode out from Inverness to help 
                                                 
94 Taylor, The Military Roads, p.21. 
95 Ross, Scottish Castles, p.165 and Tabraham and Grove, Fortress Scotland, p.106. 
96 Houlding, Fit for Service, p.40 and Tabraham and D. Grove, Fortress Scotland, p.59, 61. 
97 MacIntoch, A History of Inverness, p.115. 
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defend the Highlands against the Spanish-backed invasion fleet.98  The garrison at 
Inverness Castle also served to monitor the dubious loyalty of Inverness town.  This 
‘capital of the Highlands’ did not always favour the government in the south.  The 
proclamation of the Hanoverian succession was jeered in the streets, and when those who 
celebrated it put candles in their windows, the local magistrates encouraged them to be 
broken.99  In a similar vein, Fort William was tasked to police the surrounding disaffected 
area, providing a base of operations.  It was from here that troops were deployed to take 
part in the Glencoe Massacre on 13th February 1692.100  Twenty-two years later, in 1714, 
the garrison of Fort William included forty-eight men stationed on Mull to watch the 
MacLeans, a detachment at Eilean Donan Castle to watch the Mackenzies, and another 
barracked at Invergarry Castle to watch the MacDonalds.101  The creation of the four 
fortified barracks following the ’15 was also to provide self-contained outposts that could 
afford the government troops a quicker, more localised response to unrest.  Fort William, 
co-ordinating with Blair Castle, Ruthven, Bernera and Inversnaid, became a key base 
from which the Independent Highland Companies could direct disarming the Highlanders 
according to the Disarming Acts following the ’15 and ‘45.102   
 
Fort Augustus’s capacity to house soldiers and supplies, and its location in the 
centre of the Great Glen, aided the British army as a forward operating base, easing 
communications, transport and deployment times.  These factors were important enough 
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that the ruinous state of the fort after the ’45 was of little consequence, and it still 
functioned as the army’s headquarters from which Cumberland organised the hunt for 
rebels still under arms.103  Similarly, the location of Fort George, and the castle and 
citadel in Inverness, with access to the sea via the River Ness for re-supply, 
reinforcement or retreat, provided an ideal base for the Hanoverian forces.  The value of 
Fort George’s location was demonstrated in its use by General Sir John Cope’s army in 
late August 1745, when Cope decided to return to Edinburgh rather than face the Jacobite 
army at Corrieyairack Pass and so retreated to Fort George in order to return by ship.104  
The appointment of Major Caulfeild as lieutenant-governor of Fort George at Ardersier in 
1747 suggests that the fort was intended to provide the dual purpose of both barracks and 
an administrative base for the ongoing road and bridge building schemes.105   
 
The larger forts and castles also became prisons as the need demanded.  After the 
Jacobite invasion attempts and rebellions of 1708, the ’15 and ’45, many of the captured 
Jacobite leaders and men were held in Edinburgh and Stirling castles.  Edinburgh 
continued to hold Jacobite suspects until 1753.106  In 1715 and 1716, the 261 prisoners 
held at Edinburgh were a great financial burden on the castle, its officers even 
contributing to their upkeep.  Mar still took the opportunity to complain to Argyll in 
October 1715 about the condition gentlemen prisoners were kept in and to offer to pay 
                                                 
103 Prebble, Culloden, p.182. 
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105 Taylor, The Military Roads, p.24. 
106 MacIvor, Edinburgh Castle, p.89, 92, 96; TNA SP54/3/10, Report from Richard Dowdeswell, Excise 
Officer, Edinburgh, 30th March 1708; SP54/3/12, Richard Dowdeswell to unknown [addressed to 
Whitehall], 6th April 1708; SP54/3/16, Richard Dowdeswell to unknown, 24th April 1708; SP54/3/21, 
Richard Dowdeswell to George Tilson, 8th May 1708; SP54/11/168C, Petition from fourteen men held 
prisoner in Edinburgh and Stirling Castles [1716]; SP54/8/113, James Cockburne to Mr Pringle, Camp at 
Stirling, 28th September 1715; SP54/26/50, William Sn[illegible] to John Brown, undated [1745] and 
SP54/27/9, General Hawley to unknown, Edinburgh, 7th January 1745/6. 
 282 
for their maintenance.107  Though not strictly allowed until the mid-eighteenth century, 
Edinburgh Castle also held petty criminals when the city gaols were full.  In 1752, 
Lieutenant-Governor Richard Coren complained officers were forced to sleep two to a 
bed in order to make room for prisoners.108 
 
Military installations also fulfilled roles within the local community.  In 1690 
Colonel Hill was named tenant-in-chief with responsibility for managing the trade rights 
of Maryburgh, the town outside Fort William, as well as being governor of the fort, while 
the governor of Berwick was also the governor of the town in 1700.109  On the one hand, 
this allowed for greater integration of a garrison into local life, but on the other, it could 
be resented.  Colonel Hill, for example, faced local opposition over the appointment, 
which was traditionally awarded to local gentry.110  In a similar manner, Colonel 
Blackader, was JP for Stirling town as well as lieutenant-governor of Stirling Castle 
between 1719 and 1729, a dual role that allowed him to take responsibility for the moral 
welfare of both his soldiers and the local community.111  The simultaneous appointment 
of Major Caulfeild as deputy-governor of Inverness Castle and JP of all areas covered by 
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the Disarming Act of 1724 suggests a clear agenda to ensure military personnel would 
have some control over the application of militarily significant legislation.112 
 
According to official records of pay, Edinburgh and Stirling castles’ garrison staff 
in 1708 consisted of the governor was supported by a deputy, major, surgeon, chaplain, 
storekeeper and his deputy, master gunner, gunsmith and around six gunners (three at 
Stirling), two lieutenants, two ensigns, five sergeants (six at Stirling), six corporals (eight 
at Stirling), four drummers, two porters and around 200 men.113   
 
These numbers fluctuated during times of action, which, in the eighteenth century 
was to counter Jacobite activity.  During the ’15, re-allocation of manpower left 
Edinburgh’s garrison strength at twenty, while, in the same month, the government forces 
encampment at Stirling added three regiments of foot, two regiments of dragoons and two 
regiments of fusiliers to their strength.114  However by 1745, the permanent cadre of 
officers and other ranks at Edinburgh of ensigns, sergeants, corporals and drummers had 
been reduced by approximately half, a pattern continued in 1746 with the loss of two 
lieutenants and two sergeants.  More significantly, the number of gunners had been 
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reduced by three and the soldiers only numbered 100.115  Stirling too lost one ensign, two 
sergeants, and half its corporals, drummers and sentinels.116 
 
The Great Glen forts had similar complements of garrison staff officers to each 
other: deputy governor, a chaplain, a surgeon and surgeon’s mate, a marshal, storekeeper, 
master gunner and two gunners and two matrosses.117  All were allotted money for fire, 
candles, blankets and coverings, in line with the fortifications throughout Britain and the 
colonies.  Fort William’s governor between 1733 and 1748 was also governor of Forts 
Augustus and George, while its surgeon also treated those stationed at the four fortified 
garrisons.  Additionally, Fort William possessed a smith, a wright and their respective 
servants.  Forts William and Augustus also had funds for a frigate, or “Galley”, and boats 
for use on the lochs and rivers nearby.118 
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In addition to the permanent cadre of garrison staff, soldiers were also barracked 
within these fortifications.  In 1701 and 1715, Fort William contained two regiments.119  
Fort Augustus contained five companies of 300 men.120  In 1727, Fort George could 
house six companies totalling around 1,000 soldiers.121  One explanation for the 
surprisingly large number of men expected to barrack within such fortifications, is that 
the number represents those allocated to the administration of that garrison, not those 
required to sleep within it.  In 1704, detachments from Fort William were billeted at 
outposts and with local gentry, while in 1729 both Kiliwhimen and Fort Augustus were 
used simultaneously, even after the latter’s construction, as also occurred at the citadel 
and Fort George in Inverness between 1745 and 1746.122  Fort George at Ardersier 
considerably increased the local military presence with a capacity for two regiments of 
foot of 1,600 men, plus gunners (permanent and transitory), staff and fort officials.123 
 
Berwick, a structure of similar size to a fort, had a similar staff.  In 1700 this 
included a governor, a lieutenant-governor, a town major and a town adjutant, one master 
gunner and three gunners.  The garrison also benefited from a surgeon, a chaplain, a 
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turnkey and a storekeeper.124  Between 1700 and 1740 the military presence at Berwick 
grew from one company, including a lieutenant, one ensign, two sergeants, three 
corporals, one drummer and fifty soldiers, to the equivalent of two regiments.125  The 
barracks added to Berwick in 1717, 1721 and 1740 reflected the changing size and 
increased use of the army domestically.  The four fortified barracks also reflected this 
trend.  They slept a total of 840 soldiers; 120 men each at Inversnaid and Ruthven, 240 
men at Bernera and 360 men at Kiliwhimen.126  However, each also suffered periods of 
overcrowding and, conversely, periods when they were insufficiently manned.  This, as 
Wade had predicted, left them vulnerable during the ’45.127  Inversnaid, Kiliwhimen and 
Ruthven all fell to the Jacobites.128  When Ruthven fell to its second Jacobite siege on 9th 
February 1746 the garrison consisted of Sergeant Molloy, one corporal and twelve 
privates.129   
 
Road building 
Prior to the construction of the military road network of the eighteenth century, 
roads in Scotland were either drovers’ routes or medieval tracks that existed primarily in 
the Lowlands.130  A 1669 Act attempted to improve the road system, but with mixed 
success. Commissioners of Supply were permitted to tax landowners and could order 
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local tenants to give six days work per year for road and bridge maintenance.  However, 
success relied on the cooperation of the local community, most of whom were reluctant if 
they derived no personal gain from the work.131  Another option was to apply to the 
General Officer Commanding for the use of soldiers as labourers, a policy that was 
widely adopted in the eighteenth century.132  
 
In July 1724, the government sent Major-General George Wade to Scotland to 
report on its loyalty and defensibility.  This was in reaction to the Jacobite risings of 1715 
and 1719, the boost given to the Jacobite cause at the birth of two male heirs to James 
Stuart in the 1720s, and the arrival of Lord Lovat’s 1724 Memorial warning of the 
Highlands’ lawlessness.  In December 1724 Wade confirmed the government’s fears and 
recommended the building of fortifications and the re-establishment of the Independent 
Highland Companies for policing duties.133  He also mentioned “the great Disadvantages 
Regular Troops are under when they engage with those who Inhabit Mountainous 
Situations…The Highlands of Scotland are still more impracticable from the want of 
Roads and Bridges.”134  Wade was made Commander-in-Chief, a post he held from 1724 
to 1740, on the basis of this report, and his background witnessing the problems of 
transportation in the hilly landscape of Minorca during a deployment in 1708.135  Wade 
was joined by Major William Caulfeild in 1732, after he requested in 1725 that “a sum be 
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provided annually for making the roads of communication; and a salary for the person 
employed as Inspector for carrying on so necessary work.”136  It is another measure of 
London’s inconsistent interest in Scotland that it took seven years for Wade’s request for 
an inspector to be fulfilled.  Caulfeild remained Inspector of Roads from 1732 to his 
death in 1767, firstly assisting Wade in the road-making process and then replacing him 
from 1740 to 1767 when Wade left Scotland.137 
 
The usual pattern of road building followed the seasons; mapping and planning 
occurred during the summer, with building occurring between April and October when 
the weather was most suitable.  Roads were built to a standard design of sixteen feet 
wide, though this varied according to geographical circumstance, and as straight as 
possible.  Therefore, like the Romans – a fact not lost on classically educated officers – 
roads ran over mountains rather than diverting around them.  A foundation layer of larger 
stones (with a timber underlay, if the area was marshy) was then covered by a layer of 
smaller stones and a final top layer of larger stones and gravel around two feet thick.  
These were then beaten down by hand and by the wagons transporting material to the 
next stage of the road.138 
 
As civilians remained reluctant to lose time from their employment to build roads, 
the usual practice was to use soldiers.  At Wade’s insistence, soldiers received double pay 
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for this, as a reward for the extra duty.139  Additionally, on completion of a road, soldiers 
were rewarded with “bonfires, roasts and good beverages.”140  Around 500 men were 
used per season, living in huts, encampments or, especially in the south-west where 
cooperation was greater, in billets in the local area.141  Materials, wagons and horses 
could be ‘impressed’ from the local people, though this was a power in principle that 
could not be used to its full as the army was dependent on the good will of the local 
communities for billeting, tax for maintenance of roads and for occasional labour.  Raw 
materials were often taken from the locality, landowners providing little objection to this 
until the nineteenth century.142  In fact, repairs to Fort William in 1715 were speeded up 
because the Ordnance Office engineers could help themselves to stone from nearby 
quarries.143  Each work party was issued with shovels, pickaxes, spades, iron crowbars 
and powder to blow up larger boulders.144  As little trouble was expected, they were not 
issued with much ammunition.  However this occasionally left soldiers vulnerable.  On 
1st September 1745 it was reported that rebels “have this last night seised and Made 
Prisoners all the Men Who Were Working upon the Roads here [near Inversnaid and 
Dumbarton Castle] About 19 of them within a few Miles of this House.”145   
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The Great Glen road was the first to be built, linking Fort William to Fort 
Augustus in 1725, which was then extended to Inverness in 1726.  The road from 
Dunkeld to Inverness followed between 1727 and 1730, then from Crieff to 
Dalnacardoch in 1730 and 1731, which linked Stirling and Inverness.  From 1731 to 1732 
Fort Augustus and Dalwhinnie were linked, as were Catcleugh and Ruthven between 
1725 and 1732.146  No new roads were intended after 1736, only continuous repairs and 
improvements.  As the first road to be built and therefore the pilot for the project, the 
Great Glen road was in need of repair within six years of construction.  This was quite a 
success given the harsh climate and weather of the Highlands.  Repairs to the Stirling to 
Crieff road occurred between 1740 and 1745 and a new road was started between 
Dumbarton to Inveraray.  This was not finished until 1750, possibly as it was of lesser 
importance as it lacked serious military significance.  As General Bland complained to 
Caulfeild in September 1749 “…I have great reason to believe the Ministry will soon 
grow tired of them [roads], Particularly the Inverara Road, which is of no other use to the 
Country but for the Ease of a certain great man [Islay]”.147 
 
In reaction to the ’45, the road network was extended.  Three new roads were 
built linking Dumbarton to the Western Isles, Stirling to Fort William and from the site of 
the future Fort George at Ardersier to Blairgowrie.  An order of 1748 commanded that all 
regiments at Stirling and Edinburgh except Guise’s were to be used in road building.  A 
year later, 1,350 soldiers were ordered to work on building roads; 300 each from Guise’s, 
the Royal Welch Fusiliers, Pultney’s, Sackville’s and 150 from Ancrum’s.  In addition, 
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eighty men from various regiments were to be seconded for maintenance duty.  Six 
further roads were also authorised.  The first linked Coupar Angus to Fort George at 
Ardersier in 1750, while the second and third linking Dalmally to Bonawe and Tarbet to 
Crianlarich, were both begun in 1751.  Roads linking Bernera to Fort Augustus, and 
Inverary to Tyndrum were begun in 1755 and 1758, while the 1760s saw the addition of 
roads in Galloway.148  As the eighteenth century progressed, building procedure 
formalised.  Whether this was Caulfeild’s leadership or the effect of wider formalisation 
of army procedures and structures or both, by 1754 working parties had standing orders, 
and in 1751 orders were issued to ensure the other ranks remembered to salute officers 
when on road building duty.  A soldier’s primary role was never forgotten, however, as 
soldiers building Fort George at Ardersier in 1749 had orders to maintain drill practise 
two days of the week.149 
 
A remarkable network of roads was built during the eighteenth century 
considering the usual reluctance of the government to become financially or physically 
involved in Scotland unless forced by circumstance.  Between 1725 and 1732, Wade was 
responsible for between 243 and 258 miles of road, while 8-900 miles of road were built 
under Caulfeild’s command between 1732 and 1767.150  Wade’s main and original aim in 
building roads was to link militarily significant locations.151  The frequent letters 
justifying expenses reveal what Wade thought the government would like about roads: 
increased communications, the transportation of men and equipment and the 
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dissemination of commands and intelligence: essentially – how roads would help 
maintain crown control.152  This is also supported by the inscription on Wade’s 
showpiece, the Tay Bridge, built in 1733: “This with the Roads & other Military works 
for securing a safe & easy communication between the Highlands & trading Towns in the 
Low Country...”153  The importance of communications, especially if intelligence of rebel 
movements, was demonstrated when snowfall broke up road surfaces during the ‘15.  On 
two occasions, at great expense and to the detriment to the civil-military relationship, the 
solution, perhaps compelled by the ongoing rebellion, was to use local civilian labour: 
“they [the roads] may easily be rendred very passable by employing three or four hundred 
of the Country people to mend them”.154 
 
The government’s perception of the use of military roads as a method of control is 
also revealed by those who wished to ingratiate themselves with the government 
following different rebellions.155  The 3rd Earl of Breadalbane in 1746 focused on 
positions for future fortifications and roads, while the anonymous Memorandum 
conserning the Highlands 1746, began with the opening statement: “As the opening a 
Communication and rendering the access quick and easy through a Country full of 
disaffection and Barbarity is a principal step towards civilising them, some Roads would 
be proper which might in case of a Rebellion establish an easy and quick Communication 
                                                 
152 McCall, Routes, Roads, Regiments and Rebellions, p.20. 
153 NAS GD112/47/1/1, Inscription on Tay Bridge. 
154 TNA SP54/11/51, J. Jennings to Lord Townsend, [Perth], 24th January 1716; SP54/11/55, Cadogan to 
unknown, [Perth], 25th January 1716 and SP54/11/89, 2nd Duke of Argyll to Townsend, Dundee, 4th 
February 1716. 
155 McCall, Routes, Roads, Regiments and Rebellions, p.30 and Taylor, The Military Roads, p.15. 
 293 
to his majesty’s troops thro the several parts of that Country.”156  As the inscription on 
the Tay Bridge suggests, it was also widely acknowledged that better roads would assist 
trade and industry, which the government hoped would civilise the Highlands, especially 
after the ’45.  Scotland’s social elite were also aware of the benefit roads could bring to 
trade and industry on their estates, and, therefore, benefit their income.  In 1749, the 10th 
Earl of Rothes requested soldiers with road building experience to teach his tenants to lay 
roads to aid trade.157  Similarly, the anonymous Memorandum ended by saying: “It would 
be worth the government’s while to make Purchases in the more remote and disaffected 
parts of that Countrey purposely to people them in the above manner particularly along 
the Coast where so great advantage might arise to the nation for the Fishing Trade.”158  In 
the aftermath of the ’45, it was common for Scotland’ gentry to send memorials to the 
government suggesting ideas for fortification and road placements, partly from a genuine 
desire to help in the pacification of Scotland and partly to ingratiate themselves with the 
government.159  John Elphinstone, a military draughtsman from a notable Jacobite family, 
even went to the expense of creating a map for the new Commander-in-Chief, the Earl of 
Albermarle, in 1746, to demonstrate his loyalty and highlight his skills in the hope of 
patronage.160   
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An inadvertent outcome of the military roads was to make the Highlands in 
particular open to sightseers.  Huts built along the roads for storage or billeting were 
often later used as inns for early tourists and travellers.  Both the King’s House at 
Whitebridge (named for the bridge built in 1732 over the River Fechlin) on the military 
road between Fort Augustus and Inverness, and the King’s House near the south end of 
Loch Moy on the military road between Inverness and Ruthven, are early examples.161  
Sir William Burrell, who travelled Scotland in 1758, praised the higher quality of roads 
but found the King’s Houses of poor quality: “vile room, remarkable for nothing but its 
dirt and the antiquity of its furniture.”162 
 
The successes and failures of Scotland’s fortifications 
The military installations and road networks built in Scotland in the first half of 
the eighteenth century were invaluable for the improved access and speed of 
communications for the government and British army.  For example, though Cope’s army 
did not intercept the Jacobite army from July to September 1745, it was still able to move 
around the country with greater ease than thirty years previously.  Similarly, though most 
of the two companies of the Royal Scots ambushed on the road between Fort Augustus 
and Fort William on 16th August 1745 were captured, they were nevertheless marching at 
a good speed of 2.67 miles per hour before they were surprised.163  In the months 
following Culloden, Major-General Campbell of Mamore was able to use the network of 
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roads and fortifications to set up an elaborate network of outposts and supply depots from 
his base at Inverary.164 
 
The fortifications in Scotland also helped to create communities, which allowed 
for better civil-military relations.165  For example, in the spring of 1691 the governor of 
Fort William was awarded a royal charter to establish a neighbouring village to the fort, 
called Maryburgh.  This acted as a settlement for the soldiers’ families and for the army 
sutlers.166  These soldiers and their families often became integrated with the local 
population, especially at a time before rotation of deployment was standardised.167  The 
gravestones at Craigs Cemetery in Fort William demonstrate the presence of soldiers and 
their families throughout the eighteenth century.  “HERE LS THE BODY OF NELY 
BR[stone missing A?]YON SPS TO SARG MBEATH OF INVDS AT F WM HOW DEPD 
THIS LIFE 26 NOV 1784 AGED 53 YR.”168 
 
Garrisons also represented potentially major areas of demand for local tradesmen 
and building materials.  William Adams, Ordnance Office architect, and his three sons 
often employed local labourers.  Building Fort George at Ardersier required local men as 
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quarrymen, lumberjacks and as skilled and unskilled builders for the sixteen years of 
construction.  Local industry also benefited as iron work came from Edinburgh and nails, 
tools and lead from Inverness.169  Significantly, local communities were not required to 
pay for the building and upkeep of fortifications, unlike under the Protectorate when 
Edinburgh had to contribute a levy for building the citadels at Leith and Ayr.170  That is 
not to say that there was no expenditure.  In 1705, Berwick town had to wait twenty-six 
years to be repaid £3,000 (Sterling) for billeting and towns were often ‘taxed’ when 
occupied by armies, as they were during the ’15.171  Also, one key reason for re-locating 
Fort George to Ardersier was because the councilmen of Inverness wanted compensation 
for the loss of their harbour if a larger fort was built on the previous site.172  
 
As installations intended to prevent Jacobite uprisings and provide secure bases 
from which to operate as an army, the fortified barracks and forts showed mixed success 
when tested during the ’45.  On the one hand, the fortified barracks, designed to repel 
attack by traditional Highland raiding tactics, showed their success.  During the first 
attack on Ruthven in August 1745, the Jacobites attempted the traditional Highland 
raiding tactic of firing the door before storming through it.  Sergeant Molloy defended 
Ruthven using the design features added to the fortified barracks based on knowledge 
gained from the success of tower houses; he fired from the corner tower that provided 
enfilade covering fire.  Therefore, the defensive features of the fortified barracks were a 
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success providing the attackers’ tactics were in keeping with the anticipated mode of 
attack.173   
 
However, a more serious failure was the weakness of design and placement in the 
new forts built in Scotland revealed by the ease with which they fell during the ’45.  In 
the first half of the rebellion, the Jacobites manoeuvred undeterred by the network of 
forts and only turned their attention to them after the retreat from Derby, when, in a bid to 
ensure freedom of movement throughout Scotland, they took all the forts built since the 
Restoration except Fort William.174  Despite the advanced design and the great expense 
of its construction, Fort George could not withstand a siege, and surrendered after three 
days of siege once a mined wall collapsed on 21st February 1746.175  Fort Augustus fell 
after a three-day siege on 5th March 1746, when a coehorn mortar hit the fort’s powder 
magazine breaching the walls.  The governor was forced to surrender, as, on the arrival of 
the Jacobites, he had ordered the majority of the garrison into the old barracks at 
Kiliwhimen, which was quickly over-run.176  In both cases, failure was partly self-
induced; the former had been built on inappropriate ground, and the latter had placed its 
powder magazine in a bastion.177  The fortified garrisons also proved vulnerable to 
Jacobite attack.  This was because their design, which was intended to resist raids from 
lightly armed Highlanders, proved insufficient when the Jacobites were reinforced by 
French-supplied artillery and engineers.  Ruthven fell after one day of siege on 9th 
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February 1746; the newly promoted Lieutenant Molloy and his twelve men were 
outnumbered and out-gunned by the 300 strong force of Jacobites at Ruthven’s second 
siege.178  These losses were a heavy blow for the British army.  Despite the expense and 
desire to provide a statement of Hanoverian permanence and dominance in the 
Highlands, three major forts and two key fortified barracks were taken by the Jacobites 
within a month of each other. 
 
Fort William was remarkable as the only major new-build installation that did not 
fall to the Jacobites during the ’45.  The improved defences added under Wade’s 
administration, its better positioning, and the Jacobite army’s inability to sustain long-
term siege operations were all significant.  As occurred at the siege of Stirling Castle in 
January 1746, infighting, desertion and lack of artillery undermined the Jacobites.  
Finally, despite some success at Fort William, Charles Edward lost patience and recalled 
the Jacobite force to Inverness in preparation for an engagement that would become 
Culloden, a factor that also spared Blair Castle a long siege.179  
 
Besides failures of design and positioning, other self-inflicted failures were a 
consequence of the lethargic pace that the government departments of the Ordnance 
Office and army moved at.  Fear of attack from disaffected Highlanders and clashes over 
building design created such delays that the fortified barrack at Bernera was prevented 
from providing the forward operating base needed in the area controlled by the 
disaffected Mackenzie clan.  Therefore, when, in 1719, two years after Bernera was 
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commissioned, a Spanish-backed Jacobite invasion fleet landed at Eilean Donan Castle, 
twelve miles away by land from the site, building had only just started.  In this case the 
representation of power and presence the fortified barracks were intended to symbolise 
clearly backfired.180 
 
Additionally, the loose command structure of the eighteenth century British army 
and pluralism within the Ordnance Office directly created distractions and caused 
absenteeism amongst key officials.  Often inexperienced and overworked juniors were 
left doing jobs that required social leverage to do properly, which even their seniors’ 
positions did not automatically grant.181  For example, when Edinburgh Castle was found 
to be without provisions during the ’15, the blame was placed on a servant of the 
governor, the 1st Earl of Orkney, who was supposed to have stocked it, not on Orkney.182 
 
The presence of soldiers barracked in Scotland also caused friction with local 
communities.  Though no ‘hearts and minds’ strategy existed, and therefore did not 
technically fail, the military’s attitude is significant because of the delicate, internecine 
nature of the Jacobite period when most Scots were either already loyal or neutral and 
potentially ready to be won over.  Public billeting was common but strictly regulated 
after public disapproval of the expense and behaviour of soldiers.  Alexander MacDonald 
of Glengary, for example, was still owed in 1714, £3,542 (Scots) in losses and damages 
                                                 
180 D. Szechi, The Jacobites: Britain and Europe, 1688-1788 (Manchester, 1994), p.110 and Tabraham and 
Grove, Fortress Scotland, p.61-2. 
181 For further discussion about the importance of an individual’s personality and social standing, see 
Chapter Three: The Scottish Soldier and the State, and later in this chapter in sub-section ‘The 
communication of orders’.  Tomlinson, ‘Guns and Government’, p.46. 
182 TNA SP54/8/121, unknown (possibly Argyll or Islay) to unknown, 30th September 1715. 
 300 
caused by a detachment of the garrison from Fort William billeted on him in 1704.183  
The presence of the military within a community also caused disruption without any 
malicious intent as the priorities of military and civilian worlds collided.  In anticipation 
of a Jacobite siege in March 1746, the garrison at Fort William destroyed Maryburgh.  
Though the practice of maintaining an unobstructed glacis in order to deny a besieging 
army cover was considered standard, Fort William’s actions did nothing to aid civil-
military relations.184  Recent archaeological research has shown evidence for the burning 
and demolition of the buildings on ‘the Parade’, west of the fort.185 
 
Relations between the Ordnance Office officials and labourers were not always 
cordial, and as the Ordnance Office represented the government and army, while the 
labourers were often drawn from local Scotsmen, their relationship became representative 
of the civil-military relationship.  Labourers were paid weekly, but this depended on the 
availability of funds.  Though this was outside the Ordnance Office’s control, as budgets 
and expenses were set by Parliament with the Treasury’s approval, the late payment of 
wages was blamed on the Ordnance officials and the army in Scotland.186  Funding 
difficulties also hampered good relations between Ordnance Office officials and officers 
of the British army.  When, in August 1715, Fort William’s outer defences needed 
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repairing the governor was informed that the Ordnance Office had no money allocated 
“for carrying on any Works in North Britain.”187  Despite this lack of support, financial 
or moral, repairs must have continued because they were reported complete, if limited, in 
September.  Whether the labourers were paid from the governor’s pocket or worked 
without pay or were paid using the extraordinary fund available at times of rebellion, is 
unknown, but in the light of the recent Hanoverian Succession, and the increased threat of 
invasion, it is clear the priority was on making repairs, not on the protocol of correct 
channels or proceeding only when paid.188 
 
For the soldiers themselves, the fortifications of Scotland were effectively failures 
because of their notoriously poor living conditions.  The tented cities erected during the 
building stage and the leaking roofs and smoking chimneys of the fortified barracks 
undermined health, discipline and morale.189  The absence of pay, provisions and winter 
clothing, in combination with a harsh life under canvas while building Fort William in 
1690, is a case in point.  Disease and desertion reduced numbers and increased building 
work.  When rain undermined an earthwork, increasing the work load considerably, 
Grant’s regiment mutinied.  On 5th November 1690, they nailed up the touch holes of the 
cannon.190  The lack of a sick bay or communal cooking and eating areas in the fortified 
barracks, Berwick and the Great Glen forts, meant that all activities were carried out in 
the overcrowded bedrooms that measured 5.5 metres square.191  Morale, especially 
during the winter, must have been low, and easily explains why duty in Scotland was 
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very unpopular amongst the English and Lowland soldiers, and why a posting to 
Scotland, especially for non-Scots, was unpopular with the officers.192   
 
Fortifications as a measure of governmental interest in Scotland’s soldiers 
The Government’s level of interest in Scotland can be gauged through changes in 
barrack design.  The expected capacity per room, the availability of amenities and 
segregation by rank reveal much about the mentality, social norms and interest the 
Ordnance Office, and by extension, the government had in the soldier during the first half 
of the eighteenth century.  As the Ordnance Office and the government grew increasingly 
aware of the negative effect of uncomfortable and unhealthy quarters on morale and 
discipline, designs were altered, though in a fitful pattern that reinforces the spasmodic 
interest the government took in Scotland.  
 
Prior to the creation of purpose-built barracks, soldiers built themselves wooden 
huts seven or eight feet in length, wide enough to fit five camp beds.  These slept ten men 
when pre-existing castles and Cromwell’s citadels were filled to capacity.193  To avoid 
the expense of building, but to fulfil the desire for sufficient troops in existing 
fortifications, the unofficial policy was to house as many men in each room as possible.  
At Fort William in 1711, other ranks slept twelve men per room, while the barracks 
added to Berwick in 1717 were designed to accommodate 600 men and thirty-six officers 
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at eight men per room.194  The 1st Duke of Roxburghe (1680-1741) even boasted in 1718 
about the fortified barracks: “Your Grace will be pleased to observe that we have 
calculated five beds for ten men in so little room as can be well allowed.”195  In reality 
this only applied to Ruthven and Inversnaid, which each housed 120 men (assuming 
maximum sized companies of sixty men, as if at war).  Bernera and Kiliwhimen were 
intended to accommodate 240 and 360 men respectively.  As each had two barrack 
blocks of three floors with two rooms per floor, only Ruthven and Inversnaid held ten 
men per room.  Bernera had twenty per room and Kiliwhimen housed thirty.  The 
increased pressure on space is partially explained by the larger size of Bernera and 
Kiliwhimen, by the practise of half the soldiers of each room alternating guard duty with 
the other half, and the placing of detachments at outposts, such as the Independent 
Highland Company quartered at Drumden near Inverness in 1729.196  Their role as 
outposts, police bases and the first military response to disaffection was largely the 
reason for the government priority of military strength above soldiers’ comfort.  
Similarly, over-crowding could have been due to government pragmatism rather than 
disinterest in soldiers’ health and comfort.  The decision at Edinburgh Castle to make the 
Great Hall into six barrack rooms sleeping 310 men in 1737197 was probably motivated 
by a desire to fit the maximum number of soldiers into the minimum space prescribed by 
the capacity of a pre-existing castle.  At Ardersier, where greater design choice and 
budget were permitted, the men slept eight per room, suggesting the Ordnance Office had 
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a desire to ensure the comfort of soldiers when the opportunity allowed.198  Later 
barracks continue to show an interest in providing good quality soldiers’ 
accommodation199 and the awareness from the late seventeenth century that morale, a 
factor as important as tactics and improved technology to success, was greatly affected by 
the conditions of soldiers’ billets, suggests that the British army was always aware of the 
need for good accommodation, but was only in a position to provide it by the mid- and 
late-eighteenth centuries.200 
 
A greater concern for the quality of living conditions of soldiers during the first 
half of the eighteenth century is also shown by an institutional willingness to design and 
pay for different designs that added to comfort rather than military needs.  The barrack 
blocks commissioned for Berwick and the fortified barracks in 1717 had no mess rooms 
or communal spaces.  Cooking, eating, living and sleeping were carried out in the 
soldiers’ rooms, which were supplied with a table and chimney for that purpose.201  This 
was benignly done in the belief that this would encourage a sense of belonging and 
loyalty to the regiment, though the over crowded conditions proved detrimental to health 
and morale.  However, a significant development was that at the purpose-built 
fortifications the Ordnance Office replaced the usual slop buckets with latrines, even for 
the other ranks.202   
 
                                                 
198 Donet, British Barracks, p.44. 
199 FCA A/AAF/40/30/5/5(1), Estimate of requirements for the barracks at Leslie, c.1750 and 
A/AAF/40/30/5/5(2), Two receipts or estimates for barrack furniture and provisions, undated. 
200 J. Black, A Military Revolution?  Military Change and European Society 1550-1800 (London, 1991), 
p.10, 38. 
201 Tabraham and Grove, Fortress Scotland, p.58. 
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An additional architectural change whose only purpose was to aid comfort was 
the introduction of the corridor in fortification design.  Though later abandoned in favour 
of building Fort Augustus, the original designs for an extended Kiliwhimen in 1726 
featured a central corridor in each barrack block.203  Prior to this, rooms ran off each 
other affording little privacy.  Corridors were next employed at both other ranks’ and 
officers’ barrack blocks at Fort George at Ardersier, again suggesting that when given the 
space and finances, and in a later climate of acceptance of standing armies, the Ordnance 
Office was aware of and could facilitate the comfort of soldiers.204 
 
Unlike the conscious attempts to improve living conditions, the separation of 
officers and other ranks’ accommodation would have been natural and acceptable to all.  
This unwittingly tells us much about the social norms of the eighteenth century.  Barracks 
built at Berwick and Woolwich in 1716 position officers’ quarters at the end of blocks.205  
At the fortified barracks in 1717, separation of social order and military rank was 
extended past the placement of officers’ accommodation in the towers, to the separation 
of latrines.  Social deference to officers is also clear in their larger, better appointed 
rooms.  The officers’ rooms at Berwick were larger, with “subtly better architectural 
finishes” and only junior officers shared a room.206  At Fort George at Ardersier, three 
decades later, officers had two rooms each; a bedroom and an ante-chamber.207  This was 
in keeping with the rigid hierarchy of the eighteenth century, both within the army and 
society in general.  That the Ordnance Office went to some trouble to reinforce this social 
                                                 
203 Donet, British Barracks, p.21. 
204 Tabraham and Grove, Fortress Scotland, p.97 and Donet, British Barracks, p.44. 
205 Donet, British Barracks, p.13 and Hogg, The Royal Arsenal, I, p.154. 
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hierarchy in a military setting, from the smallest to largest of fortifications in Scotland, is 
indicative of the army’s understanding of social conventions and the high level of 
importance in which hierarchy was held.  
 
Scotland’s fortifications also reveal a great deal about the attitude of London 
towards the governance of Scotland between the Glorious Revolution and the end of the 
’45.  The date at which fortifications were built and repaired reflects patterns of 
government interest and the size and design of fortifications is indicative of the 
commitment the government was prepared to make to garrisoning Scotland.  Over the 
first half of the eighteenth century, investment in building new barracks and fortifications 
dramatically increased.  The four fortified barracks commissioned in 1717 cost £4,937 
10s 7d (Sterling).  By 1725, General Wade was given £10,000 (Sterling) for fortification 
and road building in 1725-6, and a further £50,000 (Sterling) for building Fort George in 
1726.  Minor repairs to Edinburgh Castle in 1727-8 cost £7,000 (Sterling) – already over 
double what was spent on the four fortified barracks a decade previously.208  The 
pinnacle came with Fort George at Ardersier, which finally cost £92,673 19s 1d 
(Sterling).209  This was twice the promised budget and more than Scotland’s annual 
GNP.210   
 
This trend is significant as it represents an evolution, in both public and political 
attitudes, away from the seventeenth and early eighteenth century’s fear of standing 
                                                 
208  Donet, British Barracks, p.20; Tabraham and Grove, Fortress Scotland, p.57, 76-7; MacIntoch, A 
History of Inverness, p.21. 
209 Tabraham and Grove, Fortress Scotland, p.95. 
210 Ibid, p.97 and Donet, British Barracks, p.44. 
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armies.  Consequently, despite plans for the improvement of fortifications and dockyard 
defences since the Restoration, little was acted upon until the Hanoverian succession; the 
Ordnance Office blamed “the little care the parliament has ever taken of them.”211  These 
political attitudes created a policy of reactive short-term building and repairs triggered by 
specific Jacobite unrest or rebellions.  Consequently, plans were frequently made then 
abandoned or delayed once a particular threat had dissipated.  None of the surveys or 
building works undertaken in Scotland throughout the period were pro-active; all were a 
reaction to a trigger from a source outside the government.   
 
The Whigs, however, had a greater interest in continental affairs, through their 
trade origins and support of the Dutch and Hanoverian interest.212  Unfortunately, this 
drew attention from Scotland to conflicts on the continent.  For example, the first 
Ordnance Office co-ordinated mapping project in Scotland created innovative, detailed 
and accurate maps between 1747 and 1755.  The fair copy was never completed however, 
as the outbreak of the Seven Years War re-ordered priorities.213  Even in times of peace, 
when work such as the fortifications and roads built under Wade could be prioritised, the 
traditional dislike of a standing army meant that the army was quickly reduced in size and 
budget.  In 1716, mere months after the leaders of the ’15 had fled Scotland for France, a 
Treasury-instigated investigation to reduce endemic corruption and costs reported that “a 
saving [was] to be made on guns because in our several forts, castles [and] fortifications... 
                                                 
211 Quoting a letter from the Ordnance Office, 14th November 1698 in Tomlinson, ‘The Ordnance Office 
and the King’s Forts, p.10. 
212 J. Black, Eighteenth-Century Britain, 1688-1783 (Basingstoke, 2001), p.99. 
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within our Kingdom of Great Britain [there] are much more than are necessary.”214  In 
consequence of this investigation, Stirling Castle lost two cannon and associated gunners, 
Edinburgh Castle lost ten, Berwick lost twenty-six, and Fort William lost thirty-eight.215  
The inconsistency of the government’s policy towards Scotland’s defence and military 
structures is highlighted by the contrast between the reduction of cannon and the 
Treasury approval of expenses for new barracks at Berwick, Tynemouth and the four 
fortified barracks, all of which occurred in 1717.   
 
The government’s low level of interest in Scotland, its fortifications and defence 
during peace and the consequent poor state of repair of most forts is also revealed by 
previously unexamined correspondence between Sir Robert Pollock, Governor of Fort 
William, and government officials in London.  Despite an Ordnance Office proposal to 
extend barracks at Fort William in early June 1715,216 Pollock was told on 21st June to 
find, and presumably, pay his own building agent and prepare his own construction 
proposal.217  However, on 20th August, Pollock learned that the Ordnance Office had no 
money for building in Scotland and it advised him to apply for money from the 
Treasury.218  At the outbreak of rebellion in early September, building work was 
officially postponed but, ironically, occurred anyway when a bastion collapsed on 5th 
November.219  This had to be removed and re-built, under conditions of civil uprising and 
poor weather.  Despite being separated from the necessary building materials, which were 
                                                 
214 Tabraham and Grove, Fortress Scotland, p.55-6. 
215 Edinburgh was reduced from fifty to forty, Berwick from seventy-six to fifty and Fort William from 
sixty-eight to thirty.  Ibid, p.56. 
216 NAS GD220/5/568/1, Sir Robert Pollock to Montrose, Fort William, 7th June 1715. 
217 NAS GD220/5/568/3, Montrose to Robert Pollock, Whitehall, 21st June 1715. 
218 TNA SP54/7/60A, Office of Ordnance to Townsend, 20th August 1715. 
219 Bastions were sections of fortification that project out to allow increased covering-fire.  See Glossary. 
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in Jacobite controlled areas, the rudimentary repairs were completed on 23rd 
December.220  On 6th December, Pollock was ordered by the Ordnance Office to review 
the fort’s state of repair, but when he discovered that royal permission to make repairs 
had not been given he had to ask Townsend to rectify the situation before building could 
begin.221  Additionally, by 28th December, Pollock had to ask to be reimbursed by the 
government for money spent on intelligence, the transport of water, coal, candles, 
bedding and boats to the fort, which he had been paying for in the eight months he had 
been in governor.  He also had to ask for reimbursement for 8-900 Bolls of meal and malt 
he had purchased to prevent his garrison starving during the rebellion.222  The 
government’s attitude that officers of both state and army should pay state expenses in 
the hope that the government would honour the debt was a common one.  A failure to pay 
the state’s expenses has been seen to suggest ‘a lack of zeal’ that was tantamount to 
Jacobitism and treason.  For example, when Montrose informed Pollock that the repairs 
Pollock regarded as essential to the defence of Fort William could not be afforded, he 
added: “However I have such a Confidence in your having the chief Command in those 
parts that I question not but your Zeal and vigilance will supply the weakness of your 
Garrison.”223  
                                                 
220 TNA SP54/10/23, Robert Pollock to unknown, Fort William, 5th November 1715; SP54/10/27 Robert 
Pollock to unknown, 7th November 1715; NAS GD220/5/472/51, Jo Stirling to unknown, Glasgow, 13th 
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unit of measurement used for grain.  See Glossary. 
223 NAS GD220/5/568/3, Montrose to [Robert Pollock], Fort William, 21st June 1715. 
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Fort George at Ardersier is notable for the huge investment it represented.  Its size 
and capacity, at 1,600 men, outstripped anything built before.224  The next largest and 
most recently built barrack in England was Fort Cumberland, the base at Portsmouth.  
Finished in 1747, it housed only 100 men.  The largest overseas barrack was Fort 
Townshend on the Newfoundland coast that housed 100 gunners and 300 soldiers when 
finished in 1780.225  Fort George at Ardersier was dramatically larger.  The incorporation 
of a brick vaulted powder magazine at Fort George at Ardersier demonstrated lessons 
learnt by the engineers of the Ordnance Office.  After the destruction of Fort Augustus in 
1746, Skinner designed the grand magazine at Ardersier to withstand a direct hit from a 
mortar bomb.226  Fort George at Ardersier was widely recognized by contemporaries as 
the finest defensive work of its age.227  In many ways this was because at Fort George at 
Ardersier, the government finally decided to invest enough funds to allow Skinner to 
follow the full principles of Vauban fortification to the letter, whereas Fort William, Fort 
Augustus and the original Fort George had only used the essence.228  Using the natural 
defence of sea to three sides, Skinner concentrated the bastioned trace on the narrow 
landward side.  When Sir William Burrell visited Fort George on his tour of Scotland in 
1758, he pronounced that “when perfected it is thought [it] will be the strongest [fort] in 
Britain.”229  Burrell’s visit is testament to the rarity and importance of the structure.  To 
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this day it remains the only fortification in Britain entirely constructed according to the 
principles of ‘trace italienne’ perfected by Vauban in seventeenth-century France.230 
 
The Ordnance Office 
The Ordnance Office, once authorised and funded to build, had the necessary 
powers to enable construction.  Crucially however, it could not instigate building.  It 
negotiated all contracts with contractors, and after 1667 could appoint the commissioners 
who oversaw the building work on site, rather than using overseers who were employed 
by the crown and so reported to the Secretary of State.  Control of commissioners 
remained inconsistent as many were employed by the Ordnance Office but were not its 
officers.  Those that acknowledged the authority of the Ordnance Office and reported to it 
regularly gave the Ordnance Office crucial control of building sites, contractors and 
labourers in Scotland.  This was necessary as building work was dependent on the 
quantity and quality of local labourers, especially as seasonal agricultural work 
overlapped with the best building weather, and tensions between contractors representing 
labourers and commissioners who worked for the Ordnance Office was common.231  In 
1681, for example, the local labourers working on the fort at Hull unsurprisingly 
suddenly refused to work for less than 10d (Sterling) a day on learning that the Governor 
of Hull had announced that his soldiers would not be used as labourers to compensate for 
shortages amongst manual labour due to those lost to seasonal agricultural work.232 
                                                 
230 Trace Italienne was the principle of star-shaped fortifications that used triangular bastions to provide 
maximum enfilade fire.  Along with Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban (1633-1707), Sir Bernard de Gomme 
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The process for the ordering of building or repairs to fortifications is revealing of 
the balance of power within the government and institutions of the British state in the 
early eighteenth century.  After the re-structuring within the Ordnance Office in 1716, 
when the civil branch took responsibility for fortifications, any request for building or 
repairs addressed to the Ordnance Office had to be submitted to the Privy Council, which 
then asked the Secretary of State to prepare a royal warrant.  This had to be approved and 
signed by both the crown and Secretary of State, before the latter returned it to the Privy 
Council which returned it to the Ordnance Office.  Additionally, the Ordnance Office had 
strict conventions regarding the language of warrants, the need for originals not copies 
and the number of signatures needed, before it accepted an order.233  This drawn out 
process could badly hinder the speed of decisions and actions.  However, though the 
Ordnance Office guarded its powers (for example, they refused to fire a salute at the 
Tower of London in 1702 when ordered by the Secretary of State as that privilege was 
reserved to the Master-General) it was not unprecedented for the Ordnance Office to 
ignore these conventions in times of emergency.234 
 
The procedure to authorise building could be accelerated by approaching the 
Secretary of State directly, who had personal access to the crown, so circumventing the 
Privy Council.  In this way, the Ordnance Office, through the Secretary of State, could 
have a direct line of communication to the crown.  This gave the Ordnance Office a 
limited influence over appointments and orders.  For example, in June 1715, the Duke of 
                                                 
233 Generally this was a minimum of six from the Privy Council and all or a majority from the Admiralty. 
234 Tomlinson, ‘Guns and Government’, p.26, 41. 
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Montrose, the Secretary of State for Scotland, could act as intermediary to George I and 
present a warrant to the Ordnance Office, when the governor of Fort William approached 
Montrose to obtain quick approval for emergency repairs.235  This direct line, however, 
was entirely dependent on the personal relationship between the Secretary of State and 
the crown, as well as the personal opinions and interest of the crown.236  The importance 
of personality and relationships meant the balance of power could alter with changes in 
occupancy of posts.  Though individuals with greater personal influence were able to 
enact policies more speedily and react more effectively to sudden events such as 
invasions, their ability to interfere also increased the inconsistency of policies.  A weaker 
personality allowed departments to settle into their traditional roles and lines of 
communications, creating stability.237  
 
Given the discrepancy of power and influence, and the weakness of official lines 
of communication in the face of strong individuals, completing any building project in 
Scotland was a complicated and slow matter.  The army and the Ordnance Office were 
hampered by their reliance on the Treasury for its approval of funds, on the Privy Council 
and Secretaries of State for access to the crown to get approval of policy ideas, and 
dependent on the personalities of the officials involved, as incompetence, disinterest or 
the complications of political factions could easily detract attention from an unpopular 
issue such as Scotland and a standing army.238  
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The members of the Ordnance Office who had direct contact with Scotland’s 
fortifications were generally junior officers, clerks, overseers and draughtsmen.  They, 
like the Secretaries of State, Treasurer, Admiralty and Ordnance Office, had variable 
levels of interest and knowledge of Scotland, factors which depended on the personalities 
of the individuals involved.  This was accentuated during periods of war, when “…care 
of fortifications was considered a low priority, as the prime responsibility of the Office 
was to provide munitions for the forces” and engineers were abroad attending artillery in 
the field.239  Consequently, when the Ordnance Office was asked to put the castles of 
Edinburgh and Stirling and the citadel of Inverlochy into a state of defence in 1708, the 
two remaining engineers in the Tower of London replied that their superiors, Colonel 
Richards and Colonel Romer, were embarking for the campaign in Spain and a prisoner 
in France respectively, and that they lacked the experience to do anything by 
themselves.240  Peace, however, encouraged lethargy towards Scottish issues and daily 
management was devolved to clerks.241  Fortunately for Scotland, the period of peace 
between the Treaty of Utrecht and the start of the War of the Austrian Succession 
allowed for most of the building work in Scotland.  The four fortified barracks, Wade’s 
survey and its suggested measures, including Forts Augustus and George and the 
majority of the road network, were built during this period. 
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After 1714, engineers were allocated responsibility for specific locations.242  
Theodore Drury, for example, was engineer at Stirling Castle in 1707.243  General 
Skinner, however, was an exception as, though he had responsibility for Fort George at 
Ardersier, he was also Chief Engineer in North Britain from 1746, Director of the Board 
of Ordnance from 1746 and Surveyor-General from 1757.244  Engineers were supported 
by draughtsmen, who aided them in their role designing new fortifications, and by 
overseers whose duty it was to visit sites daily and report back to the Ordnance Office.  
Not all overseers were Ordnance Office employees and so reports were often variable or 
non-existent.245  Consequently, anything from incompetence to corruption could be 
hidden from the Ordnance Office by distance.  Ordnance Office Surveyor, James Smith, 
ended his long career amidst accusations of inefficiency in 1719, while Captain Phillips, 
Engineer at Berwick, coincidentally built himself a house outside Berwick, probably 
from the 600,000 bricks ordered for barrack construction between 1717 and 1720.  Likely 
as a result of this, funding was insufficient to furnish the barracks at Berwick and 
plastering remained incomplete until the nineteenth century.246 
 
Architects were privately contracted by the Ordnance Office and often doubled as 
contractors who provided the materials and workforce, both skilled and unskilled.  In an 
environment of possible hostility where those constructing installations regarded as 
oppressive could find themselves the target for anger, a local connection between the 
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distant Ordnance Office and the local contractors must have reassured locally hired 
labourers and eased working relationships.  The kidnap of eight masons and quarrymen 
from the site of Inversnaid in August 1718 indicates that the precaution of building a 
guarded encampment before work began on any fortress, from Fort William in 1690 to 
Fort George at Ardersier in 1747, was not unwarranted.247  Civilians associated with the 
British army continued to come under attack from the mid-eighteenth century onwards, 
including the armed attack on Alexander Bryce, a map surveyor for the Ordnance Office 
in the early 1740s, and on John Russell, overseer of repairs at Inversnaid for the 
Ordnance Office in July 1747.248   
 
Conclusion 
The fortifications of Scotland reveal a great deal about the history of the army 
they were created to house and protect.  However, the reality was considerably more 
complex than the popular stereotype of a military occupation.  Admittedly, the 
fortifications and roads were intended to aid military suppression of discontent, were 
located with military strategy in mind and built by soldiers working for the Ordnance 
Office, a government department.  Additionally, building was triggered by military 
events or civil disorders and the primary purpose of every structure built, whether 
fortification, road or bridge, was military.  Even later actions such as the mapping project 
of 1747 to 1755 were intended to improve the government’s knowledge of Scotland’s 
geography for military purposes.  Some Scots clearly disapproved of such military 
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involvement in Scotland, as the attacks on the surveyor in the early 1740s, and on the 
labourers from Inversnaid in 1718 and 1747, attest.   
 
On the other hand, the administration of Scotland was often left to the official and 
unofficial government servants who were drawn from Scotland’s elites rather than 
dominating from London.  Additionally, road and bridge maintenance had been the 
responsibility of Scottish authorities since 1669 under the Commissioners of Supply, a 
power that grew stronger through the eighteenth century.  Scots also actively requested 
fortifications and roads, either suggesting possible placement for roads and fortifications 
to aid or ingratiate themselves with the government, or to gain access to aid trade from 
their lands.   
 
The history of Scotland’s fortifications in the first half of the eighteenth century is 
a microcosm of the state’s attitude towards governing Scotland.  The powers of the 
Ordnance Office were designed to control the building procedure once building had been 
authorised.  Authorisation could only be given by the crown, but could be influenced, to 
varying degrees, by the Secretaries of State, members of the Privy Council and Cabinet, 
Admiralty and Treasury.  Therefore, what fortifications were built and when is very 
revealing of the attention these officials gave towards Scotland.  The pattern of building, 
generally in the aftermath of a Jacobite rebellion, invasion or threat, demonstrates a 
reactive policy towards Scotland; only when Scotland represented a problem did it get the 
level of attention needed to achieve major building work.  The removal of cannon within 
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a year of a major rebellion is symptomatic of London’s attitude towards the governance 
of Scotland.  
 
It is clear that a disappearance of the Jacobite threat would have fundamentally 
changed London’s military policies in Scotland.  Without the real or perceived danger of 
Jacobite unrest, little money or attention would have been given to Scotland’s 
fortifications.  Though letters and memorials from members of the British army and 
Scotland’s elite show they were aware this reactive policy was militarily imprudent, the 
power balance in London and the communication structure that controlled the approval of 
warrants prevented any other policy.  Dependence on a series of government departments 
and posts for funding and official approval had the potential to slow or prevent building 
projects in Scotland.  At a time when the governmental structure was still forming its 
lines of communications and responsibilities, power-struggles between departments and 
personalities, often in matters far removed from Scotland or the army, ensured that the 
Ordnance Office and the army were rarely able to do more than follow the government’s 
knee-jerk reactions to Jacobite activity.   
 
When building was approved, however, the British army and the Ordnance Office 
could, and did, influence matters.  As the two bodies closest to the fortifications, they 
were able to utilise the shortcuts in the political system to affect what was built once it 
had been ordered.  Ordnance Office plans for the fortified barracks inspired by tower 
houses and the addition of star-trace enceinte to tower houses donated or bought by the 
British army demonstrates an awareness of Highland raiding tactics and adaptation to 
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local circumstances that is clearly military not political in origin.  They were able to adapt 
again with the creation of the Great Glen forts with the principles of ‘trace italienne’, 
though the effect was mixed as London’s control of budgets limited the extent of these 
designs, ultimately leaving the fortifications vulnerable to artillery attack.  It is highly 
significant, however, that by the end of the period, the Ordnance Office was able to 
design Fort George at Ardersier in keeping with the bastioned defence principles 
perfected by de Gomme, Coehorn and Vauban.  The increasing relaxation in attitude 
towards standing armies by mid-century is reflected in the Ordnance Office’s desire to 
address the comfort of soldiers with the addition of latrines, corridors and less crowded 
rooms.  London’s implicit endorsement of these alterations in their approval of the 
designs and budgets for building work demonstrates that the government was taking a 
greater interest in the comforts of its soldiers. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
A military study of Scotland during the first half of the eighteenth century must 
invariably pay particular attention to the Jacobite movement.  Many excellent overviews 
exist.1  Of an operational nature, Duffy and Szechi stand out,2 with the latter also 
providing valuable political and European contextualisation.3  This thesis acknowledges 
the British army’s response to the Jacobite threat, as a key agent of change in the British 
army in this period since it provided the greatest domestic challenge to Britain’s stability, 
but goes beyond an operational study restricted to campaigns and extends to examine the 
life and experiences of the Scottish officers and men in the British army.  This includes 
the army’s structural and infrastructural involvement in Scotland: its fortifications, 
barracks and roads.  Issues of governmental trust and loyalty in Scottish soldiers, and of 
those soldiers’ motivation and identity are also prominently featured, as the 
predominance of Scots in the Jacobite armies during the 1689-90, 1715-16, 1719 and 
1745-46 rebellions and the frequency that rebellions began on Scottish soil made being a 
Scot in British service a contentious matter. 
 
The rise of Scottish Nationalism in the 1970s, and the subsequent desire for 
Scottish independence, have brought into focus the socio-political changes caused by the 
Union.  The historiography pioneered by Phillipson and Mitchison, and furthered by 
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Murdoch and Harris,4 have significantly influenced this work so that the early 
governance of Scotland and the Scottish military and civil elites’ attempts to function 
within the structure of the new Great Britain is a theme featured in several chapters.  This 
thesis takes, as its effective point of departure, the Act of Union, which allows the 
impacts of the Union on the British army and, specifically, the Scottish element within 
that institution, to be highlighted.  Harris5 makes the link that military service was a way 
that Scots could contribute to the governance and preservation of the state, an idea 
furthered in the specifically military studies by Murdoch and Mackillop.6  Extending this 
idea, it is established in this thesis that military service allowed Scots to defend the 
Glorious Revolution, Protestant Succession and Act of Union.  However, unlike Murdoch 
and Mackillop, a broader view is taken here.  The recent tendency has been to focus 
specifically on the Highlander, a trend caused in part by the Scottish Nationalist desire to 
highlight everything distinctive about Scotland.7  The nineteenth century romanticisation 
of the Highlander rehabilitated the Jacobite rebel as a ‘noble savage’, made it natural that 
Scottish Nationalists would look to the Highlanders as the last group that attempted to 
end the Union by force.  This has forced the British army into the role of ‘the enemy’, its 
response to the Jacobite risings dominating studies of the British army in Scotland to the 
                                                 
4 N.T. Phillipson and R. Mitchison (eds), Scotland in the Age of Improvement.  Essays in Scottish History in 
the Eighteenth Century (Edinburgh, 1970); A. Murdoch, ‘The People Above’.  Politics and Administration 
in Mid-Eighteenth Century Scotland (Edinburgh, 1980); B. Harris, Politics and the Nation.  Britain in the 
Mid-Eighteenth Century (Oxford, 2002). 
5 Harris, Politics and the Nation. 
6 A. Mackillop, ‘More Fruitful Than The Soil’. Army, Empire and the Scottish Highlands, 1715-1815 (East 
Linton, 2000) and S. Murdoch and A. Mackillop (eds.), Fighting for Identity.  Scottish Military Experience 
c.1550-1900 (Leiden, Boston and Koln, 2002). 
7 Mackillop, ‘More Fruitful Than The Soil’ and Murdoch and Mackillop, Fighting for Identity and R. 
Clyde, From Rebel to Hero.  The Image of the Highlander, 1745-1830 (Scotland, 1995). 
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detriment of its other duties, for example as a police force and fortification builders.8  
The distinctiveness of the Highlander and government repression following Culloden has 
caused a recent preoccupation with Highland studies.9   As a corrective reaction to this, 
Scotland is considered here as a whole, to provide an inclusive study of Scottish 
involvement in the British army at a time of change shaped by the Union and the Jacobite 
rebellions.  To this end other forms of military service beyond that in Highland regiments 
are included: militias and fencibles, together with corporation and volunteer regiments.  
Individuals of Highland and Lowland background are studied to reveal similarities which 
prove that eighteenth-century Scottish gentlemen above and below the Highland Line had 
more in common with each other than is popularly suggested.  The history of 
mercenaries, individuals and regiments of both Highland and Lowland origin, from the 
pre-Union era, also demonstrated that both groups were working for the benefit of the 
state before the official creation of Great Britain, when Scotland and England were united 
only by the Union of Crowns. 
 
Unlike the traditional military studies of the British army of the period which are 
dominated by the continental wars of the eighteenth century,10 this thesis examines other 
influential individuals besides Marlborough.  It verifies that those who influenced policy 
in the army’s role in the governance of Scotland were more numerous and more Scottish 
                                                 
8 S. Reid, British Redcoat (Oxford, 1996) and S. Reid, Cumberland’s Army: the British Army at Culloden 
(Leigh-on-sea, 2006); S. Reid, 1745: a military history of the last Jacobite rising (Staplehurst, 2001); 
Duffy, The ’45 and Szechi, 1715. 
9 F. Adam, The Clans, Septs, and Regiments of the Scottish Highlands (London and Edinburgh, 1965), 
p.69, 70, 71; Clyde, From Rebel to Hero; Mackillop, ‘More Fruitful Than The Soil’ and Murdoch and 
Mackillop, Fighting for Identity. 
10 D. Chandler, ‘The Great Captain General, 1702-1714’ in D. Chandler and I. Beckett (eds), The Oxford 
History of the British Army (Oxford, 2003) and A.J. Guy, ‘The Army of the Georges, 1714-1783’ in D. 
Chandler and I. Beckett (eds), The Oxford History of the British Army (Oxford, 2003). 
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than the accepted view of the British army would suggest.  Similarly, while most studies 
of the British army as an institution are focused on England, with very rare mentions of 
Scotland,11 this thesis investigates the British army as an institution in developmental and 
compositional terms and with a close focus on Scotland.  Much of this work, therefore, 
focuses on the formation and command structure of the British army in the early 
eighteenth century.  It establishes the difficulties the army’s elite experienced dealing 
with London, and its attempts to overcome the challenges of mistrust and confusion 
which significantly impaired the government’s ability to respond to trouble.  The level of 
trust placed upon individual Scottish soldiers and regiments is a major aspect of this 
study. 
 
A comparatively neglected sector of the government and its interaction with the 
military in Scotland is the Office of Ordnance.  Though our knowledge of the department 
itself12 and architectural studies of the fortifications in Scotland13 have benefited from 
detailed and thorough studies, they have been studied in isolation.  Here, they are brought 
together to establish the role of the Ordnance Office in Scotland and its part in ordering, 
designing and constructing fortifications in Scotland and the mixed success it achieved in 
maintaining control from London.  The use of permanent barracks, the level of 
                                                 
11 A.J. Guy, Regimental Agency in the British Standing Army, 1715-1763: A Study of Georgian Military 
Administration (Manchester, 1980); J.W. Fortescue, History of the British Army.  First Part – to the close 
of the Seven Years War (London, 1910), 13 vols, I. 
12 O.F.G. Hogg, The Royal Arsenal.  Its Background, Origin, and Subsequent History (London, 1963), 2 
vols; H.C. Tomlinson, ‘Guns and Government.  The Ordnance Office under the later Stuarts’, The Royal 
Historical Society, 15, 1979; J. West, Gunpowder, Government and War in the Mid-Eighteenth Century 
(Suffolk, 1991). 
13 C. Tabraham and D. Grove, Fortress Scotland and the Jacobites (London, 1995); I. MacIvor, Edinburgh 
Castle (London, 1993); A. Saunders, Fortress Britain.  Artillery Fortification in the British Isles and 
Ireland (Liphook, 1989); C. Duffy, Fire & Stone.  The Science of Fortress Warfare, 1660-1860 (London, 
1996); J. Donet, British Barracks 1600-1914, Their Architecture and Role in Society (Norwich, 1998). 
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investment and the implications of designs that government was prepared to approve 
reflects the fluctuating level of interest the government had in Scotland and the soldiers 
stationed there.  
 
In the period after the Second World War, British military historians have 
generally been connected with the British army and a common interest in COIN has 
emerged influenced by the concerns of the post-war British army.  Consequently, the 
conduct of the British army in Scotland opposing Jacobites has come under scrutiny.14  
This thesis joins the debate with the results of a study of a wide range of sources 
providing a counter-argument to assumptions of military oppression during the first half 
of the eighteenth century.  The examination of the law and its application by government 
officials and the army, as well as trial transcripts and the outcome of disputes between 
soldiers and civilians have established that the introduction of the Mutiny Act in 1689 
and the Riot Act in 1715 limited the freedom of the army to the point of preventing it 
from fulfilling the tasks it was placed in Scotland to perform.  Similarly, an examination 
of the use of fortifications and its effect on the civil-military relationship has provided a 
more balanced view of Scottish reactions to a permanent military presence in Scotland. 
 
 Therefore, aware of the limitations and inspirations of the existing literature, this 
thesis addresses the British army in Scotland in the first half of the eighteenth century 
through five topics.  Chapter One: ‘Scotland’s Professional Soldiers’ establishes that 
Scots had been serving the state long before the Act of Union.  The Union of Crowns and 
                                                 
14 W.A. Speck, The Butcher.  The Duke of Cumberland and the suppression of the ’45 (Oxford, 1981) and 
J. Oates, Sweet William or The Butcher?  The Duke of Cumberland and the ’45 (Barnsley, 2008). 
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the internecine struggles of the Civil War, Restoration and Glorious Revolution ensured 
that Scottish regiments were utilised alongside English regiments before they were 
merged to form the British Establishment with the Act of Union in 1707.  Many Scottish 
regiments were raised and lent on a permanent basis to allied countries such as to France, 
under the ‘Auld Alliance’, and the United Provinces.  ‘Free-lance’ mercenaries as 
individuals and groups also sought service abroad.  Nevertheless, both groups were often 
motivated by a desire to aid religious and political allies, demonstrating a desire to 
protect the beliefs and principles of the Revolution Settlement that promised civil 
liberties and parliamentary checks on royal power. 
 
Some employing nations, such as the Swedes and the Dutch, made concessions in 
uniform, music and colours to attract Scottish recruits, and valued Scots for their morality 
and discipline.  In Britain, however, the disturbances caused by armed Highland retainers 
and Border reiving meant that Scots were viewed more warily.  To this, a distrust of their 
loyalty was added once Scotland became a focus of rebellions to reinstate the Stuarts.  
Therefore, in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the British people and 
government only slowly accepted the recruitment of Scots, and in particular, Highlanders.  
Thus, while the Scottish presence abroad during the Thirty Years War was substantial, it 
was not until the greater need for men in the frequent continental wars of the eighteenth 
century that the British began to seek Scots for their own army.  In addition, the legacy of 
the Civil War and the religious repression of Protestants in seventeenth-century Scotland 
ensured that the acceptance of a large standing army was slower in Britain than elsewhere 
in Europe. 
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Three Lowland regimental case studies are presented: the Royal Scots; the Scots 
Fusiliers and the Scots Greys.  It emerges that throughout their deployment, both time 
and the evidence of continuing excellent behaviour were needed for the government to 
overcome its wariness of Scottish loyalty.  By contrasting their experiences with that of 
the Independent Highland Companies, it is clear that nationality and Highland or 
Lowland origin impacted very significantly on both deployment and treatment.   
 
Chapter Two: ‘The Scottish Soldier’s Experience’ explores the wariness of the 
British public and politicians towards standing armies.  Recruitment, discipline, role and 
billeting practices of the eighteenth-century soldier are used to show the extent to which 
eighteenth-century soldiers deserved the reputation which had been earned by soldiers of 
previous centuries.  The government was sensitive to the public’s fear of standing armies.  
However, in Scotland the need to counter the Jacobite threat and potential invasions of its 
vast coastline meant that permanent barracks were a necessity.  These structures strained 
the civil-military relationship by placing often drunk and immoral soldiers near civilian 
communities but they also provided opportunities for the relationship to evolve and 
improve.  Fortification building brought employment, while their garrisons supported 
Scotland’s economy, encouraging new communities to appear and others to expand.  
Regulations controlled recruitment and assuaged the public’s fear of impressment and 
conscription.  Similarly, William III, George I and II’s desire for an increasingly 
professional army, and the changing tactics engendered by the ‘military revolution’, 
ensured that officers used both encouragement and coercion in training and maintaining 
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discipline.  This increased control was applied off, as well as on, the battlefield and 
contributed to improved civil-military relations.  However, tensions between civilians and 
the army continued well into the eighteenth century inflamed by the use of soldiers to 
assist civil authority, especially against smuggling and rioting.   
 
Chapter Three: ‘The Scottish Soldier and the British State’ re-examines in detail a 
selection of key individuals from the civil and military elite and establishes that the usual 
terms ‘rebel’ and ‘loyal’, created with hindsight and the strong influence of Whig 
historians, are an unhelpful simplification.  A comparison of soldiers’ early life and 
education, especially in the military, demonstrates that men who would fight each other 
during the Jacobite rebellions nevertheless shared a common background.  Early service 
as gentlemen-volunteers was common, as were their methods of gaining commissions 
and promotion.  Different terminology, therefore, was adopted to characterise individuals 
according to their attitude towards the government; such as ‘stalwarts’, ‘pragmatists’ and 
‘trimmers’. 
 
The inter-connected nature of society and the family links of the Scottish elites 
proves a key factor in explaining the motivations behind many Scottish events.  Loyal 
government officials, stalwarts of the government, sought pardons and leniency for 
rebels.  This occurred not from a sense of shared nationality but from an awareness that 
politics and favour could, and easily did change.  A degree of cordiality within the social 
elite, regardless of current events, needed to be maintained in case their situations were 
reversed in the future.  Scotland’s military and civil elite also knew that control of the 
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disaffected could be maintained more effectively through obligations to loyal friends and 
family which tapped into the pre-existing pervasive and binding honour-code of 
eighteenth-century gentlemen.  Though this characteristic of Scotland’s inter-woven 
society ensured peace after the ’15, it was regarded with suspicion by London, who saw 
only a conspiracy of Scots aiding fellow Scots, and prevented them from following a 
similar strategy after the ’45.  This attitude towards fellow Scots and London’s reaction 
to such behaviour also damaged the relationship between the government and their 
political and military servants in Scotland, imposing unnecessary complications and 
delays on the Scottish elite and hampering their ability to respond to Jacobite activities.  
The ambivalent behaviour of the ‘trimmers’ accentuated this suspicion and contributed 
not only to the difficulties experienced by loyal Scots, but also contributed to forcing 
many Scots into the Jacobite fold. 
 
A significant theme in Chapter Three is the motivation behind the choice of 
loyalties in a rebellion.  Issues such as religious principle, with its fundamental impact on 
the legitimacy of the Glorious Revolution and therefore Protestant Succession, are shown 
to be vitally important to many of Scotland’s military elite.  They were fully alert to the 
military implications of a threat to the constitution, and consequent balance of power 
between crown and parliament, should the Glorious Revolution be reversed.  Military 
service, therefore, provided a way for many Scots to ensure the continuation of the 
Protestant Succession and the principles of the Revolution Settlement in the form of the 
new British state. 
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Chapter Four: ‘Scotland’s Auxiliary Forces’ provides evidence that the desire to 
contribute to the security of the British state was not just the preserve of the social elite.  
The range of auxiliary formations created in Scotland to counter the Jacobite rebellions 
demonstrates that many from the lower orders, and many gentlemen unconnected to the 
British army, desired to take up arms in defence of Britain’s government, constitution and 
Protestant monarchs.  These auxiliary forces, most typically in the form of militias – 
though volunteer and corporation regiments were also common during rebellions – had 
mixed success.  The temporary nature of the militias meant they lacked the training, 
experience and confidence needed to face the Jacobite army, and this consequently made 
them unreliable.  However, when used as scouts, as garrisons or to guard baggage, their 
additional numbers were beneficial as they relieved regular soldiers for more difficult 
service.   
 
The militias’ inability to face the enemy and the Scottish civil authority’s legal 
confusion and subsequent delay in raising auxiliary forces were blamed by a government 
already suspicious of Scottish loyalties on sympathy for fellow Scots and latent 
Jacobitism.  However, as Chapter Four demonstrates, the confused nature of the 1662 and 
1663 Militia Acts, the absence of articles relating to the Scottish army or militias in the 
Union Treaty and the veto of the 1708 Scottish Militia Bill all ensured that even 
Scotland’s most senior legal advisors were unclear about who had the authority to raise 
and arm men.  Royal warrants, therefore, were deemed necessary when rebellions 
occurred but the process of their application and approval slowed official reactions in 
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Scotland.  This generated a hesitance that was viewed as border-line treachery, as the trial 
of the Provost of Edinburgh attests.   
 
Chapter Five: ‘Scotland’s Military Installations’ examines the construction of 
military structures and infrastructure in Scotland from the Union to the period following 
Culloden.  Their evident purpose was to support the military response to the Jacobites, 
and those involved in their construction were occasionally the objects of attack.  
Nevertheless, many Scots actively participated in their building and maintenance, and 
viewed roads as an aid to trade and industry.  The construction of permanent barracks and 
forts also represented a warming in British attitudes towards standing armies.  Their 
construction in Scotland was tolerated because the need for a military presence was acute 
and because Scotland, as the ‘barbarous north’, was far removed from the ‘civilised 
south’.  As such it provides a useful case study of the government’s changing attitude 
towards standing armies as represented by the increasing funding allowed for building 
work.  Similarly, the consequences of permanent barracks on the civil-military 
relationship are revealed; while tensions existed between civilians and the army, 
especially during times of rebellion, garrisons often provided an economic stimulus to 
communities.  It was not uncommon for soldiers to settle and build ties within Scottish 
society.   
 
The motivations for building, the designs adopted and the degree of fortifications 
are representative of the government’s interest in the governance of Scotland across the 
period from Union to mid-century.  It emerges that the threat or reality of rebellion, were 
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the chief causes for building or improving forts and roads.  Peace often brought 
stagnation to building work and the removal of what were then deemed unnecessarily 
expensive cannon.  This created a reactive rather than preventative attitude towards 
Scotland.  A study of the balance of power between the Crown, the Ordnance Office, the 
Treasury and the army shows that decisions to build and fund were made in London, with 
civil and military elites in Scotland rarely able to do more than petition and advise.  
However, what is also revealed is that, as time passed, the government, influenced by the 
army and Ordnance Office, began to recognise that less crowded barrack rooms and the 
addition of latrines and corridors would boost morale and health amongst its soldiers.  
Therefore the changes in barrack design reflect the government’s greater awareness of the 
comfort of its soldiers.  Still, it was not until Culloden and the desire to make a statement 
regarding the state’s military presence in Scotland that enough money was forthcoming to 
build an effective fort at Ardersier.   
 
 In summation, this thesis is an extension of Colley’s argument that a sense of 
‘Britishness’ was created by the common threat from France, by examining the relatively 
neglected case that the Jacobites also provided a common threat.  In so doing they acted 
as a unifier of nationalities and fostered the sense of ‘Britishness’, manifested by Scottish 
service in the British army.  This thesis is thus a response to Colley’s request when she 
stated that: “I have concentrated on civilian responses [to the growing idea of a British 
nationality], rather than attitudes in the armed forces, which desperately need separate 
and detailed attention.”15  Through the work summarised above, it has been shown that 
‘Britishness’ manifested itself in Scots seeking service in the British army, so that 
                                                 
15 L. Colley, Britons.  Forging the nation, 1707-1837 (London, 2003), p.7. 
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military service in the British army was a way for Scots to demonstrate support for the 
Glorious Revolution, Protestant Succession and Act of Union.  The number of Scots who 
gave long-term service to the British army, as well as short-term service with the many 
forms of auxiliary forces extant in Scotland in the first half of the eighteenth century 
speaks of the widespread desire to serve the British state and corrects the simplification 
of Highlanders as ‘noble savages’ and victims of the Union and Great Britain, as created 
by the influence of Scottish Nationalism on recent Scottish history because of a desire to 
use history to influence today’s politics.  What has been shown is that Scots across 
society and the country were politically aware and active, and viewed military service as 
an avenue to contribute to the safety, security and preservation of the British state and 
their own ambitions and interests.  
 
 The romanticisation and rehabilitation of the Highlander in the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries under the influence of Walter Scott, Stewart of Garth and 
Scottish Nationalism has vilified the British army because of its presence at Culloden 
provides a clear, if inaccurate, watershed in the history of clan culture and the Jacobites.  
Therefore, symbolically, both Highlanders and Jacobites, as the last force to oppose the 
Union, have been used by the SNP to promote independence.  However, it is argued here 
that the governance of Scotland was very much reliant on the support of Scotland’s civil 
and military elite and was not simply the product of an oppressive army imposing the will 
of London by force of arms.  The construction of Scotland’s fortifications and 
infrastructure would not have been possible without the assistance of Scottish 
government officials, labourers and architects working with the government, the army 
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and the Ordnance Office.  Similarly, policing duties that were rigidly controlled by newly 
created laws could not have been implemented without the cooperation of Scottish 
magistrates and JPs.  Indeed, what emerges is an internecine society where Scots of all 
social levels faced difficult decisions of loyalty that had serious and far-reaching 
consequences.  Religious principle, family ties, honour, money and pragmatism all had 
greater influence in the choice of loyalty than simple nationality.   
 
Finally, the impact of the Union in 1707, and the official creation of the British 
army on a joint British Establishment, have been shown to be less significant to the 
history of the British army than earlier events.  The legacy of royal power over both 
England and Scotland after the Union of Crowns in 1603 meant that at the Restoration, 
when a standing army rather than a ‘guards and garrison’ force was permitted for the first 
time, Charles II became the first monarch to command both Scottish and English 
Establishments in substantial numbers.  Consequently, prior to the Union, Scottish and 
English regiments deployed to the continent during the Seven Years War and War of 
Spanish Succession, were acting together, controlled by the same man – even if he acted 
through two parliaments.  It was at this stage, therefore, that the unofficial ‘British’ army 
– the Scottish and English regiments and their soldiers – developed in unison.  After the 
Glorious Revolution they experienced the difficulties of two countries and nationalities 
working together within a context of mistrust created by the apparently Scottish 
dominated Jacobites as they attempted to overthrow the government and the Protestant 
Succession.  Despite this, Scottish regiments continued to serve in the British army, as 
they had done prior to the Union and long before 1762 when Pitt the Elder claimed: “I 
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sought for merit wherever it could be found.  It is my boast that I was the first minister of 
the Crown who looked for it and found it in the mountains of the North.”16   
 
  
                                                 
16 J. Grant, Legends of the Black Watch: or forty-second Highlanders (London, 1859), p.iv and J. MacKay, 
The Reay Fencibles or Lord Reay’s Highlanders.  Compiled form documents supplied by the War Office; 
“Musgrave’s History of the Irish Rebellion of 1798”, “History of the House and clan of MacKay”, and 
other documents (Glasgow, 1890), p.12. 
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GLOSSARY 
 
Banquette – A fighting platform behind the parapet of a fortification. 
 
Bastion – A section of fortification that projects to allow increased covering-fire. 
 
Batardeau – Damns within a ditch surrounding a fortification. 
 
Boll – A unit of measurement used for grain. 
 
Broken-men – Men without clan affiliation, therefore often engaged in reiving. 
 
Chirurgeon – An alternate spelling of 'Surgeon', with the same pronunciation.  
 
Coronach – The wail or shriek of woman as a lamentation to accompany a funeral in the 
Scottish Highlands and Ireland. 
 
Dùthchas – The customary link between chiefs and their land that gave them 
responsibility for protecting and proportioning it. 
 
Écluse de chasse – The entry sluice for flooding a ditch of a fortification. 
 
Écluse de fuite – The exit sluice for flooding a ditch of a fortification. 
 
Enceinte – An enclosure or wall of a fortified place. 
 
Enfilade – The ability to fire along the length of a formation or position providing total 
covering-fire. 
 
Fiery cross – A partially burnt cross carried across the lands of a clan to rally its 
clansmen for military service for their chief. 
 
Glacis – A long slope surrounding a fortification outside its defences, kept bare to deny 
besiegers cover. 
 
Heritable Jurisdictions – The inherited judicial power of chiefs. 
 
Heritor – The gentry of the Scottish Highlands, whose lands are awarded from the chiefs 
in return for providing authority and services at a parish level. 
 
Matross – The rank below gunners in the artillery train charged with assisting the 
gunners in traversing, sponging, loading and firing the pieces, as well as guarding them.   
 
Postern or sally-port – A small door for sortie access from a fortification during sieges. 
 
Reiving – The act of raiding with the purpose of robbery, traditionally of cattle. 
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Representative Peer – The twelve Scottish peers annually elected to sit in the House of 
Lords after the Union of 1707.  Nominations were made by senior ministers appointed by 
the crown, who then gave final approval. 
 
Trace Italienne – The principle of star-shaped fortifications that used triangular bastions 
to provide maximum enfilade fire. 
 
Wapenshaw – The Old English name for a weapon-showing, where the state of weapons 
were inspected. 
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APPENDIX NO.1: MAP OF ‘NORTH BRITAIN’ DEPICTING THE ‘HIGHLAND LINE’, 
INCLUDING MAJOR TOWNS AND FORTIFICATIONS DISCUSSED IN THIS THESIS. 
 
  
APPENDIX NO.2: MAP OF ‘NORTH BRITAIN’ INCLUDING BATTLEFIELDS. 
 
 
1. 27th July 1689 –  
Battle of Killiecrankie 
 
2. 13th November 1715 –  
Battle of Sheriffmuir 
 
3. 10th June 1719 –  
Battle of Glenshiel 
4. 21st September 1745 –  
Battle of Prestonpans 
 
5. 17th January 1745 –  
Battle of Falkirk 
 
6. 16th April 1745 – 
Battle of Culloden 
APPENDIX NO.3: MONUMENT INSCRIPTION FOR 10th LORD LOVAT. 
 
 
TO THE MEMORY 
OF 
Lord Thomas Fraser of Lovat, who 
chose rather to undergoe the greatest 
Hardships of Fortune than to part with 
The ancient Honours of his house, 
And bore these hardships with an undaunted Fortitude of Mind. 
 
This monument erected 
by Simon Lord Fraser of Lovat his son, 
who likewise having undergone many and 
great vicissitudes of good and bad fortune 
Through the Malice of his Enemies, He, in the end, 
At the Head of his Clan, forced his way to his 
Paternal inheritance with his sword in his hand, 
And relieved his kindred and followers 
From oppression and slavery; 
And both at Home and in foreign Countries, 
By his eminent actions in the Warr and State, 
He has acquired great honour and reputation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D.W. Kemp (ed), Tours in Scotland, 1747, 1750, 1760 By Richard Pococke, Bishop of 
Meath, From the original Ms. And drawings in the British Museum (Edinburgh, 1887), 
p.179. 
 
APPENDIX NO.4: TRANSCRIPTION OF THE 1708 SCOTTISH MILITIA BILL 
ENTITLED ‘AN ACT FOR THE SETTLING THE MILITIA OF THAT PART OF GREAT 
BRITAIN CALLED SCOTLAND’. BL Hardwick Papers Add.MS.35891 f.242-6. 
 
An Act for settling the Militia of that Part of Great Brittain called Scotland. 
Where as the Militia of the severall Parts of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain were before the Union established in a different manner and it will be for the 
Strengthening and perfecting of the Happy Union that the Militia of the whole United 
Kingdom should be put on the same Establishment and Regulation Be it therefore 
Enacted by the Queens most Excellent Majesty by and with the advice and Consent 
of the Lords Spirituall and Temporall and Commons in this present Parliament 
assembled and by the authority of the same That the Militia of that Part of Great 
Britain called Scotland shall from hense forth be settled regulated and established 
in the same Manner and Form as the Militia of that part of Great Britain called 
England is now settled and regulated and established And that an Act of parliament 
Made in England in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Year of the Reign of the late King Charles 
the Second Instituted an Act for ordering the forces in the severall Counties of this 
Kingdom and all other Acts of parliament made in England for the settling or 
Ordering the Militia as far as they are now in force in England shall from and after 
the first Day of May in the Year of Our Lord One thousand Seven hundred and Eight 
extend to and be on Force throughout the whole Kingdom of Great Britain and that 
all Lawes to the contrary thereof or inconsistent therewith shall from thenceforth 
cease determine and become void And Whereas for furnishing Ammunition and  
other Necessaryes the respective Lieutenants and their Deputies in England have 
power by the Lawes now in Force there to rate the respective Counties and places not 
exceeding the whole in any one Year the proportion of a fourth part of one Months 
Assessment in each County after the Rate of Seventy thousand Pounds by the Month 
heretofore charged by an Act of parliament in England and the said respective Lieutenants 
and Deputies have power to dispose of so much of the said fourth part of the 
inferior officers for their Pains and Encouragement as to them the said Lieutenants 
and Deputies shall seem expedient And Whereas the said method of assessment 
was never used in Scotland Be it therefore Enacted That for furnishing ammunitions 
and other Necessaryes in that part of Great Britain called Scotland the respective 
Lieutenants and Deputies or any Three or more of them shall have power to lay fitting 
Rates upon the respective Counties and places not exceeding in the whole in any one 
Year the fourth part of one Months Cess according to the proportions contained in an 
Act passed this Session of parliament Entitled An Act for granting an Aid to her 
Majesty to be raised by a Land Tax in Great Britain for the Service of the Year one 
thousand Seven hundred and Eight which Monyes are to be assessed collected and 
paid by such persons and according to such directions as shall be given from Time to 
Time by the said respective Lieutenants and Deputies or any Three or more of them 
 last mentioned Act And it is hereby also Enacted that he said respective Lieutenants 
and Deputies or any Three or more of them shall from Time to Time have power to 
dispose of so much of the said fourth part to the Inferior Officers imployed in or 
about the said respective forces for their Pains and Encouragement as to them the said 
Lieutenants and Deputies or any Three or more of them shall seem expedient. 
APPENDIX NO.5: TABLE OF THE CONSTRUCTION AND NAME CHANGES OF 
FORTIFICATIONS. 
 
Fortifications in Inverness 
 
Citadel of Inverness 
– Built by Cromwell, located close to coast line by mouth of River Ness 
– Destroyed by Charles II 
– Repaired following 1689-90 Jacobite rebellions in Scotland and Ireland 
– Site rejected by General Wade, 1724, in favour of Inverness Castle’s location 
– Still in use as barracks, 1745-6 
 
Inverness Castle  
– Medieval castle, located on south bank of River Ness within the town 
– Repaired following 1689-90 Jacobite rebellions in Scotland and Ireland 
– Barrack blocks added in 1716 
– Site re-used for fort built under General Wade, 1727-1745 
– Named Fort George in 1727 
– Fell after two day siege, 21st February 1746 
– Site rejected by General Skinner, 1747, as unsound 
 
Fort George at Ardersier  
– Located outside Inverness on spit of land over-looking Moray Firth at Ardersier 
– Site chosen by General Skinner, who also designed the fort 
– Built 1747-69 
 
 
Fortifications in the town of Fort William 
 
Inverlochy Castle  
– Located further inland than the citadel, on River Lochy 
– Originally thirteenth century ancestral seat of Cromyn family 
– Used as temporary outpost to Fort William; earth ramparts built up on outer wall 
c.1690 and wooden barracks extant c.1711 
 
Citadel of Inverlochy  
– Located at head of Loch Linnhe 
– Built on orders of Cromwell, 1658 
– Destroyed on orders of Charles II 
– Repaired following 1689-90 Jacobite rebellions in Scotland and Ireland 
 
 Fort William 
– Site of citadel re-used for fort built under General Mackay, 1690 
– Named Fort William 
– Besieged March-April 1746 but did not fall 
 
 APPENDIX NO.6:  PHOTOGRAPH OF THE GRAVESTONE OF NELY BR[AY]ON, IN 
CRAIGS CEMETERY, FORT WILLIAM. 
 
	  	  
